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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability company,
Plaintiff/ Appellant/ Cross-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Docket No.

44612

)

LP BROADBAND, INC., a Colorado
corporation, successor by merger to MicroServ,
Inc., an Idaho corporation,
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

_________________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

**************
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

*** ** ******* * *
Appeal from the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District of the State ofldaho,
in and for the County of Bonneville
HONORABLE DANE H. WATKINS, JR, District Judge.

** ** ** ** ** ****
Mark R. Fuller
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls ID 83405
Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Respondent

Ronald L Swafford
655 S Woodruff
Idaho Falls ID 8340 l
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Appellant
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Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs. LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp., sucessor, General Mills, Inc., General
Mills Operations, LLC
Date

Code

User

7/2 0/2015

SMIS

CEARLY

Summons Issued

Dane H Watkins Jr

NCOC

CEARLY

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOAP

CEARLY

Plaintiff: Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho
Notice Of Appearance Mark R. Fuller

Dane H Watkins Jr

CEARLY

Filing : AA- All initial civil case filings in District
Dane H Watkins Jr
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and
H(1 ) Paid by: Fuller, Mark R. (attorney for
Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho) Receipt
number: 0031203 Dated : 7/21/20 15 Amount:
$221.00 (Check) For: Lincoln Land Company,
LLC an Idaho (plain tiff)

COMP

CEARLY

Complaint Filed

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOAP

BIRCH

Defendant: LP Broadband , Inc. , a Colorado
Corp., sucessor Notice Of Appearance Ronald L
Swafford

Dane H Watkins Jr

BIRCH

Dane H Watkins Jr
Fili ng: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Swafford
Law Receipt number: 0035243 Dated : 8/17/2015
Amount: $136 .00 (Check) For: LP Broadband ,
Inc., a Colorado Corp., sucessor (defendant)

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Schedu ling Conference
11 /12/2015 08 :30 AM)

Dane H Watkins Jr

CARTER

Notice of Hearing

Dane H Watkins Jr

8/14/2015

9/14/2015

HRSC

Judge

ANSW

CEARLY

Answer - LP Broadband Inc.

Dane H Watkins Jr

9/15/2015

NTOS

SHOPE

Notice Of Service Defendant's Answers To
Plaintiff s First Request For Admission

Dane H Watkins Jr

9/23/2015

NTOS

SHOPE

Notice Of Service Plaintiff Served A True And
Correct Copy Of The Defendant's Answers To
Plaintiff s First Request For Discovery

Dane H Watkins Jr

11 /10/2 015

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/16/2015 09:00
AM) P - Mtn Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

11/12/2015

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference
Hearing date: 11/12/2015
Time: 8:42 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk : Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho ,
Attorney: Mark Fuller
Party: LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp.,
sucessor, Attorney: Ronald Swafford

Dane H Watkins Jr
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Date

Code

User

Judge

11/12/2015

DCHH

CART ER

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference
scheduled on 11/12/2015 08:30 AM : District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for th is hearing
estimated :

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
04/06/2016 08:30 AM)

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Trial 05/ 10/2016 10:00 AM ) Dane H Watkins Jr
3 day Court Trial

ORDR

CARTER

Order Setting Trial and Pretrial Conference

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

BHOPE

Notice Of Hearing Re: Sublease/Rental
Agreements 12/16/2015 @9:00 AM

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

SHOPE

Motion For Partial Summary Judg ment RE:
Sublease/Rental Agreements

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

SHOPE

Affidavit Of Doyle H. Beck

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

SHOPE

Affidavit Of Mark R Fuller

Dane H Watkin s Jr

SHOPE

Brief In Support Of Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment Re : Sublease/Rental Agreements

Dane H Watkins Jr

11 /17/2015

NTOS

DOOLITTL

Notice Of Service {D efendant's Supplemental
Answers to Plaintiffs 1st Request for Discovery}

Dane H Watkins Jr

11 /30/2015

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/10/2015 09 :00
AM) D - Mtn to Continue and Protective Order

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Motion To Shorten Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Motion To Continue Hearing On
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Motion For Protective Order

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Motion For Amendment Of Pleadings Dane H Watkins Jr
And Third-Party Complaint

NOTH

HUMPHREY

Notice Of Hearing - 12/10/20 15 @ 9:00Am RE :
Defendant's Motion To Shorten Time , Motion To
Continue Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment, Motion For Amendment Of Pleadings
And Third-Party Complaint And Motion For
Protective Order

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Objection To Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

HUMPHREY

Affidavit Of Adam Gillings In Support Of Objection Dane H Watkin s Jr
To Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

MOT N

JNICHOLS

Plaintiffs Motion To Shorten Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

JNICHOLS

Plaintiffs Motion To Compel

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

JNICHOLS

Plaintiffs Brief In Opposition To Defendant's
Motion For Protective Order And In Support OF
Plaintiffs Motion To Compel

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

JNICHOLS

Affidavit Of Mark Fuller

Dane H Watkins Jr

12/2/2015

12/3/2015
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Date

Code

User

12/3/2015

NOTH

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion To Shorten Time
And Motion To Compel 12/10/2015 9:00AM

12/7/2015

BRIF

HUMPHREY

Plaintiffs Brief Filed In Opposition To Motion To Dane H Watkins Jr
Continue Hearing On Motion For Partial Summary
Judgment

12/9/2015

BRIF

CARTER

Plaintiff Brief In Response to Motions To Amend
Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint and To File
Defendant's Third-Party Complaint

Dane H Watkins Jr

RESP

JNICHO LS

Defendant's Response To Plaintiffs Opposition
To Motion To Continue Hearing On Motion For
Partial Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

JN ICHOLS

Second Affidavit Of Adam Gillings

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

HU MPHREY

Plaintiffs Reply Brief Filed In Support Of Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment RE:
Sublease/Rental Agreements

Dane H Watkins Jr

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type : Motion
Hearing date: 12/10/2015
Time: 9:05 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho,
Attorney: Mark Fuller
Party: LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp.,
sucessor, Attorney: Ronald Swafford

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRVC

CARTER

Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
12/16/2015 09:00 AM : Hearing Vacated P- Mtn
Summary Judgment

DCHH

CARTER

Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
12/1 0/201 5 09:00 AM : District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: D - Mtn to Continue and Protective
Order

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/03/2016 09:00
AM) P - Mtn for summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

COMP

HUMPHREY

Third-Party Complaint Filed

Dane H Watkins Jr

SMIS

HUMPHREY

(2) Summons Issued

Dane H Watkins Jr

ANSW

HUMPHREY

Amended Answer - LP Broadband , Inc

Dane H Watkins Jr

HUMPHREY

Filing : K3 - Third party complaint - This fee is in
Dane H Watkins Jr
add ition to any fee filed as a plaintiff initiating the
case or as a defendant appearing in the case.
Paid by: Swafford Law Receipt number: 0053368
Dated: 12/17/2015 Amount: $14.00 (Check) For:
LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp., sucessor
(defendant)

12/10/2015

12/11/2015

12/16/2015

Judge
Dane H Watkins Jr
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Date

Code

User

12/ 17/2015

NOTH

JN ICHOLS

Notice Of Hearing RE : Plaintiff's Motion For
Partial Sumary Judgment RE: Sublease/Rental
Agreements 02/03/2016 9:00AM

BAS INGER

Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Tape Fee Paid by: Dane H Watkins Jr
Swafford Receipt number: 0053679 Dated:
12/18/2015 Amount: $10.00 (Check)

12/18/2015

Judge
Dane H Watkins Jr

12/21/2015

TRAN

CARTER

Excerpt From Motion for
Transcript Filed
Protective Order (Judge's Ru ling) December
10, 2015

12/22/201 5

ORDR

CARTER

Order Continuing Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Dane H Watkins Jr
Partial Summary Judgment

ORDR

CARTER

Order Granting Defendant's Motion to File
Amended Answer and Third-Party Complaint

Dane H Watkins Jr

ACKN

JN ICHOLS

Acknowledgement Of Service- Benjamin W .
Hulse 12/21/2015

Dane H Watkin s Jr

NTOS

JN ICHOLS

Notice Of Service Defendant's First Set Of
Interrogatories, Requests For Production And
Requests for Admission 12/31/2015

Dane H Watkins Jr

1/5/2016

ORDR

CARTER

Order On Motion for Protective Order and Motion Dane H Watkins Jr
to Compel

1ii2/2016

NOTC

TCORONA

Notice Of Disclosure Of Expert Witnesses

Dane H Watkins Jr

CCLEMENTS

Filing : 11 - In itial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Givens
Pursley Receipt number: 0002262 Dated :
1/15/2016 Amount: $136 .00 (Credit card) For:
General Mills Operations, LLC (defendant) and
General Mills, Inc. (defendant)

Dane H Watkins Jr

CCLEMENTS

Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Givens
Pursley Receipt number: 0002262 Dated :
1/15/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) For:
General Mills Operations, LLC (defendant) and
General Mills, Inc. (defendant)

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

CCLEMENTS

Third-Party Defendants Motion for Additional
Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

CCLEMENTS

Th ird-Party Defendants Motion to Shorten Time
RE: Motion for Add itional Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

CCLEMENTS

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional
Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

CCLEMENTS

Affidavit of Alexander P McLaughlin in Support of Dane H Watkins Jr
Motion for Additional Time

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Schedu led (Motion 01/20/2016 08 :30
AM ) Mtn for Additional Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOAP

CARTER

Defendant: General Mills, Inc. Notice Of
Appearance Alexander P McLaugh lin

Dane H Watk ins Jr

NOAP

CARTER

Defendant: General Mills Operations, LLC Notice Dane H Watkins Jr
Of Appea rance Alexander P McLaughlin

MOTN

CARTER

Motion To Appear Telephonically

1/4/2016

1/1 5/2016

Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr

5

Date: 1/13/2017

Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County

Time: 01 :30 PM

ROA Report

Page 5 of 13

User: ABIRCH

Case: CV-2015-0003927-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr
Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs . LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp., sucessor, etal.

Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs. LP Broadband , Inc. , a Colorado Corp. , sucessor, General Mills, Inc., General
Mi lls Operations, LLC
Date

Code

User

Judge

1/15/2016

MOTN

CCLEMENTS

Th ird

Dane H Watkins Jr

1/19/2016

ORDR

TCORONA

Order Granting Motion to Appear Telephonically

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

CARTER

Brief In Opposition to Motion FOr Additional Time Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

CARTER

Plaintiff - Motion For Award of Expenses on
Motion to compel

AFFD

CARTER

Affidavit Of Mark R. Fuller in Support of Motion for Dane H Watkins Jr
Award of Expenses on Motion to Compel

MOTN

CARTER

Plaintiff - Motion To Strike Demand for Jury Trial

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

CARTER

Notice Of Hearing

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

TCORONA

Dane H Watkins Jr
Notice Of Hearing Re : Motion To Shorten Time
re : Motion for Additional Time 01/20/16 @ 8:30

02/03/2016 9:00am

Dane H Watkins Jr

AM

1/20/2016

1/21/2016

1/27/2016

ANSW

HUMPHREY

Answer And Defenses By Third-Party Defendants Dane H Watkins Jr
General Mills, Inc. And Genera l Mills Operations,
LLC

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 1/20/2016
Time: 8:37 am
Courtroom :
Court reporter :
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: General Mills Operations, LLC , Attorney:
Alexander McLaughlin
Party: General Mills, Inc., Attorney: Alexander
McLaughlin
Party: Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho,
Attorney: Mark Fuller
Party: LP Broadband, Inc., a Colorado Corp.,
sucessor, Attorney: Ronald Swafford

HRVC

CARTER

Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 05/10/2016 Dane H Watkins Jr
10:00 AM : Hearing Vacated 3 day Court Trial

HRVC

CARTER

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 04/06/2016 08:30 AM : Hearing Vacated

Dane H Watki ns Jr

CARTER

*** FILE 2 CREATED ***

Dane H Watkins Jr

DCHH

CARTER

Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
01/20/2016 08 :30 AM : District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: Mtn for Additional Time

ORDR

CARTER

Order Granting Motion for Additional Time

BASINGER

Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Tape Fee Paid by: Dane H Watkins Jr
Swafford Receipt number: 0002888 Dated :
1/21/2016 Amount: $10 .00 (Check)

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Service Plaintiff's First Request For
Discovery

NTOS

Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr

Dane H Watkins Jr
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Date
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1/27/20 16

MOTN

JNICHOLS

Plaintiffs Motion For Enfocement Of Order To
Compel And For Sanctions

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

JNICHOLS

Affidavit Of Mark R. Fuller In Support of Motion
To Enforce Order To Compel And For Sanctions

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

JNICHOLS

Plalintiffs Motion To Shorten Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiffs Motion To
Shorten Time 02/03/2016 9:00AM

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTC

TCORONA

Notice Of Non-Opposition To Motion To Strike
Demand For Jury Trial

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Motion To Reconsider, Motion For
Dane H Watkin s Jr
Relief From Order, Motion To Amend And Motion
For Protective Order

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Objection To Motion For Award Of
Dane H Watkin s Jr
Expenses On Motion To Compel And Motion For
Enforcement Of Order To Compel And For
Sanctions

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Defendant's Motion To Shorten Time

Dane H Watkin s Jr

MOTN

CARTER

Motion To Appear Telephonically

Dane H Watkins Jr

NTOS

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Service Plaintiffs Responses To
Defenda nt's First Request For Discover/
02/01/2016

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

JNICHO LS

Plaintiffs Reply Brief In Support of Motion For
Enforcement oF Order To Compel And Motion
For Sanctions

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

JNICHO LS

Plaintiffs Brief In Opposition To Motion TO
Reco nsider, Motion For Relief From Order,
Motion To Amend And Motion For Protective
Order

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

JNICHOLS

Affidavit Of Mark R. Fuller In Opposition To
Motion To Recons ider, Motion For Relief From
Order, Motion To Amend And Motion For
Protective Order

Dane H Watkins Jr

RESP

JNICHOLS

Reply On Motion To Reconsider, Motion For
Dane H Watkins Jr
Re lief From Order, Moti on To Amend And Motion
For Protective Order

MOTN

TCORONA

Third-Party Motion To Appear Tel ephon ically

2/1/2016

2/2/2016

Judge

Dane H Watkins Jr
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2/3/2016

MINE

KER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 2/3/2016
Time: 9:01 am
Courtroom : 5
Court reporte r: Amy Bland
Minutes Clerk: Janie Ker
Tape Number: FTR
Party: General Mills Operations , LLC , Attorney:
Alexander McLaughlin
Party: General Mills, Inc ., Attorney: Alexander
McLaughlin
Party: Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho,
Attorney: Mark Fu ller
Party: LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp.,
sucessor, Attorney: Ronald Swafford

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

KER

Order Granting Motion to Appear Telephonically

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

KER

Protective Order

Dane H Watkins Jr

DCHH

KER

Hearing result for Motion schedu led on
Dane H Watkins Jr
02/03/2016 09 :00 AM : District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : under 200 pages

HRSC

KER

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference
09/21/20 16 09 :30 AM)

HRSC

KER

Hearing Scheduled (Trial 10/11/2016 01 :00 PM) Dane H Watkins Jr

2/4/2016

ORDR

CARTER

Order Setting Tria l and PreTrial Conference

Dane H Watkins Jr

2/12/2016

ORDR

CARTER

Order On Pending Motions

Dane H Watkins Jr

2/24/2016

MOTN

JN ICHOLS

Amended Motion For Award Of Expenses On
Motion To Compel And On Motion For
Enforcement Of Order To Compel And For
Sanctions

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

JNICHOLS

Affidavit Of Mark. R. Fuller in Support oF
Amended Motion For Award Of Expenses On
Motion To Compel

Dane H Watkins Jr

NTOS

JNICHO LS

Notice Of SeNice Plaintiffs Second Request For Dane H Watkins Jr
Discovery To LP Broadband , INC.

3/2/20 16

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/13/2016 08 :30
AM ) P - Mtn Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

3/4/2016

MOTN

HUMPHREY

Plaintiff's Motion For Patrial Summary Judgment
RE: Unj ust Enrichment Claim And Burden Of
Proof

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

HUMPHREY

Brief Filed In Support Of Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment RE : Unjust Enrichmen t
Claim And Burdens Of Proof

Dane H Watkins Jr

Judge

Dane H Watkins Jr
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3/4/2016

NOTH

HUMPHREY

Notice Of Hearing - 04/13/2016@ 8:30AM RE :
Plaintiffs Motion For Pa rtial Summary Judgment
RE: Unjust Enrichment Claim And Burden Of
Proof

Dane H Watkins Jr

3/8/2016

NTOS

TCORONA

Notice Of Service Of General Mills, Inc. and
General Mills Operations, LLC's Responses To
Plaintiffs First Request For Discovery

Dane H Watkins Jr

3/16/2016

MOTN

PADILLA

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

PADILLA

Defendant's Affidavit of Counsel In Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

PADILLA

Defendant's Memorandum In Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

PADILLA

Notice of Hearing April 13, 2016 @8:30 a.m.

Dane H Watkins Jr

3/22/2016

NOTC
NOTC

TCORONA

Notice Of 30 (b) (6) Deposition Duces Tecum-LP Dane H Watkins Jr
Broadbrand , Inc.

3/29/2016

NTOS

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Service Of General Mills, INC.'s And
General Mills Operation , LLC's Amended
Supplemental Responses To Plaintiffs First
Request For Discovery

Dane H Watkins Jr

3/30/2016

MEMO

TCORONA

Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion
For Partial Summary Judgment Re: Unjust
Enrichment Claim And Burdens Of Proof

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

TCORONA

General Mills, lnc.'s and General Mills
Dane H Watkins Jr
Operations , LLC's Memorandum In Opposition To
LP Broadband , lnc.'s Motion For Summary
Judgment

TCORONA

Declaration Of Alexander P. Mclaughlin

Dane H Watkins Jr

TCORONA

Declaration Of Colleen Benson

Dane

NOTC

CPETERSON

Amended Notice of 30(b) (6) Deposiiton Duces
Tecum - LP Broadband INC.

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

CPETERSON

Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

CPETERSON

Affidavit of Doyle H Beck in Support of Second
Motion for Enforcement and in Opposition to LP
Broadband's Motion for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

CPETERSON

Affidavit of Jim Rooney in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

CPETERSO N

Affidavit of Pau l L. Fuller in Support of Plaintiffs
Dane H Watkins Jr
Motion for Summary Judgment and In Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

CPETERSON

Defendant's Objection to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

JNICHOLS

Plaintiff's Brief In Reply To LP Broadband's And
General mi ll s' Opposition To Motion For Partial
summary Judgment RE: Unjust Enrichment
Claim And Bu rdens Of Proof

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/6/2016

BRIF

Judge

HWatkins Jr
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4/6/2016

MEMO

JNICHOLS

Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support Of
Motion For Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/11/2016

MOTN

CARTER

Third-Party Defendant - Motion to Appear
Telphonically

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

CARTER

Order Granting Motion to Appear Telphonically

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/13/2016

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type : Motion
Hearing date: 4/13/2016
Time: 8:31 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: General Mills Operations, LLC, Attorney:
Alexander McLaughlin
Party: General Mills , Inc., Attorney : Alexander
McLaughlin
Party: Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho ,
Attorney : Mark Fuller
Party: LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp.,
sucessor, Attorney : Ronald Swafford

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/14/2016

DCHH

CARTER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Dane H Watkins Jr
04/13/2016 08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hell
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : P - Mtn Summary Judgment

4/1 8/2016

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/12/2016 08:30
AM) P - Mtn to Compel & Mtn to Enforce

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

TCORONA

Second Motion For Enforcement Of Order To
Compel And For Sanctions And Second Motion
To Compel

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

TCORONA

Affidavit Of Mark R. Fuller In Support Of Second
Motion To Compel And Second Motion For
Enforcement Of Order To Compel

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTC

TCORONA

Notice Of Filing Of Additional Citations

Dane H Watk ins Jr

BRIF

TCORONA

Brief In Support Of Plaintiffs Second Motion To
Compel Filed

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

TCORONA

Brief In Support Of Second Motion For
Enforcement Of Order To Compel Entered
January 5, 2016 And For Sanctions Filed

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

TCORONA

Notice Of Hearing 05/ 12/1 6 @8:30 AM
Dane H Watkins Jr
Plaintiffs Second Motion For Enforcement Of
Order To Compel And For Sanctions And Motion
To Compel

4/19/2016

NOTC

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Joinder In 30(b)(6 ) Deposition Duces
Tecum Of LP Broadband , INC .

Dane H Watkins Jr

4/29/2016

NTOS

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Service Of Third-Party Defendants'
First Set Of Interrogatories To Plaintiff

Dane H Watkins Jr

Judge
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Time: 01 :30 PM
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User: ABIRCH

Case: CV-2015-0003927-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr

Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs. LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp., sucessor, etal.

Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs. LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp., sucessor, General Mills, Inc., General
Mills Operations, LLC
Date

Code

User

4/29/2016

NTOS

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Service Of Third-Party Defendants'
First Set of Requests For Production Of
Documents To Plaintiff

Dane H Watkins Jr

NTOS

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Service Of Third -Party Defendants'
First Set Of Interrogatories To DefendanUThird
Party Plaintiff

Dane H Watkins Jr

NTOS

JNICHOLS

Notice Of Service OF Th ird Party Defendants'
First Set Of Requests For Production Of
Documents To DefendanU Third Party Plaintiff

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/ 19/2016 10:00
AM) P - Mtn to Compel & Mtn to Enforce

Dane H Watkins Jr

CONT

CARTER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
05/1 2/2016 08 :30 AM : Continued P - Mtn to
Compel & Mtn to Enforce

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

TCORONA

Motion To Appear Telephonically

Dane H Watkins Jr

BRIF

CPETERSON

Plaintiffs Amended Brief in Support of Plaintiffs
Second Motion to Compel and Request for
Attorney Fees and Costs for Failure to Attend
Deposition

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

CPETERSON

Second Affidavit of Mark R. Fu ller in Support of
Amended Second Motion to Compe!

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

CPETERSON

Plaintiffs Amended Second Motion to Compel

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

CPETERSON

Amended Notice Of Hearing 05/19/2016 @ 10:00 Dane H Watkins Jr
Am RE : Plaintiffs Second Motion for Enforcement
of Order to Compel and for Sanctions and
Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Compel

MOTN

CARTER

Motion For Pro Hae Vice Admission - Benjamin
Hulse

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

CARTER

Motion For Pro Hae Vice Admission - Steven
Ellison

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

CARTER

Order Granting Motion for Pro Hae Vic Admission Dane H Watkins Jr
- Steven Ellison

LODG

JNICHO LS

Letter Lodged- T& T Reporting

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

CARTER

Order Granting Motion to Appear Telphonically

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

CARTER

Order Grant Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission - Dane H Watkins Jr
Benjamin Hulse

TC ORONA

DELETE

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/16/2016 08 :15
AM) Motion to Continue
Telephonic

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

CARTER

Defendan t - Motion To Shorten Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

CARTER

Defendant - Motion To Contin ue Hearing

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

CARTER

Order on Motion to SHorten Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

CARTER

AMended Order On Motion to Shorten Time

Dane H Watkins Jr

5/4/2016

5/5/20 16

5/9/2016

5/10/2016

5/1 1/2016

Judge
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Case: CV-2015-0003927-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr

Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs. LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp. , sucessor, etal.
Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs. LP Broadband , Inc. , a Colorado Corp., sucessor, General Mills, Inc., General
Mills Operations, LLC
Date

Code

5/16/2016

5/18/2016

Judge

JNICHOLS

Defendant's Objection To Second Motion For
Enforcement Of Order To Compel And For
Sanctions And Amended Second Motion To
Compel

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

KER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/18/2016 10:00
AM) P - Mtn to Compel & Mtn to Enforce
Alex - 208-388-1270

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

JNICHOLS

Amended Notice Of Hearing 05/18/2016
10:00AM RE : Plaintiffs Second Motion For
Enforcement Of Order To Compel And For
Sanctions And Plaintiffs Amended Second
Motion To Compel

Dane H Watkins Jr

MINE

KER

Minute Entry
Hearing type: Motion to Continue
Hearing date: 5/16/2016
Time: 8:17 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Janie KER
Tape Number:
Party: General Mills Operations, LLC , Attorney:
Alexander McLaughlin
Party: General Mills, Inc. , Attorney: Alexander
McLaughlin
Party: Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho,
Attorney: Mark Fuller
Party: LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp.,
sucessor, Attorney: Ronald Swafford

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

KER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/26/2016 10:30
AM) 3 Motions

Dane H Watkins Jr

CONT

KER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
05/19/2016 10:00 AM : Continued P - Mtn to
Compel & Mtn to Enforce
Alex - 208-388-1270

Dane H Watkins Jr

CONT

KER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
05/18/2016 10:00 AM: Continued P - Mtn to
Compel & Mtn to Enforce
Alex - 208-388-1270

Dane H Watkins Jr

DCHH

KER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Dane H Watkins Jr
05/16/2016 08: 15 AM : District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : Under 100
Telephonic

STIP

KER

Stipulation to Continue 30(b)(6) Deposition Duces Dane H Watkins Jr
Tecum - LP Broadband , Inc.

ORDR

KER

Order to Continue 30(b)(6) Deposition Duces
Tecum - LP Broadband , Inc.

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

KER

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions
for Summary Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

5/12/2016

5/13/2016

User
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Case : CV-2015-0003927-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr

Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs. LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp., sucessor, etaL
Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs. LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp. , sucessor, General Mills, Inc., General
Mills Operations, LLC
Date

Code

User

5/18/20 16

CD IS

KER

Civil Disposition entered for: General Mills
Operations, LLC, Defendant; General Mills, Inc.,
Defendant; LP Broadband, Inc., a Colorado
Corp., sucessor, Defendant; Lincoln Land
Company, LLC an Idaho, Plaintiff. Filing date:
5/18/2016

Dane H Watkins Jr

STATUS

KER

Case Status Changed : Closed

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRVC

KER

Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 10/11/2016 Dane H Watkins Jr
01 :00 PM : Hearing Vacated

HRVC

KER

Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled
on 09/21/2016 09:30 AM : Hearing Vacated

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRVC

KER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
05/26/2016 10:30 AM : Hearing Vacated 3
Motions P - Mtn to Compel & Mtn to Enforce
Alex - 208-388-1270

Dane H Watkins Jr

8/12/2016

STIP

JNICHOLS

Stipulation For Dismissal Of LP Broadband ,
INC. 's Claims

Dane H Watkins Jr

8/19/20 16

ORDR

CARTER

Order Of Dismissal

Dane H Watkins Jr

JOMT

CARTER

Judgment

Dane H Watkins Jr

HRSC

CARTER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/21/2016 09:30
AM) LP Broadband Mtn for Attorneys Fees

Dane H Watkins Jr

STATUS

CARTER

Case Status Changed : Closed pending clerk
action

Dane H Watkins Jr

MOTN

CPETERSON

Defendant's (LP Broadband ) Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

MEMO

CPETERSON

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

CPETERSON

Affidavit of Larren K. Covert in Support of Motion
for Attorney Fees and Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

AFFD

CPETERSON

Affidavit of Ronald L. Swafford in Support of
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

NOTH

CPETERSON

Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees
and Costs 09/21/2016@ 9:30 AM

Dane H Watkins Jr

BJENNINGS

Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

5/25/2016

9/2/2016

9/16/2016

Judge

9/19/20 16

AFFD

JNICHOLS

Supplemental Affidavit OF Ronald L. Swafford In
Support of Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

9/20/20 16

MOTN

CARTER

Motion To Appear Telephonically

Dane H Watkins Jr

ORDR

CARTER

Order Granting Motion to Appear Telephonically

Dane H Watkins Jr
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Case: CV-2015-0003927-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr

Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs . LP Broadband, Inc., a Colorado Corp. , sucessor, etal.

Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho vs . LP Broadband, Inc., a Colorado Corp. , sucessor, General Mi lls, Inc., General
Mills Operations, LLC
Date

Code

User

9/21/2 016

MINE

CARTER

Minute Entry
Hearing type : Motion
Hea ring date: 9/21/2016
Time: 9:26 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter
Tape Number:
Party: Genera l Mills Operations, LLC , Attorney:
Alexander McLaughlin
Party: Genera l Mills, Inc., Attorney: Alexander
McLaughlin
Party: Lincoln Land Company, LLC an Idaho,
Attorney: Mark Fuller
Party: LP Broadband, Inc., a Colorado Corp.,
sucessor, Attorney: Rona ld Swafford

DCHH

CARTER

Dane H Watkins Jr
Hearing resu lt for Motion scheduled on
09/2 1/2016 09: 30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Amy Bland
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated : LP Broadband Mtn for Attorneys Fees

TCORONA

Filing: L4 - Appeal , Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Dane H Watkins Jr
Paid by: Fuller ~v1ark R.
(attorney for Lincoln Land Company, LLC an
Idaho) Receipt number: 0041697 Dated :
9/28/2016 Amount: $129 .00 (Check) For: Lincoln
Land Company, LLC an Idaho {plaintiff)

9/28/2016

Judge

Supreme Court

Dane H Watkins Jr

1

NOTC

TCORONA

Notice Of Appeal

Dane H Watkins Jr

APSC

TCORONA

Appea led To The Supreme Court

Dane H Watkins Jr

9/2 9/2 0 16

BNDC

AB IRCH

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 41724 Dated
9/29/2016 for 100.00)

Dane H Watkins Jr

10/5/2016

MEMO

CEARLY

Memorandum Decision And Order RE: Motion
For Attorney Fees And Costs

Dane H Watkins Jr

CPETERSON

LP Broadband's Designation of Record on Appeal Dane H Watkins Jr

10/12/2016
11/4/2016

BNDC

AB IRCH

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 47058 Dated
11/4/2016 for 100.00)

Dane H Watkins Jr

11/7/2016

APSC

ABIRCH

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Dane H Watkins Jr

CERTAP

AB IRCH

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal

Dane H Watk ins Jr

BJENNINGS

Filing : L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Dane H Watkins Jr
Su preme Court Paid by: Swafford, Ronald L
(attorney for LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado
Corp. , sucessor) Rece ipt number: 0048518
Dated : 11/15/2016 Amount: $129.00 (Check)
For: LP Broadband , Inc., a Colorado Corp. ,
sucessor (defendant)

BJENNINGS

LP Broadband's Notice of Appeal/Cross-Appeal

11/14/2 016

NOTC

Dane H Watkins Jr
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MARK R. FULLER ( I SB No. 2 698)
DAN I EL R. BECK ( I SB No . 7237)
FULLER & BE CK LAW OFF ICE , PLLC
4 1 0 MEMORI AL DRIVE , SUI TE 201
P.O. Box 5 O935
IDAHO FALLS, I D 83405-093 5
TELEPHONE :
(208) 524-5400 _
FACSIMILE : (208) 524-7167

15 JUL 20 AM 10: 24

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINT IFF

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No . CV- 1 5-

LI NC OLN LAND COMPANY , LL C, an
Idaho
l imited
l iability
company ,

2A~1

Pla i nt i ff ,

COMPLAINT
v.
LP BROADBAND ,

I NC. , a Colorado
corporation ,
s u ccessor
by
me r ger to MicroServ , Inc . , an
Idaho corpo r at i on ,
Defendant .

COMES NOW t he Pl ain t iff ,

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY ,

LLC ,

an Idaho

l i mit ed l i ability company by and through its attorney of record ,
Mark R.

Fuller of Ful l er

aga i nst

the

Defendant ,

&

LP

Beck Law Offices ,
Broadba n d ,

Inc. ,

PLLC and complains

for

a

money

judgment

against the Defendant .
1. The

Pla i n tiff ,

l i mi ted
b u siness

Li ncoln

liab il ity
in

Land

company ,

Bonneville

Company ,
wi t h

County ,

its

I daho ,

LLC ,

is

an

principa l

Idaho

p l ace

(herea f ter

of

"Linco ln

COMPLAINT - l
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Land " ) .
2 . That the Defendant LP Broadband,

Inc .

( hereafter "LP")

is a

Col orado co rporation au t horized to conduct business in Idaho
from

May

successor
Id aho

in

2013

un til

i n t eres t

by

corporation

County ,
3,

23 ,

I daho.

2013

is

wh i ch

July

17 ,

merg er
was

2014 ,

with

doi ng

MicroServ ,

b u siness

A copy of the Statemen t

attache d

as

Exh i bit

wh ich

in

In c . ,

the
an

Bonnevil l e

of Mer ge r

' A'.

is

f i led May

MicroServ ,

for me r ly known as Mi crose rv Computer Techno l ogies ,

I nc .

was

In c.

and

as Diversi f ied Ne t working , I nc .
3 . Th at Li ncoln La nd is the owner o f
in the town of Li n co ln ,

certain p ro p e rty loca t ed

Ida h o , more spec if ica l l y ident if ied

on Exhib it "B" a t tached hereto , which was l eased to General
Mi l ls Ope ra ti o ns,

I n c .,

specifica l ly

prohib i ted

p r operty

any

or

part

on or about
Genera l
the reof

June ,

Mills

2010 .

f rom

without

Such l ease

sub lett ing

th e

prior

the

written

con sen t of Lin co l n Land in e ach and eve r y case .
4. Pr ior

to

e xec u tion

thro ug h

MicroServ,

antennae

equipment

of

t he

June

instal l ed
on

the

l ocated on t he proper t y,

20 1 0

Lease Agreeme n t ,

and

mai ntained

roof top

of

the

Mil ls,

was

a

e le vators

beginn ing approximately March 20 ,

t o a Roof-Top Rental Agreement ,
then

int ernet

grain

2000 p urs uan t
which

LP ,

tenant

on

the

with General

subject

p rope rt y ,

COMPLAINT - 2
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which Agreement exp i red on or before March 20 , 2008 . A copy
of such re n t a l
the

expir a tion of

2008 ,
in

agreemen t

is attached as Ex h i b i t

the Roof - Top Re ntal Agreeme n t

' C'. After
in March ,

LP continued to occupy the roof - top of the property ,

violation

of

the

June ,

2010

Leas e

Agreemen t

between

Plaintiff and General Mills .
5 . Lincoln Land did not know of the locati on and maintenance of
th e

internet

an te n nae

on the

property u n t il

app roximately

J anuary , 20 15 .
6 . By reason o f its merger with MicroServ , Inc ., and Idaho Code
Section

30 - 18 - 206(1) (d)

in

approva l

of the merger , a l l

effect

on

May

3,

20 13 ,

upon

liabi l i ti es o f Mi c r o Serv b ecome

the liabilities of LP Br oadband , the survivi ng entity .
7 . That LP h as been unju st ly enriched a s a result of the use o f
Lincoln La nd ' s property by MicroServ and LP in the amount of
at l ea st $3 , 450 . 00 pe r month ,
in

rent

Mills ,

or

payments

which

sub j ect to credit for $1 , 800

MicroSe rv

or

LP

made

to

General

in such other amount as may be proven at trial ,

from J uly , 2010 until April 22 , 20 1 4 . The total amount owed
to Lincoln Land by LP for

MicroServ and LP ' s

use

of

the

pr ope r t y i s no less than $153 , 450 . 00 , or such amount as may
be p r oven a t trial .
8 . That LP ha s no t paid an y amount to Lincoln Land f o r the use
COMPLAINT - 3
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of

Lincoln Land ' s

property .

MicroServ and LP accepted the

benefit and appreciated the benefit
Land ' s

property ,

consent .

It

without

would

be

of the use

Lincoln

inequitab l e

benefit without paying Linco l n Land for
Linco l n Land has demanded payment

knowledge

Land ' s
for

of Lincoln

LP

to

or

re tain

such

such benefit .

That

for MicroServ and LP ' s use

of the p r operty.
9 . That

in

spite

continues

to

of

Lincoln

refuse ,

to

Land ' s

demands ,

pay Lincoln Land

LP

refused ,

for

LP ' s

and

use

of

Lincoln Land's property.
10 .

Lincoln

attorney ' s

Land
fees

has
that

the
it

r ight
incurs

accordance with IRCP 54(d)
121

and

Lincoln

12 - 123 .
Land

In

the

requests

to

and
event

in
(e) ,
this

attorney

r ecover
th is

the

action

costs
fro m LP

and
in

Ida ho Code Sections 12matter

fees

of

is

uncontested

$2 , 500 . 00

as

a

reasonable fee , plus costs .

PRAYER
WHERE FORE ,

Lincol n Land

respectful ly

requests

the

foll owing

re l ief :
1 . That
in

judgment be granted to Lincoln Land and against LP ,
the

principal

amount

of

$153 , 450 . 00 ,

after

giving

credit for all amounts which MicroServ and LP have paid to
General Mills for the occupancy of such property ,

or such

COMPLAINT - 4
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amo u nt as is proven at t ria l.
2 . Tha t

judgment

be

a tt or ney

fees

pursua n t

to

granted aga i ns t

and

Idaho

Ida h o Ru l es of Ci v i l

cou rt
Code

LP,

for

Linco l n

costs

i ncur r e d

in

Sections

12-121

a nd

t h is

Land ' s
ac t ion

12 - 12 3 ,

and

Pr ocedur e 54(d) and (e).

3 . That Li ncoln Land b e g r a n ted such o th er a nd further rel ie f
'

as may be just and equit a b le.
DATED t h i s

day of -

-+~1--7'----'

201 5.

FULL ER & BECK LAW OFFI CES , PLLC

Mar k R. Fu l ler
At to rney for Pl ainti ff

EXHIBIT "A" - Statement of Merger
EXHIBIT "B" - Legal Description
EXHIBIT "C" - Roof-Top Rental Agreement

COMPLAINT - 5
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FILED EFFECTIVE
STATE.MENT OF MERGER

lalJl'fAY -3 p 2= DO
MEcroServ, Inc.
the non-surviving Idaho corporation

SECA'ET/\.f,'y nr
STAT£ OF IDi

. -HtdE

into

LP Broadband, Inc.
the surviving Colorado corporation

May 1,2013
Article I-Surviving Company

Section 1
The name of the company surYiving the merger is LP Broadband, Inc., and such name
has not been changed as a result of the merger. The principal address of the surviving
cozporation is 400 Inverness Parkway, Suite 330, Englewood, Colorado 80112.

Section 2
The surviving company is a Colorado corporation existing pursuant to the provisions of
the Colorado Business Corporations Act incorporated on May 8, 2003.
The effective date of the merger described herein shall be the date upon which a
Statement of Merger is filed with the Colorado Secretary of State and the Idaho Secretary of
State.

Article Il - NonwSuniving Company

The name of the company merging into the survivor is MicroSe.r,,, Inc. MicroServ, Inc. is
an Idaho corporation which was incorporated May 16, 1997.

Article ill - Plan of Merger
The Plan of Merger, containing such information as required by Colorado Revised
Statutes § 7-90-203.3, and Idaho Code § 30-18-202, is set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto and
made a part hereof.

Article IV - Appro"al of Surviving Company
The Plan of Merger was duly authorized and approved by LP Broadband, Inc. in
accordance with Colorado Revised Statutes§ 7-111-103.

Article V-Approval of Non-Surviving Company
Il){IH(} SECR£TMY Of STATE
05/03/2013 05:00
CK: 13U45CJ CT: 17m9 BH: 13723'1
I I 38.88 "' 31.88 ST"T IIERfi: I 2

EX I8IT __
f}_
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11\e Plan of Merger ~'els di:ily zni·Ui:orized and 11pprove.d" by MicroServ, [nc;.. in ac~rdorico
wHti Idaho Code § 3o~18-201.
IN wtl'NESS WHERE.OF.-the. tmd¢ts.igned m:e:rg.io-g cnt.itie~ ~~te tbis S-tatcme11t 6f
Merger. and:ver.'i!y, sL1bject to.peiialties·of'perjury.that -th:e:state1nents·oonl'.iiinc:d herein .are true-as
of the date set fprth -above.

MlCROSER V, INC.

By:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___:__:__
Travis Johnson. Pi-esiacnt

·, Presh:fenl & CE.O

2
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Pl,AN OF MERGER
By and Among
LP BROADBAND. INC.

a Colorado eorporatlon,
Micr0Sen1, Inc.
an Idaho corporationt

and
T~e Shareholders of MicroServ, Inc.

1.
LP Broadband, ln~. is a Colorado corporation located at 400 Inverness Parkway, Suite
330. Englewood, Colorado 80112 ("LP Broadband"). MicroServ, Inc. is an Idaho corporation located at
1808 East 17th Street. Idaho Falls, ,daho 83404 ("MicroServ").
2.
MicroServ shall, : _pursuant to the provisions of the Colorado Corporations and
Associa:tions Act, the Colorado Bµsi11ess Corporations Act, and tho Jdaho Entity Transactions Act, be
merged with and inlo LP Broad~and, which shall be the surviving company upon the effective date
("Effective Date") of the merger (the "Surviving Company''), and which shall continue to exist as said
Surviving Company pursuant to t~e provisions of the Colorado Corporations and Associations Act, the
Colorado Business Corporations Act, and the Idaho Entity Transactions Act. TI1e separate existence of
MicroServ (the «Tenninating Company"), shalt ceaso upon said Effective Date in accoydance with the
Colorado Corporations end Asso4iations Act, the Colorado Business Corporations Act, and the Idaho
Entity Transactions Act, and the~eupon MicroServ and LP Broadband shall be a single corporation,
operating under the name, "LP Br~adband, Inc."

3.
The ArticJes of Incorporation and the Bylaws of LP Broadband., Inc. as in force and effect
upon the Effective Date of the merger shall be the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws of the
:
Surviving Company.
4.
The officers and directors of LP Broadband, Inc. in office upon the Effective Date of the
merger shall continue to be the officers at.Id directors of said Surviving Company until their successors
shall have been selected and qualified.

5.

'

On the Effective Date, by virtue of the merger and without any action on the part of any
holder thereof, all issued and outstanding shares of MicroServ ("Share/s") shall be exchanged for the right
to receive a percentage of the aggregate cash consideration as defined in the Agreement and Plan of
Merger (the "Merger Considerati6n"). The alloco.tion of the Merger Consideration shall be based upon
the percentage interest of Shares H~ld by each shareholder.

6.
The Plan of Merger llas been approved by the shareholders of the Surviving Company
and the shareholders of the Tcrininating Company in the manner prescribed by the provisfons of the
Colorado Corporations and Ass<*iations Act, !.he Colorado Business Corporations Act, and the Idaho
Entity Transactions Act, as applitable. The rcnninating Company and the Survivin~ Company hereby
stipulate that they will cause to( be executed and filed and/or recorded any document or documents
prescribed by the laws of the State of Colorado and I.he State of ldaho, and that they wiU' cause to be
perfonned a.II necessary acts ther~in and elsewhere to effectuate the merger.

24
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7.
The directors and the proper officers of ea.ch of the parties hereto are hereby authori~cd,
empowered, and directed to do any and nll acts and things, and to make, execute, deliver, file and/or
record any and all instruments papers, and documents which shall be or become necessary, proper, or
convenient to curry out or put into effect any of the provisions of the Plan of Merger or of the merger
herein provided for.

25
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Legal Description

The following real property in Bonneville County, Idaho:
Beginning at the South¼ comer of Section 10, Township 2 orth, Range 38 East of the
Boise Me1idian, Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N.89°52 1l 8"W. along the
Section line 47.20 feet; thence .01 °53'13 11 W. 965.42 feet; thence East 1293.~2.,tie!~•\J ~;;t,9:e
West bank of Sand Creek; thence S.32°29 140 11 W. along said West bank 487.Jd"fe.ef-"·fg:~pce
' ..
·~---·~-·.;..I..J{,(,
' • ,/!.'
S .260 l213511W. along said West bank 188.91 feet; thence S.14°28 137 11 W. along';saia -W,est
',-·)1 :~ .,,l~~'\_ii).:j'\t.
~
.
"\ :
bank 122.98 feet; thence S.02°53'54 11 W. along said West bank 267.63 feet to the outh line
.
..~1·!---i'j(,Jf\
: .· -;,
of said Section 10; thence N.89°52'18"W. along said Section line 825.10_(, ~Q9. the PQINT
;,_ l·.-~i--\~'
.
OF BEGINNING .
..,, ......',.''\.:i\,~li;
; .'~.r , ,
l-

:: ': -ti~;,:~~~

SUBJECT TO: existing easements of record.

I

,,

•

CONTAINING: 983,972 sq. ft. or 22.589 acres.
,I
.! '''.•

(>, ••

· ..... :..
: ,--:

9
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Roof-top Rental Agreement
3/20/2000
Microserv Computer Technologies, lnc. located at 1808 E. 17~h Street, Tdaho Falls, ID,
83404 hereby agrees to pay $50 per month to General 1tfi11s located at _ _ _ _ _ in
exchange for roof.top space on the "Evan's Grain.cry'' grain storage bins located at _ _· _
Lincoln Road in 'f daho Falls, Tdaho. General Mills also agrees to pay the electricity bill
for Mk roserv's i;qti-ipment (...,.$5 per month) local.Gd at same location. Microserv will
contract for any power requiremCiilts necessary to install their equipment as peT city, state
a.nd county electrical and safety codes.
:rvticroserv will not hold General Mills or any ofits employees liable for any damages,
liabilities or problems related to this installation or operation of any ofMicTOscrv's
equipment. AJI of the equipment and personnel associated. with this project will be
covered by Microserv's insurances.
T his contract :shall be valid for no less than 3 year s, and up to 5 years with annual
renewals after the first 3 years . Ir either party wishes to cancel this contr~ct, they mu.:;t
provide written notice of su.ch cance11ation at least 3 months prior to date of cancellation.

·es, Inc.

"it~
J
·----·--·
27
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SWAFFORD LAW P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq ., Bar No. 1657
R. James Archibald, Esq., Bar No. 4445
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
LaITen K. Covert, Esq., Bar o. 7217
655 South Woodruff Averiue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131

15 SEP 14 PH ~= 3S

Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH mDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMP ANY, LLC
Case No. CV-2015-3927

Plaintiff,
ANSWER

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES

OW, the Defendant LP Broadband, a Colorado Corporation and successor by

Merger to MicroServ, Inc., and Idaho Corporation by and through its attorney of record, Ronald
L. Swafford, Esq. and hereby answers the Complaint filed by Plaintiff as follows:

1.

Admit.

2.

Admit.

3.

Defendant is without information with which to admit or deny this allegation and

therefore denies such allegation at this time, reserving the right to amend this response after
completion of discovery.

ANSWER- I
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4.

Defendant admits that to the installation and maintenance of internet antenna

equipment on the rooftop of the grain elevators located on the property beginning March 20,
2000 pursuant to a Roof-Top Rental Agreement. Defendant denies the remainder of the
allegations contained in Paragraph 4.
5.

Deny.

6.

Defendant is without information w ith which to admit or deny this allegation and

therefore denies s uch allegation at thi s time, reserv ing the right to amend this response after
completion of discovery.
7.

Deny.

8.

Deny.

9.

Deny.

10.

Deny.

AFFIR1'viATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant specifically pleads the fo llowing affirmative defenses:

a.

Privity of Contract: There exists no privity of contract between the parties hereto.

There is no contractual relationship or duty owed by Defendant to P laintiff. Defendant occupied
the premises pursuant to a legally binding contract between Defendant and General Mills,
without knowledge of any prohibition against sublease or assignment.

b.

Statute of Limitations: Plainti ff is barred by the statute of limitations from

collecting a portion of the amount claimed. Pl ai ntiff seeks damages fro m July 10, 2010.
Plaintiff is barred from seeking damages for the period from July 10, 20 10 and thereafter for
periods beyond the Idaho Statute of Limitations on Unjust Enrichment claims.

AN SWER - 2
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c.

Lack of Standing: Plaintiff has no legal standing to pursue a cause of action

against Defendant herein. There is no legal relationship between the parti s for th creation of a
duty owed from Defendant to Plaintiff.
d.

Failure to State a Claim: Defendant submits that Plaintiff's complaint fai ls to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The duties and obligations complain d of relate
specifically to a contract between Plaintiff and General Mills. Defendant's occupied the
premises under a lease and rental agreement at all times prior to notification without knowledge
that any contract or agreement existed between Plaintiff and General Mi ll s, nor the contents
thereof. Plaintiff may not maintain an action against Defendant for unjust enrichment when
Defendant occupied the premises under lease/rental terms with a third party who physically
occupied the premises under pursuant to contractual agreements between Plaintiff and the third
party.
e.

Amendment of Pleadings: D fendant herein reserves the right to amend the

pleadings herein. Discovery has not been compl ted. Secondly, Defendant res rves the right to
add third party claims and third party defendants h reafter as appropriately di cov red and
determined during discovery.
f.

Attorney Fees: Defendant has and will incur attorney fees and costs in defending

this action and in any future actions agai nst any third party defendants. Defendant herein
requests a judgment be granted to Defendant and against the Plaintiff and any applicable Third
Party Defendants, for Defendant' s attorney fees and costs incuned in this action pursuant to
Idaho Code Sections §12-121 12-120 12-123 and Rule 54 (d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of
Ci il Procedure.

AN WER-3
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WHEREFORE Defendant respectfully requests the following relief be granted:
1.

That the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff be dismissed with prejudice, based upon

the answer, affirmative defenses and applicable law and facts.
2.

That Defendant be granted it's attorney fees and costs incurred herein, pursuant to

Idaho Code§ 12-120, 12-121 , 12-1 23 and Rule 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

That all other and further relief be granted the defendant as may be just an

equitable.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2015 .

R~~
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of September, 2015, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
J:land-delivered
[iJ"'Fax : 524-7167

D

!Fddlo~
RONALD L. SWAFFORD, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant

ANSWER-4
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(
MARK R. FULLER (ISB No . 2698)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES , PLLC .
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE , SUITE 201
P • o . Box 5 0 9 3 5
IDAHO FALLS , ID 83405 - 0935
TELEPHONE :
( 2 08 ) 52 4 - 5 4 0 0
FACSIMILE : (208) 524 -7 1 67
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
Idaho
limited
liability
company ,

Case No. CV- 15 - 3927

Plaintiff ,

v.

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK R . FULLER

LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Colorado
corporation ,
s uccessor
by
merger to MicroServ , Inc ., an
Idaho corporat i on ,
De fendant .
State of Idaho
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

MARK R. FULLER, being first duly sworn , deposes and states:

1. Affiant is an adult, is competent to testify and does so upon his personal
knowledge.
2. Affiant is the attorney for the Plaintiff in this matter and is licensed in the State of
Idaho to practice law.
3. Attached hereto as Exh ibit 'A' is a true and correct copy of Defendant's Responses
to Plaintiffs Requests for Discovery, specifically Requests for Adm ission Nos. 1-5
and 10.

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK R. FULLER - 32
1

(
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 'B' is a true and correct copy of an unsigned "Antenna
Space Lease Agreement", which allegedly subleased to MicroServ Computer
Technologies, Inc. , the rooftops on grain elevators located at 3075 E. Lincoln Road
in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 'C' is a true and correct copy of an unsigned "Tower
agreement", which allegedly subleased to MicroServ, Inc., the rooftops of the
'"Evan's Granery' located at 2910 E. Lincoln Road, Idaho Falls, ID."
6. Further this Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this

10

day of November, 2015.

Mark R. Fuller

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ill_ day of November, 2015.

N
w daho~

Residing at: \\ · ]..\· 'E:a'flfii)J\\ui., CJ).
My Commission Expires: n-1\.\-10
I

AMANDA SARGIS
NOTARYPUBLIC
STATEOF IDAHO

AFFI DAVIT OF MARK R . FULLE R - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below on th is

to

day of

November, 2015:

Document Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK R. FULLER

Attorney Served :
Ron Swafford
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

_
~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Mark R. Fuller
FULLER & BECK

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK R . FULLER - 3
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Sep , 22 . 2015 4: 06 PM

Sw ;, ffo rd law, P. C.

No, 4861

P. 3

(

SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
R. James Archibald, Esq., Bar No. 4445
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Lanen K. Covert, Esq_, Bar No. 7217
655 S Woodruff Avenue

Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST

VS .

FOR DISCOVERY

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, LP Broadband) Inc., by and through its attorney of record,
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., and responds to Plaintiffs First Request for Discovery as follows :

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatorv No. 1: Please list and identify all exhibits you intend or expect to introduce
into evidence at any hearings or trial of the above-entitled matter and state the name and address of
the person presently having possession of each exhibit.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Defendant has not completed discovery.
Defendant has not yet determined the exhibits which are intended or expected to be introduced

EXHi31T _fr_
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 1
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Sep, 22. 2015

4:07PM

Sw,tto rd Law, P. C.

No. 4861

p' 1

Request No . 5: Please produce a copy of all documents which identify Defendant's or
MicroServ's customers who received any kind of service through any of Defendant's or
MicorServ's equipment on Plaintiffs' property after July 1, 2010 .

RESPONSE NO, 5:

The defendant objects to Request for Production No. 5.

See

Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 9 and 10.
Request No. 6: Plesse produce a copy of each document utilized by or referred to by
Defendant in preparing answers rn these discovery requests.

RESPONSE NO. 6: Other than the Interrogatories, Request for Production and Request for
Admission, the Defendant used Attachment 1 and 2, each of which are attached.

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Request for Admission No . 1: Please admit that Defendant's predecessor in interest installed
internet or other antenna equipment on the rooftop of grain located on Plaintiffs property.

RESPONSE NO. 1. Admits installation ofinternet or other antenna equipment on the
rooftop of property owned by General Mills, through contractual agreement. Defendant further
admits that the equipment remained upon the grain elevators thereafter pursuant to a contract/lease
with General Mills, until removal. The defendant admits that recently received notice and
docwnents, which the defendant has become aware of a sales transaction between General Mills and
Lincoln Land, which is believed to have occurred in 2006. The Plaintiff failed to notify the
defendant of his ownership interest at the time of purchase, nor thereafter until this dispute began.
Re~st for__Admission No. 2: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in interest
utilized antenna equipment on the rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property.

DEFENDANT'S ANS\VERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 9
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Sep .22.2015 4:07 PM

Swd t ord Law, P. C.

No. 4861

P. 1L

RESPONSE NO. 2: Admits that prior to the purchase of the grain elevators by Lincoln
land from General Mills, the Defendant's predecessor and defendant used the tops of the
Grain elevators pursuant to ongoing lease agreements ·with General Mi11s. Subsequent to Lincoln
Land's acquisition of the property, the Defendant continued use of the premises pursuant to lease
agreement with General Mills, the Plaintiffs implied agent, who continued to possess and occupy
the premises at all times herein.
Request for Admission No. 3: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest did not have any authorization from Plaintiff to install antenna equipment on the rooftop of
grain elevators on Plamtiff s property.

RESPONSE NO. 3:
RESPONSE NO 3: Request No 3 is identical to Request No. 4. See response to 4 below.
Request for Admission No. 4: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest did not have any authorization from Plaintiff to utilize antenna equipment on the rooftop of
grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property.

RESPONSE NO. 4: The Defendant admits that defendant had no authorization from
Plaintiff in 2000. Plaintiff had no ownership interest at that time. The defendant had no direct
authorization from Plaintiff after 2006, qther than through Plaintiff's implied agent General Mills.
The Defendant occupied the premises exclusively through rental/lease agreement ·with General
Mills until March of2014 through General Mills.

The equipment was clearly visible to the

Plaintiff dwing the entire pe1iod. The Defendant' s predecessor had authorization from Plaintiff's
agent, assignee, designee General Mills, who Plaintiff left in possession.
Request for Admission No. 5: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest did not pay any amount to Plaintiff for the use of Plaintiffs prope1ty.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF' S FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 10
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Sep, 22. 2015 4:0 7PM

Swa+ +o r d Law, P. C.

No. 4861

P. 13

RESPONSE NO. 5: Defendant admits that no payments were made directly to the
Plaintiff. All payments were made to General Mills purported owner until 2006. The defendant's

continued payments after 2006 to General Mills, implied agent of the Plaintiff
Request for Admission No. 6: Please admit Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest obtained revenue from Defendant's and Defendant's predecessor in interest' s customers as a
result of the use of Plaintiffs property.

RESPONSE NO. 6: Admits
Request for Admission No. 7: Please admit that the fair market value for the leasing of the
rooftop of grain. elevators located on Plaintiff's property in order to place mternet antenna
equipment was $3,450.00 per month from July, 2010 through April, 2014.

RESPONSE NO. 7: Denies
Request for Admission No. 8: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest received a benefit from the utilization of antenna equipment installed by Defendant and
Defendant's predecessor in interest on the rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiff's property
between July, 2010 and April, 2014.

RESPONSE NO. 8: Defendant admits that benefits were received as a result of the
contractual/lease agreement between Defendant/Defendant 's predecessor with General Mills.
Lessor and implied agent of the Plaintiff.
Request for Admission No. 9: Please admit that it is unjust for Defendant to be allowed to
retain the benefit from utilization of antenna equipment installed by Defendant or Defendant's
predecessor in interest on the rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property between July,
2010 and April, 2014 without compensating Plaintiff for that utilization.

b BFENDANT' S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 'REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY· 11

38

Sep. 22.2015 4:07PM

S\\'aff or d Law, P. C.

No. 486 1

P. 14

RESPONSE NO. 9: Denies. All benefits of occupancy occurred exclusively through a
lease/rental agreement beginning in the year 2000, extended thereafter to 2018. There existed a
"Tower Agreement" from March of 2013 which was to provide occupancy until 2018
The rooftop rental agreement of 2000, between MicroServ, Inc. and General Mills
predates Plaintiff's interest in the property. Had Plaintiff performed the necessary due diligence
· prior to purchas:ing the property in 2006, Plaintiff either knew or should have of the installation
of wireless antenna's and equipment atop the grain elevator. The equipment was visible.
Reguest for Admission No. 10: Admit that pursuant to a Statement of Merger, filed with the
Idaho Secretary of State on May 3, 2013, LP Broadband, Inc. is the successor in interest of
MicroServ, Inc., an Idaho corporation.

RESPONSE NO. 10: Admits.
Request for Admission No. 11: Admit that a true and correct copy of the Statement of

Merger and attached Plan of Merger, filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on May3, 2013, is
attached hereto as Exhibit 'B' .

RESPONSE NO. 11: Admits
Request for Admission No. 12: Admit that a true and correct copy of the "Roof-Top Rental
Agreement", dated March 20, 2000, between MicroServ and General Mills is attached hereto as
Exhibit 'C' .

RESPONSE NO. 12: Admits Exhibit C was attached to the Plaintiff's complaint.
Request for Admission No. 13: Admit that other than the "Roof-Top Rental Agreement";
attached as Exhibit 'C', Defendant has no knowledge of any other agreement in any form which
give Defendant or Defendant's predecessor m mterest any rights upon Plaintiffs property.

39
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 12

Se p. 22 . 201 5 4:07PM

Swaffor d Law, P. C.

No .48 6

P. 15

RESPONSE NO. 13: Denies, See Tower Agreement attached pursuant to Request for
Production of Document No. 3
Request for Admission No . 14: Admit that the internet antenna equipment installed by

MicroServ on Plaintiff's property was functional and in use by Defendant or MicroServ from July,
2010 through April, 201 4.

RESPONSE NO. 14: Admits.
DATED this

2," ~ y of September, 20 15.

DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 13
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4:07 PM
F'Mt

Sw aff or d Law, P. C.

No. 4861

P. 161001100 1

VERIFICATION
STATE OF COLORADO

County of 13YGfdY11t

)

:ss

Afkxif-_Qfr,;kwru:r:

)

, being first sworn, depeiBeR and Mates:

I um the defendant in this case, I have read tho foregoing Defondtmt's Answers to
Phlintiff's First Request fot· Discover, nnd believe the faot9 and stl\tements set out therein to be

truo and eol'rect to thci best of my knowledge, information and be ef,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

1l_ day of Soptomber 20 I5.
1

dMMt!.i~'t?~
·
Notal'y Publl oc Colo

{.//-+ ~

11

MA LOR /1.. B CKMAN

o

My CommlB on Explrns; ~

..:;.___

1/1 UJ I tf

NOTARY PVDI.IC
81/ITla OF COI.O~ArlO
NOT1'RY ID d 2010402 1 n o

MV COl,t)v11S81ON t!Xt'IRl!8 MAY 20 101

41

. ..

.

....

.

'

,'.

.

.:....

..

. ·.

.
.. . ·,

'

,

. .

·:

.:

/

:

.·, ' :

,·

..

.

. .. .

.. .

ace Lease Agreement

: .

.'

I

.l
I

•'

.

~

..

..

·,

. ·. :

Microserv Computer Technologies,

,agrees to pay $50 per month

r exclusive placement of

wireless antennas and equipments a

. grain elevator located at 307

Lincoln Rd, Idaho Falls
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Travis Johnson, President
Microserv Computer Technologies, lri •

Date
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Brad Kapple, Secretary/Treasurer
Evans Grain & Elevator Co.
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April 10, 2013

Tower agreement

Microserv, Inc. hereby agrees to pay $100 per month in exchange for space and 120VAC
electrical power to install wireless equipment on the "Evan's Grainery" located at 2910
E. Lincoln Road, Idaho Falls, ID. Microserv shall have exclusive use of the 902928MHz, 2.400-2.499GHz, 3.600-3.700GHz and 5.200-5.899GHz frequency ranges at
this location.
This agreement shall be valid from 04/10/2013 to 3/31/2018.

Travis Johnson, President
Microserv, Inc.

Jim Rooney

General Mills
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LI NCOLN LAND COM PANY , LLC , an
Idaho
l i mited
liabil i ty
company ,

Case No. CV- 15 - 3927

Plaintiff ,

v.

AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE H. BECK

LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Colorado
corporation ,
successor
by
merger to MicroServ , Inc ., an
I daho corporation ,
Defendant .

State of Idaho
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

DOYLE H. BECK, being first duly sworn , deposes and states:
1. Affiant is an adult, is competent to testify and does so upon his personal
knowledge.
2. Affiant is the managing member of Lincoln Land Company, LLC , Plaintiff in the
above-entitled action.
3. On or about June, 2010, Lincoln Land Company, LLC as new owner of the grain
elevators and real property located at 3075 E. Lincoln Road , Idaho Falls, Idaho,
began leasing the real property and elevators to General Mills.
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4. The Lease Agreement between Lincoln Land Company, LLC and General Mills
specifically prohibited General Mills from subletting the property or any part thereof
without the prior written consent of Lincoln Land Company, LLC. Consent to
sublease the grain elevator rooftops was never sought by General Mills and never
provided by Lincoln Land Company, LLC.
5. At the time Lincoln Land Company, LLC and General Mills entered into the Lease
Agreement, Affiant was not aware of MicroServ, lnc.'s continuing unauthorized
occupancy of the rooftops of the grain elevators.
6. Further this Affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this

--JD--~

y of November, 2015.

Doylea ~ ~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ID~y of November, 2015.

.
.
.
.
.
_
,
_
_
_
~
~=:~~~

My Commission Expires:

610'3/t
9
l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below on this

/o

day of

November, 2015:

Document Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE H. BECK

Attorney Served :
Ron Swafford
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
¢"" Facsimile

_

Mark R. Fuller
FULLER & BECK

AE'FI DAVIT OE' DOYLE H .

BECK - 3
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AT TORNEY FOR P LA I NTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY ' LLC ' an
Idaho
limited
l iability
company ,

Case No. CV- 15 - 3927

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: SUBLEASE/RENTAL
AGREEMENTS

Plaintiff ,
v.
LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Colorado
corporation ,
s uccessor
by
merger to MicroServ , Inc ., an
I dah o corporation ,
Defendant .

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Lincoln Land Company, LLC, by and through its
attorney of record, Mark R. Fuller, of Fuller & Beck Law Offices, PLLC, and files this
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Sublease/Rental Agreements. Plaintiff
requests that the Court find that as a matter of law, Lincoln Land is entitled to Partial
Summary Judgment denying any and all defenses asserted by Defendant, LP
Broadband , Inc. (hereafter "LP

Broadband") claiming that .MicroServ, Inc. , LP

Broadband's predecessor in interest, entered into a valid Sublease/Rental Agreement
after March 20, 2008, for the rooftops of the grain elevators located at 3075 E. Lincoln
Road , Idaho Falls, Idaho (hereafter "the Rooftops"). As a matter of law, LP Broadband , as
successor to MicroServ, did not have a valid sublease/rental agreement for the Rooftops

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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after March 20 , 2008.
DATED this JQ_ day of November, 2015.
FULLER & BECK

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY tha t I served a true and correct copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorney listed
below on this JQ_ day of November , 2015 :
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
J UDGMENT RE : SUBLEASE/RENTAL
AGREEMENTS

Document Served :

Attorney Served :
Ron Swafford
655 S . Woodruf f
Idaho Fa lls , ID

83401

~

U. S . Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimi le

Mark R. Ful l er
FULLER & BECK
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MARK R . FULLER (ISB No . 2 698)
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FU LLER & BECK LAW OFFICES , PLLC .
4 1 0 MEMORIAL DRIVE , SUITE 201
P • O . Box 5 0 9 3 5
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405-0935
TELEPHONE : (208) 524 - 5400
FACSIMILE : (208) 524 - 7167

2 5NOV 12
t ( ,'.

l ; ;:1 '

•

I

;1 8:24

• I ,, ! 'I .,. N
l i I l j I~ l "{

...

.,, ..

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No. CV-15-3927

LI NCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
Idaho
limited
liab i lity
company ,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: SUBLEASE/RENTAL
AGREEMENTS

Plaintiff ,
v.

LP BROADBAND , I NC ., a Colorado
corpora ti on ,
s uccessor
by
merger to MicroSe rv , Inc ., an
Idaho co rporation ,
Defendant .

<.
C

COMES

NOW

the

Plaintiff ,

(hereafter " Lincoln Land")
Mark R.
Brief

Full er of Fuller
in

Support

Lease/Rental

of

Lincoln

Land

Company ,

by and through its at torney of r ecord ,
Beck Law Offices ,

&

Motion

Agreements .

As

for
a

Partial

matter

of

PLLC a nd files this

Summary
law ,

Judgment

Lincoln

entitled to Partial Summa ry Judgme nt denying any and a l l
as serted

by

Broadband " )
predecessor

De f enda n t ,
c la iming
in

a ft er Mar c h

e levato r s

located

at

LP

t h at

interest ,

Agreement

LLC ,

20 ,
3075

Broadband ,

I nc .
Inc .,

MicroServ ,

entered
20 08 ,
E.

into
for

Lincoln

a

the

va li d

LP

is

defenses
"LP

Broadband ' s

Sub l ease/Rental

Idaho

(hereafter " t he Rooftops " ) . As a matter of law ,

La nd

(here after

rooftops

Road ,

Re :

of

the

grain

Falls ,

Idaho

LP Broadband ,

as
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(

successor

to

MicroServ ,

did

not

have

a

valid

sublease/rental

agreement for the Rooftops after March 20 , 2008 .
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This Motio n concerns the lease/rental and occupancy of the
Rooft ops of two grain elevators owned by Plaintiff ,
Bon neville Coun ty .

located i n

Prior t o 2000 , General Mills leased the grain

elevators from Evan ' s Grain and Elevator Company , the prior owner
of

the

grain elevators .

Techno l ogies ,

Inc .

Rental Agreement "

and
for

On March
General

20 ,

Mills

the Rooftops ,

2000 ,

MicroServ Computer

entered
for

into

rent

in

a

" Roof -top

the

amount of

$50 . 00 per month . A copy of such Agreement is attached as Exhibit
' C'

to the Complaint

Agreeme n t") .

(hereaf ter referred to as "the 2000 Sublease

Pursuant to t he 2000

Sublease Agreemen t ,

MicroServ

was all owed to utilize the roof-t:op of the grain elevato r s
location of internet antennae
years ,

for

a period "of no less

than 3

and up to 5 years with annual renewals afte r the first 3

years ." See Roof - top Rental Agreement , at t ached as Exhibi t
the

fo r

Complaint .

For

purposes

of

this

Motion ,

and

' C' to

giving

the

greatest benefit to Respondent , the Court should assume that the 5
years

of

guaranteed

annual

renewals

util i zation.

is

in

Therefore ,

addition
the

2000

to

the

3

Sublease

years

of

Agreement

could extend at most for 8 years , or until March 20 , 2008 . Lincoln
Land claims unjust enrichment of Respondent occurred only after
July , 2010 (See Complaint , para . 7) , two years after expiration of
the 2000 Sublease Agreement .
On o r

about June ,

2010 ,

Lincoln Land as the owner of the

grain elevators and real property upon which the elevators are
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located , leased the real property and elevators to General Mills .
See

Affidavi t

of

Doyl e

H.

Be ck ,

Pa ra .

3.

Such

l ease agreement

specifically prohibited General Mills from subletting the property
or any pa rt the r eof without the prio r writt en consent of Lincoln
Land .

Id ., Para .

MicroS er v ' s

4 . In June , 2010 , Li ncoln La nd was not aware of

cont i nui ng

unauthorized

occ upanc y

of

the

Rooftops.

Id . , Para 5 .

On
Inc .,

or

about

May 3 ,

2 013 ,

MicroServ Comput er Technolog i es ,

me rg ed with LP Broadb a nd ,

wi th LP Broadband assuming a ll

l i ab i lit i es of Mi croSe rv . LP Broadband has admitted that pursuant
to a Stat ement of Merger filed with the Idaho Secretary of State
on

May

3,

2013 ,

LP Broadband

is

the

successor

in

in terest

of

MicroSe r v , In c ., an Idah o corporat i on . See Response to Requ e st f or
Admission No . 10 , a tta ched to the Affidavit of Ma rk R. Fulle r , as
Exhibit ' A'.
Between

Ju ly ,

Tech nolo gie s ,

20 10

or

it s

and April

22 ,

successor ,

LP

2014 ,

Mi croSe r v Computer

Broadband ,

instal l ed

and

ut ili zed internet antennae equipment on the Rooftops of the g ra in
e levators
payment
La nd ' s

wi t hout

in

any

a uth oriza ti on

amount

property .

See

to

of

Lincoln

Respons e

Lincoln

Land

to

f or

Land
the

Req ues ts

use

for

and

without

of

Linco ln

Admiss ion

1- 5

attached to the Af fidav it of Mark R. Fulle r as Exh ibit 'A ' .
Linco l n
agreements

Land

whic h

has
give

sought
LP

copies

Broadband

or

of

any

and

MicroServ

all
the

written
right

to

i nsta ll and u t ilize internet an tenna e equ i pment on Li nc ol n Land ' s
property .

Pursuant

to

Discovery

Requests ,

LP

Broadband

has

provided Lincoln Land with a copy of two unsigned documents , one
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entitled
"Tower

"Antenna Space Lease Agreement"
agreement ",

Affidavit

attached

of Mark

R.

purports

to

Roo ft ops

from June 1,

an nual

Agreement " ) .
utilization
throu gh

s i g ned
General

of

the

Tower

LP

Mill s ,

u t i lization

referred

Agreement

grain elevator

31 ,

2018

Eva n s

( or

Gra i n

of

its
&

to

' C'

to

the

Agreement

of

the

grain

elevators

1,

2009 ,

as

Co .

2004

to

Sublease

authorize

from Apri l
to

s u b l e ase

predecessor

with automat i c

" the

referred

Elevator

and

Lease

Rooftops

the

other entitled

Space

purports

(hereafter

Neithe r

Broadband

' B'

The Antenna

the

Agreement " ) .

by

Exh i bits

200 4 through June

(h e r eafter

The

March

Sublease

Fuller.

authorize

renewals

as

and the

as

20 ,

2013

" the

20 1 3

agreements

company
(prior

the

was

MicroServ) ,

owner

of

the

elevators) or Li n co l n Land , the current owner .

LEGAL STANDARD
This

Court ' s

standard in considering Plaintiff's Motion for

Summa r y Judgment was addressed in G & M Farms v . Funck Irr . Co .,
1 1 9 Id. 514 , 808 P.2d 85 1

(1991):

It is wel l established that " [A ] motion for summary
judgment sha ll be rendered f orthwith if the p l eadings,
depos i t i ons , and admissions on fi l e , together wit h the
affidav i ts , if any , show that there is no genuine i ssue
as to any mate ria l fact and that the mov ing party is
entit l ed to judgmen t as a matter of law. " IRCP 5 6 ( c) ;
Olson v . Freeman , 117 I daho 706 , 79 1 P . 2d 1285 (1990) ;
Rawson v . United Steelworkers of Am ., 1 11 Idaho 630 ,
726 P . 2d 742 ( 1 986) ; Boise Car & Truck v . Waco, 108
Idah o 780 , 70 2 P . 2d 818 (1985) ; Schaefer v. Elswood
Trailer Sales, 95 Idaho 654 , 516 P . 2d 1168 (1 973). Upon
a motion for summary judgment, all cont r over te d facts
are l i beral l y construed in favor of the non - moving
party .
Tusch Enters . v. Coffin , 1 1 3 Idaho 37, 740 P . 2d
1022 (1987) ; Doe v . Durtschi , 1 1 0 Idaho 466 , 716 P . 2d
1 238 (1986) ; Kline v . Clinton , 1 03 Idaho 1 16 , 645 P . 2d
350 ( 1982) . Li kewise, all reasonable infere nces which
can be made from the record shall be made in favor of
the
part y
resisting the motion .
Tusch
Enters .
v.
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Coffin , 113 Idaho 37, 740 P . 2d 1022 (1987) ; Doe V .
Durtschi , 110 Idaho 466 , 71 6 P . 2d 1238 (1986) ; Meridian
Bowling Lanes , Inc . v. Meridian Athlete Ass ' n , Inc .,
105 Idaho 509 ,
670 P . 2d 1 294
(1983) ; Anderson v .
Ethington , 103 I daho 658 , 65 1 P . 2d 923 (1982) ; Kline v .
Clinton , 103 Idaho 116 , 645 P.2d 350 (1982) . The burden
at all times is up on the moving par t y t o prove the
absence
of
a
gen uine
issue
of
material
fact .
Petricevich v . Salmon River Canal Company, 92 Idaho
865 , 452 P. 2d 362 (1969). Howeve r, t he plaintiff ' s case
must b e anchored in something more than speculat i on and
a mere scint i lla of evi dence i s not enough to create a
genuine issue . Id . See also Nelson v . Steer , 118 Idaho
4 09 ,
797 P . 2d 117
(1990) . If the record con t a ins
conf l icting i n ferences or r easonable minds might reach
dif f erent conclusions ,
a summary judgment must be
denied. Kl ine v . Clinton , 1 03 I daho 116 , 64 5 P.2d 350
(1 982) ; Farmer' s Ins . Co . of Idaho v . Brown , 97 Idaho
380 ,
5 4 4 P.2d 1150
(1976) . All doubts are to be
reso l ved a gains t the moving party , and t he motion must
be denied if the evidence is such that confl i cting
inferences may be drawn the r e fr om , and if reasonable
people
might
reach different
conclusions .
Doe v .
Durtschi , 110 Idaho 466 , 716 P . 2d 1238 (1986) ; Ashby v .
Hubbard , 100 Idaho 67 , 593 P.2d 402 (1979) .
119 Id . at 516 - 7 . If any genui ne i ssue of materia l
after all

fact remains ,

reasonable infere nces have been made in favor of the

non-moving party , t h e Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.
Under Rule 56(a) , the moving party has the initial burden of
s howing

Catrett ,

tha t

it

is

entitled

to

106 S .

Ct .

477 US 317 ,

judgment .
2458

In

( 1 986) ,

Celotex

Corp .

v.

the Supreme Court

held that a party moving for Summary Judgment , and not bearing the
bu rden of proof at t ri a l ,

need not negate the opposing party ' s

case . Rath e r , the moving party cou l d d i scharge its i n itial burden
by demonstrating the absence of an essential element of the case
of

the

oppone nt ,

who

bears

the

burden

of proof at

tria l .

The

Supreme Court in Celotex , supra , stated:
In our view , the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry o f s ummary judgment , after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion , aga inst a party who fails to make a showing
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sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party ' s case , and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial . In such a situation , there can be
' no genuine issue as to any material fact ', since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non moving party ' s case necessarily renders all other facts
immateria l . The moving party is ' entitled to a judgment as a
ma tter of law ' because the non - moving party has failed to
make a suffic i ent showing on an essenti al element of her case
with res pec t to which she has the burden of proof .
4 77 US at 32 1 ,

Celotex

has

10 6 S . Ct . at 2552 . "The lang uage and reasoning of

been

adopted

by

the

Appellate

Courts

of

Idaho ."

Dunnick v . Elder , 126 Id . 308 , 312 , 882 P . 2d 475 (Ct . App . 1994) .
ARGUMENT

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Pursuant t o Idaho Code Section 9- 503 :
No esta te or i n terest in real property , other than for
leases for a t erm n ot exceeding one ( 1) year ... can be
created , grant ed , assigned , surrende r ed , or d eclared ,
otherwise th an by operation of l aw , o r a conveyance or
other instrument in wr iting , subscribed by the party
creating ,
granting,
assigning ,
surrendering
or
declaring the same , or by his lawful agent thereunto
autho rized by writing .
(Emphasis added) .

Further ,

Idaho Code Section 9-505 (4)

states as

follows :
In the following cases the agreement is invalid , unl ess
the same or some note or memorandum thereof , be in
writing and subscribed by the party charged , or by his
agent . Evide n ce , therefore , of the agreement cannot be
received without the writing or secondary evidence of
its contents :

***
4 . An agreement for the leasing , for a longer period
than one (1) year , or for the sale , of real property ,
or of an interest therein , and such agreement , if made
by an agent of the party sought to be charged , is
inva l id , unless the authority of the agent be in
writing , subscribed by the party sought to be charged .
(Emphasis added) .

" Failure to comply with the statute of frauds
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renders an oral agreement unenforceabl e both in an action at law
for damages and i n a

suit i n equity for specific performance. "

Wakelam

v.

Hagood ,

151

Idaho

Hoffman

v.

SV Co .,

Inc .,

688 ,

263

102 Idaho 187 ,

P . 3d 742
190 ,

(2011) ;

citing

628 P . 2d 218 ,

221

( 1 981) .
LP

Br oadba nd ,

as

successor

to

MicroServ,

has

based

occupancy of the Rooftops on three sublease agreements :
2000 Sublease Agreement ,

(2)

i ts

( 1)

the

the 2004 Sublease Agreement and

(3)

the 2013 Sublease Agreement . Of the three d ocuments , on l y the 2000
Sublease Agreeme nt was subscribed by MicroServ or an owner of the
property .
Company as
s ubscribe

None

of

the

subleases

owner of the property .
t he

2004

Sublease

were

signed

by

Lincoln

Land

By reason of the failure

Agr eemen t

a nd

t he

20 13

to

Sublease

Agreement , these agreements v j olate the Statute of Frauds as found
in Idaho Code Sections 9-503 and 9-505(4). Pursuant to Idaho Code
9- 505(4) ,

the

Court

cannot

receive

wit hout a subscribed agreement,

evidence

of

the

agreement

and the agr eements are therefore

invalid .
Idaho

Courts

have

further

required

an

adequate

legal

description of the r ea l property being conveyed :
While t he Idaho statu t es do not specifically r equ i r e a
des cri ption of real property in t he instrument of
conveyance ,
Idaho
courts
have
always
required
a
description of the property or a reference to extrinsic
evidence which de scribes the property being conveyed in
order to satis fy the statute of frauds . In [Ray v .
Frasure] , the Idaho Supreme Court stressed that such a
property descripti on must
"adequate l y describe the
property so that it is possible for someone to identify
' exactly ' what property the seller is conveying to the
buyer ."
In

re

Garcia ,

465

B. R.

181 ,

192

(Bankr .

D.

Idaho

10 - 3- 2011) ;
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citing In re McMurdie , 4 48 B. R. 826 , 830

200
1 031 ,

P . 3d

1174 ,

1036

1178) ;

als o

(Idaho 20 03)) .

(quoting Ray v . Frasure ,

citing Garner v .

Th e

80

Bartschi ,

Bankruptcy Court

P . 3d

i n Garci a found

that a Rent - to - Own Agreement and a Sublease Contract , which only
provided a stre e t address , likely violated the statue of frauds :
In this case , neither the RTO Agreement or the Contract
include any legal description for the Property ; each
contain only a street address . The I daho Supreme Cour t
in Ray specifically held that " a property descr ipt i on
in a r e a l
estate co ntract cons isting so l ely of a
p hy sica l
a ddress does not satis f y the s tatute of
frauds ." Ray,
200 P . 3d a t
1177 ;
see also In re
McMurdie , 44 8 B. R. at 830 . Accordingly , under the Idaho
case law , the RTO Agreement and Contract wou l d like l y
no t satisfy th e requirements of the st atute of frauds .
In Re Garcia , 465 B. R. at 192 .

I n addition to the
sublease

agreeme nts ,

adequate

legal

frauds .

failure

al l

to subscribe the 2004 and 2013

thr ee

description

sublea se

required

The 200 0 Sublea se Agreemen t

to

agreements

satisfy

fails

the

lac k

the

statute

of

to fully identify the

physical addres s of the property being subleased , identifying the
property
storage

as :
bins

"roof - top
l ocated

space

on

the

" Evan ' s

Lincoln

at

Road

Grainery"
in

Idaho

grain
Falls ,

Idaho ." The address blank in the 2000 Sublease Agreement was never
filled in by the parties . No lega l description was included in the
2000 Sublease Agreement .
The 200 4 Sublease Agreement includes a

physica l

address of

the p r oper t y , b u t

only makes vagu e references to the actual roof -

top

would

space

which

be

utilized .

No

lega l

desc ri ption

was

included in the 2004 Sublease Agreement .
The 2013 Sublease Agreement expressly identifies

the wrong
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physical

address

located at

of

2910 E .

the

grain

elevato rs ,

Lincoln Road ,

Idaho

ident i fying

Falls ,

Idaho ,

property
where the

correct address fo r the grain e l evators is 307 5 E. Li ncoln Road .
No lega l descript i on was inc luded in the 2013 Subleas e Agre eme nt .
Each of these subl eas e ag reemen ts is deficient in giving a
physical l ocat ion of the grain elevators and al l fail to provide a
legal

description

as

required

by

Idaho

Courts

to

satisfy

the

Statute of Fra uds .
CONCLUSION

Lincoln

Land

is

entitled

to

Partial

declaring that the 2000 Sublease Ag reement
of law ,

extend beyond March 20 ,

2008 ,

Summary

Judgment

could not , as a matter

assuming max i mum possible

r e n e wa l s by MicroServ . Lincoln La n d is entit led to Pa rtial Summary
Judgment

holding

that

the

2000

Sublease

Agreement

had

application to the gra in elevator rooftops after March 20 ,

no
2008

and that the 2 000 Sublease Agreement doe s not cons t itute a defense
to Lincoln Land 's post - July , 2010 Unjust Enrichment claims against
LP Broadband .
Linco l n Land is further ent it led to Partial Summary Judgment
holding that the

2004

Sublease Agreement and the

2013 Sublease

Agreement are in violation of the Statute of Frauds ,

Idaho Code

Sections 9-503 and 9- 505(4) , because these sublease agreements are
not subscribed and do not contain correc t

legal descriptions of

the subject property . The 2013 Sublease Agreement is for property
at

an

entirely

different

address .

Lincoln

Land

is

entit l ed

to

Partial Summary J udgment holding th at th e 2004 a nd 2013 sublease
agreements are invalid and do not constitute a defense to Lincoln
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Land ' s

post -July ,

2010

Unjust

Enrichment

claims

against

LP

Broadband .
DATED this__}]_ day of November , 2015 .
FULLER

&

BECK

Mark R. Fu ll er
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the
fol l owing descr i bed pleading or document
below on this

t,'I)

on the attorney listed

day of November , 2015 :
BRIEF IN SUP PORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE :
SUBLEASE/RENTAL AGREEMENT S

Document Serve d :

Attorney Served :
Ron Swafford
655 S . Woodruff
Idaho Falls , I D

8 3 401

-*=-

U. S . Mail
Hand Delivery
Fa csimi l e

FULLER & BECK
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq. , Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131

15 DEC - 2 p 4: 2

Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMP ANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC .,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant LP Broadband, by and through its attorney of record,
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq. and hereby objects to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment fi led
by the Plaintiff as follows:
RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE
LP Broadband, Inc.("LP Broadband) is the successor by merger to MicroServ Computer
Technologies, Inc. ("MicroServ"). As such, LP Broadband is entitled to all defenses, rights and
obligations of MicorServ.
On March 20, 2000, MicroServ entered into an agreement with General Mills for the use
of a grain elevator rooftop for a location for antenna equipment. This agreement is attached as
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Adam Gillings and fully incorporated herein. This agreement was

ORIGINAL
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for the Evans Grainery location ovvned, operated or in use by General Mills. This agreement
allowed for M icroServ to install and utili ze equipment on the property for the payment of $5 0.00
per month. The agreement requires that any party seeking to terminate the agreement must give a
30 day notice before termination.
MicroServ installed equipment at thi s locati on and utilized the equipment until April,
2014. Pursuant to the rental agreement, M icroServ and then LP Broadband paid the monthl y rent
pursuant to the agreement with General Mills fo r each month beginning March, 2000 until April,
20 14. A copy of the payments is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Adam Gill ings and
fu lly incorporated herein.
LP Broadband and MicroServ did not have any notice or knowledge of any change of
ownership of the property by Plaintiff until April, 2014 when Plaintiff sent a letter to Defend ant.
There was no notification or signage on the property to indicate any ownership change to
Plaintiff. Photographs of the properiy are attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Adam Gillings
and fu lly incorporated herein.
At all times from March, 2000 until April, 20 14, General Mi lls operated as if it had all
authority to rent the property to Defendant. General Mills allowed access to the property and
co llected the rent payments.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary j udgm ent is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When assessing a motion for surnma1y
j udgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party.
Furihermore, the trial court m ust draw all reasonable inferences in favo r of the party resisting the
motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co. , 11 9 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851 , 854 (] 99 1);
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Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist. , 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400,404, 848 P .2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). The burden may
be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be
required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elde r, 126 Idaho 308, 311 , 882 P .2d 4 75 , 478
(Ct.App.1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affinnative showing
with the mo ving party' s own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and
the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker 's 1vfini-Mart, In c., 134
Idaho 711 , 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App.2000) . Once such an absence of evidence has been
established, the burden then shifts to the pruiy opposing the motion to show, via further
depositions , discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to
offer a valid justification for the fai lure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(:f). Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874,
876 P.2d at 156.
I.C.§9-503 states: Transfers ofreal prope1iy to be in writing. No estate or interest in real
property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over
or concerning it, or in any maimer relating thereto , can be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declru·ing the same, or by his lawf·u l agent thereunto authorized by writing.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs motion seeks summary judgment on "any and all defenses asserted by
Defendant, LP Broadband, Inc. claiming that MicroServ, Inc. , LP Broadband 's predecessor in
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interest, entered into a valid Sublease/Rental Agreement after March 20, 2008 for the rooftops of
the grain elevators located at 3075 E. Lincoln Road, Idaho Falls Idaho." The singular legal
theory asserted by the Plaintiff is that any agreements between LP Broadband and General Mills
violated the Statute of Frauds. For the reasons noted below, Plaintiffs arguments fail.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS PROSPECTIVE IN NATURE
Plaintiff attempts to have the Statute of Frauds operate to negate the past agreement
between General Mills and Defendant. This is contrary to the pm-pose of the statute. The statute's
purpose is to limit enforcement of agreements pertaining to interests in land to only those
agreements that are in writing and meet statutory requirements .
The cases cited by the Plaintiff and used to support its position are all cases dealing with
the prospective enforcement of an agreement relating to real prope1ty.
The case of Wake/am v. Hagood, 15 1 Idaho 688, 263 P.3d 742 (20 11 ) dealt with the
issues surrounding the sale of a property at an auction. Wakelam was the high bidder at an
auction for real prope1ty sold by lagood. The legal issue was the relationship between the
auction procedures and the statute of frauds. Hagood argued the Statute of Frauds prohibited the
transfer of his property as a result of the auction, as no written document was executed by the
parties. The analysis by the Court examined the auction procedures, the agreements and
documents prepared at the auction. The Court concluded that sufficient documentation existed to
enforce the sale of the auctioned property. The entire issue addressed by the Court was the
prospective application of the Statute of Frauds for the sale of the prope1ty.

The case of Hoffman v. S VCo. , Inc., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d 218 (1981 ) involved a
request for specific performance or damages related to a sale and purchase of real property.
Hoffman negotiated with Sun Valley Company for the purchase of a 1.64 acre lot. The Cornt
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examined the negotiations between the parties, the documentation that was provided between the
parties and the actions taken by each patty concerning the property. The Court found that the
events and record indicated an oral contract, however, this oral contract did not comply with the
Statute of Frauds. Therefore, the Co urt refused the prospective application of the agreement
based on the Statute of Frauds and denied any damages from that agreement.
The Plaintiff is not seeking to utilize the Statute of Frauds to prohjbit prospective
enforcement of an agreement or to limit damages from future performance. Plaintiff is seeking to
have the statue invalidate a prior agreement. to which the Plainti ff was not a party, which prior
agreement was fully performed. Thi s retroactive application of the Statute of Frauds is not
support by the law cited by the Plaintiff, and supporting case law has not been located.
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND GENERAL MILLS IS OUTSIDE
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
T he agreement between the Defendant and General Mills was one for the rental of real
property. This agreement was not only entered into by the Defendant and General Mill s and the
Defendant, but performed for 14 years. This performance of the agreement removes the
agreement fro m the application of the Statute of Frauds.
In McMahon v. Auger, 83 Idah o 27, 375 P. 2d 374 (1960) the Idaho Supreme Court stated,
" This Court has repeatedly said that an oral contract for the conveyance of real property will be
enforced and is binding upon the parties thereto, and is not within the statute of frauds when
there is partial or complete performance of the same." Id. at 37, 380, quoting Anselmo v.

Beardmore, 70 Idah o 392,2 19 P.2d 946; Wood v. Hill, 70 Idaho 93, 2 12 P .2cl 39 1; Jones v.
Adams, 67 Idaho 402, 182 P.2d 963.
Add itionall y, the Court in McMahon stated,

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PART IA L SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-5

65

Another underlying principle, appbcable where the contract does
not comply with the statute of frauds , is that equity will not enforce
it except in cases where a refusal to do so would be inequitable.
Conversely, where a party has so performed, or changed his
position in reliance on the contract, that to allow the other party to
interpose the statute of frauds as a defense, would perpetrate a
fraud on the performing party, and the legal remedy is inadequate,
equity will decree specific performance. Id. at 37, 379.

In this matter, there is no question that General Mills and Defendant entered into an
agreement in March, 2000 . This agreement allowed the Defendant to place and utilize equipment
on the Evans Grainery location. The agreement required the Defendant to pay monthly rent.
Defendant complied with this requirement. General Mills accepted the payments and allowed for
the installation and utilization of the rooftop location. This performance of the agreement by both
parties to the agreement removes the agreement from the limitations of the Statute of Frauds.
Prohibiting the defenses pertaining to the agreement between General Mills and
Defendant would be inequitable and impermissible. Based on the pe1formance of the agreement
between General Mills and the Defendant for 14 years, both the law and equity require removal
of the agreement from the limitations and obligations of the Statute of Frauds.
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GENERAL MILLS AND DEFENDANT CONTINUED
BEYOND MARCH 2008
The agreement between General Mills and the Defendant continued to operate far beyond
2008 as alleged by the Plaintiff. The agreement itself indicates that a party wishing to tem1inate
the agreement must give a 30 day notice of the cancelation of the agreement. No such notice was
ever given by General Mills or Defendant. The termination of the Defendant' s occupancy of the
property came from notices from the Plaintiff, not General Mills.
In addition to the language of the agreement, Idaho law provides for an additi onal term of
occupancy based on a hold over. In the case of Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110
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Idaho 640, 718 P.2d 55 1 (1985 , review denied 1985) the Idaho Court of Appeals stated the law
related to a hold over and the impact on tenancy and tenancy agreements. The Court stated,
When a lessee holds over after his tenancy for a fixed term of years
expires, the lessor must elect to either treat the lessee as a
trespasser or hold him to a new tenancy. If he treats the lessee as a
trespasser, the lessor may bring an action for unlawful detainer. If,
however, the lessor seeks, implicitly or explicitly, to hold the
lessee to a new tenancy, a new lease arises by operation of law.
(internal citations omitted) Id at 644-645, 555-556.
To determine what rights the hold over tenant will have requires the Court to look at the
lessor's intent. Id. This intent is determined by the lessor's words and actions. id. "If the lessor
demands or accepts rent from the lessee, he will be presumed to have elected to hold the lessee
to a new tenancy, absent of course, a clearly expressed intention to the contrary." Id.
In this matter, General Mills accepted rental payments from Defendant from March,
2000 until April, 20 14. These payments were timely and regular. No payment was ever ref·used.
There is no indication that General Mills ever expressed an intention to cancel the agreement
with Defendant.
The continued performance of the March, 2000 agreement between General Mills and
the Defendant resulted in a mutually accepted hold over and a continuing new tenancy by
operation of law. This continuing new tenancy is not subject to the Statute of Frauds and could
only be terminated by written notice. I. C.§55-208 requires that a tenancy at will may be
terminated only by the giving of written notice requiring removal from the premises within a
period of not less than one month.
The language of the March 2000 agreement and the law on hold over both provide for
Defendant to continue to occupy and utilize the Evans Grainery location. The Statute of Frauds
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has no control over the law on hold over tenancy and therefore Plaintiffs sununary judgment
request fails.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND PARTY NECESSARY FORADTIJDICATION
In addition to the March, 2000 agreement between General Mills and the Defendant,
additional agreements were negotiated and reached with General Mills. Plaintiff has also
acknowledged the role of General Mills in forming agreements with Defendant for the
occupancy and utilization of the Evans Grainery prope1ty. Defendant has filed with the Comt a
Motion to Amend Pleadings and for a Third-Party Complaint against General Mills. Defendant
has also filed for a continuance of the summary judgment hearing to allow for the inclusion of
General Mills in this litigation and discovery from General Mills. Additional time should be
granted for the Amended Answer and Third-Party Complaint prior to this Cami's determination
of this summary judgment.
The Supreme Court case of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 US 317, 106 S. Ct. 2458 (1986)
states that summary judgment should occur after adequate time for discovery. Similarly, in Boise
Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd. , 154 Idaho 99, 294 P.3d 1111 (2013) the Idaho
Supreme Court stated,
A motion for summary judgment is decided based upon the
"pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, " along with any
supporting affidavits. IR. C. P. 5 6(c). Thus, the standard
contemplates the existence of an adequate record and it follows
that a party opposing summary judgment must be afforded an
adequate opportunity to conduct discovery to make that record. Id.
at 104, 1116.

In this matter, it is clear that an adequate record is impossible without the inclusion of
General Mills as a party. Additional information is needed from General Mil ls concerning the
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agreements with the Defendants and the actions of General Mills during the time between
March, 2000 and April, 2014.
I.R.C.P. 14(a) allows for third-party practice when another entity may be liable for all or
party of the Plaintiffs claim against defendant. The purpose of this practice is to ensure all
claims and defenses are adjudicated in a timely and inexpensively as possible. In many
circumstances, inclusion of all claims is mandatory in an action to avoid losing those claims.
The inclusion of General Mills in this matter will enable the Court to make a full and
well-reasoned determination of the issues. The Court should grant the additional time necessary
to allow for the Amended Answer and the Third-Party Complaint.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs request for summary judgment on the Defendant's affirmative defenses related
to the rental agreement between the Defendant and General Mills should be denied. The Statute
of Frauds does not operate to negate the past agreement and performance of the agreement for
Defendant's use of the Evans Grainery location.
DATED this f f i ay of December, 2015 .

Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~

day of December, 2015, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D
D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 524-7167

RONALD L. SWAFFORD, E
Attorneys for Defendant
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
1revor L. Castleton, Esq. Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq. Bar o. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COU TY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY LLC

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF ADAM GILLINGS IN
SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC. ,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

)
:ss
)

Adam Gillings, having been sworn deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am Adam Gillings.

2.

I am over the age of 18 and make this affidavit of my own personal

knowledge and belief.
3.

If called to testify in this matter, I would testify as to the information set

forth herein.
4.

I am a Network Field Infrastructure Manager employed by the Defendant

herein.
AFFIDAV TT OF ADAM GILLINGS IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMA RY JUDGMENT
1

ORIGINAL

71

5.

I have been employed by Defendant for 2 years.

6.

Prior to that time, I was employed by MicroServ since 2011.

7.

As a part of my employment, I am responsible for the maintenance of all

the records related to the occupancy and use of what is known as the Evans Grainery
property.

8.

This location was first used in March, 2000 pursuant to an agreement

between General Mills and MicroServ.
9.

A tme and correct copy of the rental agreement with General Mills is

attached hereto as Exhibit A and fully incorporated herein.
10.

MicroServ and later LP Broadband operated pursuant to this agreement for

years, until April, 2014.
11.

Pursuant to the agreement, General Mills was paid $50.00 per month in

12.

A true and correct copy of the checks and records of these payments is

rent.

attached hereto as Exhibit B and fully incorporated herein.
13.

General Mills never refused any of these payments.

14.

Defendant and General Mills operated pursuant to this agreement until

April, 2014.
15 .

Neither General Mills nor Defendant provided a written notice canceling

the agreement or requesting Defendant to vacate the property or that Defendant would be
vacating the property.
16.

Defendant did not have any notice of a change in the property ownership

to the Plaintiff until receiving a letter from the Plaintiff in Apri l, 20 14 .
AFFIDAV IT OF ADAM GILUNGS JN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO MOTTON FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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17.

Photographs of the Evans Grainery location are attached here to as Exhibit

18.

These photographs were taken by me on November 16, 2015.

19.

The signage shown in the photographs is new signage that has been

C.

installed in the last 6 months. The current signage does not indicate Plaintiff as the
property owner. The prior only showed General Mills.

DATED this

L

day of Decem~

---

AdCnGillings
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this _ Lday of December, 2015 .

a21?J~-

~ y PUBLIC OF IDAHO
Residing in Idaho Falls
Commission: L\- 'J... \ - '2. \
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'7 fltl

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ o<
_ _ day of December, 2015, I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of
delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D
D
D
00

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax: 524-7167

22:'C

Pc'

RONALD L. SW AFFORD, ES Q.
Attorneys for Defendant
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EXHIBIT A

75

R oof-top R ental A gr eem ent
3/20/2000

Microse.rv Computer Technologies, Inc. located at 1808 E. 17'.h Street, Tdaho Falls, ID,
83404 hereby agrees to pay $50 per month to General 1i'1ills located at _ _ _ _ _ in
exchange for roof-top space on the "Evan's Grainety'' grain storage bins locatP..d at __
·_
Lincoln Road in ld.aho Falls, Idaho. General Mills also agrees to pay the electricity bill

for Mit:;toserv' s equ·ipment (....,$5 per month) localed at i.am.e location. Microserv will
contract for any power requirements necessary to install their equipment as per city, state
and county electrical and safety codes.
Microscrv will not hold General Mills or any of its employees liable for any damages,
liabilities or problems related to this installation or operati<:>n of any ofMicroscrv' s
equipment. All of the equipmenl and personnel associated with this proj ect will be
covered by M.icroscrv's insurances.
This contnwt shall be valid for no less than 3 years, and up to 5 years with annual
renewals after the first 3 years. If either party wishes to canc.:cl ~his contra.ct, they must
provide written notice of su.ch cance11ation at least 3 months prior to date of cancellation.
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28883
MICROSERV COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES, INC

1/1 B/20~6

300 .00

. Operations, Inc.
General Mills

300.00
/05--May/0 6
Scenic Falls CU

Evans

tower rental Dec
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MICROSF.RV COMPUJER TECHNOLOGIES, INC

General Miffs Operations, Inc.

30049

6/13/2006

300.00

.. Scenic Falls CU
Evans tower rental Jun/06-Nov/06
MSF500 !1-Jl-lCA
llr.M.Jus,•,

SFSt.l Cli75Hi!lt

300.00
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MICBOSERV COMPUTE R TECHNOLOG IES, INC

General Mills Operations, Inc.

35247

5/1/2008

300,00

.. Sceni c Fa lls CU

Evans tower rental Jun/08-Nov/0 8

MSf50Dl~JL- lCJ\

!fl SliJ{G!l/litll.

u1;i o u:;.

mu

300.00

TO REORDcn, CALl YOUR LOCAL SAFEGUARD OiSTAIDUroR AT206 -$22- 19) 6

H!JB181(]0100ll0

M D3$f(>2811!JJ

cmoBll IL

MICROSERV COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES, INC

37618
4/1/2009

General Mill s Operations, Inc.

300.00

.. Scenic Falls CU

TO REO RDER. CALL YOUR LOCAL SAFE GU ARO DISTRlBUTOR ,\T 2C·8-522 -199G

MSF6001Nl-1CA

'ta Sr1[·H:ilJll.ltD.. Lmmusr,

s,w

300 .00

Evans tower rental May/09-Oct/09
H393010010000

M03SF0264sa

cn:;o,i 11L
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MICROSERV COMPUTERTF.Cl·INOLOGIES, INC

38946
10/1/2009

General Mills Operations, Inc.

300.00

.. Scenic Falls CU

TO 11!,QRDrn, CJ\ll YDlm LOCAL SAFEGUARD DIS1RlllllTOR IIT208-5'.n· 19'J6

MSF6001Nl-lCA

l(iJS/iJ{Gtl/lRD.•

Urn:>USA

300.00

Evans tower rental · Nov/09-Apr/10
ll:i0B420D1 0UUO

MOJSFOW49J

S!SLI CIO/i-l!ll ll

MICAOSERV COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES, INC

General Mills Operations, Inc.

4/1/2010
300.00

.. Scen ic Falls CU
MSF60D1 NL- 1CI\

1t?Slltt (i()/\nO.. IITOIO

SA

srsu

Evans tower ren tal - May/10 - Oct/10
TO AF.ORDER, CA1.L voun I.OCAtSAFF.t'.UAno DISH~IDI/TOI~ 1\T 208-~22- 1!19fl

300.00
J-l!IB!ii.Zuo,0000

M03SF02B49J

tk7M011l l
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MICROSERV COMPUTER TECHNOI.OGIES, INC

General Mills Operations, Inc.

10/1/20"!0
300.00

.. Scenic Falls CU

Evans tower rental Nov/10 - Apr/11

300.00

TO REOROC/1, CAI.L YOUR I.OCAL 81\fEGUARD D!STRIOIJTOR AT 208-622- 1000
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M03SF020403
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MICROSERV COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES, INC

General Mills Operations, Inc.

4/1/2011
300.00

.. Scenic Falls CU

Evans tower ren tal May/11-OcU11

300.00

TO REOl\l>lffl. CALL YOUR LOCAL SAf EGUAl10 Ol5TH)HUTOR AT2C•8-G21 19!.l8
4
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MICROS ·RV COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES, INC

10/3/2011

General Mills Operations, Inc.

300.00

.•.

.. Scenic Falls CU

300.00

Evans tower rental OcU11 - April/12
H9808SD!J10000

TO RF.OADEn. CALL YOUR LOCAL SArnGUMD DISTRIBUTOH AT2v&~22-199G

MSFfi001Nl.·1CA

M03SF0l649~
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M ICROSERV COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES, INC

45 5 23
4/2/2012

General Mills Operations, Inc.

300.0 0

.. Scenic Falls CU
MSF!0OlNL-1CA

l@s11.1:i.:tillhl,II.

IOf!OUSA

Evans tower rental May/"I2-Oct/12
TD REORDER, CALL YOUR LOCAL SAFfOUMD DISTRIDUTOk AT 2011-622-1095

300.00
H98&US00100D0

MOJSF028493
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MICROSERV INCORPORATED

General Mills Operations, Inc.

57120
10/1/2012
300.00

.Bank of Com me rce -

www. lcchchoclts.net ORDRR U

300.00

Evans tower rental Nov/12-Apr/ 13

135322

MIG~Ofif.TN !l\lC'O!WOHA'l'f'.:O
General MilllS· Or..,el'blthms, i l")G.

58400
4/1/2013

.
300.00

.Bank of Comrnl:lrce ..

EvaM ~ower ren.tal May/1 3-0cV1 3

300.00
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
PAULL. FULLER (ISB No. 8435)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400

,.,. r.
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

)

Case No. CV-2015-3927

)
Plaintiff,
V.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

)

)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK FULLER

)
)

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss .
County of Bonneville)
Mark R . Full er, being first duly sworn upon his oath states
and all eges as foll ows :
1.

Aff iant is an a ttorney licensed by the State of Idaho

representing Lincoln Land Company , LLC in this matter and executes
this Affidavit upon his personal knowledge.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct

copy of Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery , served on Defendant on
July 27 , 2015.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK FULLER - 1
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(
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct

copy of Defendant's Responses to Discovery, served September 22,
2015.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct

copy of a "Meet and Confer" letter sent by Affiant to Defendant's
Attorney on October 27 , 2015.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibi t "D" is a true and correct

copy of a November 12, 2015 Letter from Ronald Swa fford to Affiant
and Supplemental Responses to Discovery from Defendant .
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct

copy of a second "Meet and Confer" le tter dated November 18, 2015
from Plaintiff to Defendant and an attached Stipulati on for
Pr o t ective Order and proposed Protective Order.
7.

Further this Affiant sayeth naught.

DATED this

3

day of
Mark R. Ful er
Attorney for Lincoln Land Company, LLC

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

d

day of December,

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK R. FULLER - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the persons listed below on this

3

day of

December, 2015:
Document Served:

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK R. FULLER

Persons Served:
Laren Covert, Esq .
Ronald L. Swafford , Esq.
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls , ID 83401

U.S.Mail

___±:__ Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Mark R. Fuller
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK R. FULLER -
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(

MARK R. FULLER (I SB No . 2698)
DANIEL R. BECK ( I SB No . 7 2 3 7)
PAUL L . FULLER (ISB No . 8435)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES , PLLC .
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE , SUITE 201
P . o . Box 5 0 9 3 5
I DAHO FALLS , ID 83405 - 0935
TELEPHONE : (208) 524 - 5400
FACSIMILE : (208) 52 4- 7167
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LI NCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
Idaho
limited
liability
comp any ,
Pl a i ntiff ,

Case No.

CV- 15 -

;;1Z1

FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

v.
LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Colorado
corp oration ,
successor
in
int erest to Mi croServ , Inc .,
an I daho corp or ati on ,
Defendant .

TO: LP BROADBAND , INC.:
Under authority of Rule 33, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, you are hereby
requested to answer in writing , and under oath , within thirty (30) days from the receipt
hereof, the following Interrogatories:
Each of the Interrogatories is deemed to be continuing and Lincoln Land Company,
LLC (hereafter "Plaintiff') makes demand upon the Defendant that in the event that at any

FIRST REQUES T FOR DISCOVERY -
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later date the Defendant obtain any additional facts, or obtain or make any assumptions, or
reach any conclusio n or opinions which are different from those set forth in its Answers to
the Interrogatories within, that in each such case the Defendant amend its Answers to
these Interrogatories promptly and sufficiently prior to trial to fully set forth such additional
facts , assumptions, conclusions , opinions , and/or contentions.
INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Note A:

The following te rms , words, and phrases shall have the following

meanings in this discovery pleading:
A.1 . The term "you " and "your" expressly refers to Defendant LP Broadband , Inc.
(hereafter "Defendant") , and any agent or rep resentative of Defendant.
A.2 . The term "documents" shall mean any kind of written, printed, typed, graphic
or photographic matter of any kind or nature, however produced or reproduced , and all
mechanical and eiectronic sound record ings and written transcripts thereof, however

produced or rep roduced , whether in your control or not, and including without limitation,
originals, all fi le copies, all other copies no matter how or by whom prepared , and all drafts
of such documents, whether used or not.
A.3. The term "identify" when used with respect to a document, or the description
or identification of a document, shall be deemed to request the nature and substance of
the document with sufficient particularity to enable the same to be requested and shall
include the date, if any, which the document bears, the names of all persons authorizing
the document, and the name and address of the custodian(s) of the original.
A.4. The term "identify" when used with respect to a person , shall be deemed to

FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 2
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request the person's full name, the person's last known business address , (if a natu ra l
person) , the person's last known residence, and the person's business and residence
telephone numbers.
A.5. The term "identify" when used with respect to oral communications , shall be

deemed to request the date and place thereof, whether said communication was in person
or by telephone, an identification (as provided in definition A.4) of each person who
participated in or heard any part of said communication , and the substance of what was
said by each person who participated in said communication .
A.6. The term "identify" when used with respect to the transfer of real or personal

property, shall be deemed to request the date of transfer, the full name and business
address of all parties to the transfer, a legal description of the real property involved and
the consideration exchanged for the transfer.
A.7 . The term "Plaintiffs Property" when used herein shall be deemed to include

the property described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
A.8 . The terms "Defendant's predecessor in interest" and "MicroServ" when used

herein shall be deemed to refer to MicroServ, Inc. , formerly known as MircroServ
Computer Technologies , Inc., and formerly known as Diversified Networking , Inc.
Note B:
B.1. These Interrogatories are continu ing in character, so as to require you to file
supplementary answers in a reasonable manner if you obtain further or different
information before trial.
B.2 . Whe re knowledge or information in possession of a party is requested, such

FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 3
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request includes information and knowledgE;J either in your possession , under your control ,
within your dominion , or available to you, regardless of whether this is in your personal
possession , or is possessed by your agents, attorneys, servants , employees, independent
contractors , representatives, insu rers or others with whom you have a relationship and
from who you are capable of deriving information, documents or material.
B.3. Each Interrogatory shall be accorded a separate answer and each subpart of
an Inte rrogatory shall be accorded a separate answer.
Interrogatory No. 1: Please list and identify all exhibits you intend or expect to
introduce into evidence at any hearings or trial of the above-entitled matter and state the
name and address of the person presently having possession of each exhibit.
Interrogatory No. 2: Please list and identify each and every fact witness you plan to
call to testify at the trial in this action and provide a brief summary of the facts to which
each such witness will testify.
Interrogatory No. 3: Please identify each and every expert witness you plan to ca ll
to testify at the trial in this action. As to each expert witness, please provide (1) a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; (2) the data
or other information considered by the witness in forming the opin ions; (3) any exhibits to
be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; (4) any qualifications of the witness,
including a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten yea rs ;
(5) the compensation to be paid fo r the expert testimony; and (6) a listing of any other
cases in which the witness has testified as an expert by trial or by deposition within the
preceding four years.
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Interrogatory No. 4:

Please identify all equipment installed by Defendant or

MicroServ, Inc. on Plaintiffs property after March 20, 2000 and the date each item of
equipment was installed .
Interrogatory No. 5: Please identify all equipment utilized by Defendant or
MicroServ, Inc., on Plaintiff's property after July 1, 2010 .
Interrogatory No. 6: Please identify the owner(s) of each piece of equipment utilized

by Defendant or MicroServ, Inc., on Plaintiffs property after July 1, 2010.
Interrogatory No. 7: Please identity all documents, agreements, or statements YOU
assert gave Defendant or MicroServ, Inc., the right to install any equipment on Plaintiffs
property.
Interrogatory No. 8: Please identify all documents, agreements, or statements YOU
assert gave Defendant or MicroServ, Inc. , the right to utilize any equipment on Plaintiffs

property.
Interrogatory No. 9: Please identify all of Defendant's or MicroServ's customers

who received service through any equipment located on Plaintiffs' property after July 1,
2010.
Interrogatory No. 10: Please identify all amounts collected by Defendant or
MicroServ, Inc., which were in any way generated by Defendant's or MicroServ's use of
Plaintiffs' property after July 1, 2010 .
Interrogatory No. 11: Please state all amounts paid by Defendant or MicroServ,
Inc., to any person or entity in exchange for the right to utilize antenna equipment on the
rooftops of grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property between July 1, 2010 and April,

FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 5
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2014.
Interrogatory No. 12: Submitted herewith are Plaintiffs First Requests for
Admission . As to each Request not unconditionally admitted , please set forth in detail each
fact upon which you rely in denying each such Request for Admission.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through its attorney of record, Mark R. Fuller of
Fuller & Beck Law Offices, PLLC , pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 34 and
requests that Defendant, produce the following documents and things for inspection and
copying at the offices of Fuller & Beck Law Offices, PLLC , 410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201 ,
Idaho Falls, Idaho, within thirty (30) days from the service hereof, unless some other time
and place is mutually agreed upon by the parties.
INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
Note A:

The following terms, words , and phrases shall have the following

meanings in th is discovery pleading:
A.1 . This request is intended to cover all the documents in possession of either
Defendant and its agents, representatives , consultants, and attorneys of the Defendant, or
those subject to its custody or control , or otherwise reasonab ly available to them,
regardless of the actual location of the documents.
A.2 . As used herein , the term 'document' or 'documents' shall mean any kind of
written , graphic, symbolic, recorded , and photographic matter of any kind or nature,
however produced or reproduced, and electron ic sound recordings and written transcripts
thereof, in your actua l or constructive possession , custody, care or contro l or otherwise
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available to you and all drafts of such documents, whether used or not.
Note B: If you withhold any documents by reason of a claim of privilege or other
reason , please identify such document, including its date, general subject matter (without
disclosing the contents) , persons to whom distributed and basis upon which the privilege is
claimed.
Note C:

These requests are deemed to be continuing so as to require

supplemental responses if you or your attorney, agents, employees, or representatives
obtain further documentation or requested information between the time these responses
are served and the time of trial.
Request No. 1: Please produce a copy of each and every document which You
intend to submit as an exhibit at trial or any hearing to be held in this action .
Request No. 2: Please produce a copy of any written or recorded statements made
by any potential witnesses in this case.
Request No. 3: Please produce a copy of any written agreement which YOU
purport gave the Defendant or Defendant's predecessor in interest the right to install any
internet antennae equipment on Plaintiffs property.
Request No. 4: Please produce a copy of any written agreement which YOU
purport gave the Defendant or Defendant's predecessor in interest the right to utilize any
internet antennae equipment on Plaintiffs property.
Request No. 5: Please produce a copy of all documents which identify Defendant's
or MicroServ's customers who received any kind of service through any of Defendant's or
MicorServ's equipment on Plaintiffs' property after July 1, 2010.
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Request No. 6: Please produce a copy of each document utilized by or referred to

by Defendant in preparing answers to these discovery requests.
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

YOU ARE HEREBY REQUESTED to admit the truth of the following matters, which
are relevant to the subject matter involved in the above mentioned pending cause, within
the scope of Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 36(b) .
Fa ilure to serve a written answer or objection within thirty (30) days after service
hereof, the time allowed by I.R.C.P. 36(a) , will result in admissions to the followin g
requests:
Request for Admission No. 1: Please admit that Defendant's predecessor in interest
installed internet or other antenna equipment on the rooftop of grain elevators located on
Plaintiff's property.
Request for Admission No. 2: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's
predecessor in interest utilized antenna equ ipment on the rooftop of grain elevators
located on Plaintiff's property.
Request for Admission No. 3: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's
predecessor in interest did not have any authorization from Plaintiff to install antenna
equipment on the rooftop of grain elevators on Plaintiffs property.
Request for Admission No. 4: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant' s
predecessor in interest did not have any authorization from Plaintiff to utilize antenna
equ ipment on the rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property.
Request for Adm ission No. 5: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's
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predecessor in interest did not pay any amount to Plaintiff for th e use of Plaintiffs property.
Request for Admission

No. 6: Please adm it Defendant and

Defendant's

predecessor in interest obtained revenue from Defendant's and Defendant's predecessor
in interest's customers as a result of the use of Plaintiffs property.
Request for Admission No. 7: Please admit that the fair market va lue for the leasing
of the rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property in order to place internet
antenna equipment was $3,450.00 per month from July, 2010 through April, 2014.
Request for Admiss ion No. 8: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's
predecessor in interest received a benefit from the utilization of antenna equipment
installed by Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in interest on the rooftop of grain
elevators located on Plaintiffs property between July, 2010 and April, 2014.
Request for Admission No. 9 : Please admit that it is unjust for Defendant to be

allowed to retain the benefit from utilization of antenna equipment installed by Defendant
or Defendant's predecessor in interest on the rooftop of grain elevators located on
Plaintiffs property between July, 2010 and Apri l, 2014 without compensating Plaintiff for
that utilization.
Request for Admission No. 10: Admit that pursuant to a Statement of Merger, filed
with the Idaho Secretary of State on May 3, 2013 , LP Broadband , Inc., is the successor in
interest of MicroServ, Inc., an Idaho corporation.
Request for Admission No. 11: Admit that a true and correct copy of the Statement
of Merger and attached Plan of Merger, filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on May3,
2013, is attached hereto as Exhibit 'B'.
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Request for Admission No. 12: Admit that a true and correct copy of the "Roof-Top
Rental Agreement", dated March 20 , 2000 , between MicroServ and Genera l Mills is
attached hereto as Exhibit 'C'.
Request for Admission No. 13: Admit that other than the "Roof-Top Rental
Agreement", attached as Exhibit 'C', Defendant has no knowledge of any other agreemtn
in any form which give Defendant or Defendant's predecessor in interest any rights upon
Plaintiffs property.
Request for Admission No. 14: Admit that the internet antenna equipment installed
by MicroServ on Plaintiffs property was functional and in use by Defendant or MicroServ
from July, 2010 through April , 2014.
DATED this _JJ_ day of ----t-~+----r--,___, 2015.

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT

A

Legal Description

The following real property in Bonneville County, Idaho:
Begimling at the South¼ corner of Section 10, Township 2 North, Range 38 East of the
Boise Meridian, Bom1eville County, Idaho; rupning thence N .89°52 1l 8"W. along the
the
Section line 47.20 feet; thence N.01 °53 113 11 W . 965.42 feet; thence East 1293.59.feetto
',,·,\ ':i :.::;,{:.~,'<t'!"·t'.:r.:,·;.
West bank of Sand Creek; thence S.32°29'40"W. along said West bank 487.30"'f~~f;·ili6nce
.
'
.
·:.·,~.:~'~(·fl ~ ·,• -~lt· .
S.26°12'35"W. along said West bank 188.91 feet; thence S.14°28 '37"W. ajqrig'- ~aj?iJW.¢st _
-,:'. -·.;·111·: .. it:.·z.~\l·:·,~1-"~ •!,,
bank 122.98 feet; thence S.02°53'54"W. along said West bank 267.63 fee\!f,·tl~i9.i ~9~i~J1r;,e
of said Section 10; thence N .89°52'1 S"W. along said Section line 825.l o.t:r~!1F£~4l~:YO~T
- .(. (:·,,.-... ~~J"' .,, .
OF BEGINNING
.
•
.,, · •. -~·.!..:·1. jf.:~1t.~:.fA;9,~~-,:~~./, .~. -·
1

·¾ft::r.t1jif:''; _':}:; :_ ,.,·

SUBJECT TO: existing easements of record.

.. :L;:{_,,~;&s~?t

CONTAINING: 983,972 sq. ft. or 22.5 89 acres.
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FILE~ EFFECTIVE
STATEMENT OF MERGER

lUIJ HAY -3 .p 2= DD
SECRE TARY ni: . .

M'icroServ, Inc.
the non -surviving Idaho corporation

STAT[ OF iiJA·Hi· lE

into

Ll" Broadband, Inc.
the surviving Colorado corporation

May 1,2013
Article I - Surviving Company
Section 1
The name of the ·company surviving the merger is LP Broadband, Inc., and such name
has not been changed as a result of the merger. The principal address of .the surviving
corporation is 400 Inverness Parkway, Suite 330, Englewood, Colorado 80112.

Section 2
The survivjng company is a Colorado corporation existing pursuant to the provisions of
the Colorado Business Corporations Act incorporated on May 8, 2003.
The effective date of the merger described herein shall be the date upon which a
Statement of Merger is filed with the Colorado Secretary of State and the Idaho Secretary of
St~te.

Article Il - Non-Surviving Company
The name of the company merging into the survivor is MicroServ, lnc. MicroServ, Inc. is
an ldalm corporation which was incorporated May l 61 1997.
Article III - Plan of Merger

The Plan of Merger, containing such information as required by Colorado Revised
Statutes § 7-90-203.3, and Idaho Code § 30-18-202, is set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto and
made a part hereof.

Article IV - Approval of Surviving Company
The Plan of Merger was duly authorized and approved by LP Broadband, Inc. in
ac cordance with Colorado Revised Starutes § 7-111-103.

Article V - Approval ofNon-Surviving Company
lOOHO SECRETARY Of' STAT£
05/03/2013 05:00

CK: 1.Mo-4S9 CT: 1728?3 BH: 13723'1
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111e Plan of Merger ,li'\taS doly ati-Umriz.ed .:uld t1j!>prov~d· by MicroServ; rnG-. in accordance
with idaho Code:§ 30~18-203.

IN Wll'NES-S WHERE.ciF.. the. t1nd'ers.igned m:c.rg:i1Jg ent.itic$ execµte this S-tatcmen~ of
Merger and:ver.1!y, subject ta.ptnaltie~rnf'perjw:y-l:hat -th:e.-stntetnents·colituini:d herein .arc ttue as
of the dates.et forth above.
MlCROSER V, .INC.

-~--------....;___:_Travis Johnson, ·Pl'esidei:'lt

By:

·, PresiQent & CF..O
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P'LAN Olt MERGER
By and Among

LP BROADBAND. INC.
a Co1orado corporation,

MieroScrv, Inc.
an Idaho corporJ.tion,

and

T~e Shareholders ofMicroServ, Inc.
1.
LP Broadband, ln~. is a Colorado corporation located at 400 Inverness Parkway, Suite
330, Englewood, Colorado 80112 ("LP Broadband"). MicroServ, foe. is an Idaho corporation located at
1808 East 17th Street, Idaho Falls, ~daho 83404 (''MicroServ").
2.
MicroServ shall, : _pursuant to the provisions of the Colorado Corporations and
Associations Act, the Colorado Bµsiness Corporations Act, and the Jdaho Entity Transactions Act, be
merged with and into LP Broad~and, which shall be the surviving company upon the effective date
("Effective Date") of the merger (the "Surviving Company'), nnd which shall continue to exist as said
Surviving Company pursuant to t~e provisions of the Colorado Corporations and Asoocia.tions Act, the
Colorado Business Corporations A,ct, and the Idaho Entity Transactions Act. The separate existence of
MicroScrv (the "Terminating Company"), shall cease upon said Effective Date in accordance with the
Colorado Corporations and Asso4iations Act, the Colorado Business Corporations Act, and the Idaho
Entity Transactions Act, and tbe~eupon MicroServ and LP Broadband shall be a sfugle corporation,
ope.ating under the name, "LP Broadband, Inc."

3.
The Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws of LP Broadband, Inc. as in force and effect
upon the Effective Date of the merger shall be the Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws of the
Surviving Company.
:
4.
The officers and directors of LP Broadband, Inc_ in office upon the Effective Date of the
merger shall continue to be the officers and directors of said Surviving Company untiJ their successors
s all have been selected and qualifi(?d.

5.
On the Effective :bate, by virtUe of the merger and without any action on the part of any
holder thereof, all issued and outstanding shares of MicroScrv ("Share/~") shall be exchanged for the r.ight
to receive a percentage of the aggregate cash consideration as defined in the Agreement and Plar'I of
Merger (the "Merger Consideration"). The allocation of the Merger Consideration shnU be based upon
the percent.age interest of Shares ~cld by ench shareholder,
The Plan of Merger has been approved by the shareholders of the Surviving Company
6.
and the shareholders of the Tcnninating Company in the manner prescribed by the provis.ions of the
Colorado Corporations and Asso;ciations Act~ the Colorado Business Corporations Act, and the Idaho
Entity Transactions Act, as appli;cable. The l'erminating Company a..11d the Surviving Company her~by
stipulate that thoy will cause to ; be executed Md filed and/or recorded any document or documents
prescribed by the laws of the State of Colorado end lhe State of Idaho, and that they will· cause to be
performed all necessary acts ther~in and elsewhere to effectuate the merger.
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7.
The directors and the proper officers of each of the parties hereto are hereby authori:t.ed,
empowered, and directed to do any and all acts and 1hings, and to make, execute, deliver, file and/or
record any and all instruments papers, and documents which sJ1all be or become necessary, proper, or
convenient to carry out or put into e!l'cct any of the provisions of the Plan of Merger or of the merger
herein provided for.
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Roof-top Rental Agreement
3/20/2000

Microserv Computer Technologies, Inc . located at 1808 E. 171h Street, Tdaho Falls, ID,
83404 hereby agrees to pay $50 per month to General ~ills located at _ _ _ __ in
~xchange for roof-top space on the ''Evan's Grainery'' grain storage bins located at __
·_
Lincoln Road in 'Idaho Falts, ldaho. General Mills also agrees to pay the elecnicity bill
for Mti:;toserv's equ:i_pment (,...,$5 per month) locat.t:d at same loc-ation. Microserv will
contract for any power requirements necessary to install their equipment as per city, state
and county electrical and safety codes.
Microserv will not hold General Mills or any of its employees liable for any damages,
liabilit ies or problems related to this installation or operation of any ofMicroscrv's
equipment. All of the equipment and personnel associated with this project will be
covered by Microscrv's insurances.
This contract shall be valid for no less than 3 years, and up to 5 years with annual
renewals after the fiTsr 3 years. If either party wishes to cancel this contract, they mu.st
nrnvide written notice of such ca.nce11ation at least 3 months prior to date of cancellation.

't X·, u131T
C
I Ht !
116

Sep, 22.20 15 4:06 PM

Sw(i d Law, P, C.

(

No. 486 1

P. 3

SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
R. James Archibald, Esq., Bar No. 4445
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Lanen K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Case No. CV-2015-3927

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO
PLAINTIFF 1 S FIRST REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

vs.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, LP Broadband) Inc., by and through its attorney of record,
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., and responds to Plaintiffs First Request for Discovery as follows:

lNTERROGATORIES
Interrogatory No. 1: Please list and identify all exhibits you intend or expect to introduce
into evidence at any hearings or trial of the above-entitled matter and state the name and address of
the person presently having possession of each exhibit.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Defendant has not completed discovery.
Defendant has not yet determined the exhibits which are intended or expected to be introduced

.1
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into evidence at any hearing or trial. Defendant will supplement discovery seasonably upon
completion of discovery.
Interrogatory No. 2: Please list and identify each and every fact witness you plan to call to
testify at the trial in this action and provide a brief summaiy of the facts to which each such witness

will testify.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Defendant has not completed discovery.
Defendant has not yet determined the witnesses which are intended or expected to testify at any
hearing or trial. Defendant will supplement discovery seasonably upon completion of discovery.
Interrogatory No. 3:

Please identify each and every expert witness you plan to call to

testify at the trial in this action. As to each expert witness, please provide (1) a complete statement
of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; (2) the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming the opiruons; (3) any exhibits to be used as a summary of or
support for the opinions; (4) any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; (5) the compensation to be paid for the
expert testimony; and (6) a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert

by trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Defendant has not completed discovery.
Defendant has not yet detennined the expert witnesses which are intended or expected to testify
at any hearing or trial, Defendant will supplement discovery seasonably upon completion of
discovery.
Interrogatory No. 4: Please identify all equipment installed by Defendant or MicroServJ Inc.
on Plaintiff's property after March 20, 2000 and the date each item of equipment was installed.
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: The equipment originally installed upon
the grain elevators in 2000 was pursuant to an agreement between General Mills and MicroServ,
Inc. prior to the time Lincoln Land Company, LLC acquired any ownership interest in said grain
elevators in 2006. (see Exhibit C attached to Plaintiffs complaint) MicroServ, Inc. entered into
a second agreement referred to as a "Tower Agreement" on or about Ap1il of 2013. The merger

of LP Broadband and MicroServ. Inc. occurred on or about May 3, 2013. (See att~chrnent A to

Plaintiffs complaint) Defendant is not certain as to the exact nature and specifics of all
equipment originally installed by MicroServ, Inc. on the property owned by General Mills on
July 1, 2000. Defendant is has insufficient information as to the specific description of the
equipment installed upon the General Mills property prior to the purchase of the property by
Lincoln Land Company, LLC, and/or prior to the merger ofMicroServ, Inc. and LP Broadband.
The equipment installed upon the grain elevators pursuant to agreements between

MicroServ, Inc., and General Mills after the merger between LP Broadband and MicroServ, Inc.,
is as follows:

QUANTITY

DEVICE
Laird Sing]e Polarity 5ghz sector Antenna
Ubiquiti Airrnax Antenna
Arc Wireless dual pol panel antenna
Arc Wireless single pol sector antenna
MTI dual pol panel antenna
Ubiquiti Power Bridge MS
Ubiquiti Rocket M5
Ubiquiti Rocket M2
Mikrotik Access point
Motorola Canopy PMPl 00 Access point
Cambium PMP450 Access point
Motorola Canopy CMM4
Motorola Canopy CMlvl3
Last Mile CTM-Master
Last Mile CTM-Slave
Digital Loggers Web rebooter
Cisco Catalyst Switch

IO
5
2

2
4
2
4
1
2

10
4

1
1
1
1

3
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APC 1400 UPS with external batt.
Full Rack
D~link Web Camera
Trango Apex 23 ghz Microwave backhaul
Mikrotik backhaul 5ghz

P. 6

2

l
1
1
1

Interrogatory No. 5: Please identify all equipment utilized by Defendant or MicroServ, Inc.,
on Plaintiff's property after July 1, 2010.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 4 above.
Interrogatory No. 6: Please identify the owner(s) of each piece of equipment utilized by
Defendant or MicroServ, Inc., on Plaintiffs property after July 1, 2010.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Defendant is unaware of the details of
equipment o·wnership from July l: 20 10 to the date of merger, May 3, 2013, but presumes
MicroServ, Inc. was the owner of each piece of said equipment. All equipment listed in Answer
to Interrogatory No, 4 above was 0,:1.ined by Microserv, Inc. and subsequently by LP Broadband

following the merger of the two companies in May, 2013. There was no equipment utilized by
Defendant or defendant in interest that they did not own.
Interrogatory No. 7: Please identify all documents, agreements, or statements YOU assert
gave Defendant or MicroServ, Inc., the right to install any equipment on Plaintiff's property.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

The original agreement identified as

Exhibit C to Plaintiffs Complaint is presumed to be the agreement which provided the original
right of MicroServ, Inc. to install equipment on the property then owned by General Mills. The
agreement entitled Tower Agreement, referred to as Exhibit C.

It is presumed that

Micr0Sen1, Inc., occupied the premises on a month to month tenancy after the expiration of the
original lease agreement, which continued until the second rental agreement entitled "Tower
Agreement" was entered into in March of 2013. All occupancy of Defendant, at all times, was as
120
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a lessee of MicroServ, Inc., who was a lessee from General Mills, who occupied the premises
from 2006 to the present under a lease agreement with Lincoln Land Company, LLC, the terms
of which were unknown to MincroServ, Inc. and LP Broadband.
Interrogatory No. 8: Please identify all documents, agreements, or statements YOU assert
gave Defendant or MicroServ, Inc., the right to utilize any equipment on Plaintiffs property.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: This is a repeat of Interrogatory No. 7
above. Please see the Answer to Interrogatory No. 7 above.
Interrogatory No. 9: Please identify all of Defendant's or MicroServ's customers who
received service through any equipment located on Plaintiffs' property after July l , 2010.

ANS'WER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: This request is ambiguous, as it does not
define what is intended to be a "service". Defendant does not have access or knowledge of all of
MicroServ, Inc. 's customers prior to July 1, 2010. The information sought is not reasonably
available to Defendant for services provided prior to the merger. The information is outside the
scope of Rule 26 IRCP, as it will not provide relevant evidence, nor lead to the discovery of
relevant evidence. Further, the information is confidential internal trade secrets of Defendant, as
it requires disclosure of customer information which could potentially reveal trade secrets
pertaining to the identity of customers, the rates and terms for customers and other trade secret
information normally protected This interrogatory 1s overly burdensome and oppressive, m that
it requires Defendant to obtain information from a non party corporation prior to the merger with
that corporation. It is further oppressive and burdensome in that it seeks information for periods

of time which are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.

121

Sep.22. 2015 4:06 PM

Swafr'

aw, P.C.

No. 4861

' 8

The information sought is not relevant, as Plaintiffs Complaint requests damages based
solely upon a competitive or comparative rate alleged to be $3,450.00 per month, and not based
upon services rendered or income from services rendered.
Interrogatory No . 10: Please identify all amounts collected by Defendant or MicroServ, Inc.,
which were in any way generated by Defendanf s or MicroServ' s use of Plaintiffs' property after

July 1, 2010.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: This request js ambiguous, as it does not
define what is intended to be a ''service". Defendant does not have access or knowledge of all of
MicroServ, Inc. 's customers prior to July 1, 2010. The information sought is not reasonably
available to Defendant for services provided prior to the merger. The information is outside the
scope of Rule 26 IRCP, as it will not provide relevant evidence, nor lead to the discovery of
relevant evidence. Further, the information is confidential internal trade secrets of Defendant, as
it requires disclosure of customer information which could potentially reveal trade secrets
pertaining to the identity of customers, the rates and terms for customers and other trade secret
i. •1 or.mation normally protected. This interrogatory is overly burdensome and oppressive, in that

it requires Defendant to obtain information from a non party corporation pnor to the merger with
that corporation, It is further oppressive and burdensome in that it seeks information for periods

of time which are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation.
The information sought is not relevant, as Plaintiffs Complaint requests damages based
solely upon a competitive or comparative rate alleged to be $3 450.00 per month, and not based
upon services rendered or income from services rendered
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Interrogatory No. 11 : Please state all amounts paid by Defendant or MicroServ, Inc ., to any
person or entity in exchange for the right to utilize antenna equipment on the rooftops of grain
elevators located on Plaintiff's property between July 1, 2010 and April: 20 14.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Microserv, LLC and subsequently LP
Broadband, LLC paid fifty dollars ($50.00) per month to General Mills as per the contract/lease
agreement from 2000 fo1ward. This continued up through April, 2014.
This request is ambiguous, as it does not define what is intended to be a ,:service"
Defendant does not have access or knowledge of all of MicroServ, Inc.' s customers prior to July
1,201 0. The information sought is notreasonably available to Defendant for services provided
prior to the merger. The information is outside the scope of Rule 26 JRCP, as it will not provide
relevant evidence, nor lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. Further, the information is
confidential internal trade secrets of Defendant, as it requires disclosure of customer information

which could potentially reveal trade secrets pertaining to the identity· of customers, the rates and
terms for customers and other trade secret information normally protected. This intenogatory is
overly ' -densome and oppressive, in that it requires Defendant to obtain information frorn a
non party corporation prior to the merger with that corporation. It is further oppressive and
burdensome in that it seeks information for periods of time which are barred by the applicable
statutes of limitation.
The information sought is not relevant, as Plaintiff s Complaint requests damages based
solely upon a competitive or comparative rate alleged to be $3,450.00 per month, and not based

upon services rendered or income from services rendered.
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Interrogatory No. 12: Submitted herewith are Plaintiffs First Requests for Admission. As to
each Request not unconditionally admitted, please set forth in detail each fact upon which you rely

in denying each such Request for Admission.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 12:
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
Request No. I : Please produce a copy of each and every document which you intend to
submit as an exhibit at trial or any hearing to be held in this action.

RESPONSE NO. 1: Please see response to Interrogatory 1.
Request No. 2: Please produce a copy of any written or recorded statements made by any
potential witnesses in this case.

RESPONSE NO. 2:

The defendant is not aware of any written or oral statement at this

time, but has not interviewed or questioned each -witness Witnesses have not been identified to
date. This will supplement as necessary.
Request No 3: Please produce a copy of any written agreement which YOU purport gave
the Defend'.lnt or Defendant's predecessor in interest the right to install any internet antennae

equipment on P laintiffs property.

RESPONSE NO. 3: See Exhibit 1 (2000 agreement attached to Plaintiffs complaint) and
Exhibit 2 (2013) Tower Agreement.
Request No. 4: Please produce a copy of any ,vritten agreement which YOU purport gave
the Defendant or Defendant's predecessor in interest the right to utilize any internet antennae

equipment on Plaintiff's property.

RESPONSE NO. 4: This is a repeat of Request for Production No 3. See Response to No
3 immediately above.
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Request No. 5: Please produce a copy of all documents which identify Defendant's or
MicroServ's customers who received any kind of service through any of Defendant's or
M1corSer•/s equipment on Plaintiffs' property after July 1, 2010.

RESPONSE NO. 5: The defendant objects to Request for Production No. 5.

See

Defendant's response to Interrogatory No. 9 and I 0.
Request No. 6: Please produce a copy of each document utilized by or referred to by
Defendant in preparing answers to these discovery requests.

RESPONSE NO. 6: Other than the Interrogatories, Request for Production and Request for
Admission, the Defendant used Attachment 1 and 2, each of which are attached.

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Request for Admission No 1: Please admit that Defendant's predecessor in interest installed
internet or other antenna equipment on the rooftop of grain located on Plaintiffs property.

RESPONSE NO. 1. Admits installation of internet or other antenna equipment on the
rooftop of property owned by General Mills, through contractual agreement. Defendant further
admits that the equipment remained upon the grain elevators thereafter pursuant to a contract/lease
with General Mills, until removal. The defendant admits that recently received notice and
documents, which the defendant has become aware of a sales transaction between General Mills and
Lincoln Land, which is believed to have occurred in 2006. The Plaintiff failed to notify the
defendant of his ownership interest at the time of purchase, nor thereafter until this dispute began.
Request for _Admission No. 2: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in interest
utilized antenna equipment on the rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property.
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RESPONSE NO. 2: Admits that prior to the purchase of the grain elevators by Linco]n
land from General Mills, the Defendant's predecessor and defendant used the tops of the
Grain elevators pursuant to ongoing lease agreement.s with General Mills. Subsequent to Lincoln
Land's acquisition of the property, the Defendant continued use of the premises pursuant to lease
agreement with General Mills, the Plaintiff's implied agent, who continued to possess and occupy
the premises at all times herein.
Request for Admission No. 3: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor m
interest did not have any authorization from Plaintiff to install antenna equipment on the rooftop of
grain elevators on Plaintiff's property.
RESPONSE NO. 3:
RESPONSE NO 3: Request No 3 is identical to Request No. 4. See response to 4 below
Request for Admission No. 4: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest did not have any authorization from Plaintiff to utilize antenna equipment on the rooftop of
grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property.
RESPONSE NO. 4: The Defendant admits that defendant had no authorization from
Plaintiff in 2000. Plaintiff had no ownership interest at that time. The defendant had no direct
authorization from Plaintiff after 2006, other than through Plaintiff's implied agent General Mills.
The Defendant occupied the premises exclusively through rental/lease agreement ·with General
Mills until March of 2014 through General Mills.

The equipment was clearly visible to the

Plaintiff during the entire period. The Defendant's predecessor had authorization from Plaintiffs
agent assignee, designee General Mills, who Plaintiff left in possession.
Request for Admission No. 5: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant s predecessor in

interest did rrot pay any amount to Plaintiff for the use of Plaintiff's prope1t}'.
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RESPONSE NO. 5: Defendant admits that no payments were made directly to the
Plaintiff. All payments were made to General Mills purpo1ted owner until 2006. The defendant' s
continued payments after 2006 to General Mills, implied agent of the Plaintiff
Request for AdmissiQil No. 6: Please admit Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest obtained revenue from Defendant's and Defendant's predecessor in interest's customers as a
result of the use of Plaintiffs property.

RESPONSE NO. 6: Admits
Request for Admission No. 7: Please admit that the fair market value for the leasing of the
rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiff's property in order to place mtemet antenna
equipment was $3,450.00 per month from July, 2010 through April, 2014.

RESPONSE NO. 7: Denies
Request for Admission No. 8: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest received a benefit from the utilization of antenna equipment installed by Defendant and
Defendant's predecessor in interest on the rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiff's property
betweeE July, 2010 and April, 2014.

RESPONSE NO. 8: Defendant admits that benefits were received as a result of the
contractual/lease agreement between Defendant/Defendant's predecessor with General Mills,
Lessor and implied agent of the Plaintiff.
Request for Admission No. 9: Please admit that it is unjust for Defendant to be allowed to
retain the benefit from utilization of antenna equipment installed by Defendant or Defendant's
predecessor in interest on the rooftop of grain elevators located on Plaintiff's property between July,

2010 and April, 2014 v,iithout compensating Plaintiff for that utilization.
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RESPONSE NO. 9: Denies. All benefits of occupancy occurred exclusively through a
lease/rental agreement beginning in the year 2000, extended thereafter to 20 18.

There existed a

"Tower Agreement" from March of 201 3 which was to provide occupancy until 2018.
The rooftop rental agreement of 2000, between MicroServ, Inc. and General Mills
predates'Plaintiffs interest in the property. Had Plaintiff performed the necessary due diligence

· prior to purchasing the property in 2006, Plaintiff either knew or should have of the installation
of wireless antenna's and equipment atop the grain elevator. The equipment was visible.
Request for Admission No. 10· Admit that pursuant to a Statement of Merger, filed with the
ldallo Secretary of State on May 3, 2013, LP Broadband, Inc. is the successor in interest of
MicroServ, Inc., an Idaho corporation.

RESPONSE NO. 10: Admits . .
Request for Admission No. 11: Admit that a true and correct copy of the Statement of

Merger and attached Plan of Merger, filed with the Idaho Secretary of State on May3, 2013, is
attached hereto as Exhibit ' B' .

RESPONSE N0.11: Admits
Request for Admission No . 12: Admit 1hat a true and correct copy of the "Roof-Top Rental
Agreement", dated March 20, 2000, bet\.Veen MicroServ and General Mills is attached hereto as
Exhibit 'C'.

RESPONSE NO. 12: Admits Exhibit C was attached to the Plaintiff's complaint.
Request for Admission No. 13: Admit that other than the' Roof-Top Rental Agreement";
attached as Exhibit ' C', Defendant has no knowledge of any other agreement in any form wruch
give Defendant or Defendant's predecessor i11 interest any rights upon Plaintiff's property,
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RESPONSE N0.13: Denies, See Tower Agreement attached pursuant to Request for
Production of Document No. 3
Request for Admission No. 14. Admit that the internet antenna equipment installed by

MicroServ on Plaintiffs property was functional and in use by Defendant or MicroServ from July,
2010 through April, 2014.

RESPONSE NO. 14: Admits.
DATED this

2~y of September, 20 15.
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County of

, being first swor.n 1 depl)l:Jell an.d .~tates:

I um the defendant in this case, l have read tho foregoing Defcndum' ;; Answcra to
Pldntitl's Fir.st Request fol' Discover, ond believe the fa.ot9 and st!\tements S(lt out therein to be

truo and correct to th(:.) btiSt of my knowledge, information and be ef.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

11_ day of Septomber, 20 I5.

fYJ1did~ri. ~. Yl-&Q

Notary

PubU or Colo o. o

My Commls on Bxplrtis: fl1o.~

1- q 2-0 f l.f
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FULL.cR & BECK LAW OFFICES, t-i..LC.
1

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
Paul L. Fuller - Associate

410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0935

Telephone: (2081 524-5400
Facsimile : (208) 524-7167
Email: fullerandbeck@gmail.com

Via Facsimile: 208-524-4131
October 27, 2015

Ronald L. Swafford
SWAFFORD LAW OFFICE, P.C.
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Re:

Lincoln Land Company, LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc.

Dear Ron :
This letter follows up on Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs First Request for Discovery. As noted in several emails sent directly to your office, a copy of the April, 2013, "Tower Agreement" referenced in mu ltiple
discovery responses was not attached to your Responses to Requests for Production. Please provide a copy
of that 2013 "Tower Agreement" at your earliest convenience.
I also believe that your response to Interrogatory No. 8 is mistaken. Interrogatory No. 7 requests documents
giving Defendant or MicroServ the right to install any equipment on Plaintiff's property. Interrogatory No. 8 is
different, requesting all documents which you assert gave Defendant or MicroServ the right to utilize any
equipment on Plaintiff's property. Interrogatory No. 8 is not a repeat of Interrogatory No. 7, but requests
different information . While the same documents may be responsive to Interrogatory No. 7 and Interrogatory
No. 8, the Interrogatories are not repetitious and should be independently answered.
Interrogatory No . 9 requests the identification of customers who used the equipment "after July 1, 201 O." The
response to Interrogatory No. 9 states that "Defendant does not have access or knowledge of all of
MicroServ's customers prior to July 1, 201 O." Customers prior to July 1, 2010 have not been requested. Your
client has not responded to the request for identification of customers after July 1, 201 O and this information
is directly relevant to the unjust enrichment claim asserted by Plaintiff. These same facts are present with
regard to Interrogatory No. 10 which requests income generated "after July 1, 2010." Defendant's lack of
knowledge of MicroServ's customers prior to July 1, 2010 is not relevant and does not justify any nonres ponse to this Interrogatory.
Your response to Interrogatories Nos. 1O and 11 asserting that Plaintiff's Complaint bases damages solely
upon a "competitive or compa rative rate alleged to be $1,450.00 per month , and not based upon services
rendered or income from services rendered", is a misunderstanding or misstatement of Plaintiff's Complaint.
In Paragraph 7, Plaintiff specifically states that LP has been enriched "in an amount of at least $3,450.00 per
month ... or such other amount as may be proven at trial. .. ." Total damages are req uested in an amount of "no
less than $153,450.00 , or such amount as may be proven at trial. " The identification of the customers and
income generated by LP Broadband and MicroServ, Inc., after July 1, 2010 is directly relevant and will lead to
the discovery of relevant evidence.
In addition, your objection that these Interrogatories "requires Defendant to obtain information from a nonparty corporation prior to the merger with that corporation", has no basis in fact. As a result of the Statement
of Merger, filed May 3, 2013, LP Broadband, Inc., as the survivor entity is the direct successor to MicroServ.
The Plan of Merger, Paragraph 2, provides that the separate existence of MicroServ shall cease upon
acceptance of the Plan of Merger by both the States of Colorado and Idaho. Specifically, LP Broadband has
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become MicroServ for all purposes after the merger, including the production of documents and responses
to these Discovery Requests do not involve a non-party corporation. Your assertion in response to
Interrogatory No. 11 that "information regarding amounts paid to MicroServ is not read ily available to
Defendant for services provided prior to the merger" is simply not accu rate, as MicroServ has legally become
LP Broadband. The ABA Official Comment to Idaho Code Section 30-1 -1107 states: "Under section 1107(1 ),
in the case of a merger the survivor and the parties that merge into the survivor become one. The survivor
automatically becomes the owner of all real and personal property and becomes subject to all the liabilities,
actual or contingent, of each party that is merged into it." This is an automatic joinder, requiring no action by
LP Broadband , and not capable of avoidance by LP Broadband . Please make such effort as is necessary to
obta in and produce these documents.

With regard to Requests for Production, as noted above, your response to Request No. 3 identifies a 2013
"Tower Agreement" which has not been provided . Your assertion that Request No. 4 is a repeat of Request
No. 3 is not accurate, as explained above, and an independent response to Request No. 4 is requested. As
explained above, your refusal to respond to Request No. 5 to identify customers is without basis and a full
response to Request for Production No. 5 is requested .
W ith regard to Requests fo r Admission , your assertion that Request No. 3 is a repeat of Request No. 4 is not
accurate and an independent response to Request No. 3, rega rdin g authorization to insta ll antennae
equ ipment, is requested . Request No. 12 asks for the admission that a true and correct copy of an
agreement has been attached. Your response "Admits Exhibit 'C' was attached to the Plaintiffs Complaint" is
nonresponsive , and does not admit or deny that the document attached is a true and correct copy. Please
respond directly to Request No. 12 to establish the genuineness of the document attached, not simply its
attachment.
Please consider this letter to be a Meet and Confer Request, pursuant to IRCP 37(a)(2), in an attempt to
secure the above-requested disclosures without court action . In the absence of supplemental responses to
each of the items listed above with in fourteen (14) days from the date of this letter, a Motion to Compel will be
fi led to obtain complete and non-evasive responses.
As noted in our earlier conversation, if you will forward a proposed Amended Answer and Third Party
Complaint for my review, it is my hope that I can obtain approval from my client to stipulate to such
amendment, avoiding the need for a hearing . We have been patient in allowing your full investigation of this
matter, but in the absence of mediation , preparation for trial and litigation must proceed . I await a response at
your earl iest conven ience.
Best personal regards ,
FULLER & BECK

~-<~
Mark R. Fuller
Attorney at Law

c: client
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
655 S, WOODRUFF AVENUE
IDAHO FALLS) IDAHO 83401
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-4002
FAX: (208) 524-4131
RONALD L. SWAFFORD-ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
TREVOR. L. CASTLETON - ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
LARREN K. COVERT - ATTORNEY-AT-LAW

ASSIST ANT
MARTANN OLSEN - LEGAL ASSISTANT
SIOBHAN ASHMBNT-LEOAL ASSISTANT

TWINKIE Sw AFFORD - LEGAL

November 12, 2015

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
RE:

VIAFACSJMILE
524-7167

Lincoln Land Company, LLC v. LP Broadband
Ca.se No. CV-2015-3927

Dear Mai:k:
Thank you your meet and confer letter of October 27, 2015. I believe I sent via email the
'(Tower Agreement''. I will attach another copy to this letter to make certain it was received.
Interrogatory No. 8: You are correct in identifying my interpretation. I will amend it, but
it will involve the identical documents. The answer is nevertheless identical.

Interrogatories Nos. 9 and 10: No doubt you realize that you are seeking ''confidential
trade secrets", which won't be provided except by court order. I don't believe that your claim
of unjust enrichm.ent is applicable to LP Broadband. The 2000 lease clearly states that it is for a
term of 3 to 5 years initially, and annually thereafter. Written notice was requited to cancel it.
Obviously LP Broadband was operating under the written lease at all times until they vacated in
April of 2014.
I will file a Motion for a Protective Order with regard to Interrogatories Nos. 9, 10, 11
and Request No . 5. I would request that we jointly seek a mutually agreeable date for this
hearing. I will check with you office before setting it
You have a valid claim against General Mills for your damages but not LP Broadband. I
will b.e filing a Motion for Summary Judgment in the near future.
Your letter in paragraph pertaining to Microsoft records is subject to the same objection ..
We will simply have to present this to the court. I don't see that it is relevant to LP Broadband,
and again it is protected and private information.
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I am modifying the Responses which you will receive in the next few days.
Sincerely,

SWAFFORD LAW. P.C.

!Fd~~SQ
Enclosures as stated
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq. , Bar No. 1657
R. James Archibald, Esq., Bar No. 4445
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Larren k. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Case No. CV-2015-3927

Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST REQUEST FOR
DISCOVERY

VS.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant, LP Broadband, Inc., by and through its attorney of record,
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., and responds to Plaintiffs First Request for Discovery as follows:

INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatory No. 7: Please identify all documents, agreements, or statements YOU assert
gave Defendant or MicroServ, Inc., the right to install any equipment on Plaintiff's property.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

The original agreement identified as

Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Complaint titled "Roof Top Agreement" dated March 20> 2000.
Interrogatory No.~: Please identify all documents, agreements, or statements YOU assert
gave Defendant or MicroServ, Inc., the right to utilize any equipment on Plaintiff' s property.
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ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8.: The March 20, 2000 the document attached
.as Exhibit C to Plaintiffs Complaint described more particularly in Answer to Interrogatory No. 7,
which by its terms was renewed annually each year. Neither party provided written notice of
cancellation. See also the unsigned "Tower Agreement" dated of April, 2013. LP Broadband
believes General Mills has the executed copy.
Interrogatory No. 9: Please identify all of Defendant's or MicroServ's customers who
received service through any equipment located on Plaintiffs' property after July 1, 2010.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: This request is ambiguous, as it does not
define what is intended to be a "service". The request is extremely burdensome and oppressive
in that it requires review of five years worth of records.
The information is outside the scope of Rule 26 ~RCP, as it will not provide relevant
evidence, nor lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. LP Broadband was a legal tenant under
a written lease agreement between General Mills and Lincoln Broadband, and complied with the
lease agreement at all times.
Further, the information is confidential internal trade secrets of Defendant, as it requues
disclosure of customer informatjon which require disclosure of trade secrets pertaining to the
identity of customers, the rates and terms for customers and other trade secret information
critical to the business of LP Broadband. It is further oppressive and burdensome in that it seeks
information for periods oftime which are barred by the applicable statutes oflimitation.
The information sought is not relevant, as Plaintiffs Complaint requests damages based
solely upon a competitive or comparative rate alleged to be $3,450.00 per month, and not based
upon services rendered or income from senrices rendered. LP Broadband cannot be deemed to
have been unjustly enriched by a written lease agreement with Lincoln Land' s tenant.
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Inten ogatory No. 10: Please identify all amounts collected by Defendant or MicroServ, Inc.,
which were in any way generated by Defendant's or MicroServ's use of Plaintiffs' property after

July 1, 20 10.

ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10:.

See Defendant's Answer to

Interrogatory No. 7. The information is outside the scope of Rule 26 IRCP, as it will not provide
relevant evidence, nor lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. Further, the information is
confidential internal 1rade secrets of Defendant, as it requires disclosure of customer information
which would require disclosure of trade secrets pertaining to the identity of customers, the rates
and terms for customers and other trade secret information normally protected. The information
sought is-not relevant, as Plaintiff s Complaint requests damages based solely upon a competitive
or comparative rate alleged to be $3,450.00 per month, and not based upon services rendered or
income from services rendered.
Interrogatory No. 11 : Please state all an1ounts paid by Defendant or MicroServ, Inc., to any
person or entity in exchange for the right to utilize antenna equipment on the rooftops of grain
I

elevators located on Plaintiff's property between July 1, 20 10 and April, 20 14.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 11: MicroServ, LLC and subsequently LP

Broadband, LLC paid fifty dollars ($50.00) per month to General Mills as per the contraci/lease
agreement from 2000 fmward. This continued up through April, 2014.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
Request No. 4: Please produce a copy of any written agreement which you purport gave the
Defendant or Defendant' s predecessor in interest the right to utilize any internet antennae equipment
on Plaintiff' s property.

RESPONSE NO. 4: See Response to Request No. 3.
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Request No. 5: Please produce a copy of all documents which identify Defendant's or
Micr0Serv 1 s customers who received any kind of service through any of Defendant's or
MicorServ's equipment on Plaintiffs' property after July 1, 2010.

RESPONSE NO. 5: Defendant objects to Request for Production No. 5. See Defendant's
Answers to Interro gatory Nos. 9 and I 0.
Request No. 6: Please produce a copy of each document utilized by or referred to by
Defendant in preparing answers to these discovery requests.

RESPONSE NO. 6: Other than the Interrogatories, Request for Production and Request for
Admission, the Defendant used Attachment 1 and 2, each of which are attached.

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
Request for Admission No. 3: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest did not have any authorization from Plaintiff to install antern1a equipment on the rooftop of

grain elevators on Plaintiff's prop rty.

RESPONSE NO 3: Admits.
Request for Admission No. 4: Please admit that Defendant and Defendant's predecessor in
interest did not have any authorization from Plaintiff to utilize antenna equipment on the rnoftop of
grain elevators located on Plaintiffs property.
RESPONSE NO. 4: Admits. Defendant admits tbat Defendant had no authorization from
Plaintiff in 2000. P1aintiffhad no m-vnership interest at that time. Defendant'had no direct
authorization from Plaintiff after 2006, other than through Plaintiffs implied agent General Mills.
Defendant occupied the premises exclusively through rental/lease agreement with and through
General Mills until March of 20 14. The equipment was clearly visible to P]aintiff during the entire

138

Nov. 17. 20 15 1:47)M

Law, P. C.

No . 5948

P. 6

period. TI1e Defendant's predecessor had autholization from Plaintiffs agent~ assignee, designee
General Mills, wbo Plaintiff left in possession.
RESPONSE NO. 12: Admits.

DATED this

l~ day ofNovember, 20 15.

RONALD L. SWAFFORD, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant
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VERJFICATION
STATE OF COLORADO

)

County of Arapahoe

)

:ss

Albert D. Fosbenner, being first swom, deposes and states:
I am 1he defendant in this case, I have read the foregoing Defendant's Answers to
Plaintiffs First Request for Discover, Eilld believe the facts and statements set out therein to be
true and co1Tect to the besc of my knowledge, information and e ·ef.

ALBERT FOSBE .- • R

Senior Vice Presicle.nt, Finance and Accounting

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN·to before me this lk__ day ofNovember, 2015,
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FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, t"LLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
Paul Fuller - Associate

410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0935

Telephone
(208) 524-5400
Facsimile
(208) 524-7167

Via Facsimile: 208-524-4131

November 18, 2015
Ronald L. Swafford
SWAFFORD LAW OFFICE, P.C.
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls , ID 83401

RE:

Lincoln Land Company, LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc.
Stipulation for Protective Order

Dear Ron :
This letter is in response to your letter dated November 12, 20 15. I do not believe there is a need for a
hearing on your Motion for a Protective Order, as we are willing to stipulate to an appropriate Protective
Order regarding the information requested in Interrogatories Nos. 9, 10, 11 , and Request for Production
No. 5. Attached is a proposed Protective Order and Stipulation for Protective Order for your review and
signature.
Please let me know if entry of such a Protective Order will satisfy your concerns and allow you to respond
to the discovery we have requested. If you are unwilling to respond to the discovery, even with entry of a
Protective Order, I will proceed with a Motion to Compel.
As a hearing on our Motion for Summary Judgment is already scheduled for December 16, 2015 at 9:00
AM, that will likely be the date selected for a hearing on the Motion to Compel. Please let me know by
November 30, 2015, whether you will respond to the remain ing discovery requests, specifically
Interrogatories No. 9, 10, 11 and Request for Production No. 5, so that I can timely file the Motion to
Compel, if needed .

Very truly yours,
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney at Law

Enclosures :

Stipulation for Protective Order
Proposed Protective Order

(
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB NO. 2698)
PAUL L. FULLER (ISB NO. 8435)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE
P.O. Box 50935
IDAH0 FALLS , IDAHO 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC ,

)

Plaintiff,

)
)
)

V.

)
LP BROADBAND, INC. ,

Defendant.

)
)

Case No. CV-2015-3927

STIPULATION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER

)

)
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED b y the patiies to this action, by and
through their counsel that a protective order be entered as follows:
1.

When using this Stipulation for Protective Order, the words set forth below shall

have the following meanings :

A

"Documents" means (i) all writings, originals, and duplicates, which have

been produced in this action by any person, whether pursuant to fonnal discovery
requests or otherwise· and (ii) any copies, reproductions or summaries of all or
paii of the foregoing, including electronic copies, which are labelled by the
disclosing party "CONFIDE TIAL" prior to disclosure.
B.

"Confi dential Discovery Materials" means (i) Documents as defined

above; (ii) deposition testimony taken in this action, exhibits thereto, and

STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 1
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transcripts thereof, whether in writing or on audio tape, video tap or computer
disk, which are identifi ed to the opposing party as "CONFIDENTIAL"; (ii)
answers to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions
served or filed in this action, which are labelled as "CONFIDENTIAL" by the
disclosing party; and (iv) any other discovery material produced either by a party
or non-party, which is labelled as "CONFIDENTIAL" by the disclosing paiiy.
C.

"Disclosure" means to reveal, divulge, give

or make available

Confidential Discovery Materials, or any part thereof, or any infomiation
contained therein.
2.

The entry of an order on this Stipulation does not alter, waive, modify or abridge

any right, privilege or protection otherwise available to any party with respect to discovery
matter , including but not limited to any party's or to assert the attorney-client privilege, work
product doctrine, or other privileges, with respect to Confidential Discovery Materials or any
party' s right to contest any such asse1tion.
3.

All Confidential Discovery Materials shall be used solely for the prosecution or

defense of this action, including preparation for trial, and any and all appeals and retrial s. Except
by order of the Court, Confidential Discovery Materials shall not be used by any pa1iy or nonpa1iy, other than the producing party, for any other purpose.
4.
term

For purposes of the preparation, trial and appeal of this action, and subject to the

conditions, and restrictions of thi Stipulation for Protective Order, attorneys representing

the parties in this action who receive Confidential Discovery Mate1ials in thi litigation may
disclose Confidential Discovery Materials only to a "Qualified Person' , who shall be defined to
include:

STIPULATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 2
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A.

Counsel of record in the preparation and tiial of this action.

B.

The Court and any persons employed by the Court whose duties require

access to any infonnation lodged or filed in connection with this action.
C.

Expe1is who are retained by counsel for the parties to this action

concerning the preparation and trial of this action.
5.

Prior to delivery of Confidential Discovery Materials to any person indicated in

subparagraph 4(C), counsel for the party to whom said materials or documents were produced
must obtain an agreement in writing, which shall recite that the expert has received a copy of this
Stipulation and accompanying Order and agrees in writing to be bound by its provisions. At the
conclusion of the litigation, or in the case of an expert when his or her services are terminated,
the person having possession, custody or control of any materials protected by this Order shall
return all copies of the materials within 10 days , and will not at any time disclose or distribute
any of the information contained herein.
6.

In the event that any counsel, expe1i or party subject to this Stipulation for

Protective Order having possession, custody or control of any Confidential Discovery Materials
of any opposing party receives from a non-party a subpoena or other process to produce such
Confidential Discovery Materials or any part thereof, such person or patiy shall promptly give
notice by overnight mail or facsimile to counsel of record for the party or non-patiy claiming
confidentiality, and shall furnish such counsel of record with a copy of said subpoena or other
process. The paiiy or non-patty claiming confidentiality will have the responsibility, in its sole
discretion and at its own cost, to move against the subpoena or other process, or otherwise to
oppose entry of any order compelling production of the Confidential Discovery Materials. In no
event shall the counsel, expert or patty receiving the subpoena or other process produce

STIP LATION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER - 3
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Confidential Discovery Materials in response to the subpoena or other process unless and until
such counsel, expert or party is ordered to do so by a comi of competent jurisdiction.
7.

Counsel shall attempt in good faith to agree upon procedures to protect the

confidentiality of infonnation at any hearing or trial. Prior to such hearing or trial, counsel for the
producing party or non-party claiming confidentiality shall submit proposed procedures,
including any disputes relating thereto, to the Court for its approval or modification. Subject to
the Rules of Evidence, nothing in this protective order shall limit the admissibility of any
Confidential Discovery Materials at any hearing or trial.
8.

Nothing in this Stipulation for Protective Order shall prohibit a party from seeking

further protection of Confidential Discovery Materials by stipulation among all the parties or by
application to the court.
9.

This Stipulation for Protective Order is entered without prejudice to the right of

the producing party to waive the applicability of this Order to any Confidential Discovery
Materials produced by them. Any such waiver must be expressly set forth in a w1iting signed by
the producing party.
10.

This Stipulation for Protective Order shall continue to be binding after the

conclusion of this litigation, including appeals from any decision of the trial comi. The court
shall retain jurisdiction to enforce or modify any Order resulting from this Stipulation.
11 .

Entering into, agreeing to and/or producing or receiving Confidential Discovery

Materials or otherwise complying with the tern1s of this Stipulation for Protective Order shall
not:
A.

Prejudice in any way the rights of the parties to object to the production of

documents they consider not subj ect to discovery, or operate as an admission by
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any party that the restrictions and procedures set forth herein constitute adequate
protection for any particular info1mation deemed by any party to be Confidential
Discovery Mate1ials.
B.

Prejudice in any way the rights of any party to object to the admissibility

into evidence of any document, testimony or other evidence subject to this
Stipulation for Protective Order, except that if under the laws of this Court's
jurisdiction production of the documents is deemed to authenticate such
documents then this Protective Order shall not operate to prevent such
authentication;
C.

Prevent all of the signatories to this Stipulation for Protective Order from

agreeing to alter or waive the provisions or protections provided for herein with
respect to any particular Confidential Discovery Materials.
D.

Prevent the parties from seeking modification or resc1ss10n of the

protective order by the Court.
12.

This Stipulation for Protective Order has no effect upon and shall not apply to, a

paiiy' s use or disclosure of its own Confidential Discovery Materials for any purpose.
13.

Confidential Discovery Materials may not be shared with representatives of the

parties who are not bound by this Stipulation and its terms. This includes the agreement not to
use the discovery mate1ial, the contents thereof, or any information contained within that
material for any purpose not associated with this litigation.

DATED this _ _ _ day of _ _ __ _

, 2015.
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Ronald Swafford
Attorney for Defendant
DATED this _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ , 2015 .

Mark Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiff
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB NO. 2698)
PAULL. FULLER (ISB NO. 8435)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

)

Case No. CV-2015-3927

)
Plaintiff,

)

)

V.

)
LP BROADBAND, INC.,

Defendant.

PROTECTIVE ORDER

)
)
)

)
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following Protective Order shall govern the
responses of LP Broadband, Inc. to Plaintiff's First Request for Discovery, Inten-ogatories Nos.
9. 10, and 11 and Request for Production No. 5:
1.

When using this Protective Order, the words set forth below shall have the

following meanings:
A

"Documents" means (i) all writings, originals, and duplicates which have

been produced in this action by any person, whether pursuant to formal discovery
requests or otherwise; and (ii) any copies reproductions, or summaiies of all or
prui of the foregoing, including electronic copi s, which are labelled by the
di closing party "CONFID NTIAL" prior to disclosure.
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B.

"Confidential Discovery Materials" means (i) Document , as defined

above; (ii) deposition testimony taken in th.is action, exhibits thereto, and
transcripts thereof, whether in writing or on audio tape, video tape or computer
disk, which are identified to the opposing party as "CONFIDENTIAL"; (ii)
answers to intenogat01ies, requests for production, and requests for admissions
served or filed in this action, which are labelled as "CO FIDENTIAL" by the
disclosing party; and (iv) any other discovery material produced either by a party
or non-party, which is labell d as "CONFIDENTIAL" by the disclosing party.
C.

"Disclosure" means to reveal, divulge, give, or make available

Confidential Discovery Materials, or any part thereof, or any information
contained therein.
2.

The entry of this Protective Order does not alter, waive, modify or ab1idge any

right, privilege or protection otherwise available to any party with respect to discovery matters,
including but not limited to any party's right to assert the attorney-client privilege, work product
doctrine or other p1ivileges, with respect to Confidential Discovery Materials or any paiiy's
right to contest any such assertion.
3.

AJl Confidential Discovery Materials shall be used solely fo r the prosecution or

defense of this action, including preparation for trial, and any and all appeals and retrials. Except
by order of the Court, Confidential Discovery Materials shall not be us d by any party, other
than the producing party for any other purpose.
4.

For purposes of the preparation trial and appeal of this action, and subject to the

tenns, conditions, and restrictions of this Protective Order, attorneys r presenting the parties in
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this action who receive Confidential Discovery Materials in this litigation may disclose
Confidential Discovery Materials only to a "Qualified Person", who shall be defined to include:
A.

Counsel of record in the preparation and trial of this action.

B.

The Court and any persons employed by the Court whose duties require

access to any infonnation lodged or filed in connection with this action.
C.

Experts who are retained by counsel for the patties to this action

concerning the preparation and trial of this action.
5.

Prior to delivery of Confidential Discovery Materials to any person indicated in

subparagraph 4(C), counsel for the pmty to whom said materials or documents were produced
must obtain an agreement in writing, which shall recite that the expert has received a copy of the
Stipulation and accompanying Order and agrees in writing to be bound by its provisions. At the
conclusion of the litigation, or in the case of an expert when his or her services are terminated,
the person having possession, custody or control of any materials protected by this Order shall
return all copies of the materials within 10 days, and will not at any time disclose or distribute
any of the infmmation contained herein.
6.

In the event that any counsel, expert or party subject to this Protective Order

having possession, custody or control of any Confidential Discovery Materials of any opposing
party receives from a non-pmty a subpoena or other process to produce such Confidential
Discovery Materials or any part thereof, such person or pmty shall promptly give notice by
overnight mail or facsimile to counsel of record for the party or non-party claiming
confidentiality, and shall furnish such counsel of record with a copy of said subpoena or other
process. The party claiming confidentiality will have the responsibility, in its sole discretion and
at its own cost, to move against the subpoena or other process, or otherwise to oppose entry of
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any order compelling production of the Confidential Discovery Materials. In no event shall the
counsel, expe1i or party receiving the subpoena or other process produce Confidential Discovery
Mate1ials in response to the subpoena or other process unless and until such counsel, expert or
paiiy is ordered to do so by a comi of competent jurisdiction.
7.

Counsel shall attempt in good faith to agree upon procedures to protect the

confidentiality of inf01mation at any hearing or trial. P1ior to such heaiing or trial counsel for the
producing paiiy claiming confidentiality shall submit proposed procedures, including any
disputes relating thereto, to the Court for its approval or modification. Subject to the Rules of
Evidence, nothing in this protective order shall limit the admissibility of any Confidential
Discovery Materials at any hearing or trial.
8.

Nothing in this Protective Order shall prohibit a paiiy from seeking fu1iher

protection of Confidential Discovery Materials by stipulation among all the parties or by
application to the court.
9.

This Protective Order is entered without prejudice to the right of the producing

party to waive the applicability of this Order to any Confidential Discovery Materials produced
by them. Any such waiver must be expressly set forth in a writing signed by the producing party.
10.

This Protective Order shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this

litigation, including appeals from any decision of the trial court. The court shall retain
jurisdiction to enforce or modify any Order resulting from this Stipulation.
11.

Entering into, agreeing to and/or producing or receiving Confidential Discovery

Material or otherwise complying with the tenns of this Protective Order shall not:
A.

Prejudice in any way the rights of the pariies to object to the production of

documents they consider not ubject to discovery, or operate a an admission by
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any party that the restrictions and procedures set forth herein constitute adequate
protection for any particular infonnation deemed by any paiiy to be Confidential
Discovery Mate1ials.
B.

Prejudice in any way the rights of any party to object to the admissibility

into evidence of any document, testimony or other evidence subject to this
Protective Order, except that if under the laws of this Court's jurisdiction
production of the documents is deemed to authenticate such documents then this
Protective Order shall not operate to prevent such authentication;
C.

Prevent all of the signat01ies to this Protective Order from agreeing to alter

or waive the provisions or protections provided for herein with respect to any
particular Confidential Discovery Materials.
D.

Prevent the parties from seeking modification or resc1ss10n of the

protective order by the Cami.
12.

This Protective Order has no effect upon and shall not apply to, a use or

disclosure of its own Confidential Discovery Materials for any purpose.
13.

Confidential Discovery Materials may not be shared with representatives of the

patties who are not bound by this Stipulation and its terms. This includes the agreement not to
use the discovery material, the contents thereof, or any inf01mation contained within that
mate1ial for ai1y purpose not associated with this litigation.
DATEDthis _ _ _ dayof _ _ __ _, 2015.

District Judge
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NOTICE OF ENTRY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a conformed
PROTECTIVE
-

ORDER

to

the

attorneys

listed

below

copy of the foregoing
on

this

__

day

of

- - - - -' 2015.

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
FULLER & BECK
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq .
SWAFFORD LAW P.C.
655 S Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

CLERK
BY:
- - - - - - - - - -- Deputy Cierk
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No. CV- 15- 3927

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC ,
Pl aintiff ,

v.

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE:
SUBLEASE/RENTAL AGREEMENTS

LP BROADBAND , INC .,
Defendant .
COMES

NOW

the

Plaintiff ,

Lincoln

Land

Company ,

LLC,

(hereafter "Lincoln Land")

by and through its attorney of record,

Mark R . Fuller of Fuller

Beck Law Offices ,

&

PLLC , and files this

Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff ' s Motion for Parti al Summary
Judgment .
FACTS AND STANDARDS

Plaintiff

realleges

and

reincorporates

by

reference

the

Sta t ement of Fact s and Legal Standards as asserted in Plaint i ff ' s
Brief

in

Support

of

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment

Re :

Sub l ease/Rental Agreements .
ARGUMENT

The sol e

purpose of

Pl aintiff ' s

Motion fo r

Partial Summary

Judgment is to address issues of liability by requesting the Court
declare

(1)

tha t

the 2000 Sublease Agreement violated the Statute
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of

Frauds

elevator

and/or

could

have

rooftops

after

March

had

no

20 ,

application

2008

constitute a defense to Lincoln Land ' s
against

LP Broadband ;

and

(2)

that

and

to

the

grain

therefore does

not

Unjust Enrichment claims

the

unsigned 2004

and 2013

s ubl ease agreement s are invalid under the Statute of Frauds and do
not

constitute

a

d efense

to

Lincoln

Land ' s

Unjust

Enrichment

c la ims against LP Broadband . Lincoln Land does not seek any ruling
regarding damages and Lincoln Land is not conceding that General
Mills was authorized t o enter into any Sublease Agreement with t h e
Defendant . These issues will be the subject of trial o r subsequent
Motions for Summary Judgment .
1.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS - PROSPECTIVE/RETROACTIVE

I n opposition to Lincoln Land ' s Motion for Partial Summar y
Judgment ,

Defendant

prospective

and

attempts

retroactive

Lo

crea te

application

a

distinction

under

t he

between

Statute

of

Frauds . Such a distinction is not supported by the cases cited by
the

Defendant ,

caselaw .

All

necessarily

nor
Court

is

it

supported

rulings

ret r oactive

on

because

by

statute

Statute
the

Court

of

or

Fraud

is

alternative
cases

are

determining

the

validity of an agreement at the t ime the agreement was a llegedl y
ente r ed.

I daho Cod e Section 9-503 states in part t h at " No estate

or interest in real property ... can be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law , or a

conveyance or other instrument in writing , subscribed by the party
creating , granting , assigning , surrendering or declaring the same ,
or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing . " (Emphasis
added . )

The

Statute

of

Frauds

is

necessarily

retroactive

in
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application beca use violation of the Statute of Frauds invalidates
the

initial

creation ,

grant ,

assig nment ,

surrender

and/o r

declaration att empt ed by the writing or oral agreement . Furthe r ,
Idaho Code Section 9- 505(4) states as fo l lows :
In the f ollowing cases t h e agreement is invalid, un l ess
the same or some note or memora ndum t hereof , be in
writ i ng and subscribed by the pa r ty cha r ged , or by his
agent . Evide n ce , therefore , of t h e ag r eement cannot be
received wi thout the writing o r secondary evidence of
its content s :

***
4 . An agr eement for the leasing , f or a longer period
than one ( 1) year , or for the sale , of real property ,
or of an interest therein , and such agreement , if made
by an a gent of the party sough t t o be charged , is
inval id, u nless the authority o f the agent
be in
writing , subscribed by the party sought to be c ha r ged .
(Emphasis a dded) .
prospective o r

Section

9- 505 ( 4)

does not distinguis h between

ret r oact i ve application o f the ~tatute of Frauds ,

but clearly states that an agreement is invalid,
being invalidated ,

unless

there is a

not subject

to

writing subscribed by the

party charged or his authorized agent . Ev i dence simply cannot be
received by the Court without the proper writing ,

rendering the

evidence inadmissible .
The Defendant points to Wakelam v . Hagood , 151 Idaho 688 , 263
P . 3d 742 (2011) , and Hoffman v . Hoffman v . SV Co . , Inc ., 102 Idaho
187 ,

628

P . 2d

218

(1981) ,

in

its

prospective/ retroactive distinction .

attempt

to

create

the

Retroactive application

was

upheld by the Court in Wakelam, because the Court determined that
the

parties

determined

complied

that

the

with

the

contract

was

Statute
valid

of
from

Frauds .
its

The

court

creation

because the contract was found to be ret r oactively va l id ,

and

there
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was no need for the court to make retroactive modifications .
Retroactive
addressed

in

applica ti on

Hoffman

when

of

the

the

Statute

Court

of

de t ermined

Frauds

that

was

the

oral

agreement between the parties violated the Statute of Frauds , and
refused to enforce a verbal agre emen t
its

entirety .

property
sought

In

specific

the

seller

refu sed

alleged

oral

agreement

Hoffman /

pursuant

to

an

to convey real property in

performance

or

damages

to

convey

and

bas ed upon

the

the

real
buyer

se l ler ' s

refusal . Because the Court retroactively determined that the oral
agreement

violated

enforced ,

it was

the

Statute

of

not n ecessary for

Frauds ,
the

and

Hoffman

could
Court

not

be

to order

retroactive damages or specific performance because the property
was never lega lly conveyed . Becau s e of a violation of the Statute
of Frauds ,

the buyer was not entitled Lo specific performance or

damages , either prospectively or relroactively .
In
Wake lam

addit i on ,
and

the

Hoffman/

present

case

because

the

r etroac t ive damages based on ac tu a l

can

be

dis t inguished

present

case

deals

from
with

possession under an i nvalid

agreement which violated the Statue of Fra uds .

Further ,

Lincoln

Land ' s claim for unjust enrichment is not based upon any alleged
agreement between the Defendant and General Mills . Lincoln Land's
claims are based upon the Defendant ' s occupancy of Lincoln Land ' s
property after July , 2010 without

authorization from Linco ln Land

o r an authorized agent of Lincoln Land. Any agreement between the
Defendant and a third party could only act as an offset to Lincoln
Land ' s

claims ,

not prevent the claims . Lincoln Land has already

credited the Defendant for all payments made to General Mills . See
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Complaint , Prayer , Para . 1, Page 4 .
STATUTE OF FRAUDS - EQUITABLE APPLICATION

2.

De fendant next requests th is Court to prospectively enforce
the

expired

March ,

2000

agreement

on

the

basis

of

equity

and

performance . As noted by the Defendant , in the case of McMahon v .

Auger , 83 Idaho 27 ,
stated

that

an

375 P . 2d 374

" underlying

(1960) , the Idaho Supreme Court

principle ,

applicable

where

the

contract does not comply with the statue of frauds , is that equity
will not enforce i t except in cases where a refusal to do so would
be inequitable ."

( Emphasis added . ) The pres ent action is a case

where re fusal to enforce the March 2000 Subleas e Agreement wou ld
not be inequitable .
As previous l y cited, Idaho Code 9-50 5( 4) sta tes that :
An agreement for the leasing , for a longer period than
one (1) year , or for the sale , of real property , or of
an interest the eln , and such agreement , if made by an
agent of the party sought to be charged , i s invalid ,
unless the author i ty of the agent be in writing ,
subscribed by the party sought to be charged .
(Emphasis added . ) Assumi ng for purposes of this Motion tha t
Defendant
Mills

entereq into

in March ,

2000 ,

a

valid sublease

Defendant

agreement

could only enter

the

with Gen eral
into

such an

agreement under an agency theory , with General Mills acting as the
agent of the owner of the real property , Evans Grain . If General
Mills

was

not

acting

as

the

agent

of

the

owner

of

the

real

property , then no evidence of the agreement between General Mills
and

the

Defe ndant

can

be

received .

Such

parole

evidence

is

inadmissible .
If in 2000 General Mills was acting as the agent of the owner

REPLY BRIEF I
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of the real property, Idaho Code 9-505(4) requires that the agency
authority of General Mills must be in writing , subscribed by the
owner

of

writing ,

the

real

property .

Defendant

has

not

provided

any

subscribed by the prior or cur r ent owners of the real

property ,

authoriz i ng

General

Mills

to

act

as

an

agent

in

subleasing the grain elevator rooftops t o Defendant as required by
Idaho Code 9- 505(4) .
The

Idaho Appellate Court

addressed

the

Statute of

Frauds

with regards to full or partial performance in Wolske Bros . Inc.

v . Hudspeth Sawmill, 116 Idaho 714 ,

779 P . 2d 28

(Ct . App . 1989) ,

wherein it stated as follows :
We acknowledge that in some circumstances an oral
agreement may be removed from the strictures of the
statute of fr auds by part or full performance . Th is
exception to the statute of f rauds is grounded in
equity . The exception protects a par Ly who demur1::; Lrci Le::;
reliance upon an oral con tract by ac t s that would not
have been done but for the contract . Such reliance
cannot be established by conduct referabl e to a ca use
other than the oral contract .
Id .

at

715- 16

(citations

omitted) .

In

Wolske

Bros.,

the

Court

found that "although the agreement was reduced to writing several
times , it was never signed . . . . " Id . The Court went o n to hold that
" the

record

inference ,

that

agreement . "
could

be

does

Id .

not

show ,

Wolske
at 716 .

attributed

to

nor

relied

does

it

so l ely

support

upon

the

a

reasonable

alleged

The record showed that Wolske ' s
its

desire

for

financial

gain

oral

actions
or

in

satisfaction of its debt owed to another party . Id .
Just as in Wolske , the Defendant in the present case did not
base its performance under the alleged agreement solely upon the
agreement .

The

underlying

purpose

of

the

occupation

of

the
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rooftops was to increase the Defendant ' s service capacity , thereby
increasing
hence ,

Defendant ' s

Defendant ' s

desirability

profitability .

as

If

a

service

Wolske

upon an agre ement which violates the

provider

prohibits

statute of

and

reliance

frauds

because

Wolske ' s " activi t ies could be attributed t o its prospective share
o f monetary proceeds ",
upon

then Defendant s h ould not be ab l e to rely

an alleged agreement which violates

the

statu te of frauds

because the Defendant ' s activities could also be attributed to the
De fe ndant ' s

prospective

financial

ga in

by

occupa ncy

of

the

roof tops . Nei ther law nor equity requires the removal of any of
the

alleged

sublease

agreements

from

the

limitations

and

obligations of the Statute of Frauds .
THE

3.

2000 SUBLEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GEN ERAL MI LLS AND

DE FENDANT CEASED I N MARCH , 2008 AT THE LATEST .
Defendant
Agreement
March ,

next

between

contends

Defendant

that

and

the

General

2008 based on a hold over theory .

March ,
Mills

2000

Sublease

extended

beyond

Defendant asserts that

General Mills ' acceptance of payments beyond March , 2008 " resu l ted
in a mutual ly accepted hold over and a continuing new tenancy by
ope r ation of law ." See Defendant ' s Objection to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgmen t,
Pre - Mix

Concrete ,

p.

7.

Inc .

Defendant cites to the case of Lewiston
v.

Rohde,

110

Idaho

640 ,

718

P . 2d

551

(1985 , review denied 1985) as Defendant ' s authority to establish a
hold over tenancy . However ,

in the Rohde case the Court further

elaborated on the hold over tenancy theory as fol lows :
A court must look to the lessor ' s intent , as revealed
by either his words or his actions , to determin e
whether a new tenancy results . If a lessor demands or
accepts rent from the lessee , he will be presumed to

REPLY BRIEF I
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have e lected t o hold the lessee to a new tenancy ,
a b sent of course , a c l ear l y expressed intention to the
contra ry .
at

Id .

645 .

Whi le

Defendant

would

l ike

the

Court

to

consider

General Mills t o be the " lessor" , the property legally belonged to
Evan s Grai n and t hereafter Li ncol n Lan d Company . This Court should
loo k solely at
i mply

intent

the actions o f
regarding

Evans Grain a nd Lincoln Land to

whether

a

new

hold- over

tenancy

was

c r eated . Only an owner or his authorized agent have the capacity
to create a n implied hold over ten anc y .
During

June ,

when

2010 ,

Lincoln

Land

purchased

elevators and began leasing them to Gene ra l
"was

not

aware

of

MicroServ ,

Inc . ' s

the

grain

Mills ,

Li ncoln Land

continuing

unauthorized

occupancy o f t h e r ooftops of the gra i n e l eva tors . " See Affidav it
of

Doyle

General

Dec k ,

5.

The

"specifically

Mills

s uble tting

p ara .

the

property

a greement

b etween

prohibited

or any part

and

Mills

from

General

t here of

writ ten consent of Li nco ln Land Company ,

Plaint if f

without

LLC . "

Id .

at

the

prior

para .

4.

" Consent to sub le ase the gra in elevator rooftops was never soug ht

by General Mills and never provided by Lin coln Land Company , LLC . "
Id .

at para .

4.

De f e ndant has expressl y admitted that De fen dant

and MircoServ did not have any author i zation from Plaintiff t o
ins ta ll

or

rooftops .

utilize

See

antenna

equipment

on

the

Supplemental Response to Requests

gra in

elevator

for Admissions ,

Nos . 3 and 4 , attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Mark R.
Ful l er ,

dated

December

3,

2015 .

Defendant

has

furt h er

admitted

that

Defendant and MicroServ did not pay any amount to Lincoln

Land

for

the

use

of

Lincoln

Land ' s

property .

See

Response

to
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Request

for

Admission

No .

5,

attached

as

Exhibit

B

to

the

Affidavit of Mark R. Fuller . After June , 2010 , the De fe ndant could
only have a lessor - lessee relationship with Lincoln Land . Lincoln

Land

expressly

prohibited

General

Mil l s

from

subleasing

the

p ro p erty to a n yone else wit h out Linco l n Land ' s consent and d i d not
gr ant agency authority to General Mi ll s . Based upon Lincoln Land ' s
lack

of

knowledge

Lincoln

Land

of

never

Defendant ' s

demanded

or

occupancy
accepted

of

any

its

property ,

rent

from

the

Defendant and no h o l d over tenan cy can be i mpl i ed . The actions of
the actual owner of the propert y prevent a ny claim fo r an implied
hold over tenancy by Defendant .

4.

ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IS NOT NECESSARY .

Wi th

reg ar d

information

from

Defe nda n t ' s

to

General

Mil ls

is

a ss e r tion

t h at

a d ditional

nece s sary ,

p l ea ~e

r efer

to

Plaintiff ' s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Continue Hearing , p .
4- 6 ,

previously fi l ed in this action and incorporated herein by

ref e rence .
5.

ADMISSION

THAT

THE

2004

AND

2013

AGREEMENTS

ARE

NOT

RELEVANT .
respons e

In
J u dgment ,
Gilling ' s

to

Defendan t

Plai n ti ff' s

Affidavit ,

until

he

states

20 1 4 .

that

Gillings ,

response

to

Par t i al

" MicroServ

[the 2000 Sublease)

Defendant

and

pursuant t o this agreement until April ,
Adam

for

Summary

filed the Affidavit of Adam Gil li n gs . In Mr .

Broadband operated pursuant to
years ,

Mo t ion

paras .

10

Interrogatory

and
No .

14 .
11 :

General

and

later

LP

agreement for
Mil l s

operated

2014 ." See Af fidavit of

This

ratifies

"MicroServ ,

Defendant ' s
LLC

and

LP
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Broadband ,

LLC paid fifty dollars

( $50 . 00)

per month to General

Mills as per the contract/lease agreement from 2000 forward . This
continued up th r o ugh Apr il, 20 1 4 ." Se e Exhibit B to the Affidavit
of

Mark

R.

Fuller .

Based

upon

its

repeated

admissions ,

the

unsigned 2004 a nd 2013 Sublease Agreements were never relied upon
by Defendant and cannot be considered by this Court as a val id
defense to Lincoln Land 1 s claim for unjust enrichment .
ma de payments

solely u nder t h e

2000

Defendant

Sublease Agreement

and

its

defenses must be based only on that agreement . The unsigned 2004
and 2013 Subleas e Agreements cannot be considered by the Cou rt .
CONCLUSION

Th is

Court

should grant

Summary Judgment ,

Lincoln Land 1 s

Motion for

Partial

ruling as a mat t er of l aw that the 20 00 ,

2004

and 2013 Sublease Agreements do not constitute valid defenses to
Lincoln Land 1 s claim for unjus t enrichment .
The 2000 Sublease Agreement does no t comply with the Statute
of Frauds because there has been no ev idence of compliance with
Idaho Co de

Sect i on

9- 505 ( 4)

wh ic h requ i res a

subscribed wr iting

evidencing the authority of Gene r al Mills to act as the agent of
the owne r and based upon the inadequate legal description found in
the

2000

Sublease

Agreement .

"The

physical

address

is

n ot

a

sufficient description of the property for purposes of the Statute
of

Frauds .

It

is

imposs i ble

to

determine

exactly wha t

Frasure intended to convey to the Respondents ,

re lying solely on

the physical address in the contract . " Ray v . Frasure,
625 ,

630 ,

respond t o

200

P . 3d

1174

Plaintiff 1 s

(2009) .

Defendant

property

has

failed

14 6 Idaho
to

even

arguments that the Sublease Agreements do
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not contain an adequate legal description of the property, so this
issue was not addressed in this Reply Brief. This issue has been

conceded by Defendant ' s complete failure to oppose .
The 200 4 and 2013 Sublease Agreements do not comply with the
Statute of
2000

Fraud s

for the same

Subl ease Agreement ,

Statute

of

Frauds

due

reasons

and they also
to

the

identified regarding the
fail

failure

of

to comply with the
the

party

creating ,

granting , assigning , surrendering or declaring the same , or by his
la wful

agent

thereunto

aut horized by writ ing ,

to

s ubs cribe

its

name to the 2004 and 2013 Subl ease Agreements as requ ired by Idaho
Code

Section

9- 503 .

Defendant tha t

There

the 2004

are

also multiple

admissions

of

the

and 2013 Subl ease Agreements were never

relied upo n by Def endant ,

and no payment s were made under these

unsigned Sublease Agreements .
It is ther e fore request ed that this Court rule as a matter of
law that the 2000 ,
and

do

not

2004 and 2013 Sublease Agreements are invalid

cons ti tute

val id

defenses

to

Plaintiff ' s

claim

for

unjust enrichment .
DATED this

___!i_

day of December , 2015 .
FULLER & BECK

Mark R . Ful ler
Attor ney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true a nd correct copy of the
following desc ribe d pleading or document on the attorney listed
below o n this

q

day of December , 2015 :

Document Served :

REPLY BRI EF IN SUPPORT OF MOT ION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Attorney Served :
Ron Swafford
Larren K. Covert
655 S . Woodruff
Idaho Falls , ID 83401
Facsimile : 208 -5 24 - 4131

~

U. S . Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Pau l L. Fu l l er
FULLER & BECK

165

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOT I ON FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12

.,

(

(

BONNEVILLE CuUHTY
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Lanen K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
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Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMP ANY, LLC

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF ADAM
GILLINGS

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

STA TE OF IDAHO

)

:ss
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

)

Adam Gillings, having been sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am Adan1 Gillings.

2.

I am over the age of I 8 and make this affidavit of my own personal

knowledge and belief.
3.

If called to testify in this matter, I would testify as to the information set

forth herein.
4.

I am a Network Field Infrastructure Manager employed by the Defendant

h rein.

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF ADAM GILLINGS
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5.

I have been employed by Defendant for 2 years.

6.

Prior to that time, I was employed by MicroSer . since 20 1 I.

7.

I physically inspected and maintained the equipment operated by the

Defendant at the Evans Grain location.
8.

This equipment consisted of antennae located on the roof of the building

and microwave dishes to relay the signal. Located inside the structure by the stairs and
grainery pump equipment was a control and power box for the equipment.
9.

The antennae located on the rooftop at the Evans Grain location w re

clearly visible to the naked eye.
10.

Any reasonable inspection of the property would have disclosed the

presence of Defendant ' s equipment at this location.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Dare photographs of the equipment located at

the van Grain location and are fully incorporated herein.
12.

These photographs go back to 2007 and show the equipment at this

location.
13.

Prior to 2007 the same or simil ar equipment was at thi same location and

just as visible .
14.

Any inspection of the property would have disclosed all of this equipment.

15.

All of the equipment of the Defendant at this location since 2000 would be

just as visible as the equipment in the photographs in Exhibit D and the equipment
cmrently placed at the Evans Grainery location.
16.

Defendant does not ha e information from General

i1ls Inc. ho ing

their actual receipt of the payments on the prior agreements, other than the payment

E ONO AFFIDAVIT OF ADAM GILLING
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receipts previously provided. Only General Mills, Inc. is able to confirm the receipt of the
payments.
17.

Defendant is not aware of the information concerning our rental of the

rooftop space at the Evans Grainery location that was passed from General Mills, Inc. to
Plaintiff. Only General Mills, Inc. is able to confirm what information they provided to
Plaintiff.
18.

Defendant does not have any infonnation concerning the sale of the

property, the terms of the sale, inspections performed during the sale process and the role
General Mills, Inc. perfonned in the sale of the property. This information would be in
the possession of General Mills, Inc.
19.

General Mills, Inc. would have any and all signed agreements foi· the

rental of the property between Defendant and General Mills, Inc.
20.

This additional information is necessary to produce a full and complete

record of the relationship between the parties, and the legal status of the Defendant's
occupancy of the Evan Grainery location pursuant to prior agreements.
21.

Defendant has requested to include General Mills, Inc. as a party to this

matter to expedite the discovery of this information and to ensure all proper parties are
available to present the full and complete record to the Court.
22.

Additional time is needed to include General Mills, Inc. as a party to this

litigation and obtain the above information from them prior to a determination on
summary judgment.

DATED this ~

day of December, 2:. ~

- --

Ada~
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF ADAM GILLINGS
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___:f__ day of December, 20 15.

N~
Residing in Idaho Falls
Commission: "I - 2 \ -

;:z_ \

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

qf\-

day of December, 2015, I served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of
delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D
D
D
ill

U.S . Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax : 524-7167

~~-

LARREN K. COVERT ESQ.
Attomeys for Defendant
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
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Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT
vs.
LP BROADBAND INC.,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC. ,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

COMES NOW, the Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff, LP Broadband a Colorado
Corporation and successor in interest to MicroServ, Inc. , and Idaho Corporation, by and through
its attorney of record, Ronald L. Swafford, Esq. and alleges and complains as follows :

THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT- I

ORIGINAL

183

PARTIES JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. Third-Party Plaintiff, LP Broadband, Inc. (LP Broadband) is Colorado Corporation
authorized to business in Idaho and the successor in interest to MicroServ, Inc., and Idaho
Corporation.
2. Third-Party Defendant, General Mills, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation authorized and
doing business in Idaho.
3. Third-Party Defendant, General Mills Operations, LLC is a Delaware Limited Liability
Company authorized and doing business in Idaho.
4. Juri sdiction and venue are proper in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for
Bonneville County as the amount in controversy is in excess of $ 10,000.00.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
5. Third-Party Plainti ff im:orporates all preced ing paragraphs fully herein.
6. General Mi lls Operations, LLC is a subsidy/alter-ego of General Mills, Inc. and both
entities are collectively referred to herein as "General Mi ll s."
7. On March 20, 2000, Defendant General Mills entered into a Roof-top Rental Agreement
with MicroServ, Inc. for the placement of wireless internet antennae on the "Evan 's
Grainery" location in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho.
8. LP Boradband, Inc. is the successor in interest by merger of MicroServ, Inc. with all
rights and obligations between General Mills and MicroServ in the lease agreement dated
March 20, 2000.
9. The March, 2000 Roof-top Rental Agreement was for an initial term of 3-5 years with
annual renewals after the first 3 years.

TH IRD-PARTY COM PLA INT - 2
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10. The March, 2000 Roof-top Rental Agreement additionally included the lan guage " If
either party wishes to cancel this contract, they must provide w ritten notice of such
cancelation at least 3 months prior lo the date of cancellatio n.
11 . Neither MicroServ nor General Mi lls nor LP Broadband ever provided a written noti ce of
cancelation of the agreement, and the contract continued and renewed annually thereafter.
12. In 2010, the property that contained the Evan ' s Grainery location was sold to Lincoln
Land Company, LLC.

13. LP Broadband, was unaware of the property sale, and General Mills continued in
possession of the property.
14. There was no change in the signage on the property to show a change in ownership, and
no other changes were made to the property to reflect a change in ownership. All sig nage
reflected ownership by General Mills.
15. General Mill s leased the property containing the Evan' s Grainary location from Lincoln

Land Company and continued performing under the terms of its contractual agreement
with MicroServ, Inc. and LP Broadband for the use of the rooftop antennae.

16. The lease agreement between Lincoln Land Company, LLC and General M ills prohibited
General Mi lls from sub-leasing any portion of prope1ty, however General M ills never
di sclosed the lease restriction .
17. In April, 20 14 , LP Broadband first became aware of the ownership interest of Lincoln
Land Company in the Evan 's Grainery property through a demand to remove the wireless
internet antennae received from Lincoln Land Company.
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18. Subsequently, Lincoln Land Company filed a complaint against LP Broad band seeking a
money judgment for LP Broad band ' s use of the Evan ' s Grainery locati on for wireless
internet antennae placement.

COUNT I. INDEMNIFICATION
19. Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs fully herein.
20. LP Broadband 's use of the Evans Grainery location was based on the rental agreement
with General Mill s.

2 1. LP Boradband at all times paid the rental amount to Genera l M ills for the rooftop
location.

22. General Mills accepted each and every rental payment for the rental of the rooftop
location.
23. General Mills never notified LP Broadband of the ownership interest of Lincoln Land
Company, LLC and/or the lease agreement General Mills entered into with Lincoln Land
Company, LLC.
24. General Mills should be ordered to indemnify LP Broadband for any damages sought or
obtained by Lincoln Land Company, LLC.
25 . General Mills is responsible for any damages based on the equitable rule of implied
indemnity.
26. Any and all damages to Lincoln Land Company, LLC were caused by the actions of
General Mills in contracting for the rental of the roof-top of the Evan s Grainery location
without the authority to so do .

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
27. Third-Party Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs f-t1ll y herein.
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28. LP Broadband has been forced to retain the services of Swafford Law Office, PC in this
matter and requests attorney fees and costs pursuant to LC.§§ 12-121 , 12-123, Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and (e) and all other applicable rules and statutes in the
amount of $5,000.00 if this matter is taken in default or a greater amount to be shown at
trial.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE Third-Party Plaintiff respectfr1lly requests the following relief be granted:
1.

That judgment be granted to LP Broadband against General Mills in the amount

of any judgment granted Lincoln Land Company including attorney fees and costs ..
2.

That judgment be entered against General Mills requiring full indemnification of

LP Broadband for any judgment granted in favor of Lincoln Land Company, LLC.
3.

That LP Broadband be granted it s attorney fees and costs incurred herein,

pursuant to LC.§§ 12-121 12-123, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d) and (e) and all other
applicable rules and statutes in the amount of $5,000.00 if this matter is taken in default or a
greater an1ount to be shown at trial.
4.
equitable.

That all other and further relief be granted LP Broadband as may be just and

~

DATED this /.S-aay of December, 2015.

,ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq. , Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq. , Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
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Attorney for Defendant
.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

., : ·'

l

'

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

AMENDED ANSWER
vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, LP Broadband, a Colorado Corporation and successor in
interest to MicroServ, Inc. , and Idaho Corporation, by and through its attorney ofrecord, Ronald
L. Swafford, Esq . and hereby answers the individual paragraphs of the Complaint filed by
Plaintiff as follows:
1.

Admits.

2.

Admits.

3.

Admits.

4.

Defendant admits that to the installation and maintenance of internet antenna

equipment on the rooftop of the grain elevators located on the property beginning March 20,

AM ENDED ANSWER- I
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2000 pursuant to a Roof-Top Rental Agreement. Defendant denies the rema inder of the
allegations contained in Paragraph 4.
5.

Deny.

6.

Admits

7.

Deny.

8.

Deny.

9.

Deny.

10.

Deny.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Defendant specifically pleads the following affirmative defenses:
a.

Privity of Contract: There exists no privity of contract between the parties hereto .

There is no contractual relationship or duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff. Defendant occupied
the premises pursuant to a legally binding contract between Defendant and General Mills,
witho ut knowledge of any prohibition against sublease or assignment.
b.

Statute of Limitations: P laintiff is barred by the statute of limitations from

collecting a portion of the amount claimed. Plaintiff seeks damages fro m July 10, 20 l 0.
Plaintiff is barred from seeking damages for the period from July l 0, 20 10 and thereafter for
periods beyond the Idaho Statute of Limitations on Unjust Enrichment claims.
c.

Lack of Standing: Plaintiff has no legal standing to pursue a cause of action

against Defendant herein . There is no legal relationship between the pa11ies for the creation of a
duty owed from Defendant to Plaintiff.
d.

Failme to State a Claim : Defendant submits that P laintiffs complaint fa ils to

state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted. The duties and obligations complained of relate
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specifically to a contract between Plaintiff and General Mills. Defendant' s occupied the
premises under a lease and rental agreement at all times prior to notification without knowl edge
that any contract or agreement existed between Plaintiff and General Mills, nor the contents
thereof. Plaintiff may not maintain an action against Defendant for unjust enrichment when
Defendant occupied the premises under lease/rental terms with a third party who physically
occupied the premises under pursuant to contractual agreements between Plaintiff and the third
party.
e.

Payment: Defendant was not unjustly enriched as Defendant paid for the use of

the property pursuant to contrnct.
f.

Sole Negligence of Third-Party: Any and all of the Plaintiffs alleged damages

were the result of the actions of a third-party, General Mills, Inc. and/or General Mills
Operations, LLC.
g.

Fail m e to Join an Indispensable Paiiy: Plaintiff has fai led to join the

indispensable party of General Mills, Inc. and/or General Mills Operations, LLC who would be
responsible for any alleged damages and with whom the Plaintiff had a contract.

h.

Good Faith : Defendant acted in good faith in obtaining and operating under a

contract for the use of the property.
1.

Amendment of Pleadings: Defendant herein reserves the right to amend the

pleadings herein. Discovery has not been completed. Secondly, Defendant reserves the right to
add third party claims and third party defendants hereafter as appropriately di scovered and
determined during discovery.

J.

Attorney Fees: Defendant has and will incur attorney fees and costs in defending

this action, and in any future actions against any third party defendants. Defendant herein
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requests a judgment be granted to Defendant, and against the Plaintiff and any applicable Third
Paity Defendants, for Defendant's attorney fees and costs incurred in this action, pursuant to
Idaho Code Sections § 12-121 , 12-120, 12-123 , and Rule 54 (d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE Defendant respectfully requests the following relief be granted:
1.

That the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff be dismissed with prejudice, based upon

the answer, affirmative defenses and applicable law and facts.
2.

That Defendant be granted it's attorney fees and costs incuned herein, pursuant to

Idaho Code§ 12-120, 12-121 , 12-123 and Rule 64(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

That all other and further relief be granted the defendant as may be just an

equitable.
DATED this / 0day of December, 2015.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

/ r aay of December, 2015, I served a true and

7

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
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Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 524-7167
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r
BONNEVILLE COUNTY
tDAHO
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jeffrey W. Bower, ISB No. 8938
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
P .0. Box 2720
601 West Bannock Street
Boise, Idaho 83-702
Telephone (208) 388-1 200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
alexmclaughlin@givenspursley.com
j effbower@givenspursl ey. com
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Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC

)
)
)
)
)
)
) Case No. CV-2015-3927
)
) ANSWER and DEFENSES BY
) THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS
) GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
) GENERAL MILLS OPERATIO NS,
) LLC
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

v.
LP BROADBAND, INC.
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC. ,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
V.

GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL
MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

1

193

COMES NOW, the Third-Party Defendants, General Mills, Inc. and General Mills
Operations, LLC (hereinafter collectively known as "General Mills"), by and tlu·ough their
attorneys, and hereby answer the Third-Party Complaint as follows:

PARTIES JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

General Mills lacks knowledge or information sufficient to fonn a belief as to the

truth of the allegations of paragraph 1 and therefore denies the same.
2.

General Mills admits that General Mills, Inc. is a Delaware corporation that does

business in Idaho.
3.

General Mills admits that General Mills Operations, LLC is a Delaware limited

liability company that does business in Idaho.
4.

General Mills does not dispute

Lhat jurisdiction

and venue are proper in the

District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonnevi11e County.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
5.

General Mills incorporates its responses to all preceding paragraphs as if fully set

fo1ih herein.
6.

General Mills denies that General Mills Operations, LLC is a "subsidy" (sic) or

alter ego of General Mills, Inc. General Mills admits that Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff
collectively refers to both Third-Patiy Defendants as "General Mills" in the Third-Party
Complaint.
7.

General Mills admits that on March 20, 2000, it entered into an agreement with

Microserv Computer Technologies, Inc. regarding the use of roof-top space on the "Evans
2
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Grainery grain storage bins located on Lincoln Road in Idaho Falls, Idaho. General Mills
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 7.
8.

General Mills lacks knowledge or infom1ation sufficient to fonn a belief as to the

truth of the allegations of paragraph 8 and therefore denies the same.
9.

General Mill s admits that the March 20, 2000 agreement with Microserv

Computer Technologies, Inc. states, 'This contract shall be valid for no less than 3 years and up
to 5 years with annual renewals after the first 3 years." General Mills otherwise denies the
aUegations of paragraph 9.
10.

General Mills admits that the March 20, 2000 agreement with Microserv

Computer Technologies, Inc. contains the following language: ' If either party wishes to cancel
this contract, they must provide written notice of such cancellation at least 3 months prior to date
of cancellation." General Mills otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 10.
11.

General Mills denies the al legations of paragraph 11.

12.

General Mills admits the allegations of paragraph 12.

13.

General Mills lacks knowledge or infonnation sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth of the allegations regarding LP Broadband' s knowledge and therefore denies the same.
General Mills admits that in June 2010 it entered into an agreement with Lincoln Land
Company, LLC regarding the property.
14.

General Mills denies the allegations of paragraph 14.

15.

General Mills admits that in June 2010, it entered into an agreement with Lincoln

Land Company, LLC regarding the property. General Mills admits that it fully performed its

3
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obligations under its March 20, 2000 agreement with Microserv Computer Technologies, Inc.
General Mills otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 15.
16.

General Mills admits that the June 2010 agreement with Lincoln Land Company

contained the fo llowing language: "Tenant will not sublet the Property.... " General Mills
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 16.
17.

General Mills lacks knowledge or information sufficient to fo1m a belief as to the

trnth of the allegations of paragraph 17 and therefor denies the same.
18.

General Mills admits the allegations of paragraph 18.

COUNT I. INDEMNIFICATION
19.

General Mills incorporates its responses to all preceding paragraphs as if fully set

forth herein.
20.

General Mills lacks knowledge or infonnation sufficient to form a belief as to the

trnth of the all egations of paragraph 20 and therefore denies the same.
21.

General Mill s admits that Microserv Computer Technologies, Inc. and LP

Broadband made payments to General Mill s pursuant to the tem1s of the March 20, 2000
agreement. General Mill s denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 21.
22.

General Mill s admits that it received payments from Microserv Computer

Technologies and LP Broadband pursuant to the terms of the March 20, 2000 agreement.
General Mills denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 22.
23.

General Mill s denies the allegations of paragraph 23.

24.

General Mill s denies the allegations of paragraph 24.
4
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25.

General Mill s denies the allegations of paragraph 25.

26.

General Mills denies the allegations of paragraph 26.
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

27.

General Mill s incorporates its responses to all preceding paragraphs as if fully set

forth herein.
28.

General Mill s admits that LP Broadband has retained Swafford Law Office, PC in

this matter and that it seeks to recover attorney fees and costs. General Mills denies the
remaining allegations of paragraph 28 and specifically denies that LP Broadband is entitled to
any recovery by way of its Third-Party Complaint.
DEFENSES
The following defenses are not stated separately as to each claim for relief or
allegation of LP Broadband. Nevertheless, the following defenses are applicable where
appropriate, to any and all of the claims for relief of LP Broadband. In asserting the defenses,
General Mills does not admit that the burden of proving allegations or denials contained in this
answer is upon General Mills, but, to the contrary, asserts that by reason of these denials, and by
reason of relevant statutory and judicial authority, the burden of proving the inverse of the
allegations contained in the defenses is upon LP Broadband. Moreover, in asserting any defense,
General Mills does not admit any responsibility or liability, but rather specifically denies any and
all allegations of responsibility and liability in the pleadings.

5
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FIRST DEFENSE
General Mills denies each and every allegation contained in the Third-Party
Complaint that is not expressly and specifically adm itted herein.
SECOND DEFENSE
The Third-Party Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
against General Mi lls and should, therefore, be di smi ssed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
THIRD DEFENSE
Third-Party Plaintiff's claim for indemnification is barred, in whole or in part, by
Idaho law in that the facts and circumstances of this case are not the type giving rise to a
relationship of indemnity, duty to indemnify, or to an indemnification claim.
FOURTH DEFENSE
Third-Party Plaintiff assumed the risk of the matters, events, and damages, if any,
alleged in the Third-Party Complaint.
FIFTH DEFENSE
The damages alleged in the Third-Party Complaint reasonably could have been
avoided by Third-Party Plaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff has failed to mitigate the alleged
damages.

6
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SIXTH DEFENSE
Third-Party Plaintiff's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of
estoppel (all variants), waiver, and unclean hands. Fmther, Third-Party Plaintiff had knowledge
and/or actual or constructive notice of the ownership transition between Pl aintiff and General
Mills.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
Third-Party Plaintiff's claim for indemnification is barred, in whole or in part, by
the language of the relevant contracts.

EIGHTH DEFENSE
Third-Party Plaintiff's claim for indemnification is barred, in whole or in pa1t,
because the delay in seeking indemnification, among other things, caused Gem:ral Mills
prejudice.

NINTH DEFENSE
The damages alleged in the Third-Party Complaint were not proximately or
actuall y caused by the acts or omissions of General Mills.

TENTH DEFENSE
The agreements between Third-Party Plaintiff and General Mills are a license and
did not confer a leasehold interest.

7
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ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Third-Party Plaintiffs claim for indemnification is barred, in whole or in part,
because Plaintiff is not entitled to judgment in its favor, for at least the following reasons:
(1) Plaintiff cannot prove the elements of unjust enrichment or that Plaintiff is otherwise entitled

to relief; (2) Plaintiff seeks an improper double recovery; (3) Plaintiff has not proven that any
agreements are unenforceable and, therefore, is not entitled to equitable relief; (4) Plaintiffs
claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Idaho Code § 5-217; (5) Plaintiff
ratified the agreement between Third-Party Plaintiff and General Mills; and (6) Plaintiff had
actual/constructive notice and/or knowledge of the existence of the applicable agreements
between General Mills and Third-Party Plaintiff and, therefore, assumed the 1isk of their
existence and any claimed loss (whether equitable or legal), ratified the same, waived the ability
to file suit on the basis asserted, and/or is estopped from doing so.

RESERVATION
General Mills has not engaged in any discovery in this action and reserves the
right to amend this pleading to set fo1ih such other and additional defenses, denial s, admissions
(if necessary), affinnative defenses, cross-claims, third-party complaints, and other claims as
may be appropriate.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
The actions of LP Broadband have required General Mills to retain counsel to
represent their interests. General Mills is entitled to the recovery of its costs and attorneys' fees
pursuant to Idaho Code, including, but not limited to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-12 1, and any
agreement between General Mills and Third-Party Plaintiff authori zing an award of fees or costs.

8
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), General Mills hereby demands a
jury trial on all claims in this case. General Mills will not stipulate to a jury of less than 12
people.
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, GM prays for the following relief:
1.

That the Third-Party Complaint be dismissed and LP Broadband take

2.

An award of the reasonable costs and fees incurred in defending against

nothing;

LP Broadband's claims; and
3.

For such further relief as this court deems just and equitable.

DATED this 13th day of January, 2016.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

e
cLaughlin - Ofthe Firm
s for Third-Party Defendants

9
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of January, 2016, I caused a true and c01Tect
copy of the foregoing ANSWER and DEFENSES BY THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICE, PLLC
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
Facsimile (208.524.7167)

Ronald L Swafford
Trevor L. Castleton
Larren K. Covert
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

( ) U.S . Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
t / /acsimile (208.524-4131)

OQ

~~

·- ----
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FROM
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2015
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.. .
MARK R. FULLER (ISB NO. 2698)
PAUL L. FULLER (ISB NO. 8435)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC.
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE

20lofEB-3 At110= Olt
1

DI STHIC T COURT
MAGISTRATE DIV 1s1e-N

] ONNEVILLE COUNTY
IOAHO

P.O. Box50935
83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208) 524-5400
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

V.

)
)

LP BROADBAND, INC.,

)

Defendant.

Case No. CV-2015-3927

PROTECTIVE ORDER

)
)
)

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following Protective Order shall govern the
responses of LP Broadband, Inc. to Plaintiff's First Request for Discovery, Interrogatories Nos.
9, 10, and 11 and Request for Production No. 5:
l.

When using this Protective Order, the words set forth below shall have the

following meanings:
A.

"Documents" means (i) all writings, originals, and duplicates, which have

been produced in this action by any person, whether pursuant to formal discovery
requests or otheiwise; and (ii) any copies, reproductions, or summaries of all or

part of the foregoing, including electronic copies, which are labelled by the
disclosing party "CONFIDENTIAL" prior to disclosure.
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B.

"Confidenti al Discovery Materials" means (i) Documents, as . defined

above; (ii) deposition testimony taken in this action, exhibits thereto, and
transcripts thereof, whether in writing or on audio tape, video tape or computer
disk, which are identified to the opposing party as "CONFIDENTIAL"; (ii)
answers to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions
served or filed in this action, which are labelled as "CONFIDENTIAL" by the
disclosing party; and (iv) any other discovery material produced either by a party
or non-party, which is labelled as "CONFIDENTIAL" by the disclosing party.
C.

"Disclosure" means to reveal, divulge, give, or make available

Confidential Discovery Materials, or any part thereof, or any information
contained therein.
2.

The entry of this Protective Order does not alter, waive, modify or abridge any

right, privilege or protection otherwise available to any party with respect to dis·covery matters,
including but not limited to any party's right to assert the attorney-client privilege, work product
doctrine, or other privileges, with respect to Confidential Discovery Materials or any party's
right to contest any such assertion.
3.

A11 Confidential Discovery Materials sh all be used solely for the prosecution or

defense of this action, including preparation for trial, and any and all appeals and retrials. Except
by order of the Court, Confidential Discovery Materials shall not be used by any party, other

than the producing party, for any other purpose.
4.

For purposes of the preparation, trial, and appeal of this action, and subject to the

terms, conditions, and restrictions of this Protective Order, attorneys representing the parties in

PROTECTIVE ORDER - 2
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this action who rece1ve Confidential Discovery Materials in this litigation may disclose
Confidential Discovery Materials only to a "Qualified Person", who shall be defined to include:

A

Counsel of record in the preparation and trial of this action.

B.

The Court and any persons employed by the Court whose duties require

access to any information lodged or filed in connection with this action.
C.

Experts who are retained by counsel for the parties to this action

concerning the preparation and trial of this action.
5.

Prior to delivery of Confidential Discovery Materials to any person indicated in

subparagraph 4(C), counsel for the party to whom said materials or. documents were produced
must obtain an agreement in writing, which shall recite that the expert has received a copy of the
Stipulation and accompanying Order and agrees in writing to be bound by its provisions. At the
conclusion of the litigation, or in the case of an expert when his or her services are terminated,
the person having possession, custody or control of any materials protected by this Order shall
return all copies of the materials within 10 days, and will not at any time disclose or distribute
any of the information contained herein.
6.

In the event that any counsel, expert or party subject to this Protective Order

having possession, custody or control of any Confidential Discovery Materials of any opposing
party receives from a non-party a subpoena or other process to produce such Confidential
Discovery Materials or any pa.ii thereof, such person or party sha11 promptly give notice by
overnight mail or facsimile to counsel of record for the party or non-party claiming
confidentiality, and shall furnish such counsel of record with a copy of said subpoena or other
process. The party claiming confidentiality will have the responsibility, in its sole discretion and
at its own cost, to move against the subpoena or other process, or otherwise to oppose entry of
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any order compelling production of the Confidential Discovery Materials. In no event shall the
counsel, expert or party receiving the subpoena or other process produce Confidential Discovery
Materials in response to the subpoena or other process unless and until such counsel, expert or
party is ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.
7.

'

Counsel shall attempt in good faith to agree upon procedures to protect tbe

confidentiality of information at any hearing or trial. Prior to such hearing or trial, counsel for the
producing party claiming confidentiality shall submit proposed procedures, including any
disputes relating thereto, to the Court for its approval or modification. Subject to the Rules of
Evidence, nothing in this protective order shall limit the admissibility of any Confidential
Discovery Materials at any hearing or trial.

8.

Nothing in this Protective Order shall prohibit a party from seeking further

protection of Confidential Discovery Materi als by stipulation among all the parties or by

application to the court.
9. .

This Protective Order is entered without prejudice to the right of the producing

party to waive the applicability of this Order to any Confidential Discovery Materials produced
by them. Any such waiver must be expressly set forth in a writing signed by the producing party.

10.

This Protective Order shall continue to be binding after the conclusion of this

litigation, including appeals from any decision of the trial court. The court shall retain
jurisdiction to enforce or modify any Order resulting from this Stipulation.

11.

Entering into, agreeing to and/or producing or receiving Confidential Discovery ·

Materials or otherwise complying with the terms of this Protective Order shall not:

A.

Prejudice in any way the rights of the parties to object to the production of

documents they consider not subj ect to discovery, or operate as an admission by
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any party that the restrictions and procedures set forth herein constitute adequate
protection for any particular information deemed by any party to be Confidential
Discovery Materials.

B.

Prejudice in any way the rights of any party to object to the admissibility

into evidence of any document, testimony or other evidence subject to this
Protective Order, except that if under the laws of this Court's jurisdiction
production of the documents is deemed to authenticate such documents then this
Protective Order shall not operate to prevent such authentication;
C.

Prevent all of the signatories to this Protective Order from agreeing to alter

or waive the provisions or protections provided for herein with respect to any
particular Confidential Discovery Materials.
D,

Prevent the parties from seeking modification or· rescission of the

protective order by the Court.
12.

This Protective Order has no effect upon and shall not apply to, a use or

disclosure of its own Confidential :Oiscovery Materials for any purpose.

13.

Confidential Discovery Materials may not be shared with representatives of the

parties who are not bound by this Stipulation and its terms. This includes the agreement not to
use the discovery material, the contents thereof, or any information contained within that
material for any purpose not associated with this litigation.
DATEDthi~ 3
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NOTICE OF ENTRY

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a conformed copy of the foregoing
PROTECTIVE

-

ORDER

to

the

attorneys

listed

below

on

this

3

day

of

~~ - - - ' 2015.

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
FULLER & BECK
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Rona ld L. Swafford, Esq.
SWAFFORD LAW P.C.
655 S Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

CLERK
BY:
Deputy Clerk

~
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ATTORNEY FOR PLA INTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
Idaho
limi ted
liabil ity
company ,
Pla inti ff ,
v.

LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Colorado
corporati on ,
s uccesso r
by
merge r t o Mi croServ , I nc ., an
I daho co rporat ion ,

Case No. CV- 15- 3927
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CLAIM AND
BURDEN OF PROOF

Defendant .
LP BROADBAND , INC .,
Third- Party Plainti ff ,
V.

GENERAL
MILLS ,
INC .
and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS , LLC ,
Third- Par ty Defendants .
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Lincoln Land Company, LLC , by and through its
attorney of record, Mark R. Fuller, of Fuller & Beck Law Offices, PLLC, and files this
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Unjust Enrichment Claim and Burden of Proof.
Plaintiff requests that the Court find that as a matter of law,

Lincoln Land is entitled to

Partial Summary Judgment declaring that LP Broadband was unjustly enriched by use

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE : UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM AND BURDEN OF PROOF -209
l

and access to Lincoln Land's property with the amount of unjust enrichment to be
determined at trial.
Lincoln Land requests the Court enter an Order determining as a matter of law that
the co rrect ca lculation for damages based on the theory of unjust enrichment is the
amount of profit which LP Broadband received from the use of Lincoln Land 's property,
less any leg itimate expenses and costs incurred by LP Broadband during the use of such
property, with the fair market rental value being the min imum restitution amount possible.
Lincoln Land requests th is Court assign evidentiary burdens regarding the amount
of unjust enrichment to the respective parties, with Lincoln Land first presenting evidence
of known net profit from the unjust benefit, or a reasonable approximation thereof, and
with LP Broadband then being allowed to present evidence of costs, expenses and other
deductions to show the net unjust enrichment LP Broadband received by the
unauthorized use of Lincoln Land's property.
DATED th is -1:_ day of March, 2016.
FULLER & BECK

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiff
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RE : UNJ UST ENRICHMENT CLAIM AND BURDEN OF PROOF -210
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY tha t

I served a true and co rre ct copy of the

fal l owing described pleading or document on the attorney l i sted
below on this z_ day of March , 20 1 6 :
Document Served :

MOTI ON FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT
CLAIM AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Attorney Served :
Ron Swa f ford
Larren Covert
655 S . Woodruff
I daho Falls , ID 83401
Fax : 208 - 524 -413 1

U. S . Ma il
Hand Delivery
_ £ Facsimile

Alexander P . McLa ughlin
Jeffrey W. Bower
GIVENS PURSLEY , LL P
P . O. Box 2720
Boise , I D 83 702
Fax : 208-388- 1 300

U. S . Mail
Hand Delivery
_£ Facs i mile

FULL ER & BECK
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3

(

(

b

MARK R. FULLER (ISB No . 2698)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES , PLLC .
4 1 0 MEMORIAL DRIVE , SUI TE 201
P . o . Box 5 0 9 3 5
I DAHO FALLS , ID 83405-0935
TELEPHONE : (208) 524 - 5400
FACSIMILE : (208) 524 - 7167
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTI FF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
Ida ho limited liability company ,

Case No. CV-1 5-3927

Plaintiff ,
v.
NOTICE OF SERVICE

LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Co l orado
corporation , successor by merger
to Micro Serv ,
Inc .,
an Idaho
corporation ,
Defendant .
LP BROADBAND , INC .,
Third-Party Plaintiff ,
V.

GEN ERAL MILLS , INC . and GENERAL
MILLS OPERATIONS , LLC ,
Third-Party Defendants .

COMES NOW the

Plaintiff ,

Lincoln Land Company ,

through its atto rney of r eco rd ,

Mark R .

Fuller ,

LLC ,

by and

and hereby gives

the court notice of its service of Plaintiff ' s Second Request for
Discovery

to

Defendant ,

through its atto rneys , Larren Covert , on the

LP

Broadband ,

Inc .,

which

were

submitted

to

l3

the
day

of February , 2016 .
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DATED this -1:2_ day of February, 2016.
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES , PLLC

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below on th is ~ day of
February, 2016:

Document Served:

NOTICE OF SERVICE

Attorney Served:
Ron Swafford
Larren Covert
655 S. Wood ruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Fax: 208-524-4131
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jeffrey W . Bower
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise , ID 83702
Fax: 208-388-1300

_
~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
___sC_ Facsimile
_

Mark R. Fuller
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
Idaho
limited
liability
company ,
Pla i ntiff ,
v.
LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Colorado
corporation ,
successor
by
merger to MicroServ , Inc ., an
Idaho corporat ion ,

Case No . CV- 1 5 - 3927
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM
AND BURDENS OF PROOF

Defendant .
LP BROADBAND , INC .,
Th ird -Party Plaintiff ,
v.
GENERAL
MILLS ,
INC .
and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS , LLC ,

Third- Par ty Defendants.

COMES NOW t he Plaintiff ,

Lincoln Land Company ,

LLC ,

by and

through its at t orney of rec ord , Mark R. Fuller , of Ful l er & Beck
Law Of fi ces ,
Partia l

PLLC , and fi les this Brief in Support of Motion for

Summary J udgment Re : Unjust Enrichment Claim and Burdens

of Proof . Plaintiff requests that the Court find that as a matter
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of law that Lincoln Land is entitled to Parti al Summary Judgment
regard i ng

a ll

elements

of

Lincoln

Land ' s

cla im

for

unjust

enrichment , leaving only the amount of damages to be determined at
trial .

The

Cour t

should

deny

any

and

a ll

defenses

asse r t i ons by Defe ndant , LP Broadband , Inc .,
Broadb and ' s

(LP

p r edecessor

in

the

Fa l ls ,

grain
Idaho

MicroServ ,

elevators

upon

that MicroServ ,

Inc .

intere st )

Sublease/Rental Agreement after March 20 ,
of

based

located at

307 5

(hereaf ter " t h e Ro oftops u ) .

possessed

200 8 ,
E.

a

valid

for the rooftops

Lincoln

Road ,

(LP Broadba nd ,

Idaho

Inc .,

and

Inc . , whi ch have now merged , shal l be jointl y referred

to herein as "LP Broadband u ) As a matter of law , LP Broadband did
not ha ve a valid sublease/rental agreement for the Rooftops afte r
Ma rch 20 , 2008 and any subl ease/ren ta l ag r eements LP Broadband had
with

General

(jo i n tl y

Mi 7 7 s ,

" General

Inc .

Mills u )

and/or
are

General

not

Mills

r e levant

Operati ons ,

to

Lincoln

LLC

Land ' s

un just enrichment claims aga i nst LP Broadba nd .
The Court should also alloca te the b u r d ens of proof regarding
proof of damages for unjust enric hment with Lincoln Land having a
burden to establish a reasonable approximation of net profit based
upon

income

Mi l ls ,

received and

ren t

p aid by LP Broadband to

General

and th en requ i ring LP Broadband to submit any ev idence of

addit i onal

costs

or

expenses

incurred

as

a

result

of

LP

Broadband ' s unauthorized access of Linco ln Land ' s property .
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This Motion concerns Li ncoln Land ' s Unjust Enrichment claim
and

the

defenses

raised

by

LP

Broadband

based

upon

alleged

lease/rental agreements of the Rooftops o f grain elevators owned
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by Lincoln Land .

Prior to 2000 ,

General Mills leased the grain

elevato r s from Evan ' s Gra i n and Elevator Company , the prior owner
of

the

grai n

elevators .

On

March

20 ,

2000 ,

LP

Broadban d

and

General Mills signed a " Roof-top Rental Agreement " to utilize the
Rooftops , with rent in the amount of $50 . 00 per month . A copy of
such

Agreement

is

attached

as

Exhibit

' C'

to

the

Complaint

(hereafter refer r ed to as " the 2000 Sublease Agreement " ) . Pursuant
to

the

utiliz e

2000

Sublease

the

Rooftops

Agreement ,
as

a

LP

Broadband

loca t ion of

period " of no less than 3 years ,

was

a l lowed

internet antennae

to

for

a

and up to 5 years with annual

renewals after the first 3 years ." See Roof-top Rental Agreement ,
attached as Exhibit ' C'

to the Complaint . While Lincoln Land does

not

Rental

so

Motion ,

interpre t

Ag reemen t ,

for

purposes

of

this

and giving the greatest. benefit of interpretation to LP

Broadband ,
annual

the

the Court should assume that the " up to 5 years with

renewals "

is

in

guaranteed utilization .

addit io n

to

the

init ia l

3

years

of

Using this interpretation most favorable

to LP Broadband , the 2000 Sub l ease Agreement co uld extend at most
for

8 years ,

or until Mar ch

20 ,

2008 .

Lin co ln Land on l y seeks

damages for unjust enrichment of LP Broadband which occurred after
July ,

2010

(See Complaint ,

para .

7) ,

two

years

after the

last

possible expiration date of the 2000 Sublease Agreement .
On or abou t June , 20 10, Lincoln Land , as the new owner of the
grain elevators and real

property upon which the

elevators are

located , leased the real property and elevators to General Mills .

See Affidavit of Doyle H. Beck , dated November 10 , 2015 , Para . 3 .
Such lease agreement

specifically prohibited General Mills

from
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sublet ting

the

written

consent

Lincoln

Land

property
of

or

any

part

Id . ,

Lincoln Land .

was

not

aware

thereof

of

with out

Para .

LP

4.

In

the

prior

June ,

2010 ,

Broadband ' s

continuing

unauthorized occupancy of the Rooftops . Id ., Para 5 .
Between Ju l y , 2010 and April 22 , 20 14 , LP Broadband , utilized
int erne t antennae equipment o n the Rooftops of the grain elevators
without authorization from Li ncoln Land and without payment in any
amount to Lincoln Land for the use of Lincoln Land ' s property . See
Response to Requests for Admissi.on 1 -5 attached to the Affidavit
o f Mark R . Fuller , dated November 10 , 20 15 , as Exhibit ' A' .
Lincoln
agreements
uti lize

Land

which

internet

has

sought

gave

LP

antennae

copies

Br oadband
equipment

of
the

any
right

and
to

all

written

install

on Lincoln Land ' s

and

property .

Pursuant to Discovery Req\Jests , LP Broadband has provided Lincoln
Land with a copy of two un signed documents , one entitled " Antenna
Space Lease Agreement " and the other en ti tled "Tower agreement ",
attached

as

Exhibits

' B'

and

' C'

to

the

Affidavit

of

Mark

R.

Fuller , dated November 10 , 2015 . The Antenna Space Lease Agreement
purports to authorize the utilization of the Rooftops fr om June 1 ,
200 4

t hr ough

June

1,

2009 ,

with

automatic

annua l

renewals

(h ereafter ref erred to as " the 2004 Sub le ase Agreement " )

Id . The

Tower

of

Agreement

purports

Rooftops

from April

referred

to

as

" the

20 ,

to
2013

2013

authorize

the

through March

utilizat i on
31 ,

Sublease Agreement " ) .

2018

Id .

the

(hereafter
Neither

of

these sublease agreements was signed by LP Broadband , MicroServ ,
General Mills ,
Elevator Co .

Inc . , General Mills Operations , LLC , Evans Grain &

(prior owner of the elevators) or Lincoln Land . Id .
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At

a

hearing

conducted

acknowledged " that
unjust

December

the par ties disagree

enrichment .... "

Februa ry 19 ,

on

Affidavit

See

Exhib i t

2016 ,

10 ,

on t h e

of

Mark

Transcript ,

' B',

t he

20 15 ,

lega l
R.

p.

Cou r t

theory of

Fuller ,
ln .

3,

dated

6-7 .

The

Court de te r mined not to address the con fl icting understanding of
the

theory of un just en richmen t

at

that hearing ,

as the matte r

before the Cou rt was " simply a discovery dispute ." I d . at ln . 910 .

Lin coln

Land ' s

Broadband to

Compla i nt

d isgor g e

the

seeks

unjust

an

p ro fits

orde r

requiring

LP

LP Broadband realized

through the unauthorized use of Lincoln Land ' s real property . See
Complaint .
un jus t ly

Linc o l n
e nriched

Land
by

asserts

using

that

Lincoln

LP

Broadband

Land' s

property

has
to

been
locate

internet antennae equipment whic h was utilized by LP Broadband ' s
customers .

correct

Id . Based upon this use and distribution o f access , the

measu re

Broadband

of

received

res t i tution
fro m LP

is

the

Broadband ' s

net

profi t

cust omers '

whi ch
use

of

LP
the

equ i pment located on Lincoln La nd ' s property , with the fair market
r ental value as a minimum measurement for unjust enr ichment .
On or about December 15 , 2015 , LP Broadband filed an Ame nded
Answe r ,
upon

asserting as a ff irmative d efenses various theories based

the

and/ or

2000

the

Sub l ease
2013

Affirmative Defe nses

Agreement ,

Subleas e
(a) ,

(c) ,

the

Agreement .
(d) ,

(e) ,

2004
See

(f) ,

Sublease

Agreement

Amende d
(g)

and

Answer ,

(h) . These

af fir mative defenses are also th e subject of this Motion and each
should be denied .
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LEGAL STANDARD

This Court ' s

standard in considering Plaintiff ' s

Motion for

Summary Judgment was addressed in G & M Farm s v . Funck Irr .
119 I d . 51 4 , 808 P . 2d 851

Co .,

(1991) :

I t is we l l established that " [Al motion fo r summary
judgment shall be rende r ed forthwith if the pleadings ,
depositions , and admis sio ns on file , together with th e
af fi davits , i f any , show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law ." IRCP 56(c) ;
Olson v . Freeman , 117 I daho 706 , 791 P . 2d 1285 (1990) ;
Raws on v . United Stee lworkers of Am ., 111 Idaho 630 ,
726 P . 2d 742 (1986) ; Boise Car & Truck v . Waco , 108
Idaho 780 , 702 P . 2d 8 1 8 (1985) ; Schaefer v . Elswood
Trailer Sales , 95 Idaho 654 , 516 P . 2d 11 68 (1973) . Upon
a motion for summary judgment , all controverted facts
ar e liberally construed in favor of the non- moving
party .
Tusch Enters . v . Coffin , 1 13 Idaho 37 , 740 P . 2d
1022 (1987) ; Doe v . Durtschi , 110 I daho 466 , 716 P . 2d
12 38 (1986) ; Kline v . Cl i nton , 103 I daho 116 , 645 P . 2d
350 ( 1982) . Likewise , a l l reason ab l e inferences wh ic h
can be ma d e from the r ecord s h all be made in fav o r of
th e
pArty resisting the motion .
Tus ch Ent ers .
v.
Coffin ,
113 I dah o 37 , 740 P . 2d 1022 (1987) ; Doe V .
Durtschi , 110 Idaho 466 , 716 P . 2d 1238 (1986) ; Meridian
Bowling

105

Lanes ,

Inc .

v.

Meridian

Athlete

Ass ' n ,

Inc .,

Idaho

509 ,
670 P . 2d 1294
(1983) ;
Anderson
v.
Ethington , 103 Idaho 658 , 651 P . 2d 923 (1982) ; Klin e v .
Clinton , 10 3 I daho 116 , 645 P . 2d 350 (1 982) . The burden
at all times is upon the moving party to prove the
absence
of
a
genuine
issue
of
material
fact .
Petricevich v . Salmon River Canal Company ,
92 Idaho
865 , 452 P . 2d 362 (1969) . However , the plaintiff ' s case
must be anchored in something more than speculation and
a mere scintilla of evidence is n ot enough to create a
genuine i ss u e . Id . See a l so Nelson v . Steer , 118 Idaho
409 ,
79 7 P . 2d 117
(1990) .
If the record contains
conf l icting inferences or reasonable minds might reach
different
conc lus ions ,
a
summary
judgment must be
denied . Kline v . Clinton , 103 Idaho 116 , 645 P . 2d 350
{1982) ; Farmer ' s Ins . Cc . of Idaho v . Brown , 97 Idaho
380 ,
544
P . 2d 1150
(1976) . All doubts are to be
resolved against the moving party , a nd the motion must
be denied if the evidence is such that conf lic ting
inferences may be drawn therefrom , and if reasonable
people
might
reach
different
conclusions .
Doe
v.
Durtschi , 110 Idaho 466 , 716 P . 2d 1238 (1986) ; Ashby v .
Hubbard , 100 Idaho 67 , 593 P . 2d 402 (1979) .

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PART IAL SUMMARY JUDGM ENT
RE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLA IM AND BURDENS OF PROOF -219
6

119 Id . at 516- 7 . If any genu i ne issue o f material fact remains ,
after all

reasonable infe r e n ces have bee n made i n

fa vor of t h e

non - moving party , the Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied .
Under Rule 56(a) , the moving party has the initial burden of
show i ng
Catrett ,

t h at

it

is

entitled

to

106 S .

Ct .

477 US 317 ,

judgment .
24 58

In

(1 986) ,

Celotex

Corp .

v.

the Sup r eme Co u rt

held that a par t y moving for Summary Judgment , and not bearing the
burden of proof at trial ,

need not negate the opposing party ' s

case . Rather , t h e moving party could dis c harge its i n it i al burden
by d emonstrating the absence of an essen tia l
of

the

opponent ,

who

bears

the

burden

of

element o f the case
proof

at

trial .

The

Supreme Court in Celotex , supra , stated :
In ou r view, the p l ain l a nguage o f Rul e 56(c) manda t es t h e
entry of summary judgment , after adequate time for d i scovery
and u p o n mot i o n , against a party who fai l s to make a showing
suff i c ient to estab l ish the existence of an element essent i al
to that party ' s case , and on which tha t party will bear the
burden of proof at trial . In such a situation , there can be
' no genuine issue as to any material fact ', since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essent i al element of the nonmoving pa rt y ' s case n ecessarily r e nders all other facts
immaterial . The moving party is ' entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law ' because the non- moving party has f ailed to
make a suff icient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof .
4 77 US at 321 ,
Celotex

has

106 S . Ct . at 2552 . " The language and reasoning of

been

adopted

by

t he

Ap pellate

Courts

of

Ida ho ."

Dunni ck v . Elder , 12 6 Id . 308 , 312 , 882 P . 2d 475 (Ct . App . 1994).
ARGUMENT

1 . LP BROADBAND WAS UNJUST LY ENRICHED AT THE EXPENSE OF LINCOLN
LAND .
Unjust

enrichment

e xists

where

" (l)

there

conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff ;

was

a

benefit

(2) appreciati on by
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the defendant of such benef i t ; and

(3)

acceptance of the benefit

under circumstances that would be inequitable for the de f endant to
retain t he benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value
thereof ." Vanderford Co . , Inc . v . Knudson , 144 Idaho 5 47 , 558 , 165
P . 3d

2 61 ,

27 2

1 33

Peiper ,

( 2007 )
Idaho

(citing

82 ,

88 ,

Co .

Aberdeen - Springfield Canal

982

P . 2d

917 ,

923

(1999)) .

v.

"The

substance of an action for unjust enrichment lies in a promise ,
implied by law,

that a party will render to the person entitled

thereto that wh i ch in equ i ty and good conscience belongs to the
la tter ."

Smith

(1973) (emphasis
unjust

v.

added) .

enrichment

95

Smith ,

is

Idaho

"The
th e

477 ,

essence

claim

that

484 ,

of

511

an

the

P . 2d 294 ,

action

301

based

upon

has

been

defendant

enriched by t he plain t iff and that it wou l d be in equitable for the
defendan t

to

retain

that

benefit

wit:hout

compensating

the

plainti ff for the value of the benefit. " Gillette v. Storm Circle
Ranch , 101 Idaho 663 , 666 , 619 P . 2d 1116 , 1119 (1980) .

In the present action , i t
are present ,

is clear that each of the elements

the only legitimate question is the amount by which

LP Broadband was unjustly enriched .
disputed ,

While the amount may be in

the re is no dispute that the other elements of unjust

en ri chment have been met .
There is no dispute that Lincoln Land conferred a benefit on
LP Broadband when LP Broadband accessed Lincoln Land 's property
for

the

placement

of

antennae

equipment .

The

property

and

all

benefits of ownership belong t o Lincoln Land . General Mills lacked
any

authority

to

lease

the

property

or

to

benefit

from

subleasing/assigning the property to another .
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There is no dispute that LP Broadband appreciated the use of
Lincoln

Land ' s

equ ipment

on

property .
Lincoln

LP

Land ' s

Broadband p l aced
property

and

internet

sold

access

antennae
to

the

retain

the

equipment to customers within the range of the equipment .
It

would

be

inequitab l e

for

LP

Broadband

to

benefits it received by occ up y i ng Lincoln Land ' s property without
authorizat i on f r om Lincoln La nd without payment to Lincoln Land
for the value received . The property and rights to its use belongs
to Lincoln Land .

Protecting property rights

is one of th e most

basic requiremen ts for a legal and just soc iety . Anyone who uses
the property of another without authorization should be required
to compensate and disgo rge any profits received by such use . As
will be discussed below ,

LP Broadband ' s

all eged agreements with

Genera l Mi l l s t o access Lincoln Land ' s property do no t

ne gate the

fact that LP Broadband received a benefit which rightfully be longs
to Lin coln Land . Any agreement between LP Broadband and Genera l
Mills should not deprive Lincoln Land of i ts property rights .
Based on the claims and positions taken by LP Br oadband ,

it

is clear that LP Broadband was unjustly enriched at the expense of
Lincoln Land . At tr ial , Lincol n Land will estab li sh the amount of
such unjust en ri c hment . This Court should enter an Order granting
Linco l n

La nd ' s

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment

determining

that LP Broadband was unju stly enriched at the expense of Lincoln
Land ,

with t he amount of un just enrichment t o be determi ned at

trial .
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2 . NO VALID LEASE/SUBLEASE AUTHORIZED LP BROADBAND TO ACCESS THE
ROOFTOPS EXISTED BET WEEN JUNE , 20 10 AND THE PRESENT .
a . STATUTE OF FRAUDS - SUBSCRIPT I ON
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 9-503 :
No estate or interest in real property , other than for
l eases fo r a term no t exceeding o ne ( 1) year ... can be
created , gr ant ed , assigned , surre ndered , or declared ,
otherwise th an by ope r ation of law , or a conveyance or
other inst r ument in writ ing , subscribed by the party
creating ,
granting ,
assigning ,
surrendering
or
declaring the same , or by his lawfu l agent thereunto
authorized by writing .
(Emphasis added) .

Further ,

Ida.ho Code Section 9-505 ( 4)

states as

follows :
In the following cases the agreemen t is invalid , unless
the same or some note or memorandum thereo f , be in
writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent . Evide nce , therefore , of the agreement cannot be
received without the wr i tin g or secondary ev i de n ce of
it s co ntents :

***
4 . An agreement for the leasing , for a longer period
than one ( 1) year , or for the sale , of real property ,
or of an int erest ther ein , and such agr eement , i f made
by an age n t of the party sought to be cha r ged , is
invalid ,
un l ess the authority o f
the agent be in
writing , subscribed by the party sought to be charged.
(Emphasis added) .
renders an ora l
for

damages

and

" Failure to comply with the statute of frauds

agreement unenforceable both in an action at law
in a

suit

Wakelam

v.

Hagood ,

151

Hoffman

v.

SV Co . ,

Inc .,

in

equity

Idaho
102

688 ,

for

2 63

specific performan ce . "

P . 3d

Idaho 187 ,

190 ,

7 42
628

( 2011) ;

citing

P . 2d 2 18 ,

221

( 1981) .
LP

Broadband

bases

sublease agreements :
Sublease

Agreement

(1)
and

its

occupancy of

the

Rooftops

the 2000 Sublease Agreement ,
( 3)

the

2013

Sublease

on

three

(2) the 2004

Agreement .

Of

the
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t h ree documents ,

only the 2000 Sublease Agreement was subscribed

by LP Broadband . None of the subleases were signed by Lincoln Land
Company as owner of the property ,

or by any prior owner of the

property . By reason of t he fai l ure of a ny party to subscribe the
2004 Sublease Agreement and the 2013 Sublease Agreement , the 2004
and

2013

Sublease Agreements

violate

the

Statute of

Frauds

as

found in Idaho Cod e Section s 9- 503 and 9- 505( 4 ) .
Pursuant

to

Idaho

Code

9- 505(4) ,

the

Court

cannot

even

receive evidence of a lease without an agreement subscribed by the
party sough t
agent) ,
that

to be charged

(i . e.

the

land owner or a u thorized

and the agreements are therefore invalid .

General

Mi lls

was

acting

as

the

agent

of

Any assertion
Lincoln

Land ,

implied or ot h erwise , i s i n valid under I d aho Code Section 9- 50 5 (4)
because the agency authority of General Mills must be in writing ,
subscribed by Lincoln Land . Such authorization does not exist and

there is express lang uage in Lincoln Land ' s lease to General Mills
denying such sublease authority .
b . STATUTE OF FRAUDS - LEGAL DESCRI PTION
Idaho

Courts

have

further

required

an

adequate

legal

description of the real property being conveyed :
While the Idaho statutes do not specifically require a
description of real property in the instrument of
conveyance ,
Idaho
courts
have
always
required
a
description of the property or a reference to extrinsic
evidence which describes the property being conveyed in
order to satisfy the statute of frauds . In [Ray v .
Frasure] , the Idaho Supreme Court stressed that such a
property description must " adequately describe the
property so that it is possible for someone to identify
' exactly ' what property the se ll er is conveying to the
buyer . "

In

re Garcia,

465

B. R .

181 ,

192

(Bankr .

D.

Idaho

10-3-2011) ;
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citing In re McMurdie , 448 B.R . 826 , 830 (quoting Ray v . Frasure ,
200

P . 3d

1031 ,

1174 ,

1036

als o

1178) ;

(Idaho

2003)) .

citing Garner

The

v.

Bartschi ,

Bankruptcy Court

80

Garcia

in

P . 3d
found

that a Rent-to - Own Agreement and a Sublease Cont ract , which only
provided a street address , likely violated the statue of frauds :
In this case , neither the RTO Agreement or the Contract
include any legal description for the Property ; each
contain only a street address . The Idaho Supreme Court
in Ray specifically he ld t hat " a property description
in a rea l
estate cont r act consisting sole l y of a
physical address does
not
satisfy the statute of
frauds ."
Ray,
200 P . 3d at 1177 ;
see also In re
McMurdie , 448 B . R . at 830 . Accordingly , under the Idaho
case law , the RTO Agreement and Contract would likely
not satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds .

In Re Garcia, 465 B . R . at 192 .
In addition
sublease

to

th e

agreements ,

failure

all

to

thre e

subscribe the

sublease

2004

agreements

and 2013
lack

an

adequate legal description to satisfy the statute of fra uds . The
2000

Sublease

Agreeme n t

fa ils

to

fully

ident ify

the

p h ysical

address of the property being subleased , i dentifying the property
as :

"roo f - top space on the " Evan ' s

locate d

at

Lincoln

Road

Grainery" grain storage bins
in

Idaho

Fal l s ,

Idaho ."

The

address blank in the 2000 Sublease Agreement was never f i lled in
by

the

parties .

No

legal

description

was

included

in

the

2000

Sublease Agreement .
The 2004

Sublease Agreement

includes a

physical address

of

the property , but o n ly makes vague references to the actual roof top

space

which

would

be

utilized .

No

legal

description

was

included in the 2004 Sublease Agreement .
The

2013

Sublease Agreement expressly identifies the wrong
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physical

address

located at

of

29 10 E .

the

grain

elevators ,

Lincoln Road ,

identifying

Idaho Falls ,

Idaho ,

property
where the

correct address for the grain elevators is 3075 E . Lincoln Road .
No legal description was included in the 2013 Sublease Agreement .
Each of these sublease agreements are deficient in giving a
a dequate property description o f the gra in elevators and al l
to provide a

legal

description as

satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

requ ired by

fail

Idaho Courts

to

Each of these sublease agreements

should be disregarded by the Court.
3 . THE EXISTEN CE OF ANY LEASE/SUBLEASE AGREEMENT BETWEEN LP
BROADBAND AND GENERAL MILLS IS NOT MATERIAL TO LINCOLN LAND ' S
CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
LP Broadband asserts that Lincoln Land "may not maintain an
action

against

Defendant

f or

unjust

e nri chment

when

De fendant

occupied the premises under leasP./rental terms with a third party
who

physically

occupied

the

premises

u nder

pur suant

[sic]

to

contractual agreements between Plaintiff and the third party . " See
Affirmative Defense
the

premises

(d).

pursuant

LP Broadband asserts that it " occup i ed
to

a

legally

binding

cont ra ct

between

Defendant and General Mills without knowledge of any prohibition
against sublease or assignment . " Id at (a) . LP Broadband willingly
admi ts

that

" [t] here exists n o privity of contract between the

parties hereto" , Id . at (a) , and "[t]here is no legal relationship
between

the

Broadband]

parties
to

for

[Lincoln

the

creation

Land] . "

Id .

of
at

a

duty owed

(c) .

Such

from

[LP

assertions

ev idence a misunderstanding of the equitable doctrine of unjust
enrichment ,

which actually requires no e xpress agreement between

the parties , which LP Broadband admits does not exist .
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Even

if

this

Court

determines

that

there

exists

contract between LP Broadband and General Mills ,

a

valid

such does

not

preven t Lincol n Land from asserting c l aims for unjust enrichment .
Unjust enr ichme nt , or restitution , is the measure of
recovery under a contract implied in law . A contract
implied in law , or quasi-contra ct , i s not a contract at
all , but a n obligation imposed by law for the purpose
o f bringing about justice and equi t y without reference
to the intent of the agreement of the parties , and , in
some cases ,
in spite of an agreement between the
par ties .

Barry v . Paci fic West Const .
440

(2004) (citations

Inc ., 140 Idaho 827 ,

omitted)

"The

substance of

834 ,
an

unjust enrichment li es in a promis e , implied by law,

103 P . 3d

action

for

that a party

will render to the person entitled thereto that which in equity
and good consc ience belongs to the

l atter ."

Smith

v.

Smith ,

95

Mills

is

Idaho 477 , 48 4 , 51 1 P . 2d 294 , 301 (1973) (emphasis a dded) .
Any

agreement

between

LP

Broadband

and

General

irrelevant to a claim f or un j ust enrichment between Linco l n Land
and LP Bro adband . As the l egal owner of the property , Lincoln Land
is entitled to exercise control and to receive a ll benefits of t he
p r oper ty . Purs uan t

to a Lease Agreement b etween Li ncol n Land and

General Mills , Gene ral Mills compensated Lincoln Land for the use
of Lincoln Land ' s prope r ty and Lincoln La nd expressly proh i bited
General

Mills

from

subletting/assigning

any

interest

in

the

property to any other entity or person . When LP Broadband accessed
and ut il ized Linco l n Land ' s property ,
Lincoln Land ,
Lincoln Land ' s

LP Broadband

received a

without t he permission of
benefit

from the

use

of

property which Lincoln Land did not authorize LP

Broadband to receive , a benefit which LP Broadband appreciated . By
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LP Broadband ' s own admissions ,

the elements o f unjust enrichment

have all been me t .
Gene ral Mi lls lacked the authority as a tenant t o allow LP
Broadband

to

utilize

Lincoln

La nd ' s

property .

LP

Broadband

accepted a bene f it under ci rcumstances that wou ld be ine quitable
for LP Broadband to retain wi thout payment to the Lincoln Land for
the

value

ther e of .

None

of

the

el ement s

of

unjust

enrichment

require any l e vel of culpability ,

fault , negligence or nefarious

motive .

un just

None

of

the

eleme nt s

of

enrichme n t

r equi re

any

l evel of knowl edge that a b e nefit wa s b e ing wrongfully received .
The Idaho Supreme Cou r t

ha s expre s sly stated tha t

wrongdoing is

no t required for an unj ust e nrichment cla i m. In Hi xon v . Allphin ,
76 Idaho 327 , 28 1 P . 2d 1042 (1 955 ) , Cour t stated as fo l lows :
The essence of a quasi cont ractual obligation lies in
the fact that the defendant has received a benef it which
it wo uld be inequitable f or him to re tain . ** * It i s not
necessary i n order t o create an obligation to make
restitution or to compensate , that the party unjustly
enriched shou ld have b een g u ilty o f any to rt i ous o r
act .
The quest i on i s :
Did h e ,
to the
f ra udu l e n t
detriment o f someone e l se , obta in something of value to
which he was not ent it led?
Id . at 333 . Th i s exact issue was aga in addre ssed i n Pichon v . L . J .
Broekemeier ,

Inc . , 108 Idaho 846 ,

702 P . 2d 884

(Ct . App . 1985) as

foll ows :
Subsequent Idaho appellate decisions also permit an unjust
e nr i chment recovery when the defendant was no t guilty of
misconduct . See McKa y Cosntruction Co . v . Ada County Board of
County Commissioners , 96 Idaho 881 , 538 P . 2d 1185 (1975) ;
Con tinental Forest Products , I nc . v . Chandler Supply Co ., 95
Idaho 7 39 , 518 P . 2d 12 01 (197 4 ) ; Du rs teler v . Durstele r, 1 08
Idaho 230 , 697 P . 2d 1244 (C t . App . 1985) . We believe it is
clear that [the Plaintiff] is not obligated o prove culpable
conduct by [the Defendant] in orde r to recover on the theory
of unjust e nrichment .
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Pichon , 108 Idaho at 887 . LP Broadband received a benefit which it
was not authorized to receive . Lincoln Land expressly prohibited
General Mills from subletting or assigning any interest in Lincoln
Land ' s

property

authorization

to

from

another .
Li ncoln

LP

Land

Broadband
to

occupy

did
it s

not

receive

property .

Any

unauthorized agreement between LP Broadband and Gene ral Mills is
simply irrelevant to Lincoln Land ' s c laim for unjust enrichment .
It would be inequitable for LP Broadband to retain the benefits LP
Broadband

rece i ved

property and

by

its

such benefits

unauthorized

use

of

Lincoln

La nd ' s

should be disgorged and returned to

Lincoln Land as the owner of th e property .
4 . BURDENS OF PROOF FOR DAMAGES UNDER UNJUST ENRICHMENT .
Th e

disag r eement

between

the

parties

as

to

damag e

proof

appears to be due to a misunderstand i ng o f the differences between
th e theories of quan um merui t

a nd unjust en r i chment . The Idaho

Supreme Court addressed these relat ed theori es in Barry v . Pacific
West Cons t.

Inc ., 140 I daho 827 , 103 P . 3d 440

(200 4 ) , as fo llows :

Though some cou r ts do not differentiate between the
measure of recovery under unjust enrichment and quantum
meruit , th is Court has carefull y done so . 66 Am . Jur . 2d
Res ti tut ion
and
Impl ie d
Contracts
§
66
( 197 3
&
Supp . 1996) . In Peavey v . Pellandini , 97 Ida ho 655 , 658 ,
551 P . 2d 610 ,
613
(1 976) , this Court stated that
quant um meruit is the appropr iate recovery under a
contract implied in fact . A contract impl i ed in fact
exists where there is no express agreement bu
the
parties ' conduct evidences an agreement . Id . ( quoting
Continental Forest Prod ., Inc . v . Chandler Supply Co .,
95 Idaho 739 , 518 P . 2d 1201 (1974)) . Unjust enrichment ,
or restitution , is the measure of recovery under a
contract implied in law . Id . A con tra ct i mplied in law ,
or quasi-contract , " is not a contract at all , but an
obl i gation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing
about j ustice and equity without reference to the
intent of the agreement of the parties , and , in some
cases , in spite of an agreement between the parties ."
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Id . Recovery under a quantum merui t theory is measured
by " the reasonable value of the services rendered or of
goods received , regardless of whether the defendant was
enriched ." Erickson v . Flynn , 1 38 Idaho 430 , 434 - 35 , 64
P . 3d 959 ,
963 - 64
(Ct . App . 2002) . Recovery under an
unjust enrichment theory , on the other hand , is limited
t o the a mount by whi ch the defendant was unjustly
enriched . Id . at 434 , 64 P . 3d at 963 .
Barry r 140 Idaho at 834 .

In o rder to have a claim under quantum meruit , there must be
a contract imp lied i n fact based upon the conduct of the parties
evidencing an agreement . Such is not the case here . Lincoln Land
was not a party to any contract with LP Broadband and was unaware
that Li nco l n Land ' s prope r ty was being ut ilized by LP Broadband .
There

can

ignorant

be
of

Broadband

no

contract

the

actions

asse r ts

that

implied

a n d General Mil ls ,

Answer ,

Affirmative

r ecovery

is

the

it

" occup i ed

rendered

or of

to

goods

o f fending

where
party .

the

one

pa r ty

is

Fu rt her ,

LP

premises ... without

o r agreement existed betwee n [Lincol n

nor the contents thereof ." Se e Amended

Defense

limited

fact

of

knowledge that any co n trac t
Land]

in

(d) ,

the

p.

3.

r easonable

received ,

such

as

Under
value
the

q uantum
of

fair

the

meruit ,
services

market

rental

value of property occupied .
To

support

a

c l aim under

unjust en ri chment ,

or a

contract

implied in law , there only needs to be a benefit conferred which
would be unjust for a party to retain . No agreemen t
and in some cases ,

is necessary ,

unjust enrichment is awarded in spite of an

agreement . Unjust enrichment is based upon society ' s interest in
pr e vent i ng the injustice of a party retaining a benefit f o r which
no payment has been made to the provider . Under unjust enrichment ,
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recovery here

is the amount by wh ich LP Broadband was

unjustly

enriched , which would include the profits realiz ed by LP' s u se of
t h e real proper t y ,

less a ny expenses and cos ts i n curred by LP in

utilizing and maintaining the property ... or in other words ,

the

net i ncrease i n the ass ets of LP Broadband a ttributab le to its use
of Lincoln Land ' s property .
Idaho cas e law is consistent with the Resta tement (Th ird) o f
Restitution
res t it u t ion

and

Unjust

under

discussed in detai l

Enrichment,

un just

which

en ri chment .

addr esses
This

in Am . Master Lease , LLC v .

c l aims

Restatement

for
was

IDANTA Partners ,

Ltd ., 22 5 Cal . App . 4th 14 51 (Cal . App . 2014) :

" The ob ject of restitution ... is to eliminat e profit "
the
" conscious
wron gdoer ,
or
de faulti ng
of
fi ducia r y
witho ut
regard to
no ti ce
or
fault .. .. "
(Rest . 3d Restitut i on & Unjust Enrichmen t , § 51 (4) . )
Tnde ed ,
" [t]he object of th e disgorgement r emedy-to
el iminate the possibility of profit from conscious
wrongdoing- is one of the corners tones of the l aw of
rest itut ion and unjust enr i chment ," and " [t ] h e pro f it
for which th e wro ngdoer i s liable by the rule of §
51 ( 4)
is the net increa se in the ass ets of the
wrongdoer ,
to
the
extent
that
this
increase
is
attributable to the underlying wrong ." (Id ., com . e . )

***
As noted above , subsection ( 4 ) o f s ection 51 of the
Restatement Third of Resti tuti on and Unjus t Enr ichment
provides that "the unjust enrichment of a conscio u s
wr ongdoer , or of a default i ng fiduc i ary without regard
to notice or fault , is the net profit attr ibutable to
the underlying wrong ....
Restitution remedies that
pursue this object are often cal l ed ' disgo rg ernent ' o r
' accounting .'" The amount of r es titut i on to be made is
sometimes described as th e " b e nefit " rece ived by th e
defendant . (Rest . , Restitution , § 1 , com . a . )

Am . Master Leas e , LLC , 22 5 Cal . App . 4th at 1486-87 .
Based on both Idaho caselaw and the Restatement

(Th ird ) of

Restitution and Unjust Enrichment , the amount of restitu tion to be
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disgorged under an unjust enrichment cause of action is the net
profit
action ,

attributable

to

the

underlying

wrong .

In

the

present

the under l ying wrong was the unaut horized placement and

access of internet antennae equipment on Lin col n Land ' s property
and the net increase in the assets of LP Broadband attributable to
the underlying wrongful use is the net profit which LP Broadband
re ceived from the use of the equipment placed upon Lincoln Land ' s
property .
Generally ,

the

burden

is

upon

the

party

claiming

unjust

enrichment to prove facts showing that the opposing party received
a bene f it and also the amount of that benefit which the opposing
party has unjustly retained .
107

Idaho

134 ,

139 - 40 ,

686

See Hartwell ,

P . 2d

79

Corporation v .

(Ct . App .

1984) ;

Smith ,
citing

Gillette, supra . Plai ntiff has been unable ro find any o ther Idaho

cases which provide greater detail regarding the burdens placed on
the parties .
In

determi ning

profits

unjustly

(Third) of Restitution and Unjus t

retained ,

the

Restatement

Enrichment , as explained in Am .

Master Lease , LLC v . IDANTA Partners, Ltd . , supra ., is consistent

with Idaho case law , but provides greater detail , when its states
as follows :
Subsection ( 5) of section 51 of the Restatement Third
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment exp lains that
" [ i] n determining net profit the court may apply such
tests of causat i on and r emoteness , may make such
apportionments ,
may
recognize
such
credits
or
deductions , and may assign such evidentiary burdens, as
reason and fairness dictate , consistent with the object
o f res ti tut ion as specified in subsection ( 4) . .. . " The
Restatement further explains that " [p]rofit includes
any form of use value , proceeds , or consequential gains
[citation] that is identifiable and measurable and not
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unduly remote . " (Id . , subsec . (5) (a) . ) In addition , a
" conscious wrongdoer or a defaulting fiduciary may be
allowed a credit for money expended in acquiring or
p r eserving the prop erty o r in carrying on the business
tha t
is
the
sou rce
of
t he
p r o fi t
subject
to
d i sgorgemen t . ... "
(Id . ,
s ubsec .
(5)(c) . ) Comment (a)
explains that " [t]he princ i pal focus of § 51 is on
cases in which unjust enrichment is measured by the
defendant ' s profits , where t he object of restitution i s
to
strip
the
defenda n t
of
wron g ful
gain
[citations] .... " (Id ., com. a . )
In measuring the amount of the defendant ' s unjust
e nri c hmen t , the plaintiff may present evidence of the
total or gross amount of the benefit, or a reasonable
approximation
thereof,
and then
the defendant may
present
evidence
of
costs,
expenses,
and
other
deductions to show the actual or net benefit the
defendant received . As the court in Uzyel v . Kadisha ,,

supra , 188 Cal . App.4 th 86 6 , 116 Cal . Rptr . 3d 2 44 sta t e d ,
" [t] he pa r ty seeking disgorgement ' has the burden o f
producing evidence permitting at least a reasonable
approximat i on of the amount of the wr ongful gain ,' " and
t he " ' [r]esidual risk of u ncerta i nty in calcul ating net
profit is a ss i g n ed to the wrongdoe r. ' [Ci t a t i on . ] " ( I d .
at p . 894 , 116 Ca l. Rptr . 3d 2 4 4 . ) The court in Uzyel
adopted this formulation from the Restatement , which
explains that the "traditional formula , inherited from
trust accounting and enshrined in the Copyright Act ( 17
U.S . C . § 504(b) ) , states that the claimant has the
burden of proving revenues and the defendan t has the
burden of proving deductions . " (Rest . 3d Restitution &
Unjust Enrichment , § 51 , com . i . ) The new Restatement ,
however , " adopts a more modern and general l y useful
ru l e that the claimant has the b urden of producing
evidence from which the cou rt may make at least a
reasonabl e approximation of the defendant ' s
unjust
enrichment ," and "the defendant is then free (there is
no need to speak of ' burden shifting ' ) to introduce
evidence tending to show that the true extent of unjust
enrichment is something less ." (Ibid . ) Thus , "[ a]s a
general rule , the defendant is entitled to a deduction
for all marginal costs incurred in producing the
revenues that are subject to disgorgement. Denial of an
otherwise
appropriate
deduction ,
by
making
the
defendant liable in excess of net gains , results in a
punitive sanction that the law of restitution normally
attempts to avoid . " (Id . , com . h . )

Am.

Master

Lease,

LLC,

225

Cal . App .

4th

at

1487-88

(emphasis

added) . This means that the burden is o n Lincoln Land to produce
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sufficient

evidence

approximat i on

for

of LP

the

Broadband ' s

Court

to

make

unjust

enrichment ,

reasonable

a

and then LP

Broadband is allowed an opportunity to present evidence that such
amount is actua lly less , due to costs of operation , expenses , etc .
A similar burden
Marson

Fastener

of proof formula
Corp . ,

392

Mass .

was
334 ,

applied
467

in

USM Corp .

N. E . 2d 1 271

v.

(1984) ,

related to improper use of a trade secret :
Once a plaintiff demonst rates that a defendant made a
profit from the sale of products produced by improper
use of a trade secret , the burden sh i fts to the
defendant to demon st rat e those costs properly to be
offset against its profit and the portion of its profit
attributable to factors other than the trade secret .
Id . at 174 n . 14 , 385 N. E . 2d 1349 . See 17 U. S . C. §
504 (b)
(1 982) (copyr ight act) . If a de fen dant cannot
meet its burden as to costs and profits , the de fen dant
must suffer the consequences . Jet Spray II , supra at
183 , 385 N. E . 2d 1349 . Th e ove r - all object is to r ende r
" the ultimate re cove ry a sou nd r eflecti on of [the
defendants ' l unjust enrichment due to t.he explo it ation
of the sec r et , and no more ." See USM Corp . I , supra 379
Mass . at 105 n . 17, 393 N. E . 2d 895 ; Jet Spray II , supra
377 Mass . at 183 n . 22 , 385 N. E . 2d 1349 . Of course ,
such a process may result in the pla intiff 's recovering
far more than its actual loss . Id . at 182 - 183 , 385
N. E . 2d 1349 .
467 N. E . 2d at 1276-77 .
Lincoln
resulting
through

Land

from

the

LP

i ntends

to

Broadband ' s

antennae

provide

ev idence

use

of

Lincoln

Land ' s

p l aced

thereon ,

based

equipment

of

the

profit
property

upon

the

payments received from LP Broadband' s customers . Such profit will
then be offset by the monthly rental payments which LP Broadband
can

establish

it

paid

to

General

Mills ,

cur r ently believed to

approximate $50 . 00 per month . LP Broadband is then free to assert
any

costs

or

expenses

otherwise

resulting

from

LP

Broadband ' s

unauthorized use of Lincoln Land ' s property which would offset the
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profit by which LP Broadband was unjustly enriched . LP Broadband
must

then

be

Ordered

to

disgorge

the

unjust

profit ,

which

ri ghtfu lly be lo ng s to Li ncoln Land .
Should the unjust profits received by LP Broadband be less
than the fair market rental val ue of the property , then the fair
market rental value should be considered the amount by which LP
Broadband was

unjustly enriched .

Had LP Broadband behaved as a

law-abiding tenant , it would have negotia ted with Lincoln Land , as
the property owner , to reach a market value rental rate . I nstead ,
LP Broadband sought a rental rate from General mills, who was only
a tenant ,

significantly below market rate . Even i f

LP Broadband

was operating it s business at a loss , LP Broadband was benefitted
by th e amou nt

of rent that LP Broadband wou l d h av e pa id h ad LP

Broadband ente red into a vnlid lease agreement with Lincoln Land
for the use of the Rooftops.
CONCLUSION

Lincoln
declaring
access

to

tha t

Land
LP

Lincoln

is

entitled

Broadba nd
Land ' s

was

to

Partial

un jus t ly

property .

The

Summary

enriched

amount

of

Judgment

by
such

use

and

unjust

enrichment shall be determined at trial .
Li ncoln Land is entitled to Partial Summary Judgmen t that the
2000

Sublease Agreement

beyond

March

MicroServ .

20 ,

2008 ,

could

not ,

assuming

as

a matter

ma x imum

of

possible

law ,

extend

renewals

by

Lincoln Land is entitled to Partial Summary Judgment

holding that the 2000 Sublease Agreement had no application to the
Rooftops after March 20 , 2008 and that the 2000 Sublease Agreement
does not constitute a defense to Lincoln Land ' s post-July ,

2010
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Unjus

Enrichment claims against LP Broadband .
Li ncoln Land is further entitled to Partial Summary Judgment

holding tha t

the

2004

Sublease Agreement

and the

20 1 3 Sublease

Agreement are both in violation of the Statute of Frauds ,
Code

Sections

agreements

9-503

are not

and

9- 505(4) ,

these

because

Idaho

sublease

subscribed and do not contain correct

legal

descriptions of the subject property . The 2013 Sublease Ag r eement
is for property at an entirely different address . Lincoln Land is
entitled to Partial
2013

sublease

Swmnary Judgment

agreements

are

holding that

inval id

and

do

not

the 200 4 and
const it ute

a

defense to Lincoln Land ' s post - July , 2010 Unjust En richment claims
against LP Broadband .
Li nco l n Lan d is fu rthe r en tit led to Partia l
holding

tha t

any

agreement

between

Summary J udgment

General

Mills

and

LP

Broadband/MicroServ does not proh i bit Lincoln Land fr om pursuing a
claim for unjust enrichment .
Lincoln Land further requests that this Court enter an Order
determi n i ng as a matter of l aw t hat the correct calculation for
damages based on the theory o f unjust enrichment is the amount of
profit which LP Broadband received from the use of Linco l n Land ' s
proper ty ,

less any legi t imate expenses and costs incurred by LP

Broadband during the use of such property . It is requested that
t he Cou r t

prohibit LP Broadband from asserting that the maximum

measure of

res ti tut ion

is the

fair market

rent a l

value of the

property unjustly occupied . While such fair market rental value
may

be

the

minimwn

restitution

amount ,

the

correct

max imum

calculation of damages is as set forth above in Section 4 .
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In addition ,
Idah o

c aselaw

it

and

Unjust Enrichment ,

is re quested that t h is Court ,

the

Restatement

(Third)

of

pursuant to

Restitut i on

and

ass i gn evidentiary burdens to the respe c tive

parties , with Lincoln Land first present ing evidence of kn own net
profit

from

t he

unjust

benefit ,

or a

r easonable approximation

thereo f , wi th LP Broadband then be i ng allowed to present evidence
of cos ts ,
en ri chme n t

expenses and other dedu ctions to show the net unjust
LP

Broadband

received

by

the

unauthorized

us e

of

Li ncoln La nd ' s proper t y .
DATED this _2_ day of March , 2016 .
FULLER & BECK

Mark R. Fuller
Att o rney for Pla intiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVJLLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant by and through its attorney of record, Swafford Law, PC
and hereby moves this Court for summary judgment against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56 (c). The Defendant requests this Court find, as a matter oflaw and
undisputed facts that Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for Unjust Enrichment against the
Defendant. Defendant additionally requests that this Court find as a matter of law and undisputed
facts that Third-Party Defendant must indemnify Defendant in this matter.
This motion is based on the Memorandum of Law fi led herewith and all pleadings lodged
with the Court.
DATED this ¥

~
C?--~
LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.

day of March, 2016.

Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Case No. CV-2015-3927

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, LP Broadband, by and through its attorney of record,
Larren K. Covert, Esq. and hereby provides the following Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment as follows:
RELEVANT UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE

LP Broadband, Inc. is the successor by merger to MicroServ Computer Technologies,
Inc. ("MicroServ" ). As such, LP Broadband is entitled to all defenses, rights and obligations of
MicorServ. All references to MicroServ include the successor entity of LP Broadband,
Defendant.
On March 20, 2000, MicroServ entered into an agreement with General Mills for the use
of a gain elevator rooftop for a location for antenna equipment. This agreement is attached as
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Exhibit A to the Affidavit ofAdam Gillings and fully incorporated herein. This agreement was for
the Evans Grainery location owned, operated or in use by General Mi ll s. This agreement al lowed
for MicroServ to install and utilize equipment on the property for the payment of $5 0.00 per
month. The agreement requires that any party seeking to terminate the agreement must give a 30
day notice before termination.
MicroServ installed equipment at this location and utilized the equipment until April,
2014. Pursuant to the rental agreement, MicroServ and LP Broadband paid the monthly rent
pursuant to the agreement with General Mills for each month after March, 2000 until April 2014.
A copy of the payments is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit ofAdam Gillings and fully
incorporated herein.
Lincoln Land Company, LLC, (Lincoln Land) purchased the Evans Grainery Property in
2006. At this time, MicroServ continued to utilize the Evan Grainery location for its equipment.
This equipment was in plain sight at the top of the grainery and a rack of computer equipment
was located inside an equipment shed at the top of the grainery. Second Affidavit ofAdam

Gillings
MicroServ did not have a ny notice of the ownership of the property by Lincoln Land
until April, 20 14 when Lincoln Land sent a letter to MicroServ. There was no notice on the
property to indicate the ownership by Lincoln Land. Photographs of the property are attached as
Exhibit C to the Affidavit ofAdam Gillings and fully incorporated herein.
At all times from March, 2000 until April, 201 4, General Mills operated as if it had all
authority to rent the property to MicroServ, co llected rent and never indicated any lack of
authority to rent the space. General Mi lls allowed access to the property and collected the rent
payments.
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Lincoln Land (Plaintiff) now seeks damaged solely on the theory of unjust
enrichment against LP Broadband (Defendant). Defendant seeks indemnification of any claims
from Plaintiff to Defendant against General Mills.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When assessing a motion for summary
judgment all controve11ed facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party.
Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the
motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851 , 854 (1991);
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist. , 125 Idaho 872 874 876 P.2d 154 156 (Ct.App.1994).

The party moving for summary judgment initially canies the burden to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404,848 P.2d 984,988 (Ct.App.1992). The burden may
be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the non moving party will be
required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311 , 882 P.2d 475, 478
(Ct.App.1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing
with the moving paity's own evidence or by a review of all the nonrnoving party's evidence and
the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134
Idaho 711 , 712, 8 P.3d 1254 1255 (Ct.App.2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been
established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further
depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to
offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under l.R.C.P . 56(f). Sanders 125 Idaho at 874
876 P. 2d at 156.
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"Unjust enrichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which would be
inequitabl e to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust."

Vandetford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261 ,27 1 (2007) (citing Beco Constr.
Co. v. Bannock Paving Co. , 118 Idaho 463 , 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990)). A prima facie case
for unjust emichment exists where: "(I) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the
plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit
under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without
payment to the p laintiff for the value thereof." Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital

Grp., Inc. , 152 Idaho 824, 827, 275 P.3d 839, 842 (2012)
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of the elements necessary to prove unjust
enrichment. Plaintiff cannot show it conferred a benefit on Defendant. The Defendant also never
appreciated any benefit from the Plaintiff. Finally, Plaintiff cannot show the acceptance of the
benefit by the Defendant that would be in any way unequitable for the Defendant to retain. As
these are all elements the Plaintiff would have to show at trial, Plaintiff must show the evidence
necessary to prove each and every element.

THERE WAS NO BENEFIT CONFERRED UPON THE DEFENDANT BY THE PLAINTIFF
The moving party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonrnoving party fails to
make a showing sufficient to establi sh the existence of an element essential to that party' s case
on which the party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Brewer v. Washington RSA No.8 Ltd.

Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 739, 184 P.3d 860, 864 (2008). Plaintiff must show a benefit that
was conferred upon the Defendant.
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In the case of Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 184
P.3d 860 (2008) the Plaintiff alleged a claim for unjust enrichment based on Inland Cellular's use
of the Plaintiff's property for a microwave communication towers, and that it received a below
market lease. On summary judgement, the plaintiff only alleged that the use of the property was
a benefit and that the amount paid by Inland Cellular for the property was less than a market
value for this type of lease. The district court on the case below and the Supreme Court on appeal
held that these allegations were insufficient to show the prima facie case for unjust enrichment
and granted surnmary judgment for Inland Cellular.
This matter contains very similar facts to the Brewer case. In this matter, the Plaintiff has
only alleged that the use of the property was a benefit to the Defendant. The holding in Brewer
indicated that this allegation is not sufficient to meet the initial burden on an unjust enrichment
claim. Without additional allegations or evidence, Plaintiff cannot show it provided a benefit to
the Defendant summary judgment should be granted.
The case of Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. ,
157 Idaho 395,336 P.3d 802 (20 14) is another case which shows the Plaintiff in this matter did
not provide a benefit to the Defendant. In Medical Recovery, a judgment and execution
documents were obtained by Medical Recovery Services against a debtor. Medical Recovery
Services then undertook efforts to have wages garnished from the employer of debtor. The
garnishment was mi stakenly sent from the employer to another collection company, Bonnevi lle
Billing and Collections, which also had outstanding amounts owed by the same debtor. Medical
13,..ecovery Services sought to obtain the fund s from Bonneville Billing and Collections, but was
unsuccessfu l. Medical Recovery Services then fil ed suit against Bonneville Billing and
Co llections for unjust enrichment.

MEMORANDUM fN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMA RY JUDGMENT

-5

245

On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the District Court's determination that Medical
Recovery Services was entitled to relief based on unjust enrichment. The Court noted, "A person
confers a benefit upon another if he or she gives the other some interest in money, land, or
possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies the debt of the
other, or in any other way adds to the other's advantage. " 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts § 9

(2013)."
In the analysis of the case, the Supreme Court noted that Medical Recovery Services did
not confer any direct benefit on B01meville Billings and Collections. Id. at 399, 806. The Court
held that Medical Recovery Services did nothing to directly benefit or at the request of
Bonneville Billing and Collections. The Comt noted that Medical Recovery Services did nothing
for the direct benefit of anyone else.
The Supreme Court also noted that an additional factor, mistake, also played an important
part in a finding of no unjust enrichment. The Court noted that it was a mistake on the part of a
third pa1iy, that Medical Recovery Services had not made part of the litigation, that conveyed
any actual benefit to Bonneville Billing and Collections. The Comt reasoned that as the benefit
was actually given by a third party, Medical Recovery Services had no ability to seek unjust
enrichment. Id.
In this matter, Plaintiff did not directly convey any actual benefit to the Defendant. The
Plaintiff did not undertake any action at the Defendant's request and did not di rectly provide
anything to the Defendant. The most that could be said is that General Mi ll s, a third party,
conveyed a benefit to Defendants in providing a lease for the use of the property. While this may
have been a mistake on the part of General Mill s, it does not impute a liability between Plaintiff
and Defendant.

MEMORAN DUM IN S UPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-6

246

Plaintiff cannot show that it directly provided a benefit to the Defendant in this matter. As
such, summary judgment against the Plaintiff should be granted.
APPRECIATION OF THE BENEFIT BY THE DEFENDANT
Plaintiff must also show the Defendant appreciated the benefit bestowed upon it. Black 's

Law Dictionary (I 0th Edition 2014) defines appreciate as " to understand the significance or
meaning of." In thi s matter, the Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendant appreciated any benefit
from the Plaintiff, as the Plaintiff never knew it was providing a benefit. It is necessary to show
that the party against whom unjust enrichment is sought, had knowledge of, and approved of the
actions subjecting it to the unjust emichment claim. (See Hertz v. Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 457, 567
P.2d. I , 2 (1977))
In its complaint, the Plaintiff admits that it did not know about the agreement between
Defendant and General Mills and the occupancy of Defendant until January, 2015. (Complaint
paragraphs 4 and 5) It was only after January, 2015 that Plaintiff and Defendnat knew about each
other. Without this knowledge, it cannot be shown that Defendant appreciated, knew or accepted
any benefit from the Plaintiff, and Plaintiff cannot show that it was knowingly giving a benefit to
the Defendant.
Without a showing that the Defendant knew and accepted any benefit given by the
Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot establish the facts necessary for its claim of unjust enrichment.
Summary judgment should be granted.
PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW THE VALUE OF THE BENEFIT AND THE AMOUNT THAT
WOULD BE UNJUST TO RETAIN
The final element P laintiff must show is the amount of the benefit and the amount that
would be unjust for the Defendant to retain. "Unjust enrichment theory allows recovery where
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the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff and it would be inequitable to allow the
defendant to retain the benefit without compensating the plaintiff for its value." Beco Const. Co.

v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990); Continental Forest
Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co. , 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201 , 1205 ( 1974); Hausam
v. Schnabl, 126 Idaho 569, 573, 887 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Ct.App.1994); Idaho Lumber, Inc. v.
Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 745, 7 10 P.2d 647, 655 (Ct.App.1985). "The defendant must make
recompense only for that amount of the benefit that would be unjust for the defendant to retain."

Connnental Forest Products, Inc. , 95 Idaho at 743, 518 P.2d at 1205; Hausam, 126 Idaho at 57374, 887 P.2d at 1080-81 ; Idaho Lumber, Inc., 109 Idaho at 744, 710 P.2d at 654.
As noted above, the Plaintiff cannot point to any benefit that has been given to the
Defendant in this matter. As such, it cannot show the value of the benefit and the amount of that
value that would be unjust to retain. Without this showing, summary judgment against the
Plaintiff must be grated.
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM ANY RECOVERY
Even if this Court were to ignore relevant case law that the use of the property by
Defendants was not a benefit given to them by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is still barred from any
recovery. It is well established that recovery for unjust enrichment is unavailable if the benefits
are created incidentally by a party pursuing his own economic advantage. Indian Springs LLC v.

Anderson, 154 Idaho 708, 7 13,302 P.3d 333,33 8 (2012) quoting He/finga v. Sybrandy, 126
Idaho 467, 47 1, 886 P.2d 772, 776 ( 1994).
In this matter, the alleged benefit is the use of the Plaintiff's property by the Defendant.
The Plaintiff could only be able to asse11 this benefit after it purchased the property, an action
clearl y seeking its own economic advantage. It is onl y through the purchase of the property that
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Plaintiff would have been able to convey any alleged benefit. As the benefit was incidental to its
purchase of the prope1ty and not direct to the Defendant, Plaintiff is unable to recover under a
theory of unjust enrichment.
Plaintiff is also barred for recovery based on the principle of the "officious intermeddler."
The officious intermeddler rule essentially provides that a mere volunteer who, without request
therefor, confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution. This rule exists to protect
persons who have had unso licited " benefits" thrust upon them." Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378,
382,94 1 P.2d 350,354 (Ct. App. 1997). Quoting Chinchurrela v. Evergreen Management, Inc.,
117 Idaho 591, 593, 790 P.2d 372, 374 (Ct.App.1989) (adopting Restatement (First) of
Restitution § 2 (1937)).
In Curtis, the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant an amount for the
construction of a road leading to the prope1ty of the defendant. The defendant never requested
the plaintiff perform the work on its property and never requested a benefit. The Court of
Appeals analyzed this case based on the officious intermeddler principle and the clean hands
doctrine. The clean hands doctrine requires a party seeking equity must come before the court
w ith clean hands, meaning, that the plaintiff's actions were not inequitable, unfair, dishonest,
fraudu lent or deceitful as to the controversy at issue. Curtis at 355, 383. The Court of Appeals
found that since the plaintiff did not have the permission of the defendant to perform the work
that the defendant was not unjustly enriched. Further the court found that the failure to gain
permission from the defendant was contrary to the clean hands doctrine and made the plaintiff an
officious intermeddler.
In this matter, the Plaintiff is an officious intermeddler and does not come before the
Comt with clean hands. If any benefit was provided to the Defendant, the benefit was thrust upon
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them. No request was ever made to the Plaintiff from the Defendant for any benefit whatsoever.
The Defendant did not even know about the Plaintiff until April, 2014. Affidavit of Adam

Gillings in Support of Objection to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment p.2. Defendant had
been using the property since March, 2000 and had made monthly payments to General Mi lls for
thi s use. Id. There was nothing on the property to show the Plaintiffs involvement in or
ownership of the prope11y. Id. at p.3. Plaintiff also does not have clean hands in this matter.
Plaintiff should have inspected the property prior to its purchase and known about the use of the
property by the Defendant. The equipment on the property was in plain sight and visible to the
naked eye. Second Affidavit ofAdam Gillings p. 2 and attachments. The Plaintiff has ind icated
that it only performed a "ground level" inspection of the property prior to the purchase in 2006.

Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant 's First Request.for Discovery p.10. Plaintiff also admitted
that the Defendant's equipment was visible by stating "the subject equipment is located hundreds
of feet above ground and not easily observable from the ground." Id. at p. 15.
P laintiff is seeking to thrust a benefit upon the Defendant that Defendant never asked for
form the Plaintiff. In so doing, Plaintiff is seeking a windfall from its own bad actions and bad
bargain in the purchase of the property. This is simply a case of Plaintiff being willfully ignorant
of the status of the property and the agreement with General Mills and the Plaintiff not seeki ng to
enforce its contract with General Mills and the breach thereof. The doctrine of unjust enrichment
"does not operate to rescue a party from the consequences of a bargain which turns out to be a
bad one." Independent School Dist. Of Boise City v. Harris Family limited Partnership, 150
Idaho 583 , 590, 249 P.3d 382, 389 (20 11) quoting George v. Tanner, 108 Idaho 40, 43 , 696 P.2d
891 , 894 (1985) .
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST GENERAL MILLS FOR INDEMNIFICATION
Defendant and General Mills entered into an agreement in March, 2000 wh reby
Defendant was allowed to use the rooftop location at Evans Grainery for its equipment. As pati
of this agreement, Defendant pay the agreed upon amount of $50.00 per month. General Mills
continually accepted this amount and provided the Defendant access to the location for
installation and maintenance. General Mills never canceled this agreement in writing as
r quired. The Defendant and General Mills continued operating under this agreement unitl
April, 2014.
Plaintiff has alleged that in 2006 it purchased the property and entered into a rental
agreement with General Mills for General Mills' continued occupancy of the property. As part
of the agreement between Plaintiff and General Mills, it is alleged that General Mills could not
sub-lease any pati of the property without permission from the Plaintiff. Despite this alleged
agreement between the Plaintiff and General Mills, General Mills continued to rent Defendant
the roof-top space, continued to collect the monthly rent and continued to allow access to the
property.
As a result of General Mills actions, the Plaintiff has now brought suit against the
Defendant for Defendant's use of the property it was leasing from General Mills, claiming
General Mills had no right to provide the property to Defendant.
Defendant seeks indemnification from General Mills in this matter pursuant to the
equitable principle of implied indemnity. "Implied indenmity is an equitable principle based
upon the general theory that one compelled to pay for the damage caused by another should be
able to seek recovery from that party." Griggs v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAm. 103 Idaho 790 792
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654 P.2d 378, 380 (1982) quoting May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho
319 543 P.2d 1159 (1975).

In this matter, any liability the Defendant may have to the Plaintiff is the direct result of
the actions of General Mills. By leasing the roof-top space to Defendant, General Mills took
responsibility for that action. If General Mills had entered into an agreement with the Plaintiff
for the use of the property, and if that agreement included a restriction on General Mills ' ability
to continue with the lease to the Defendant then it was the legal responsibility for General Mills
to info,m Defendant of the change and that a lea e would no longer be possible without the
approval of the Plaintiff. General Mills actions however, caused the Plaintiff to now being this
su.it against Defendant. A suit which at its heart is based on General Mills ' breach of the
agreement with the Plaintiff concerning a sublease.
Defendant should be indemnified by General Mills for any and all amo unts that are
sought by Plaintiff in this matter. It is the actions of General Mills that has subjected the
Defendant to this suit and possible judgment.

CONCLUSION
Defendant should be granted summary judgment in this matter. Summary judgment
should be granted against the Plaintiff for the inability of the Plaintiff to meet the required
elements for unjust enrichment and the inability of the Plaintiff to recover. Summary judgment
should also be granted in favor of the Defendant in its claim against General Mi lls for
indemnification .
DAT D this _/Kday of March, 2016.

~c__

LARREN K. COVERT ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant

M MORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

- 12

252

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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day of March, 2016, I served a true and

con-ect copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D
D
D

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
60 l W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 208-524-7167

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 208-388-1300

~ Kc.sQ

L~.COVERT ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH mDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,

Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

)

:ss

Larren K. Covert, having been sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am Larren K. Covert.

2.

I am over the age of 18, an attorney licensed in the State of Idaho and

make this affidavit of my own personal knowledge and belief.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs

Discovery Responses in this matter.
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4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a true and correct copy of Third-Party

Defendant's Discovery Responses in this matter.
DATED this /& 'day of March, 2016.

L~,ESQ.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

j/p__ day of March, 2016.

~4u~h/U7C2

NOT A Y PUBLIC OF IDAHO
Residing in Idaho Falls
Commission: 15-;,;;t:J-/7
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
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t

day of March, 20 16, I served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery
indicated:

D
D
D

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
4 IO Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 208-524-7167

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

U.S . Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 208-388-1300

~
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FRO M

(M O N) FE0

1

20 1 8

1 5 :1 8 / ST a~S: O1 / N o.753019228 4

MARKR . FULLER ( ISBNo . 2698)
F ULLER & BECK LAW OF FICES , PLLC .

4 10 MEMORIAL DRI VE: , SUITE 201
P . o . Box 5 0 9 3 5
I DAHO FALLS , ID 83 40 5 - 0935

(208 ) 524 - 5,100

TELEPHONE:

FACS IMIL E:

(208) 524- 7 1 67

A'I'TORNEY FOR PLAI NT I FF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LI NCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an )
Idaho limited liab i lity company, )

Case No. CV-15-3927

)
)

Plai ntiff ,

)

V.

NOTICE OF SERVICE

)
)
)

a Color ado
corporation , s u ccessor by me r ger
to Mi croServ ,
In c .,
an Idaho )
corporat i o n,
)
LP

BROADBAND ,

INC . ,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

De fen dant .
LP BROADBAND,

INC.,

Th i rd-Party Plaintiff ,
v.

)

GENERAL MILLS ,

)
)

and

INC .

GENERAL

MILLS OPERATIONS , LLC ,

)
)
)
)

Third-Pa rt y Defendan ts.

COMES

NOW t h e

Pl aintiff ,.

Lincoln Land Company ,

through its attorney of record , Mark R. Ful l er ,

the

court

notice

of

its

service

of

LLC,

by and

and hereby gives

Plaintiff's

Responses

to

Defendant 's First Request for Discovery, which we re submitted to
the Defendant ,

through its attorneys ,

La rr en Covert,

on the

J.__

day of February , 2016.
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p

2

FROM

(M0N)F~B

DATE D this

L

~

2 018

15:1 9/ST . 15:O1/No . 753O182264

day of February, 2016.
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below on this __ day of
February, 2016:

Document Served :

NOTICE OF SERVICE

Attorney Served:
Ron Swafford
Larren Covert
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Fax: 208-524-4131

U.S. Mail
_
Hand Delivery
_i:_Facsimile

Alexander P. McLaughlin

XU.S.Mail
_
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Jeffrey W. Bower
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
P .O . Box 2720
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208-388- 1300

Mark R. Fu ller
FULLER & BECK U\W OFFICES, PLLC
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p

3

FROM

( MON)FEB

~

2 0~8

1 5 :~ S/ST . ~ 5 : 0 1 / N o . 7530 182284

MARK R. FOLLER ( I SB No . 2 69 8)
DANI EL R . BECK {I S B No . 7 237 )
FULLE R & BECK LAW OF FICES, PLLC.

410 MEMORIAL DRIVE , S UI TE 2 0 1
P. O . Box 5 0 935
I DA HO F ALLS , I D 83405 - 0 935
TELEPHONE:
(208) 524-5 400

(20 8) 52 4-7167

F ACSIMILE :

ATTORNEY FOR PLAI NTIF F

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRI CT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLU

LA ND

Id a h o
compan y ,

COMPANY '

limi ted

LLC, an
liabil it y

Case No. CV-1 5-3927

Pl a in tiff,
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST
FOR DISCOVERY

V.

LP BROA DBAN D, I NC ., a Colorado
corporat i on ,
s u cc e sso r
by
me r g er t o Mi croServ, Inc . , a n
Id a ho co rp o r a t ion ,
Def endant .

COME S NOW t he

Pla inti ff ,

through its a t t o rney o f

by

and

and s ubmit s

the

Lincol n La nd Company ,

record ,

Mark R.

Full er ,

LLC ,

following respon ses t o Defe ndant' s First Reque st fo r Di scovery .
GENERAL

r eques t

discovery

for

Defendant

or

wh ich

d i scovery

is

ongoing

supp l emen t

Pl aintiff

OBJECTIONS:

al l

seeks

is

i n f ormation

attorney

and

d iscove ry

objects

work

Pla i ntiff
responses.

to

t he

already

product .

reserves
Plaintiff

extent
possessed

any
by

Add i tiona l ly ,

the

right

objec t s

to

to

any

d i s covery r eques t wh i ch is vague , overbroad , unduly burdensome or
oppressive , or not r easonably calculated to l ead to t he discovery

of admissible evidence .

Plaintiff

reserves the r igh t

to produce
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FROM

(MON)FEB

documents
its

subsequently

responses

as

1

2018

15:19/ST. 1S:01/No~7530192284

discovered to supplement,

set

forth

herein.

Plaintiff

alter or amend
objects

to

each

request insofar as it may be construed as limited or restricti n g
Plaintiff's
whatsoever,
documents

right

including,
as

proceeding .

to

re l y

upon

any

document

but not limited to ,

evidence

at

any

subsequent

for

any

the use of responsive
hearing,

trial,

or

Plaintiff objects to each request to the extent that

it seeks disclosure of documents not now in existence,
by

purpose

any privilege ,

including,

but not

limited to,

protected

the attorney-

cl i ent pri v ilege or work-product privilege, and Plaintiff and its
counse l

hereby

assert

such

privileges.

Without

waiving

such

objections , Plaintiff responds as fol l ows :

INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY

NO.

1:

Pl e as e

identify yourself fu l ly ,

giving

the full name o f the company, principal place of business , date of
creation , business e ngag e d in a nd me mbers.

RESPONSE:
Name: Lincol n Land Comp any , LLC

Pr inciple Place of Busi ness:

3655 Professional Way
Idah o falls , ID 83402

Date of Creation: March 2 , 2006

Business Engaged In : Ownership and manageme nt of rea l
property.

Member: Doyle H. Bec k
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P

INTERROGATORY NO. 2 : Please state any other business entities
own ed by Plain tiff,

or a ny business entity owning a ny portion of

Plaintiff .
RESPONSE: Entities o wned by Pl aintiff: None
Entities owning Plaintiff: None

IN TERROGATORY NO . 3 : For each witness you int e nt to , or might
c all in the trial

in this case ,

please give the name ,

address ,

telephone number, and a brief summary of the testimony you intend
to elicit from the witne ss .
RESPONSE: Plainti ff objects to the ext ent Inter rogatory No. 3
see ks

to

acti on.

l imit

Pl aintiff ' s

Plaintiff

ability

reserves

th e

to

call

right

to

witnesses
call

any

in

this

witne ss

consi stent wi th t he Idaho Rules o f Civi l Procedure a n d to ca l l a ny
witnes s

these

identified

Defendant

by

proceedings .

and/or any

Notwithstanding

third- party

f oregoing

the

added to

objection ,

Plaintiff identifies the follo wing witnesses :
1. Do yle H.

Beck
Contact through Plain tiff ' s coun se l

Mr . Bec k has kn owl edge as membe r and manager of Li ncoln Land
Compa ny,

LLC , a nd was involved in the purchase of the grain

silos which are
knowl edge o f

t he

hi s

s ubj ect

of

this

action .

Mr .

Bec k ha s

communi cations with Evans Grain

regarding

purchase o f the Pla int i ff's property , and with Ge neral Mills
r egarding the le ase of the subject property and the contract
between

Plaintiff

a nd

General

Mills ,

and

wi t h

Threshe r

Artisan Wheat regarding the subject a ntennae equi pme n t after
discovery .

Mr.

Beck

has

knowledge

of

the

exp iration
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P

Mr. Beck has knowledge of
of

a

rooftop

lease

wit h

Fybe rCorn , LLC .
2. Jared Stowell
FyberCom, LLC

P. O. Box 520
Ucon , ID 83454
P: 523-5733
Mr . S t owe ll has knowledge of the grain s i los whi c h are t h e
subject

of this act i on

as member and manager of FyberCom,

LLC , a t enant subsequent to Defendant o f the rooftops of t h e
grai n s il os . Mr.

Stowell wi ll test ify regarding the process

by which FyberCom ,
te rms

of

the

rooft ops . Mr.

LLC became a tenant of Plaintiff and t h e

agreement

placement

use

of

the

silo

Stowell a l so may testify as an expert witness

regarding fair ma rket

for

f or occupa ncy and

of

rates for the leasing of rooft op space

internet

antennae

equipment

u sed

by

companies similar to Defendan t .
3 . Terri Gazd i k
Coop er Norman
1000 Riverwalk Drive
Idaho Falls , ID 83402

P: 523-0862
Ms . Gazdi k may testify as an expert witne ss in relation to
t he

a mou nt

of

unjust

enrichme nt

which

De fe nda n t

received

t h rough the occupancy of Pl aintiff ' s p r operty .

4 . Daniel Packard
Cooper Norman
10 00 Riverwal k Drive
Idaho Fa l ls , ID 83 402
P: 523 - 0862
Mr . Packard may tes tify as an expert witness in relation to
the

amount

of

unjust

enrichment

which

Defendant

rece ived
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t hrough the occupancy of Plaintiff's property.
5. Kevin Miller

Thresher Artisan Wheat
1475 Lindsay Blvd.
Idah o fal l s , ID 83402
P: 208-522-2413
Mr. Mi l ler may testify regarding his conversations with Adam
Gellings

at

MicroServ/LP

antennae

from

silo

Broadband

roof top

and

regarding

transfer

remova l
tenancy

of

of
from

General Mi l ls to FyberCom, LLC .

6 . S. Bradford Kapple
Evans Grain and Elevator Co .
1168 Edgewood Drive #B
Odgen , UT 84403
P: 801-476-0277
Mr.

Kappl e

may

test i fy

regarding

purchase

of grain

lack of

knowledge

regarding

( 1)

General

Mills

MicroS erv

and

a nd

negotiat ions

leading

si l os by Linc o ln Land and Evans

to

Grains'

sublease agreement between
presence

( 2)

equipment on the silo rooftop. Mr. Kapple wi l l
was never a dis c u ss ion r ega rding e ith e r

of

a ntennae

testify there

of these items with

any representative o f Lin coln Land .
7 . J ames Pa s l e y

Pasley' s Grain , Seed & Feed
5740 E. Iona Road
Idaho Falls, I D 8340 1
P : 208 -522-1910
Mr . Pas l ey was manager of Eva ns Grain and El evator during its
own e rship

Evans

of

Grain

the

subject

had

no

propert y,

knowledge

a nd

wi l l

regarding

(1)

testify

a

that

sublease

agreeme nt between General Mills and Mi croServ or (2) presence

o f ante nna e equipment on t he silo rooft op. Mr.
t est i fy

there

wa s

no

discussion

Pasley wil l

regarding e i ther o f

these
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issues with any representative of Lincoln Land.
8. Jim Rooney
1273 Tipperary Court
I daho Falls, ID
P: 208-523-8795
Mr. Rooney wa s manager of General Mills, while located at the
subject property,

until

approximately

September,

Mr.

2013.

Rooney will have knowledge regarding discussions with Doyle
Beck

regarding

there

was

Plain tiff ' s

never

a

propert y

discussion

and will

wi th

Mr.

testify

Beck

that

regarding

MicroServ placing antennae equipment o n silo rooftop.
INTERROGATORY NO.

4:

Have you e ngaged or consulted with any

expert witness to testify at the trial or any evidentiary hearing
of this cause? If so, please stat the experts

a . Name, address and tel e phone number;
b. Educational background;

c. Any

fields

of

specia li zation ,

special

training

or

special

skills pos sessed by the expert ;
d. The subject matter upon which such witnesses are expected to
testify;

e . The

substance

of

any op inion testimony t hat

the

expert i s

expe cted to give at t h e trial of this ca u se ; and ,
f . The specific fa cts on which such op inions are bas ed .
RES PONSE: Pl aintif f objects to t he extent Interrogatory No. 4
seeks
t hi s

to

limit

act i on .

Plaint iff's
P l a intiff

ability to call

re serves

the

right

expert
to

call

witne sses
a ny

in

expert

witn ess consist e nt with t h e Idah o Rules of Civil Pro cedure and to
call any exper t

witness identified b y De fendant and/or a ny t h ird-

party added to t h ese proceedings . Plaintiff furt her o bject s t o the
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request to identify any expert witnes s "engaged or consul tedu as
s uch is privileged as attorney work-product and Defendant is on ly
entitled t o info rmation regarding expert witness es which Plaintiff
ma y

call

at

trial,

not

tho se

who

were

Notwithstanding the foregoing o bject i on,

simply

consulted.

Plaintiff identifi es the

following expert witnesses who may be ca lle d at trial:
l. Jared Stowell
FyberCom, LLC
P.O. Box 520
Ucon, ID 83454
P: 523-5 733

Education : Rigby High School, BYU-Idaho (No degree r eceived}
Specialization: Wireless internet and business experience.
Subject Matter: Mr.

Stowell has knowledge of the grain sil os

which are the s ubject of this a c tion as member a nd mana ger of

LLC ,

Fyberco m,

a

tenant

s ub sequent

to

Defendan t

of

the

r ooftops of t h e grain si lo s.

Mr. St o we ll a l s o has kn o wledge

r egard i ng

for

f air market

int e rnet

ant e nna e

rates

equipment

t he

u sed

by

leasing

of

companies

s p ace

for

similar

to

right

to

Defen dant .
Opini on

Test imo ny:

Not

yet

kno wn.

Res erve

s uppleme nt.
Factual Basis : Not yet

kno wn. Reserve right to supp leme nt.

2 . Terri Gazdik
Cooper Norman
1000 Rive rw a l k Drive
Ida h o Fa l ls , ID 834 0 2
P: 523-0 862
Educa tio n: See attach ed Curriculum Vi tae .
Spe c ializatio n : See att ach e d Curriculum Vitae .
Sub ject

Mat t e r: Ms .

Gazdik ma y test ify as an expert

wi t ness
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unjust

enric hment

occupancy

of

which

Plaintiff ' s

property.
Opin i on

Testimony:

Not

yet

known.

Reserve

right

to

supplemen t.
Factual Basis: Not yet known. Reserve right to supplement.

3. Daniel Packard
Cooper Norman
1000 Riverwa lk Drive
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

P: 523-0862
Education : See attached Curriculum Vitae .
Specialization : See attached Cu rri cul um Vitae.
Subject Matter : Mr. Packa rd may testify as an expert witness
in

relation

Defendant

to

the

receive d

a mount

through

of
the

unjust

which

enri c hme n t

occupancy

of

Plaintiff ' s

property .
Opinion

No t

Testimony :

yet

known .

Reserve

right

to

supplement.
Factual Basis : Not yet known . Reserve right to supplement .
INTERROGATORY NO.
to ,

5:

Please identify each exhibit you intend

or reasonably antic ipate

you migh t ,

i ntroduce at trial .

For

each exhibit , please s tate who prepared it a nd for what purpose it
will be offered into evidence .
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to the ext e nt Interrogatory No . 5
seeks to limit Plai ntiff's ability t o introduce exhibit s in this
action .

Plaintiff

reserves

consistent with the

the

right

to

introduce

any

exhibit

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and to

re ly

upon any exhibit introduced by Defendant and/or a ny other thirdPLAINTIFF' S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 8
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proceedings.

Notwithstanding

t he

foregoing objection,

Plaintiff identifies t he fol lowing exhibits:

See

attached

all

response

documents
to

Defendant's

hereto

Request

produced

for

by

Discovery

Plaintiff
a nd

see

in
all

docQments produce d by Defendant in resp o nse to Plaintiff's request
f or discovery.

See also any affidavi t

subrni tted by any party in

this a ction and attachments there to.
INTERROGATORY NO.
Pla intiff

obtained

obtained

includ ing

6:

the

List the date and method by wh ich the

subject

th e

property

individuals

and

involved

from whom
in

the

it

wa s

purchase

process with Pla i nt if f or any other entity.
RESPONSE :
Da te : March 15 , 2006.
Me t h od

of

Purchas e :

Do wn

Payment,

contract

involving

1031

exchange .
Seller: Evans Grain and El evator, Ogden, Utah .
Individuals:

S.

Bradfor d

Kapp le

( Evans

Grain)

and Doy le H.

Beck (Lin co l n Land) .
Ent i ty : American Sxchange Services, 10 31 Exch ange Fa c ili ta tor
for Evans Grai n.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify the dates Plaintiff , a ny of its
officers o r agents con ducted a physical inspecti on of th e subject
property the identity of the inspecting party.
RESPONSE:

Ob j ection

th at

this

Inter rogatory

is

incomprehensib l e and vague. The d ef init ion of "propertyu se t f orth
on Page 3, Subpart
and incl udes

(c ) o f

numer o us

De fe ndant's discovery re quests is vague

items of p e rsonal property not

related to
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t h is litigation. Wi thout waiving these objections ,
Plaintiff ' s

Manager ,

performed

an

inspection

P

Doyle H. Beck ,

of

the

subject

rooftop on numerous occasions during his empl oyment at U & I Sugar
during

the

early

1970 ' s.

Doyle

H.

Beck ,

Plaintiff's

Manager ,

per f ormed a genera l inspection of the g r ound level of the s u bject
real

property prior to

its

purchase

in

2006.

Mr.

Beck did

not

inspect and had no reason to inspect the subject rooftop of the
silos at the time of purchase and did not inspect the rooftop from
t he

ear l y

1 970 ' s

u nti l

20 14,

afte r

d i scovery

of

the

a ntennae

placement .
INTERROGATORY NO . 8 : Identify the amount you seek for damages
in this matter ,

including the method of computing tho se damages

any

or

doc umen t s

mater i al

u sed

to

ca l culate

damages

and

individuals involved in the calcu lation of damages.
RESPONSE :

Plaintiff

grounds of vagueness.

seeks

unjust

objects

to

Inter r ogatory

No .

8

on

the

Witho ut waiving such objection , Lincoln Land

enrichment

ca l cu l ated

upon

the

greater

of

t wo

indepe ndent bases:

1. Underpayment of Rent is the minimum amount sought:
Fair Ma r ket Rent

$3 , 450.00 per mont h

Rent pa i d by LP Broadband

$

Net Mon hly Underpayment

50.00 per month

$3 , 400.00 per month
x 46 months

Total Underpayment
2 . Profit
unjustl y

unjustly
retained

retained
as

a

$156,400.00

by

result

LP
of

Broadband:
dat a

Al l

transmission

profits
through

the an t ennae wrongfully placed on Lincoln Land's property for
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the period of Ju l y,

2014 . Su ch amount

2 010 thr ough April 22,

cannot be calculated until Linco ln Land's experts re v i e w and
eva lu ate responses

to discovery which has been and wil l

submitted by LP Broadband.
supp leme n t

the r ight to

t his res ponse as discovery proceeds .

INTERROGATORY NO.

Mi lls

Plaintiff res erves

be

9: I dentify all communicat ion s with Gene r a l

subject property,

concerning th e

the property to any en t ity ,

Defendant or sublease of

including the da te of communication ,

meth od of commun icatio n, individuals i nvo l ve d in th e communica tion
and subject of the communication.
RESPONSE :
grounds

of

prov ided .

Plaintiff

objects
No

va guenes s .

to

Interrogatory

definit ion

of

No.

8

on

th e

" communications "

is

Without wai vi n g the o bj ect ion, pleas e see the following

documents attached hereto .
l . See a t tached e-mai l

from Kevin Mi ll er to

Doyle Beck,

dated

March 1 8 , 2014.

2 . See at t ach ed letter from Eric Tone to Doyle H.

Beck,

dat e d

Marc h 1 2 , 201 4.
INTERROGATORY

c urrently

occupying

NO .

10 :

or

Identify all

util i zing

the

the n ame o f the indi vi d ual or e nti ty ,

individuals or entities

subject

prop er ty

i ncluding

pu rp ose for the i r occ up a ncy

of the p roperty and the terms o f any agreement with the individual
or entity .
RESPONS E:

See

attached

lease

agreements

with

FyberCom ,

LLC

Requests

fo r

and Lan sing Trade Group, LLC.
INTERROGATORY

Admissions .

As

to

NO .

each

11:

Submitted

request

not

herev;it h

fully

are

and

unconditionally
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admitted , please set forth in detail each fact which yo u rely upon
in denying each such admission.

RES PONSE:

see Plaintiff's Responses to each Request

Ple ase

for Admission, submitted herewith.

REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUES T FOR PRODUCTION NO.
an d

all

documents

were

which

Please provide copies o f

l:

consulted

or

assisted

any

you

in

answering a ny of the foregoing interrogatories served h ere with .

RESPONSE: Please see attached.
produced

by

De fendant

in

Please also see all documents

response

to

Plaintiff's

Request

for

Please provide copies o f

any

Discovery.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION

NO.

2:

and all d ocuments which you, your agent, or attorney intend to use
a t trial or any hearing in t his mat t er.

RESPONSE:

Please

to

response

see

Interrog at ory

No.

5

and

attached documents.
REQUEST

and

all documentation

Comp laint
No.

FOR PRODUCTION NO.
supporting

3:

Please provide copies of any

your

claim of damages

in

your

or us e d to calcul ate damages identif i ed in Interroga to ry

8.

RESPONSE:
right

See

attached

documents .

Plaintiff

reserves

the

to supplement this respons e as discovery progresses and in

the event expert reports are prepared.
REQUEST
reports

along

FOR

PRODUCTION NO .

with

expert

4:

wit ness

Pl ease

provide

qualifications,

all

ex pert

supporting

d ocumentation referenced o r used by t he expert .
RESPONSE:

No

such

reports

current l y

exist.

The

Expert
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Witne sses identified by Pla int iff may subsequently submit reports
and
with

Plaintiff will timely s u pplement this
the

Co urt's

Scheduli ng

Order

and

Request in accordance
Idaho

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure if such reports are prepared .
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTI ON NO.
related

to

the

purchase

of

5:

Please provide al l

the

property

as

docume nts

referenced

in

Interrogatory No. 6 .
RESPONSE: Please see attac hed documentation .
REQUEST fOR PRODUCTION NO.

6:

Please prov ide all inspections

performed o n t h e pro perty or reports of inspections f rom any agent
or off i cer .
RESPONSE: Please see attached documentation .
REQUEST

FOR

PRODUCTION

NO.

7:

Please

provide

all

commun icatjons identified in I n terrogatory No. 9 .

RESPONSE : Please see a t tached documentation .
REQUEST

FOR PRODUCTION NO.

writlen or recorded s tatements ,

8:

Please provide copies o f

audiotapes ,

any

videotapes , writings ,

t e xt messages, or memoranda conce rning the facts in this matter.

RESPONSE:

To t h e

extent such materials exi st ,

Plaintiff, are possessed by Pl aintiff ,
prov i d e d,

p l ease

the right

to

see

and have not be p revious ly

attached documentation.

supplement

t:1is

Response

are known to

Plaint iff

r eserves

in accordance with

Ida ho

Rule s of Civil Procedur e .
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.
agreement

with

any

and

al l

9:

Please provide a copy of all

e ntities

or

indiv i dual s

currently

occupying or ut i l i zing t he subject property.
RESPONSE : Please see attached do c wnentation .
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REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION

REQUE ST FOR ADMI SSION NO . 1: Admit that the Defendant entered
and

u ti lized

the

subject

property

prior

to

o wnership

by

the

regardi ng

the

Plaintiff .
RESPONSE:
status

of

Plaintiff

Defendant' s

is

without

info rmation

occupa ncy on the s ub ject property

at any

ownership of the property a nd on that

time prior to Pl aint i ff ' s
basis denies the same .

REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admi t that the Defendant e n tered
and utilized t he subject property purs ua nt to an agreement

with

General Mil l s .
RESPONSE :

Plaintiff

is

wit ho ut

information

regarding

the

status o f any alleged agree ment between Defendant and General Mi ll
at

the

p rope rty

time
and

the
on

Defenda nt
tha t

entered

bas i s

denies

and
the

utilized
same .

the

subj ec t

Subsequent

to

Pl aintiff ' s p urcha se of the subject property , the June 2010 lease
agr eement between Plaintiff a nd Gen e r al Mil ls prohib it ed Ge ne ral
Mills

from

sublet ting

any

portion

permitting the assignment o f
and any a l leged subl ease ,

of

the

subject property ,

or

the lease or any interest therein ,

assignment or li cen se agreement between

General Mills and Def endant

s ubsequent to General Mi l ls e n teri ng

into the June 2010 lease agreement with Plaint i ff was invalid.

REQUEST

FOR

ADMIS SION

NO .

3:

Admi t

t hat

Plaintiff

a nd

Defendant had a nd h ave no contractual relationship for use of the
p r operty .
RESPONSE ;
relationship

Admit that Defendant has n ever h ad a contractual
with

Plaintiff

f or

the

use

of

Plaintiff ' s

real
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property.
REQUEST

FOR

ADMISSION

NO.

4:

Admit

that

the

equipment

ut ilized by the Defendant on the property was in plain sight.
RESPONSE:

Pla intiff

objects

to the

Request on the

grounds

that t he term "plain sight" is vague and ambiguous and therefore
denies

Request

located

for

hundreds

Admission

of

feet

No.

4.

above

The

subject

ground

level

equipment

and

was

easi l y

not

observable from the ground.
REQUEST

contractual

ADMISSION

FOR

NO.

Admit

5:

relationship with General

that

Plaintiff had

for

Mills

t he

use

a

of the

property.
RESPONSE:

Admit.

See

June

2010

Lease

Agreement,

submi tted

herewith.

FOR

REQUEST

ADMI SS ION

NO.

6:

Admit

that

Defe ndant

paid

Gene r al Mills for use of the subject property.
RESPONSE :
( or amount)

Plaintiff i s

made by

un abJ.e to admit or deny any payment

Defendant to Ge ne ral Mills as

Pl ainti ff was

not a party to the allege d transaction and therefore denies t h e
same .

Defendant

Mills

as

set

al l eges payment

for th in

11, dated November 17,
Affidavit

of

Adam

of

Defendant' s

$ 50.

00 p e r

month to General

Response t o Interrogatory No.

2 015 a n d as attach ed as Exhibit

Gel l ings ,

dated

De cemb er

2,

' B'

2015 .

to the

Defendant

bears the burde n of producing evidence of any justif i abl e o ff set
t o

Plaintiff's

unjus t

e nrichment

c laim,

includin g

any

p ayme nts

made to Ge ne ral Mill s .
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day o f ~ - 20 16.

Attorney for Plaintiff
VERIFICATION
STATE Of IDAHO

ss

COONTY OF BONNEV I LLE
Doyle Beck, acting as Manage r of Linco ln Land Company , LLC , being sworn
upon h is o a th, says that. the fa cts set forth in the foregoing E'laintiff' s
Responses to Defendant's First Reque st for Discovery a re true, accurate, and
complete to the bes t o f his k n owle d
a nd b lief.

Dovl

.. Beck

Manj_ger - Lincol n La n d Company, LLC
this

_j_

day of

1~

, 2016.
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NOTI CE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a t r ue and correct copy of t he

foregoing Discovery t o t he a t t o rney l isted below on t h is _ /_

day

of February , 2016.

DOCUMENT SERVED :

PLAINTifF ' S RESPONSES

TO

DEFENDANT ' S FIRST SET OF
REQUESTS FOR DISCOVERY

Attorney Served :
Larren Covert
Ron Swafford
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
F: 524-4131
Alexander P. Mclaughlin
Jeffrey W . Bower
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
P.O . Box 2720
Boise, ID 83702

U.S. Mail

_
Hand Delivery
~ Facsimile

<1"
_

U.S. Mail

Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Fax:208-388-1300

Mar k R. Fu lle r
Att o rne y a t La w

PLAI NTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DE!:E:NDANT ' S FIRST REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY - 17
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State of Idaho
Office of the Secretary of State

I, LAWERENCE DENNEYj Secretary of State of ~he State of Idaho, hereby
'
certify that I am the custodian of the corporation, limited liability company, limited
partnership, limited liability partnership, and assumed business name records of this

State.

7

I FURTHER CERTIFY That th annexed is a full, true and complete duplicate of
CERTIFICATE OF WITHDRAWAL OF LP BROADBAND, INC,1 received and filed on
July 17, 2014, under file number C 198535

Dated: January 29, 2016
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State of Idaho
Office of 1t1P. Secretary of State

CERTIFICATE OF WITHDRAWAL
OF
LP BROADBAND, INC.
File Number C 198535
I. BEN YSURSA, Secretary of State of the State of ldet_'loi hereby certify that
'

Application for Certificate of Wlthdrawa\ from this State, has been rece\ved in this office

and is found to conform 10 law.

ACCORDINGLY and by vtnue of the authority ves1ed in me by law, I issue this
Cer1ificate of Withdrawal and attach hereto a duplicate cf the Application for such

Certificate.

Da.te<1: Jul';' 17, 2014

SECRETARY OF STATE
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LEASE
THTS LEASE, made this __ day of June, 2010, by and between LINCOLN
LAND COMPANY L.LC. e'Landlord"), and GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, INC.•
A Delaware corporation ('•Tenant").

WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the covenants, conditions and agreements herein contained,
the parties hereby agree as follows:

1. PROPERTY. Landlord in consideration of the rents and covenants
hereinaftc:r mentioned, to be paid and performed by Tenant, berby demises,
leases and lets unto said Tenant, and Tenant hereby hires and takes from
Landlord the property as legally described on Exhibit A attached hereto and
made a part hereof, located in the City of Lincoln. County of Bonneville,
State of Idaho (" Property").

2. TERM. The tenn of this Lease shall be for a period of approximately five
(5) years, commencing on Mayl~ 2010 and t~nninati.ng on Aprill, 2015.

3. RENT. Tenant agrees to pay the Landlord as rent for the Property without
offset or deduction the sum of One Hundred Twenty Thousand and no/100
Dollars ($120,000), payable annually on the t" of July of each calendar year
herein commencing July I~ 2010.
4. USE. The Property shall, subject 10 the provisions of Paragraphs 6 and 17
herein, be used without restriction by Tenant during the term of this Lease.

S. EQUIPMENT. There is included in the lease the follm\ing equipment
Case Skidster

Model l 845C

Massey Ferguson Model l 500
Allis Chalmers

Model 7453047327

Serial No. JAF01038l J $5,000
Serial No. 9C00 l394
Serial No. 96M02434

$ t ,000
$ 4,000

The Tenant shall maintain the equipment and return the same of Landlord at
the termination of the Lease in good condition and repair subject lo reasonable
depreciation. If the cost to ~epair said equipment exceed the value specified,
the tenant may purchase the equipment at the specified value.
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6. MAINTENANCE AND SURRENDER. Tenant sh.ill keep, at its expcm;e,
H1e Property and every pa11 thcl'cof in general repair and condition during
the term. Tenant will not use or permit anything upon the Property that may
be dangerous to life or limb. Tenant s])all not in any manner deface ot·
injure the Property that will create a nuisance. Tenant shall not use or
permit the use of the property, or any part thereof, for any illegal purpose
it1cl uding any violation of envfronmental regulations. Tenant shall retrn·n
the Property peaceably and promptly to Landlord at the end of Lhe term of
this Lease, or at atl)' earlier termination thereot~ in good condition, loss by
fire and ordinary wear and tear acc~pted.

7. UTILITES. Tenant shall promptly pay all rates, costs and charges for
utilities consumed by Tenant at the Property.

~- SIGNS. Tenant may erect, place or pe-rmit to be erected or placed on the
Property any customary business signs including signage on the exterior of
any bui1dings without the prior v.ritten consent of the Landlord. Tenant ·
wiU remove any such signs at the termination of the Le.ase.

9. CONDITION OF PREMISES. To the best of its knowledge. Landlord
acknowledges herein that the Property, including all buildings located
thereont is in good condition and repair including but not limited to
compliance with all applicable laws and regulations inc1uding all
enviromncntal requirements. To the best of its knowledge, Landlord
acknowledges that the Property and the equipment, plumbing, drains,
fixtures, appliances and rnachinery if any therein, nre at the time of the
Lease commencement in good condition and repair. Tenant has leased the
Property since July of l 995 and agrees that the Property is in good condition
and repair and has done nothing to the Property that would change this
condition.

10. DEFECT. Landlord shall not be released from any ctaims arising from any
latent defect in the condition of the Property, or the equipment, -fixtures or
appliances, if any, in or serving the Property, and the builder buildings of
which they are a part, and the streets, alleys, areas, area-ways, passages or
sidewalks adjoining or appurtenant thereto.

t 1. SUBLEASING~ Tenant wi11 not sublet che Property, or nny part thereof, and
will not assign this Lease or any interest therein, nor permit this Lease to be
1.Tansferred in any manner without the prior written consent of Landlord in
each and every case of undcrk:tting-or assignment,.-Tenant shall not be
relieved from liability to Landlord for the terms and condition of this Lease.

12. BANKRUPTCY. Any assignment, sale in bankruptcy or insolvency of
Tenant may~at the option of Landlord be considered an assignment within
the meaning of this Lease and as a breach of the covenants hereof

2
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13. LIABILITY OF LANDLORD. Unless due to the negligence of Landlord,
its agents or employees, Landlord shall not be liable for any damage or loss
to property, inju1•y or death occurring in or about the Prope11y or in miy way

related to Tenant's use thereof or due to the hnppening of any accident, or
any act or neglect of the Tena,nt1 or any other tenant or occupant of any
building, or of any other person, persons or corporations, or occasioned by
any nuisance made or suffered thereon. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Landlord shall be liable for compliance with any environmental regulations
regarding conditions existing at the Property at the time of th,e Lense
commencement date.
Landlord agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold Tenanthannless from any
losses, cpsts, damages and expenses, fines, penalties, attorneys' fees and

costs resulting from any cJaim asserted against Tenant (i) arising out of
Landlord's actions, operations. or activities at the leased premises; (ii)
arising from the actions of any co~tenants, agent, representative, or invitee
leased premises, including the presence of hazardous substances or the
discharge or release of hazardous substances, not caused by Tenant; and (iv)
Landlord's breach of any representations and warranties.
14. LIABILITY OF TENANT. Tenant assumes liability and obligation for all
damages as specified in paragraph 13, above, and agrees to hold Landlord
harmless,·and to indemnify Landlord therefore. In case of such damages,
Landlord may, at its option, repair such damage and Tenant shall thereupon
reimburse Landlord for the reasonable costs ofrepairing said damage, ond if
Tenant fails to perform any of the covenants or agreements herein provided
to be kept ofperfom1ed by Tenant, Landlord may perform the same and
charge Tenant with the reasonable expense of such performance, and Tenant
agrees promptly on demand to repay Landlord the reasonable expense of

such perfonl'lance by Landlord.
15. TRESPASSERS. The tenant shall use its besL efforts to prevent trespass to
the le-ased property and to the adjacent property owned by the Landlord.
Such best efforts shall include but not limited to posting of appropriate signs
and notifying local authorities of any trespass.
16. INSURANCE. Tenan1 shall secure and maintain throughot1t the term hereof
general liability insurance of not less that Two Million and Noll 00 Dollars
($2,000,000.00), with bodily injury limits ofnot less than Two Million and
NO/I 00 Dollars per person and Two MHlion and No/I 00 Dollars per
accident, and property insurance for physical damage caused in any way, to
the buildings and improvements leased by Tenant with damage limits of not
less than Two Mil1ion Two Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($2,200,000.00) per accident. Tenant shall have the option to cover all

3
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requil'ecl insurance under its corporate blnnket insurance policies naming
Landlord on a Certificate of Insurance as an additional insmed.
17. COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS. Tenant covenants and agrees at
its own expense to observe and keep all applicable laws, regulations and
requirements of the federal, s1atcor local authori1ies having jurisdiction over
the Property,

18. TAKING FOR PUBLIC USE. Tenant agrees that if1he Property, or any
part thereof, shall be taken for apy street or other public use, or destroyed by
the action of the public authorities, so that Tenant cannot conduct its normal
bt1siness thereon, this Lease shall thereupon terminate.
19, DESTRUCTION BY FIRE. If during the term of this Lease the Property
or the improvements thereon shalJ be damaged or destroyed by fire or the
e]ements, or any other cause rendering the Property unfi~ for occupancy, or
to such an extent that they cannot be reasonably repaired within sixty (60)
days from the happening of such injury, then Landlord may with the WJ.itten
consent of Tenant terminate this Lease from the date of such damage or
destruction, and Tenant shall immediately surrender the Property to
Landlord, and Tenant shaU pay rent only to the time of such surrender; and

in case of any such destruction, Landlord may re-enter.and repossess the
property. However, if the Property can be reasonably restored within sixty
(60) days from the happening of the injury thereto, and Landlord with
fifteen (15) days from the occurrence of such injury elects in writing to
restore the Property within sixty (60) days from the happening of injury
thereto, then this Lease shall .not terminate on account of such i1'iury but the
rent shall abate during the process of repairs up to the time the repairs are
completed, ex.cept that Tenant shall, dutingsuch time, pay a pro rata portion
of such rent apportioned to the portion of the Property which are in

condition for occupa11ey. If, however, the Property sl1all be so slightly
injured by any cause aforesaid, as not to be rendered unfit for occupancy,
then Landlord shalJ repair the same with reasonable promptness and, in that
case, the rent shall not cease or be abated during such repairing period. All
improvements or betterments placed by Tenant on the Property shall, in any
event, be repaired and replaced by Tenant at its own expense.

20. QUIET ENJOYMENT. Landlord covenants and agrees that Tenant, on
paying the rent and perfonning the covenants hereunder, shalt and may
peaceably and quietly have, hold and enjoy th.e Property for the tern hereof.
Landlord represents herein that as of the Lease commencement date it has
legaJ ownership of the Property and the same is subj~ct to no encumbrances
which could interfere with Tenant's intended use of the Property.

2J. DEFAULT. If Tenant shall neglect or fail to keep, observe and perfonn any
of its covenants and agreements contained herein (i) in respect of the

4
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payment of amounts for a period often (10) days after written notice that
said surns are due; (ii) for non-money matters for a period of thirty (30) days
after written notice describing said breach or default; or (iii) if the leasehold

inte1'est of Tenant shall be taken on execution 0cr other p1'ocess of law, or if
Tenant shall petition to be or be declared bankrupt, or insolvent according to
law, then and in any of said cases Landlord may immediately and without
further notice or demand, enter inlo and upon the Property and take absolute
possession of the same withont such re-entry working a forfeiture of the
rents to be paid and the covenants io be performed by the Tenant for the foll

tenn of this Lease, and may at Landl9rd's election lease or sublet the
Propeity, or any part thereof, on such terrns and conditions ·ru.id for such
rents and for such time as Landlord may elect, and after crediting the rent
acrually collected by.Landlord from such reletting on the rentals stipulaled
to be paid under this Lease by Tenant from time to time, colJect from Tenant
any balance remaining due from time to time on the rent reserved under this

Lease 1 Charging to Tenant such reasonable expenses as Land_Iord may
expend in putting the Property in tenantable condition. Or Landlord may at
its election upon written notice to Tenant declare this Lease forfeited and
void, and may therenpon re-eater and take full_and absolute possession of
the Property as the owner thereof, and free from any right or claim or
Tenant. Such election .and re-entry shall constitute an absolute bar to any
right to enter by Tenant i1pon the payment of all arreara.ges _o f rent and costs
after a dispossession under any suit or process for breach of any of the

covenants of this Lease, and the commencement by Landlord of any action
lo recover possession of the Property aforesaid shall be deemed a sufficient
notice of election of said Landlord to treat this Lease as void and terminated,
without the ,vritten notice above specified, unless Landlord shall in Vl"riting.
before beginning such proceeding, notify Tenant that after obtaining such
possession .Landlord will continue to look to Tenant for the perfonnance of
the Lease and will submit the Property on Tenant's account, in the manner
as above provided.
21. TAXE~. Tenant shall pa;v· as additional rent all real estate taxes on the
property of the Landlord leased by the Tenant as well as adjacent property
O\.vned by the Landlord that is not leased by the Tenant. Landlord agrees to

cooperate with Tenant in any tax reduction evaluation proceedings which

Tenant may initiate. .
23. RE·DELIVERY OF PROPERTY. Tenant, upon the termination of this
Lease, shall at its own expense remove all dirt, rubbish and refuse which
Tenant shall have placed at fut:: Properly d_uring the term of this Lease, and
upon Tenant's expense, which Tenant shllll 11ay upon receipt of a bill for

same frcim Landlord.
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24. WAIVER. Tenant agrees thnt no assent by Landi ord to any breach of any of
Tenant's covenants ot: agreements shall be deemed a waiver of any

succeeding breach of such covenant.

25. RIGHT OF tNTRY. Landlord shall ar all times upon prior written notice
to Tenant {except in the event of an emergency) have the right to enter upon
the Property to inspect its condition, and to make repairs required he.reunde.r.
Landlord shall have the 1·ight during the last thirty (30) days of the term
hereof to place and maintain on the Property and in the windows thereof the
customary notice of"To Let" OJ "To Rent", and to sh9w the Prope1ty to
prospective tenants.
26. RAILROAD TRACKAGE. Landlord agrees herein that duriDg the term of

this Lease, Tenant shall be entitled at no additional charge.to share in the use
of the railroad tracks which lie 011 the ~andlord's property adjoining the
leased _Property. Landford acknowledges that it owns t~e trackage and has
the unrestricted rights of usage of such trackage which will remain
uninterrupted during the term of this Lease. Landlord ·does not use such
trackage, therefore, all necessary, all nee;essary repairs and maintenance of
the trackage will be at the Tenanfs expense.

2'1. FIRST REFUSAL, Provided Tenant is not in dcfaul~ herounder, Landloi·d
shall within one hundred twenty days ( l 20) before the expiration of the
LeAse and before ll1e expiration of ninety (90) days before the expiration of
the Lease offer to the Tenant the right to either re-le!lSe or to purchase the
property as in the discretion of the Landlord. Whether to sell or lease is
within the discretion of the Land!Qrd. The price of the lease or the purchase
shall be communicated to the Tenant arid if the parties then can agree on that
or other price of the lease or the purchase then the same shall be reduced to
appropriate contract. If the pa1iies cannot agree upon the terms of the lease
or the purchase then in such even the Landlord shall be at liberty to offer the
same to a bona fide thiro party on a lease or a purchase, provided, however,
the Landlord shall not lease or sell the Property during the term of this
Lease, assuming no defaults, on more favorable lenns and conditions than
was offered to the Tenant If the Landlord and the Tenant have not agreed
upon the terms of a lease or purchase during th.e term of the Lease then in
such event the right of the Tenant to lease or purchase the Property after the
expiration of the Lease shall be ofno further force and effect. The Tenant
shall have thirty {30) days from the time any offer to purchase or re-lease is
communicated to it within which to accept the terms and if not accepted the
same shall be deemed rejected and the Landlord may th~n negotiate with
any bona fide third party relative to the lerms of sale or lease but upon no
mare favorable terms than offered Tenant.
28. RIGHT TO SELL. Landlord may sell the Property at anytime during the
term of this Lease to a bona fide third part>'· However, Teoant shall be
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given the right of 1.1rs1 refusal upon the same terms offered any bona fide
third party ~d shall have thirty (30) days from the time any offer to
purchase is communicated to it within which to accept the terms and if not
accepted the same shall be deemed rejected and the Landlord may.then
negotiate with any bona fide third party relative to the terms of sale but upon
no more favorable tenns than o·ffered Tenant.

29. HEIRS AND OTHERS. Each of the covenants, provisions, terms and
agreements of this Lease shalt inure.to the benefit of and $all be binding
upon the respective heirs, executors, administrntors, successors and assigns
of the respective parties.
30. NOTICES. All notices required heretmder shall be by demand effective an
validly given if personally delivered or sent by United States certified mail,
return receipt requested. postage prepaid and addressed to t~e parties at 1he
address opposite their signature on the signaMe page hereof OT such other
address as noticed in writing by the parties from time to tfme.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Landlord and Tenant hove executed this Lease
on the day and year first written.

NOTICE ADDRESS :

LANDLORD:

P.O. BOX 1768
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403-1768

LINCOL

By------·---...------ -(ts,_ _..tJ.;:~e!S:-- - - -

NOTICE ADDRESS:

TENANT:

PO Box 1113

Minneapolis, MN 55440

Ann., Grain Operations
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EXHIBIT A
Legal Description

The following real property in Bonneville County, Idaho:

Beginning at a point that is N.89°52' 18''\V. along the Section line 1807.72 feet from the
Southeast comer of Section 10, Township 2 North. Range 38 East of the Boise Meridian;
running thence N. 89°52' 18"W. along sajd Section Une 574.19 feet; thence N.00~19' 13''W.
816.00 feet; thence S.88°20'23"E. 857.50 feet to the West bank of Sand Creed; thence
S.32°29'40"W. 280.49 feet; thence S.26°12'35"W. 188.91 feet; thence S.14°28'37"W.
122.98 feet; thence S.02°53'54"W. 267.63 feet to the point of beginning.
Subject to existing County road Right-of Way and Easements of record.
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CURRICULUM VITAE
October 9 1 2015
TERRI R. GAZDIK, CPA, CVA

EXPERIENCE

Partner - Cooper Norman PLLC since 1996
Cooper Norman is a member firm of CPAAI (CPA Associates International)
Currently at 31 years experience in public accounting providing tax, audit, accounting,
and business consulting.
Certified in 1995 as a Certified Valuation analyst with NACVA (National Association of
Certified Valuation Analysts)
UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION
Idaho State University, Bachelor of Business Administration in Accounting, Pocatello,
Idaho, 1983
PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
AICPA - American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
AICPA FVS - Member of Forensic and Valuation Services
ISCPA - Idaho Society of Certified Public Accountants
NACVA- National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts
CPAAI - CPA Associates International - Past Chair of Construction Committee
CPAAI - CPA Associates International - Member of Business Valuation Committee
Cooper Nom,an - Accounting and Auditing Chairperson for the firm
GERTI FICATIONS
CPA - Certified Public Accountant (Idaho State Board of Accountancy)
CPA - Certified Public Accountant (Wyoming State Board of Accountancy-expired
12/31/11)
CVA - Certified Valuation Analyst (National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts)
VALUATION EDUCATION
NACVA Certification Training - 1995
NACVA Updates in Valuation and Training for Recertification - 1998
NACVA Career Development Institute -Advanced Training in Business Valuation and
Litigation Support and Updates in Valuations - 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010.
CPA Associates International Inc - 2011 Business Valuations Seminar
NACVA Updates in Valuation and Training for Recertification - 2013
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PRESENTATIONS
Sanctuary Wealth Management- Building Wealth (What will my company be worth),
June 22, 2011
Technology Ventures Corp. - Enterprise Valuation, September 15, 2010
Beard, SL Clair et al - Roth IRA's for 2010

EXPERT TESTIMONY
Federal Court
Dixon, Bench, Byington v Bonneville County (CV-09-36) testimony by report
Cathy McGiffin v. Westmark Credit Union (CV-11 -0148-EJL-REB) testimony by
report
Patricia Mattern v. Teton Valley Health Care (CV-00554-EJL-REB) testimony by
report
Robert Maxfield v Brigham Young University - Idaho (CV-:00443-BLW) testimony
by report
Donald Verrill v Battelle Energy Alliance LLC - (CV-00628-BLW) testimony by
report
Travis Williams and Amanda Williams v Madison County, Idaho and the Madison
County Sheriffs Department- (4:12-cv-00561 -EJL-CWD) U.S. District Court for
the District of Idaho , testimony

Thomas C Rowley v Action Motor Sports Inc - (4: 13-cv-00229-REB) testimony
by report

Idaho District Court
Larsen v Larsen (CV 1972-0019621 ), Bonneville County Court, testimony

Hathaway v Hathaway (CV2001 -0003910) Bonneville County Court, testimony
Wingerson v Wingerson (CV 2006-00023730) testimony by report
Gillespie v Gillespie (CV 2008-0000037) Bingham County Court, testimony
Jones v Jones (CV 2009-0002633-DR) testimony by report
Papin v Papin (CV- 14-4449), Bonneville County Court, testimony
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CURRJCULUM VITAE

Daniel Lynn Packard
ldaho Falls, ID 83402 • 208.201.6205
dpackard@coopemorman.com

Li censure
Partner - CPA, CFE
Cooper Norman, Certified Public Accountants; Idaho Falls, Idaho

06/10 - Present

•

Developing expertise in entity-level tax compliance, financial statement preparation, and
fraud io.vestigation.

•

Participating in several forensic and engagements and conducting necessary procedures
pursuant to drafting the final investigative reports. Providing expert testimony in presentation
of forensic findings.

•

Maintaining a certified public accountant license from the State of Idaho and a Certified
Fraud Examiner designation. Maintaining current professional education regiment of 80
hours annually related to accounting and fraud examination.

Expert Testimony
• Idaho State Court- Court of Judge Joel E. Tingey
o State ofldaho vs. Margot Babette Stewart (testimony)
• Idaho Stat<; Court - Court of Dane H Watkins Jr.
o State of Idaho vs. Jared Daniel Sloan (testimony by report)
• Shoshone Bannock Tribal Court - Court of Council Member Nathan Small (testimony)
• US Tax Court- Court of Judge Vasquez
o Kevin and Sondra Ward vs. Commissioner (testimony by report)
•

Idaho Stale Court - Court of Judge Stevens
o Mike Orr vs. Danny Cockrell (testimony by report)

•

Idaho State Court- Court of Darren B. Simpson
o Idaho Select, Inc., etal. vs. Russell C. Leonardson, etal. (testimony by report)

•

Idaho State Court
o Papin vs. Papin (report)

•

Idaho State Court
o Hagrman vs. Hagrman (report)

•

Idaho State Court
o Jean E. McCall vs. C lea r Creek Properties Inc. (report)

Publications
• Investigate T his: Emotional reactions to numbers - Inability to be random can help detect
fraud - ACFE and Fraud Magazine ("Fraud Magazine", May/June 20 14, a publication of the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Austin, TX, © 20 14)
o Examined lhe usefulness of revising statistical fraud detection techniques by
considering the qualitative and subconscious tendencies associated with fraudulent
behavior.
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Finances: Safeguarding Your Operations - Fraud prevention and internal controls - Potato
Grower Magazine ("Potato Grower", September 2013)
o Examined the usefulness of fraud prevention measures and a fraud response plan in
the agricultural industry.
Finances: Safe & Secure - Protecting your business from fraud - Potato Grower Magazine
("Potato Grower", August 2015)
o Provided useful processes and procedures in preventing fraud.

Recent Lectures
• Idaho Falls Chamber of Commerce
o Healthcare Reform - May 2013

•

Idaho Potato Commission
o Fraud Prevention and Internal Controls - September 2013

•
•

ConnectShare
o Fraud Prevention - August 2013
Idaho State University
o Forensic Accounting - February 2013
o Forensic Accounting - November 2014

•

Brigham Young University - Idaho

Forensic Accounting - April 2013
o Forensic Accounting - November 2014
o Forensic Accounting - February 2015
Project Redwood
o Gender Diversity and Fraud Prevention - March 2015
o

•

Professional Societies and Organizations
• AICPA - American Ins6tute of Certified Public Accountants

•
•
•
•

ISCP A - Idaho Society of Certified Public Accountants
ACFE - Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
CPAAI - CPA Associates International Forensic Accounting Committee
NACYA- National Association of Certified Valuators and Analysts

Education
The O1:Jio State University; Columbus. Ohio
Master o(Accounling
•

4.00 GPA

•
•

University Fellowship Award recipient
Academic Pacesetter A ward recipient

Brigham Young University-Idaho; Rexburg. Idaho

06/10

04/09

B.S., Accounting w/ minor emphasis in business
•
•

3.95 GPA
Academic Scholarship recipient

293

P

37

FROM

(MON)FEB

1

2 018

1 5 : 2 3 /S T, ~5:01/N o. 753018 2284

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.

----

294

P

38

(MON)FEB

FROM

•.

. 'l

1

2018

15: 2~ / S T. ~ 5 :0~/No~ 7S30182264

P

}
ReaJ Estate Sales Agreement

Evans Grain & Elevator Co. (Seller) and Lincoln Land Co. LLC (Buyer) hereby agree to
the following terms:
Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to purchase the Seller's property, including 1and
and all building structures and equipment that are currently on the landt located at 3075
East Lincoln Road in the City of Lincoln, Bonneville County, Idaho. (See exhibit A for
property description). Buyer has reviewed the commitment for title insurance (See
exhibit A-1) and accepts the property subject to all of the information presented in the
conunitment. The purchase price will be $1,275,000. Seller will keep ½ of the
remaining pro-rated lease income already received by Seller from the lessee, General
Mills. General Mills has paid the lease amount owed through 6/30/2006. The total lease
amount subject to this ½ pro-ration if the closing is before June 30, 2006 is $100,000
which paid for the tenn of 7/1/05 thru 6/30/06. For example, if this sale closed as of
March 31, 2006, the amount that the buyer will pay at closing would be reduced by
$12~500 ($100t000 / 12 months x 3 months x ½ = $12,500). If the closing is after June
30, 2006, the lease amount subject to the pro-ration is $103,000. However, if the closing
occurs after June 30, 2006, the Buyer will receive a fu11 daily pro-ration of the $103,000
lease amount that Evans should receive from General Mills by July 1, 2006.

Buyer will pay $625,000 at closing and the remainder will be financed by Seller in the
fonn of a personally guaranteed mortgage note. The mortgage note will bear .interest at a
rate of prime minus 1% based on prime as of the closing date. The interest rate will then
be adjusted to prime minus 1% on January 1st of each year during the term of the loan.
(The prime rate will be based on what Wells .Fargo Bank shows as its prime interest rate
at the designated times. The Wells Fargo Bank prime was at 7 .5% effective Jan.nary 3 1,
2006.) The loan amortization period will be 10 years with payments of principal and
interest made quarterly beginning July 1, 2006. The mortgage note will also have a 4
year call option that the Seller may use to call all of the remaining proceeds due at the
end of 4 years from the closing of this transaction. Buyer may prepay any of the
mortgage note after December 31, 2006 with no penalty. However, if the Seller is able to
properly use a 1031 Exchange to defer the recognition of any gain on this transaction,
then the Buyer may payoff the note at that time even if it is before December 31, 2006.
The mortgage note will be secured by the property being sold and also with the personal
guarantee of Doyle Beck, the principal owner of Lincoln Land Co. LLC.
Seller will assign the lease it has with General Mills and Buyer agrees to accept the
assignment and abide by alt of the terms of the General Mills lease (see Exhibit B for a
copy of the lease agreemeot),

The sate includes the irrigation water rights that the property has to the Sand Creek
Canal. (See Exhibit C for a copy of the Progressive Irrigation District assessment notice
regarding these water rights to irrigatjon water from the Sand Creek Canal).
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There is a1so a well on the property that is leased to Falls Water Company for the amount
of$1,450 annually increasing $50 per year and goes thru 7/31/2010. Falls Water
Company also leases the rights to 33 acre feet of water usage each year that have been
transferred to domestic use for $1,112 per year. The well and its lease will be assigned to
the Buyer. Also, the buyer will receive the rights to the 33 acre feet along with the
assignment of the lease of these rights to Falls Water Company. Seller will assign these
two leases it has with Falls Water Company and Buyer agrees to accept the assignment
and abide by all of the terms of these leases. (See Exhibit D for copies of the well lease
and the water rights lease with Falls Water Company). All rents and fees with respect to
these water rights will be properly pro-rated at closing. The Seller will retain the right to
pursue any other water rights that it may have that either are now or were at sometime in
the past pertinent to the property. Buyer wi!l cooperate with the Seller in its efforts to
revive, claim and transfer any of these rights. The Seller will have until the property has
been paid off in full by the Buyer to pursue these rights.
The property is also subject to an agreement with the Eagle Rock Chapter of Sons of
Utah Pioneers. (See Exhibit E) This group has been given a right to use part of the
property for a monument commemorating the beet sugar production that previously took
place at the property. The term of the agreement is for twenty-five years beginning
March 30, 2001.
The property is being sold "as is" with no warranties or representations as to the land and
any of the structures and equipment conditions or their use. Title will be transferred by
special warranty deed. Additionally the Buyer accepts the property in its present
environmental condition which includes all deposits and debris of any kind that are on or
below the surface of the land known or unknown. Buyer has performed its own due
diligence with respect to the purchase of the property and accepts the property as is.
Buyer and seJler will split all closing cost. However, the Seller will pay for the title
insurance policy. Buyer and Seller agree to obtain a title insurance policy in the amount
of $500,000, which is $775,000 less than the agreed upon purchase price. Both parties
agree to pay for their respective legal fees. AmeriTitle in Idaho Falls will handle the
closing. The seller will be pursuing a possible 1031 Exchange with regards to the sale of
the property and the Buyer agrees to cooperate with the Seller and AmeriTitle to facilitate
the 1031 Exchange. Closing will take place once all proper documentation is in place
and once Seller has decided on its 1031 Exchange. In any case, the closing will be on or
before August 31, 2006.
Buyer and Seller will file a memorandum with the state of Idaho disclosing that this
agreement is in effect regarding the property. Once this agreement is signed by both
parties, Buyer may access the property for some minimal dirt and gravel moving and
hauling work. However, such work can not interfere with the nonnal operations of the
lessee, General Mills nor violate any existing laws or ordinances. Buyer will provide that
Seller is named as an additional insured on its insurance policy and that such policy will
be for an amount of no less than $2,000,000. Also, Buyer will provide Seller with proof
of adequate worker's compensation insurance on all of its employees that will enter onto
the property.
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Buyer and Seller do hereby agree to the above terms:

Seller:

~;colntn~~
Buyer:

Evans Grain & Elevator Co .

By:A ~ I : ~
Its:~']/T~
Date:

31 IJ- I

I)

1ts:

t

STATEOFUTAH

Date:

~~Ma,_

3 - (b . . ""2(;:o{_

)
}

COUNTY OF WEBER)

'7J}a,za/;,

On this /5~ay of
in the year 2006, before met the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared S. Bradford
K.apple,- known to me to be the Secretary/freasurer of Evans Grain & Elevator Co. and
the person who subscribed said Corporation name to the foregoing instrument, and
acknowledged to me that he executed the same in said Corporation name.

,,-.-----J;:WiW&.-1I ~~
a,(p//p
"
~
~/ / ,
b

lI

•

11156E4800S
Ou~n UT 84'03
My rromm'l&alQn Expfrlil:.

I

L- ~:. - - ~~X~e28F28¥!H_ J

R

fiaUtah,

'd'
t
b--~
2::2-A/
mg a -=~.,,.._~-""""""'"'"""""...c...,c_.,,_____,...-..

esi

M

My commissiot!'expires

o~/#,M 7

STATE OF IDAHO

COUNTYO

thi~~%

o~~

On
day
• in the year 2006, before me, the
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared Doyle Beck,
!mown or identified to me to be the Mauaging Member of Lincoln Land Company, LLC,
and the person who subscribed said LLC's name to the foregoing instrument, and

aclmowledged to me that he executed the s a m ~ ~

:"l. o.».Y..~---~

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at
~cietio ~
My commission expires on lli
6siha:~

NOTAA\' PUBLIC

LENORE J. KATRI

STATE OF IDAHO
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MEMORANDUM OF CONTRACT OF _SALE
NAMES OF SELLER:

EVANS GRAIN & ELEVATOR CO . , A UTAH CORPORATION

NAMES OF PURCHASER:

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC. , AN IDAHO LIMITED

LIABILITY COMPANY
PATE OP <;:ONTRACT:

MARCH . / {" ,

LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY:

2 0.0 6

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A"

Locat·ed at 3075 E. Lincoln Road, in the City of Lincoln, County of
Bonneville, State of Idaho .

NOTICE IS HERB.BY GIVEN that the above-named Seller has
entered into a Contract for Sale of Real Property wherein the
above - named Purchaser agreed to buy, and the Seller agreed to
sell, the real property above described.

Pursuant

of the contract, title has been
the Purchaser fully performs the
contract, and a Special Warranty Deed will be placed in escrow at
time of closing for delivery to the Purchaser upon completion of
such performance. The recording of the Special Warranty Deed at a
future date shall be conclusive proof, as against the Seller, and
S.e ller' s heirs, personal representatives, successors, and assigns,
that Purchaser has fully and completely performed all of the terms
of the Contract for Sale of Real Property, and that Seller has no
further right, title, or interest in and to the real property
r~served

in

to

the

the

terms

Seller until

above described.
Also, pursuant to the terms of the Contract for Sale of Real
Property, a Quitclaim Deed will be placed in escrow, at time of
closing, to be delivered to the Seller in the event Purchaser
a.hal l default under the Contract for Sale of Real Property, and
shal l fail to cure the default within the time provided in the
contract (the parties having agreed that time is of the essence of
their agreement) .
The recording of such Quitclaim Deed conveying
the right, title and interest of Purchaser in the above - described
property to seller shall be conclusive proof, as against the
Purchaser,
and Purchaser's heirs,
personal representatives,
successors,
and ass:i;.gns,
that
Purchaser
has
defaulted
in
performance of the Contract for Sale of Real Property, and that
procedures set forth in the contract f or sending notice of
def ault,
rescission
of
the
contract,
and
termination of
Purchaser's right to continue the purchase and to continue in
possession of the proper ty, have been fully and completely

- 1 -
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complied with by Seller.
Dated:

March

- - -,

2006.

SELLER;
EVANS GRAIN

PURCHASER:
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC.

&

ELEVATOR CO.

By: ·

Its: Manager

~IMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATE OF IDAHO

)
}

County of Bonneville

88

)

On this \\a~ay of March, 2006, before me,

the undersigned

notary public, in and for the State of Idaho, personally appeared,

Doyle H.

Beck,

known

liability company

to

that

me

executed

person who executed the
limited

to be the Manager of
the

within

the

instrument

foregoing instrument on behalf

liability · company,

and

acknowledged

to

me

limited
or

the

of said

that

such

company executed the same.
IN WI TNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
' cial seal, the day and year first above written.

NOTARY PUBLIC
LENORE J. KATRI

STATS OF IDAHO

commission expires:

- 2 -

299

P

43

FROM

(MON)F E B

/

~

2018

15:24/ST. 15:01~No.7530 1 9228 4

)

CORPORATE ACKNOWLE.DGMl!!NT
STATE OF UTAH

)
)

County of Weber

BS

}

On this 15 th day of March, 2006 1 before me, the undersigned
notary public, in and for the State of Utah, personally appeared,

s.

Bradford Kapple, known t o me to be the Secretary/Treasurer of

..

the corporation that executed the within instrument or the person
who

executed

the

instrument

foregoing

on

behalf

of

said

corporation, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed
the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official seal, the day and year fi r st above written.

,-------.. _.

~4~
ary~ic

f

forUtah

•
1
I

Residing at Ogden, Weber County

My commission expires:

L

1

-

f

J cs.n,ur 84403
,'!.y ~mmllllon l:l!Plrn

r

1188 E 4800 S

f .~'./"'··

<PJ /a '}

Ni,i;ryPu"ilic'" --,

,UDY A. SHIPLEY

J~_J_H. IOCJlr

- ~-~ - - ~TA_~~-"!!H__

f

J
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General Mills Operations, Inc.
Northwest Grain Operations

n Rth Straet North, Sule 200
Post Office Box 5022
Great Falls, Montana 59403

(406} 761-6252

March 21, 2000

Travis Johnson
Microserv Computer.Technologies, Inc.
1808 E. 1;,th Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

'
Dear Mr. Johnson:
.\

\

Please frnd endosed the sighed lease you requested.

Before you begin the installation at our facility on Lincoln Road, please contact Jim
Rooney at our Idaho Fcills location at (208) 522-2414 to schedule an appointment.
Al l rental payments will be, made directly to the Idaho Falls location as follows:

General Mills Operations,
P.O. Box 2870
Idaho Falls, ID 83403.

Inc.

KS:dk
Enclosure
cc: Ralph Loehr
Jim Rooney
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------- Forwarded message - - - From: Kevin Miller-Elevator <kevin .m iller@genmills.com>
Date: Tue, Mar 18, 2014 at 5:31 PM
Subject: Digis
To: "dhbeck@gmail.com" <dhbeck@gmail.com>

Doyle in regards to our phone conversation yesterday.

I received a call from Adam (digis@ 932-5699) he was quite concerned that he had heard on the
grapevine that someone was threatening to "pull the power" on their equipment at Lincoln.

I explained ttiat I had said this, mostly tongue in cheek, after several unsuccessful attempts at contacting
Corey who I was told would stop ~y to discuss the terms of leases for both faciliti es.

He explained that things were very hectic, and that Corey had recently left Digis.

I then told him that you and I had agreed that as the owner of the faci lity that terms of a lease really ought
to be discussed directly with you.

He ended the conversation by saying he would try to find documentation of an agreement then would call
you directly. He did mention that in the past many things were done on a handshake.

Kevin
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Fron, : Doyle Beck dhbeck®grnail.coin
Subject: Fwd : Lincoln Land Co. LLC
Date: May 7, 2015 at 10:04 PM
To: Mark Fuller fullerandbeck@gmail.com

---------- Forwarded message - --------From: Sean Hatch <shatch@coq2.digis.net>
Date: Thu 1 May 7, 2015 at 9:22 PM
Subject: RE: Lincoln Land Co. LLC
To: Doyle Beck <dhbeck@gmail.com>

Doyle,
I'll forward this on to the correct people for review.

Sean Hatch

Digis Idaho Area Manager
Office: .(208) 528-6161

Cell: .(208) 317-3649

-------- Orig-inal message -------From: Doyle Beck <dhbeck@gmail.com>
Date: 05/07/2015 9:05 PM {GMT-07:00)
To: Sean Hatch <shatch@corg.digis.net>

Subject: Lincoln Land Co. LLC
Sean,
I have not herd anything from you again, I did not want to see lt turn out this way
but you are not giving me much of an alternative. Please see attached.
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doyle
208-529-9891 wk

208-529-3241 hm
208-589-2326 Cell

doyle
208-529-9891 wk
208-529-3241 hm
208-589-2326 Cell
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FULLfR & BECK LAW OFFICES, r'LLC.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
Paul L. Fuller - Associate

410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Boit 50935
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0935

Telephone: (208) 524-5400
Facsimile: (208) 524-7167
Email: fullerandbeck@gmail.com

May 7, 2015

Sean Hatch
Digis Idaho/Nevada
1808 E. 17th Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Re:

My Client: Lincoln Land Company, LLC

Dear Mr. Hatch:
Our office has been retained by Lincoln Land Company, LLC (hereafter "Lincoln Land") to pursue a claim
against Digis for unjust enrichment. During April, 2014, you were served with legal notice terminating any
alleged tenancy-at-will claimed by Digis Idaho/Nevada by which Digis asserted a right to access to the rooftop
of grain elevators owned by Lincoln Land. I am informed that you have now complied with that legal notice
and vacated that property. The purpose of this letter is to demand payment for the amounts by which Oigis
was unjustly enriched through ·occupancy of my client's property. I have been assured that no lease
agreement was in fact entered into by Evans Grain. This has been verified by both Brad Kappel and Jim
Pasley, who managed the property for Evans Grain. My client acquired the subject property and in June,
20 10, leased the premises to General Mills Operations, Inc. The General Mills lease specifically prohibited
General Mills from subletting the property or any part thereof without the prior written consent of the landlord
in each and every case of underletting or assignment. General Mills had no authority to lease any portion of
the property to Digis and no legal contrac: to lease the rooftop as an antenna location was ever created. If
you have a copy of any signed contract or lease agreement, please provide it to me immediately.

a

Without legal authority from either the landlord or the tenant, Digis installed internet antenna equipment on
the rooftop of the grain elevators and occupied through January 1, 2015. After a bidding process, in which
Digis participated, a rooftop space lease was entered into on April 22, 2014, with Fybercom, LLC. I
understand you continued to occupy the rooftop under an informal agreement with Fybercom, LLC until your
equipment could be relocated. However, your occupancy prior to April 22, 2014 was without authorization
from Lincoln Land and was to your significant benefit. Based upon the rental agreement reached with
Fybercom, the market value of the rooftop property was established at $3,450.00 per month, and Lincoln
Land believes that is a fair market value during the years prior to April, 2014. Because of the unauthorized
occupancy of the elevator rooftop, Digis has an obligation, imposed by law, to do justice to Lincoln Land,
even though it is clear that there was no promise ever made or intended by Lincoln Land to allow occupancy
of the rooftop. Claims for unj ust enrichment are based upon society's interest in preventing the injustice of a
company retaining a significant financial benefit from property occupancy for which no payment has been
made to the property owner.
Because no contract exists between Lincoln Land and Digis, Lincoln Land has no adequate remedy at law,
and cannot sue for breach of contract. A significant benefit was conferred upon Digis and there is no question
that Digis has appreciated that benefit and been unjustly enriched. Digis accepted and retained the benefit of
the rooftop access for an extended time period under circumstances which make it inequitable for Digis to do
so without paying the value to Lincoln Land .
Lincoln Land believes that the $3,450.00 per month lease amount is a reasonable value for the unauthorized
access taken by Digis. If we are unable to resolve this matte r, resulting in litigation, Lincoln Land may seek to
recover the actual benefit conferred upon Digis, which we believe to be significantly higher that this monthly
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May 7, 2015
Page 2

amount. This would require a careful exam ination of the bil ling structure utilized by Digis in providing the
rooftop antenna service to its customers. It will also involve a carefu l review of other sim ilar lease agreements
entered into by Digis with other access providers.
In ord er to avoid exte nsive discovery and disclosure and examination of significant business records, Lincoln
Land will accept payment of the $3,450.00 per month for the perioq of four years extending from April, 2010
through April, 2014. Demand is there fore made for payment of $165,600.00, reduced by any amount Digis
can prove was paid to General Mills, within ten (10) days of the eceipt of this letter, to avoid litigation, which
will be filed soon thereafter. Enclosed is a copy of the draft Complain!, Summons and first Requests for
Discovery. Payment in this amount by cash or cashier's check payable to Lincoln Land Company, LLC must
be received in my office within the ten (1 0) days provi<;Jed to avoid litigation. If litigation is filed, we will seek
payment of attorney fees and costs which could significantly increase the actual amount recovered by
judgment.

As noted above, if in fact you possess any signed contract agreement, which esta blishes any legal right to
occupy the premises, please provide it to my office immediately for my carefu l consideration . In the absence
of such proof, payment is expected w ithin the time provided.

Very truly yours,
FULLER & BECK

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney at Law

c: client
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LEASE

THIS LEASE. made this fliay of April, 2015, by and between LINCOLN
LAND COMPANY L.L.C. ("Landlord>>), and LANSING TRADE GROUP, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company (''Tenant'').
WITNESSETH:

ln consideration of the covenants, conditions and agreements herein contained, the
parties hereby agree as follows:
1. PROPERTY. Landlord in consideration of the rents and covenants hereinafter
mentioned, to be paid and performed by Tenant, hereby demises, leases and lets
unto said Tenant, and Tenant hereby hires and takes from Landlord the property as
legally described on Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof, subject to a
rooftop lease to Fybercon, referred to in paragraph 27 hereof, located in the City of
Lincoln, County of Bonneville, State of Idaho ("Property''), which description may
be updated as a result of a survey performed by TenanL

2. TERM. The term of this Lease shall be for a period of five (5) years. commencing
on April 6, 2015 ("Lease Commencement Date") and terminating on April 5, 2020
("Initial Term"). Thereafter, this Lease shall automatically renew for an additional
five (5) year period (the "Renewal Term," and together with the Initial Tenn, the
"Tenn"), provided that Tenant may terminate this Lease at the end of the Initial
Tenn by providing Landlord with at least one hundred twenty (120) days written
notice prior to the end of the Initial Tenn of its intent to terminate the Lease at the
conclusion of the Initial Term. The Renewal Tenn shall be on the same terms as
provided in this Lease for the Initial Term, subject to the adjustment in rent as
specified in Section 4 herein.
Landlord represents and warrants that it cunently leases the Property to General
Mills Operations, or their affiliates, subsidiaries or successor in interest (hereafter
jointly "General Mills'') and that such lease expires, along with all other rights of
General Mills in the Property, on April I. 2015. Landlord shall use its best efforts
to deliver the Property to Tenant on the Lease Commencement Date as specified
herein. In the event Landlord is unable to do so due to the holdover of General
Mills, the Lease Commencement Date shall become the date upon which Tenant is
able to take possession of the Property. The date rent is due hereunder shall also
be delayed to the oew Lease Commencement Date. Tenant agrees that Landlord
shall have no liability to Tenant arising out of Landlord's failure to provide
possession and quiet enjoyment of the Property to Tenant by April 6, 2015 if such
failure is due solely to the holdover of General Mills.
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In the event Landlord is unable to deliver possession and quiet enjoyment of the
Property to Tenant by July 15, 2015, Tenant sha11 have the right, in its sole
discretion, to tenninate this Lease by providing written notice to Landlord of its
intent. Upon delivery of such notice, this Lease shall be terminated.
Landlord agrees to indemnify and hold Tenant hannless from any and all losses,
damages or claims initiated by General Mills, related to the non-renewal of the
June, 2010 General Mills lease, arising out of the actions or omissions of Landlord
3. DUE DILIGENCE. Prior to the Lease Commencement Date, Tenant may
immediately begin to conduct due diligence on the Property, which review shall
include, but not be limited to full access and opportunity to examine the facilities,
books, records, and other docwnentation relating to the Property and all such other
items as it reasonably requires. This inspection shall include but not be limited to
environmental audits and smveys. Landlord agrees to permit such inspections and
testing provided that Tenant or its representatives provides Landlord with
reasonable notice prior to accessing the Property.

4. RENT. Tenant agrees to pay the Landlord as rent for the Property without offset
or deduction the sum of Two Hundred Forty One Thousand Six Hundred and
no/100 Dollars ($241,600). payable annually on the 6th of April of each calendar
year herein commencing April 6, 2015 through the Initial Tenn. Rent for the
Renewal term shall be adjusted upward or downward based on the sum of the
annual changes in the consumer price index as published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics ("CPI") for each year of the Initial Tenn.
5. USE. The Property shall, subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 6 and 17 herein,
be used without restriction by Tenant during the term of this Lease.
6. MAINTENANCE AND SUR.RENDER; IMPROVEMENTS. Tenant shall keep,
at its expense, the Property and every part thereof in general repair and condition
during the Tenn. Tenant wilt not use or permit anything upon the Property that
may be dangerous to life or limb. Tenant shall not in any manner deface or injure
the Property that will create a nuisance, Tenant shall not use or permit the use of
the property, or any part thereof, for any illegal purpose including any violation of
environmental regulations. Tenant shall return the Property peaceably and
promptly to Landlord at the end of the term of this Lease, or at any earlier
termination thereof, in good condition, loss by fire and ordinary wear and tear
accepted. Tenant shall have 1he right to make improvements to the Property as it
deems necessary and at its expense with the prior consent of Landlord, which shall
not be unreasonably withheld, provided that Tenant shall have the right to make the
following improvements without the prior written consent of Landlord: (i) safety
improvements, (ii) improvements to rail, (iii) installation of groW1d pile(s), and (iv)
.improvements to the efficiency of equipment (collectively, the "Improvements").
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7. UTILITIES. Tenant shall promptly pay all rates, costs and charges for utilities
consumed by Tenant at the Property.
8. SIGNS. Tenant may erect, place or permit to be erected or placed on the Property
any customary business signs including signage on the exterior of any buildings
without the prior written consent of the Landlord. Tenant will remove any such
signs at the termination of the Lease.
9. CONDITION OF PREMISES. To the best ofits knowledge, Landlord
acknowledges herein that the Property, including all buildings located thereon, is in
good condition and repair including but not limited to compliance with all
applicable laws and regulations including all environmental requirements. To the
best of its knowledge, Landlord acknowledges that the Property and the equipment,
plumbing, drains, fixtures, appliances and machinery, if any therein, as of the Lease
Commencement Date are in good condition and repair. Prior to the Lease
Commencement Date, Tenant and Landlord shall conduct a joint inspection of the
Property, equipment, plumbing, drains, fixtures, appliances and machinery in order
to determine the ope.rational condition of such items. Tenant shall provide
Landlord with a written list indicating the items that need repair or replacement as a
result of this inspection and Landlord shall be responsible for all costs and repairs
required to bring these items into good operational condition.
10, DEFECT, Landlord shall not be released from any claims arising from any latent

defect in the condition of the Property, or the equipment, fixtures or appliances, if
any. in or serving the Property, and the builder buildings of which they are a part,
and the streets, alleys, areas, area-ways, passages or sidewalks adjoining or
appurtenant thereto.

11. SUBLEASING. Tenant wilJ not sublet the Property, or any part thereof, and will
not assign this Lease or any interest therein, nor permit this Lease to be transferred
in any manner without the prior written consent of Landlord in each and every case
of subleasing or assignment, Tenant shall not be relieved from liability to Landlord
for the terms and condition of this Lease.

12. BANKRUPTCY. Any assignment, sale in bankruptcy or insolvency of Tenant
may, at the option of Landlord be considered an assignment within the meaning of
this Lease and as a breach of the covenants hereof.
13, LIABILITY OF LANDLORD, Unless due to the negligence of Landlord, its

agents or employees, Landlord shall not be liable for any damage or loss to
property, injury or death occurring in or about the Property or in any way related to
Tenant's use thereof or due to the happening of any accident, or any act or neglect
of the Tenant, or any other tenant or occupant of any building, or of any other
person, persons or corporations, or occasioned by any nuisance made or suffered
thereon. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Landlord shall be liable for compliance
3
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with any environmental regulations regarding conditions existing at the Property at
the time of the Lease Commencement Date.
Landlord agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold Tenant harmless from any losses,
costs, damages and expenses, fines, penalties, attomeys' fees and costs resulting
from any claim asserted against Tenant (i) arising out of Landlord's actions,
operations, or activities at the leased premises; (ii) arising from the actions of any
co-tenwits, agent, representative, or invitee leased premises, including the presence
of hazardous substances or the discharge or release ofhazardous substances, not
caused by Tenant; and (iii) Landlord's breach of any representations and
warranties.

14. LIABILITY OF TENANT. Tenant asswnes liability and obligation for all
damages as specified in paragraph 13 above, and agrees to hold Landlord hannless,
and to indemnify Landlord therefore, provided that Tenant shall have no liability or
obligations and shall have no duty to hold Landlord harmless for any or all damage
or loss to property, injury or death occurring in or about the Property that occurred
due to the negligence of Landlord. In case of such damages, Landlord may, at its
option, repafr such damage and Tenant shall thereupon reimburse Landlord for the
reasonable costs of repairing said damage, and if Tenant fails to perform any of the
covenants or agreements herein provided to be kept of performed by Tenant,
Landlord may perform the same and charge Tenant with the reasonable expense of
such performance, and Tenant agrees promptly on demand to repay Landlord the
reasonable expense of such performance by Landlord.

15. TRESPASSERS. The tenant shall use commercially reasonable efforts to prevent
trespass to the leased property. Such commercially reasonable efforts shall include
but not limited to posting of appropriate signs and notifying local authorities of any
trespass.
16. INSURANCE. Tenant shall secure and maintain throughout the term hereof
general liability insurance of not less that Two Million and NO/I 00 Dollars
($2,000,000.00), with bodily injury limits of not less than Two Million and N0/100
Do1lars per person and Two Million and No/100 Dollars per accident, and property
inswance for physical damage caused in any way, to the buildings and
improvements leased by Tenant with damage limits of not less than Two Million
Two Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($2,200,000.00) per accident, naming
Landlord in a Certificate of Insurance as an additional insured. Tenant shall have
the option to cover all required insurance under its corporate blanket insurance
policies naming Landlord on a Certificate ofinsurance as an additional insured.

17. COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS. Tenant covenants and agrees at its
own expense to observe and comply with all applicable laws, regulations and
requirements of the federal, state or local authorities having jurisdiction over the
Property.
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18. TAKING FOR PUBLIC USE. Tenant agrees that if the Property, or any part
thereof, shall be taken for any street or other public use, or destroyed by the action
of the public authorities, so that Tenant cannot conduct its normal business thereon,
this Lease shall thereupon tenninate.
19. DESTRUCTION BY FIRE, If during the term of this Lease the Property or the
improvements thereon shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or the elements, or
any other cause rendering the Property unfit for occupancy or for Tenant to conduct
its normal business, or to such an extent that they cannot be reasonably repaired
within sixty (60) days from the happening of such injury. then Landlord may with
the written consent of Terumt terminate this Lease from the date of such damage or
destruction, and Tenant shall immediately surrender the Property to Landlord, and
Tenant shall pay rent only to the time of such surrender; and in case of any such
destruction, Landlord may re-enter and repossess the Property. However, if the
Property can be reasonably restored within sixty (60) days from the happening of
the injury thereto, and Landlord with fifteen (15) days from the occurr-ence of such
injury elects in writing to restore the Property within sixty (60) days from the
happening of injury thereto, then this Lease shall not terminate on account of such
injury but the rent shaJI abate during the process of repairs up to the time the repairs
are completed, except that Tenant shall, during such time, pay a pro rata portion of
such rent apportioned to the portion of the Property wnich are in condition for
occupancy or which are in a condition for Tenant to conduct its normal business
operations. If, however the Property shall be so slightly injured by any cause
aforesaid, as not to be rendered unfit for occupancy or for Tenan.t to conduct its
normal business operations, then Landlord shall repair the same with reasonable
promptness and, in that case, the rent shall not cease or be abated during such
repairing period. All improvements or betterments placed by Tenant on the
property shall, in any event, be repaired and replace by Tenant at its own expense.
20. QUIET ENJOYMENT. Landlord covenants and agrees that Tenant, on paying

the rent and performing the covenants hereunder, shall and may peaceably and
quietly have, hold and enjoy the Property for the Term hereof. Landlord represents
herein that as of the Lease Commencement Date it has legal ownership of the
Property and the same is subject to no encumbrances which could interfere with
Tenant's intended use of the Property.
21. DEFAULT. If Tenant shall neg1ect or fail to keep, observe and perform any of its
covenants and agreements contained herein (i) in respect of the payment of
amounts for a period often (10) days after written notice that said sums are due; (ii)

for non-money matters for a period of thirty (30) days after written notice
describing said breach or default; or (iii) if the leasehold interest of Tenants.hall be
taken on execution or other process oflaw, or if Tenant shall petition to be or be
declared bankrupt, or insolvent according to law, then and in any of said cases
Landlord may immediately and without further notice or demand. enter into and
upon the Property and take absolute possession of the same without such re-entry
working a forfeiture of the rents to be paid and the covenants to be performed by
5
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the Tenant for the full term of this Lease, and may at Landlord's election lease or
sublet the Property, or any part thereof, on such tenns and conditions and for such
rents and for such time as Landlord. may elect, and after crediting the rent actually
collected by Landlord from such reletting on the rentals stipulated to be paid under
this Lease by Tenant from time to time, collect from Tenant any balance remaining
due from time to time on the rent reserved under this Lease, Charging to Tenant
such reasonable expenses as Landlord may expend in putting the Property in
tenantable condition. Or Landlord may at its election upon written notice to Tenant
declare this Lease forfeited and void, and may thereupon re-enter and take full and
absolute possession of the Property as the owner thereof, and free from any right or
claim or Tenant. Such election and re-entry sha11 constitute an absolute bar to any
right to enter by Tenant upon the payment of all arrearages ofrent and costs after a
dispossession under any suit or process for breach of any of the covenants of this
Lease, and the commencement by Landlord of any action to recover possession of
the Property aforesaid shall be deemed a sufficient notice of election of said
Landlord to treat this Lease as void and terminated, without the written notice
above specified, unless Landlord shall in writing, before beginning such
proceeding, notify Tenant that after obtaining such possession Landlord will
continue to look to Tenant for the performance of the Lease and will submit the
Property on Tenant's account, in the manner as above provided.
22. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. Tenant shal! pay as additional rent a11 real estate

taxes and water/irrigation assessments on the Property. Landlord agrees to
cooperate with Tenant in any tax reduction evaluation proceedings which Tenant
may initiate.

23. RE-DELIVERY OF PROPERTY. Tenant, upon the termination ofthls Lease,
shall at its own expense remove all dirt, rubbish and refuse which Tenant shall have
placed at the Property during the term ofthis Lease, and upon Tenant's expense,
which Tenant shall pay upon receipt of a bill for same from Landlord.
24. WAJVER. Tenant agrees that no assent by Landlord to any breach of any of
Tenant's covenants or agreements shall be deemed a waiver of any succeeding
breach of such covenant.
25. RIGHT OF ENTRY. Landlord shall at all times upon prior written notice to
TenW1t (except fo the event of an emergency) shall have the right to enter upon the
Property to inspect its condition, and to make repairs required hereunder. Landlord

shall have the right during the last thirty (30) days of the term hereof to place and
maintain on the Property and in the windows thereof the customary notice of "To
Let'' or "To Rent", and to show the Property to prospective tenants.
26. RAILROAD TRACKAGE .EASEMENT AND ASSIGNMENT. Landlord
agrees he.rein that during the term of this Lease, Tenant shall be entitled at no
additiona1 charge to share in the use of the railroad tracks which lie on the

Landlord,s property adjoining the leased Property. Landlord acknowledges that it
6
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..
has certain rights of usage of such trackage pursuant to an easement recorded in the
Bonneville County Recorder's Office in Book 2 at Page 295 of Miscellaneous
Records on January 29, 1918 at 9:08 a.m. and Landlord hereby assigns to Tenant
any and all rights under such easement, during the term of the Lease. Landlord
does not use such trackage, therefore, all necessary repairs and maintenance of the
trackage will be at the Tenant's expense.

27. TENANT'S RIGHT TO PURCHASE. Notwithstanding any other rights herein
to the contrary, during the Term of the Lease Tenant shall have the right to
purchase the Property from Landlord by providing Landlord written notice of its
intent to purchase the Property. The purchase price shall be detennined in
accordance with Exhibit B attached hereto. Upon delivery of the written notice
from Purchaser indicating its intention to purchase the Property, the parties shall
use commercially reasonable efforts to finalize the purchase and sale of the
Property within one hundred twenty ( 120) days of the date Landlord receives such
notice. In the event that Tenant desires to purchase the Property, Tenant shall also
assume all of Landlord's rights and obligations associated with that certain Grain
Elevator Roof Top Space Lease, dated as of April 2014 by and between Landlord
and FyberCom, LLC.

28. RIGHT TO SELL. Landlord may sell the Property at any time from the date
hereof to a bona fide third party. However, Tenant shall be given the right of first
refusal to purchase the Property at either (i) the same price as offered by the third
party or (ii) at the purchase price set forth in Exhibit B hereto, and such
detennination shall be in Tenant's sole discretion. From the date hereof, Landlord
shall provide Tenant with written notice of all the terms offered by a bona fide third
party to purchase the Property. Tenant shall have thirty (30) days from the time
any offer to purchase is communicated to it within which to accept the terms,
provide notice to Landlord of its intent to Purchase the Property at the purchase
price set forth in Exhibit B hereto, or not elect to purchase the Property. If not
accepted the same shall be deemed rejected and the Landlord may then proceed
with accepting the bona fide offer from a third party. ln the event that the purchase
price is greater than $2,667,000, then upon completion of the sale, Landlord shall
remit to Tenant the documented costs of Tenant Capital Improvements in excess of
$10,000 per occurrence which is incurred by Tenant during the Tenn, pursuant to
paragraph 6 above, which costs shall be capped at the lesser of the actual costs of
the Improvements or the difference between the actual purchase price the Property
was sold at and $2,667,000. Tenant shall provide Landlord with prior notification
and a written annual update of the cost and nature of the Improvements to be
recovered. In the event that transaction does not close within one hundred twenty
(120) days after Tenant's rejection or any of the material terms of the transaction
are not the same as those communicated to Tenant, then Landlord must comply
with the provisions of thls section prior to selling the Property. Notwithstanding
anything herein to the contrary, Tenant's right to purchase under this Section 28
shall begin on the date this Lease is executed.
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29. HEIRS AND OTHERS. Each of the covenants, provisions, terms and agreements
of this Lease shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the respective
heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the respective parties.
This Lease shall survive any sale of the Property.

30. NOTICES, All notices required hereunder shall be by demand effective and
validly given if personally delivered or sent by United States certified mail, return
receipt requested, postage prepaid and addressed to the parties at the address
opposite their signature on the signature page hereof or such other address as
noticed in writing by the parties from time to time.
31. MEMORANDUM OF LEASE
This Lease will not be recorded. Upon the request of either party, the other shall
execute, acknowledge, and deliver a memorandum of this Lease in recordable form.
If this Lease is terminated, Landlord may record a statement verifying the
termination and removing the memorandum of lease fiom the public record.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Landlord and Tenant have executed this Lease on the
day and year first written.

NOTICE ADDRESS:

LANDLORD:

P.O. Box 1768

LINCOLN

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403~ 1768
By

I~
NOTICE ADDRESS:

)~Dt~MPANY L.L.C.

Wk~
~er-

TENANT:

10975 Benson Drive

Suite 400
Overland Park, KS 66210

BY- - - ---------- ~---Its

{!kc

8
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EXHIBIT A
Legal Description

The following real property in Bonneville County, Idaho:
Beginning at the South ¼ comer of Section 10, Township 2 North, Range 38 East of the
Boise Meridian, Bonneville County, ldaho; running thence N.89°52'18"W. along the
Section line 47.20 feet; thence N.01 °53'13"W. 965.42 feet; thence East 1293.59 feet to the
West bank of Sand Creek; thence S.32°29'40"W. along said West bank 487.30 feet; thence
S.26°12'35"W. along said West bank 188.91 feet; thence S.14°28'37"W. along said West
bank 122.98 feet; thence S.02°53'54"W. along said West bank 267.63 feet to the South line
of said Section 10; thence N.89°52'18"W. along said Section line 825.10 feet to the POINT
OF BEGINNING.

SUBJECT TO: existing easements of record.

CONTAINING: 983,972 sq. ft. or 22.589 acres.
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EXHIBIT B
Calculation of Purchase Price

5.0%

Interest Rate
Amortization (yeacs)
Beg. Principal

5

$2.667.000

Payment Interest Prindpal Ye1Ueod Purchase Price
$2,5.58,750
241.600
133.350 108,250
241,600 127,938 113,663
$2,445,088

Yi:ar

l
2
4

2,445p88
2,325J42

5

2,200,429

3

122,254

241,600
241,600
241,600

116,287
110,021

119,346
125,313
131,579

$2,325,742

$2,200.429
$2,068,850

PW'cha11e Price at the end of year 5 = $2,068,850

In determining the Purchase Price for years 6- LO of the Renewal Tenn, the interest rate
shall be adjusted one time at Year 6 to prime plus 2% as determined using the Wells Fargo
Prime Rate.
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GRAIN ELEVATOR ROOFTOP SPACE LEASE
This Grain Elevator Rooftop Space Lease ("Lease") is made and entered into the _ day
of April, 2014, by and between Lincoln Land Company, Inc., P.O. Box 1768, Idaho Falls, Idaho
83403-1768, hereinafter referred to as ''Landlord", and FyberCom,LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company, 3780 North Yellowstone Highway, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83454 (''Tenant").
WHEREAS, Landlord owns and maintains a grain storage elevator and equipment shelter
(jointly referred to as the uelevator") geographically located upon the property described in

Exhibit "A" (the "Premises") near the City of Lincoln, Idaho.
WHEREAS, Tenant desires to occupy, and Landlord is willing to provide rooftop space
and attachment locations at the Premises for Tenant's transmission and receipt of radio-internet
signals.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises, conditions, and other
good and valuable consideration of the parties hereto, the receipt and sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, it is covenanted and agreed as follows:

1. Demise of Premi~es. Landlord hereby lets and demises unto Tenant, and Tenant
hereby receives and accepts from Landlord, the rooftop of the Premises at City of Lincoln, Idaho,
more particularly described in Exhibit A (the "Premises") attached hereto and made part hereof.
The Leased Premises shall include:
·

(a) Attachment locations upon the roof top of the elevator at the Premises, for the

placement and affixing of antennas oriented in such directions as shall be in accordance
with Tenant's needs, subject to the structural limitations of the elevator.
(b) The Leased Premises shall also include 25 square feet of space in Landlord's
Building, near the elevator rooftop where Tenant can locate its communications

equipment.
2. Priyile~s. Landlord hereby confers upon Tenant the following described privileges
appurtenant to the Premises, wbich shall be irrevocable for the duration hereof:

(a) The right to place the Tenant's Equipment in Landlord's Building, near the elevator

on the Premises.
(b) To place and affix lines for signal carriage between Tenant's Equipment and Tenant's
antennas upon the elevator.
(c) To extend and connect lines for utility services

between Tenant's Equipment and

utility company service connection points located at the Premises.
(d) To travel between the Premises and the public road over routes which Landlord is
entitled to use.
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(e) To traverse common areas of the Premises reasonably necessary to accomplish
Tenant's purposes and contemplated herein.

3. Use of Premises. Tenant shall be entitled to use the Leased Premises to install,
operate, and maintain thereon antennas and related equipment for the transmission and receipt
of internet and other electrical signals, but for no other use or pwpose. Tenant's use of the
Premises shall at all times comply with and conform to all laws and regulations applicable
thereto, and shall be subject to Landlord's review and approval regarding Tenant's placement of
antennas and lines upon the elevator, and all other matters which Landlord deems, in Landlord's
reasonable opinion, to affect Landlord's own operations or interests. The cost of modifying
Landlord's Equipment Shelter at the Premises, including the cost of improving the delivery
of utility services to the Premises or making any necessary or desirable alterations to the
elevator to accommodate Tenant's antennas, lines, and operatioos, shall be borne exclusively by
Tenant. Landlord agrees to exerc.ise the utmost restraint in rescinding its approval once given
for any portion of Tenant's installation, and to refrain from requiring Tenant to undertake later
modifications to Landlord's Equipment Shelter without sharing the cost thereof.
4. Initial Term. Subject to the provisions of Paragraph 20, the initial term ofthis Lease
shall commence on the day Tenant has exclusive access to the rooftop of the Premises, and shall
expire five (5) years from that initial date.

5. Renewal This Lease shall automatically renew and extend for one (1) additional
tenns of five (5) years, as the same shall coincide with, and not exceed, the duration of
Landlord's right to keep the elevator at the Premises, upon a continuation of all the same
provisions hereof.
6. Option to Terminate. Tenant shall have the right to terminate this Lease or any
extension thereof at any time after the initial five (5) year term, upon giving Landlord sixty (60)
days written notice by certified mail to Landlord at the address shown above.
7. E&DJ. Tenant shall pay rent ("Rent") to Landlord in the amount of Three Thousand

Four Hundred Fifty and no/100 DOLLARS ($3,450.00) per month, which shall be due on
the first day of each calendar month. Landlord shall specify the name, address, and taxpayer
identification number of a sole payee (or a maximum two payees) who shall receive rent on
behalf of the Landlord. Rent will be prorated for any partial month. Rental shall be based on the
proposal dated March 31, 2014, attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Landlord will not be required to
provide a generator for backup power. Landlord shaU pay to have fiber optics run to the elevator
from the City of Ammon at such time as it becomes available, at reasonable expense.
On the second five (5) year anniversary of the commencement date of the term of this lease,
Rent shall be increased by three percent (3%) for the third five (5) year term of this Lease. lf,
however, the Rent increase of 3% falls below the Consumer Price Index for the previous five
(5) year term, then the rent shall instead be increased by the CPI. The Rent shall be adjusted in
proportion to the cumulative change in the latest published Consumer Price lndex. compared to
the same index as historically recorded for the month and year in which the term of this Lease
commenced. "Consumer Price Index" shall mean the Consumer Price Index. for All Urban
Consumers, AIJ Items, U.S. City Average, 198284 =: 100, (U .S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics). If the said Index ceases to be published, then a reasonably comparable inde.x
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shall be used. For pmposes of this paragraph "Rent' shall include the Base Rent, Additional
Rent, and the current Permitting Fee as defined in Section 8 below.
In the event of defau1t by Tenant of any payment or should Tenant otherwise default
in the perfonnance of any covenants or tenns in this Lease, and should such default not be
corrected within thirty (30) days after written notice to Tenant specifying the exact nature
thereof; or if the Leased Premises or any part thereof shall become vacated or abandoned, or
if Tenant shall be dispossessed during the term of this Lease, or if Tenant makes at any time
during the term of this Lease Agreement, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors or an
insolvent assignment or is adjudged a bankrupt pW'Suan~ to v9luntary or involwitary proceedings
in bankruptcy, then Landlord may tenninate this Lease Agreement and reenter Leased Premises
and remove all persons and equipment there from, with such equipment to be stored in a
public warehouse at the cost and expense of Tenant. Unless Tenant has exercised the Option to
Tenninate found in paragraph 6, Tenant shall be liable for any deficiency that may arise during
the remainder of the term of this Lease.
8. Pennittina Fee. In addition to Base Rent and exclusivity fee, Tenant shall be
responsible to pay any and all permitting fees which may be charged by any public entity.

9. Utilities. Tenant shall solely and independently be responsible for payment to the
Premises' primary tenant, currently General Mills. of all utility services to be consumed by
Tenant's operation; provided, however, that if General Mills and Tenant shall mutually agree for
reasons of convenience and practicality Tenant shall be permitted to connect to General Mill's
existing electric utility service and to draw power therefrom for Tenant's Equipment, subject to a
duty to reimburse General Mills for Tenant's share of the cost of power.
10. I.am. Tenant shall be responsible for personal property taxes levied against
Tenant's antennas and lines, and all of Tenant's Equipment. Landlord shall be responsible for
taxes levied against the elevator, Landlord's own Building, and Landlord's equipment.
11. Access and Secyrity. Tenant shall have unrestricted access to the Leased Premises
and to Landlord's elevator at all hours of the day and night, without any requirement of
supervision by the Landlord. Tenant's access to the elevator sha1l be limited. to work performed
on Tenant's behalf by a qualified employee or services contractor hired at Tenant's sole expense.
Landlord and Tenant mutually covenant to admit only their authorized personnel to the Leased
Premises, and only in furtherance of the specific business purpose of internet communications.
Tenant agrees to make best effort advance notification to Landlord prior to entering the Leased
Premises during normal working hours, and in cases where advance notification is not required
or possible, to retroactively notify Landlord. Doors and gates shall be kept closed and locked
except when required to be open for immediate ingress or egress.
12. Non-Interference. Tenant shall not use the Leased Premises in any way, which
interferes with the current use of the Premises by Landlord, the provision of services to
Landlord's current customers, or the use of the Leased Premises by the primary tenant, currently
General Mills, other tenants or licensees of Landlord. Similarly, Landlord shall not subsequently
use, nor shall Landlord pennit any subsequent Tenants, licensees, employees, invitees or agents
to use any portion of the Premises in any way, which interferes with the operations of Tenant.
Such interference shall be deemed a material breach by the interfering party who shall, upon
3
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written notice from the other party, be responsible for terminating such interference within 24
hours. In the event any such interference does not cease promptly, the parties acknowledge
that continuing interference may cause irreparable injury and, therefore, the injured party shall
have the right, in addition to any other rights that it may have at law or in equity, to turn off the
offending equipment and bring an action to enjoin such interference and/or to tenninate this

Lease.
13. Aviation Hazard Marking. Landlord agrees to be solely responsible for full
compliance, at all times, with the elevator marking, lighting, maintenance, inspection, recording,
notification, and registration requirements of the Federal Communications Commission and the
Federal Aviation Administration, and to share proof of such compliance with Tenant as Tenant
may rea.<1onably require.
·
14. Radio Frewienc;y (RF} Radiation. Tenant agrees to comply with all Federal
Communications Commission Guidelines for Radio .frequency (RF) Radiation, including
training of Tenant's personnel who work at the Leased Premises in General and Site-Specific
RADHAZ, completion of . RF Radiation Level Analysis where required, and preparation of
Safety Procedures and Practices documents for personnel working in a controlled zone.

15. Mutual Indemnjfjcation. Tenant shall indemnify and hold Landlord harmless from
and against any loss, damage or injury to the extent caused by, or on behalf of, or through the
fault of the Tenant, or resulting from Tenant's use of the Leased Premises or its presence at the
Premises. Landlord shall indemnify and hold Tenant harmless from and against any loss, damage
or injwy to the extent caused by, or on behalf of, or through the fault of the Landlord. Neither
party shall be required to hold the other party harmless against the unwelcome consequences of
such other party's own willful or negligent conduct.

16. Insurance. Tenant shall continuously maintain in full force and affect a policy of
commercial general liability in an aggregate amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000), and
Worker's Compensation insurance to statutory limits covering Tenant's work and operations
at the Leased Premises. Tenant shall name Landlord as an additional insured on Tenant's
commercial liability policy and provide Landlord a certificate of insurance. Tenant shall provide
Landlord thirty (30) days notice prior to cancellation of any such insurance policy.
Each party hereby waives all liability of and aIJ right ofrecovery and subrogation against
the other party and agrees that neither such party or any of its officers, agents, employees, or its
or their insurer will sue the other party, or any of the officers, agents, or employees of the other
party for any loss of or damage arising out of any Act of God or damage caused by or due to any
act or acts of any party or entity not a party to this Lease.
17. Opportuney to Cure Defaults. If Landlord or Ten.ant fails to comply with any
provision of this Lease which the other party claims to be a default hereof, the party making such
claim shall serve written notice of such default upon the defaulting party, whereupon a grace
period of 30 days shall commence to run during which the defaulting party shall undertake and
diligently pursue a cure of the default. Such grace period shall automatically be extended for an
additional 30 days, provided the defaulting party makes a good faith showing that efforts toward
a cure are continuing. This Section shall not apply in cases of interference, which instead shall
require an immediate and effective cure.
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18. Tenant's Separate Pmperty. Landlord hereby agrees . that Tenant's Equipment,
including Tenant's antennas and Jines, are and shall remain Tenant's separate personal property,
and that said property shall never be considered fixtures to the real estate. Tenant shall at all
times be authorized to remove Tenant's property from the Premises, if free from any lien of
Landlord. Such removal shall be accomplished without damage to the property of Landlord or
third parties, and in accordance with Landlord's management control of the ~emises.
19.

Assignment or Sublease of Tenant's

Interest. Tenant's interest 1mder this Lease

may be assigned to any parent, affiliate, or purchaser of all or substantially all of Tenants assets,
upon notice to Landlord. Any other assignment of this Lease requires Landlord's prior written
consent, which consent Landlord agrees, shall not unreasonably be withheld. Any sublease of
this Agreement may be made at Tenant's discretion so long as the subleasee agrees to be bound
by the terms of this Agreement. Tenaat shall give notice of any sublease to Landlord as soon as
practical. Such notices shall be in writing and include the name, address and telephone number
of such assignee. Tenant acknowledges that in the event of a sublease, Tenant remains obligated
to Landlord under the terms of this Agreement.

20. Remoyal of Current Occupant(3). Landlord acknowledges that the Premises are
currently being utilized by Digis Idaho/Nevada, or another occupant, without authorization
from Landlord. Tenant shall have until May 1, 2014, to negotiate a sublease with Digis Idaho/
Nevada, on such terms as shall be acceptable to Tenant, subject to consent of Landlord. IfTenant
is unsuccessful in negotiating a sublease by May 1, 2014, Landlord shall take all necessary
legal or other actions, at Landlord's sole cost and expense, to remove the current occupant
from the Premises in order to afford Tenant occupancy under the terms of this Agreement. If a
sublease cannot be agreed upon, Landlord and Tenant specifically agree that all rent due under
this Agreement shall abate until Tenant is provided access to the rooftop of the Premises for its

business purpose, and this Agreement shall not commence until Tenant is afforded exclusive
access to the rooftop of the Premises.
21. Surrender. Upon the expiration or earlier termination of this Lease, Tenant shall
remove all of Tenant's property from the Leased Premises and surrender the Leased Premises to
Landlord in good condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted.

22. Execution of Other Instruments. Landlord agrees to execute, acknowledge, and
deliver to Tenant other instruments respecting the Leased Premises, as Tenant or Tenant's lender
may reasonably request from time to time, provided that any such instruments are in furtherance
of, and do not substantially expand, Tenant's rights and privileges herein established. Such
instruments may include a memorandum of lease, which may be recorded in the county land
records, Landlord also agrees to reasonably cooperate with Tenant's efforts to obtain all private
and public consents related to Tenant's use of the Leased Premises, as long as Landlord is not
expected to bear the financial burden of any such efforts.

23. Attorney's Fees. In any action on this Lease at law or in equity. the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover the reasonable costs of its successful case, including reasonable
attorney's fees and costs of appeal.
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24. Merjer and Modifications. This Lease contains the entire agreement of the parties,
and may not be modified except in writing signed by the party against whom such modification
is sought to be enforced.

25. Notices. All notices required or desired to be given under this Lease shall be in
writing and dispatched by certified mail or commercial courier to the party to be served at its
address as follows:

If to Landlord:

Lincoln Land Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 1768
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83043- ! 768

If to Tenant:
FyberCom, LLC

P.O. Box520
Ucon, Idaho 83454
or at such other addre3s as such party may previously have advised the other party by notice

similarly given.
26. Bindine: Effect. All of the provisions of this Lease shall inure to the benefit of and be
binding upon the parties hereto aud their respective successors in interest.
Idaho Law. This Lease shall be governed by, construed, and enforced in
27.
accordance with the laws of the State ofldaho.
28.

Hazardous Sµbstapces. Tenant agrees that it will not use, generate,

store, or dispose of any hazardous material on, under, about or within the Leased Premises in
violation of any law or regulation. Landlord represents, warrants, and agrees (1) that neither
Landlord nor, to Landlord's knowledge any third party has used, generated, stored, or disposed
of, or pennitted the use, generation, storage or disposal of, hazardous material on, under, about
or within the Premises except as disclosed on any Schedule, and (2) that Landlord will not, and
will not permit any third party to use, generate, store or dispose of any hazardous material on,
under, about or within the Premises in violation of any law or regulation. Landlord and Tenant
each agree to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other and the other's partners, affiliates,
agents, and employees against any and all losses, liabilities, claims and /or costs (including
reasonable attorney's fees and costs) to the extent arising from any breach of any representation,
warranty or agreement contained in this paragraph. In addition, Landlord shall defend, indemnify
and hold harmless Tenant from all other losses, liabilities, claims and/or costs arising from or
related to the environmental condition of the Leased Premises, including costs of remediation,
which are not the result of the Tenant

29. Miscellaneous. The waiver of any term, provision or any default shall not constitute
the waiver of any other term, provision or default. This Lease shall be governed by the laws of
the State of Idaho. If any part of this Lease shall be adjudged contrary to law, the remaining
provisions hereof shall remain in fulJ force and effect.
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IN WfINESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto bind themselves to this Lease as of the day
and year first above written.

Lincoln Land Company, LLC
By·
I
Beck

FyberCom, LLC
By: Jared Stowell

I

~
-Date: '1 zz~ {L/
4

FEIN:

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)

---------

I, the undersigned, a notary public in and for the State and County aforesaid, do hereby
certify that Jared Stowell. Manager of FyberCom, LLC, known to me to be the same person
whose name is subscribed to the foregoing Tower Rooftop Space Lease, ap_peared before me this

I, the undersigned, a notary public in and for the State and County aforesaid, do hereby
certify that Doyle H. Beck, known to me to be the same person whose name is subscribed to the
foregoing Grain Elevator Rooftop Space Lease, appeared before me this day in person and
acknowledged that, pursuant to bis authority, he signed the said Lease as his free and voluntary
act on behalf of Lincoln Land, Inc., for the uses and purposes therein stated.
Given under my hand and seal this

ZJ..,

,_cf

_J,._'I)

day o f ~ , 2014.
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PERSONAL GUARANTY
ln consideration of the terms and conditions of the foregoing Grain Elevator Rooftop

Space Lease, I, Jared Stowell, do liereby personally guarantee to Lincoln Land Company, LLC,
its successors and assigns one ( 1) year of the rental obligation of FyberCom, or the remaining
term of the lease or any extension, whichever is less, in the event of default by FyberCom, LLC.
This guarantee is expressly limited to a maximum of one (l) year of the rental obligation
pursuant to said Lease or extension, and does not waive any defenses of Jared Stowell, including
but not limited to LinC<>ln Land Company's failure to mitigate its damages in the event of default.

STATE OF

Ida.Jw

County of J3ti,r,ev/ ~

)):ss

)

On this ,2Z'\<iay of..z:::i.J,,,t::ld,,,::~-' 2014, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public
in and for said County and Stat personally appeared Jared Stowell, known to me to be such
person whose name is subscribed to the within and foregoing instrument, and who acknowledged
to me that he execllted the same.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST GENERAL MILLS FOR INDEMNIFICATION
Defendant and General Mills entered into an agreement in March, 2000 whereby
Defendant was allowed to use the rooftop location at Evans Grainery for its equipment. As part
ofth:is agreement, Defendant pay the agreed upon amount of $50.00 per month. General Mills
continually accepted this amount and provided the Defendant access to the location for
installation and maintenance. General Mills never canceled this agreement in writing as
required. The Defendant and General Mills continued operating under this agreement unitl
April , 2014.
Plaintiff has alleged that in 2006 it pmchased the prope1iy and entered into a rental
agreement with General Mills for General Mills ' continued occupancy of the property. As part
of the agreement between Plaintiff and General Mills, it is alleged that General Mills could not
sub-lease any pmi of the property without permission from the Plaintiff. Despite this alleged
agreement between the Plaintiff and General Mills, General Mills continued to rent Defendant
the roof-top space, continued to collect the monthly rent and continued to allow access to the
property.
As a result of General Mills actions, the Plaintiff has now brought suit against the
Defendant for Defendant's use of the property it was leasing from General Mills, claiming
General Mills had no right to provide the property to Defendant.
Defendant seeks indemnification from General Mills in this matter pursuant to the
equitable principle of implied indemnity. "Implied indemnity is an equitable principle based
upon the general theory that one compelled to pay for the damage caused by another should be
able to seek recovery from that pmiy." Griggs v. Safeco Ins. Co. ofAm., l 03 Idaho 790, 792,

ME MORA DUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-ll

332

654 P.2d 378,380 (1982) quoting May Trucking Co . v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho
319,543 P.2d 1159 (1975).
In this matter, any liability the Defendant may have to the P laintiff is the direct result of

the actions of General Mills. By leasing the roof-top space to Defendant, General Mills took
responsibility for that action. If General Mills had entered into an agreement with the Plaintiff
for the use of the property, and if that agreement included a restriction on General Mills' ability
to continue with the lease to the Defendant, then it was the legal responsibility for General Mills
to inform Defendant of the change and that a lease would no longer be possible without the
approval of the Plaintiff. General Mills' actions, however, caused the Plaintiff to now being this
suit against Defendant. A suit which at its heart is based on General Mills' breach of the
agreement with the Plaintiff concerning a sublease.
Defendant should be indemnified by General Mills for any and all amounts that are
sought by Plaintiff in this matter. It is the actions of General Mills that has subjected the
Defendant to this suit and possible judgment.

CONCLUSION
Defendant should be granted summary judgment in this matter. Summary judgment
should be granted against the Plaintiff for the inability of the Plaintiff to meet the required
elements for unjust enriclunent and the inability of the Plaintiff to recover. Summary judgment
should also be granted in favor of the Defendant in its claim against General Mills for
indemnification.
DATED this _ _ day of March, 2016.

LARRE K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant

MEMORAN DUM TN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY nJDGMEN
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1 lex.under P. McLaughlin; ISB Nt). 7977

Jcfff,ey ·W..Bb\\~¢t, lSB Ng, .8.938
OtVENS PURSLEY~
LLP.
'

P.O. Box 2720

601.' West Ban:nocl(Sfrcct
Boi.se, Ithiho 83102
TC1le1-1h6ne .(208};388,-1200
I'fucsimile (208} 388~ 1300

n1exm.cla ugh.!in@gi venspurs1 ey.con~
jefiho1,ver@givenspur!il~y.ccJin
AtL<)fJJey .for ThirclM Party Defend Mt
.I l T.HB-DlSTRIC_T :COURT OF THE-S. VENTH JUD.lC1Al DISTRICT

OF·THE STATE OF.J.OAHO, IN ANDFOR BONNEVfLLE .COUNT .

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY,.LLC
'

~

.)

)
'\ '"'f' .

PlanthL1

)

)
)

v.

.)

U BRO .·DBAND, INC,

)

Ca.s e No. CV-l0lS-3927

.)
Defendant.

1 GENKRAL MILLS" lNC/S.ANn ·
) GENE-RAI.1 .MlLLS' OPERATIONS,·

. 1 LLG'S RESPONSES TO
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
DetendantJThird-Party .Pla.i11tiff:.

). :rLAINTIJl':F'S FIRST .ItEQUEST ·FOR
) ·.0.J:SCOV.1}' RY
)
)

)

V.

)

GEN,ERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL
Ml LS OPERATIONS Ll.C>
Thifd-1'-nrty Defet1dij1fts.,

}
)
}

>

COMBS NOW~. the Third~Party. Defendants~,

General .MHls, 'inc. and Ctcm:ral Mill

Operations. LL . (hefcinafter collectively known as H(1e11ers.l Mills' )> by and through tJieir
GE ~.1~RAL l\'ULLS_, INC; ·s. ANP . GimlmAL M.ILL'S 0-J>KRATlONS, LL'C'S R:RSl>{)NSE'S '['(),.
PL -!NTH< F'S.FIRST m .:QUJi:ST FC.lR .JJ't8CO\lE)ff · :l
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attorneys~ and hereby respond to P.laintiff s First. Request for Discovcty to General Mills, Inc,

and.(ionerat Mills Opm.·aU011.s, _.LLC,

Esmh
-ofthet"ic .G9nt.1.·al
cach .(md cv-cry answer. .and.
. .
.
. ()hjections
. .
...is. . incorporated
.
.
. belowinto
.
,

response a.s

it

~~t :forth folly

tJierc_in. Certain. of' th0se answers an:cl respm:1ses l'Gi:i'tate the
I ,

'

'

'

. .

'

'

•

substance of certain .g~H'lertil .ohjections for cmplrnsis 011ly;. '.Regardless of Wh<ilh61' ,or to what
extent any of those ari.sWers atttl responses .restate the substante of any gci:ltmil ol)jectioni:f, all of
the. general objections are intended _to he and a.re ittcorpora.ted into ,and ii.et fi:m h as part of each.

ans:Ver and r~sponse.

The nnden.igncd objects to (.1ach and every Interrogatory and Request for :Production of
Documents to the extent that it seeks inforn:1ation or documents· that .are within the.possession~

custody, or GOntro.l of, or equally or more available to, the. party propounding these discovery

requests,
The undersigned objects to each and every Intcrrogato1y and Request far Production of
Documents to the extent that it seeks information or documettts· not withiu the undersigned~ s

pc)ssession, custody, or control..
lhe undersigned objt~cts to -each and every Interrogatory a(Jd Requ est fi.1r Production of
Doc:umcnts to tl1:.e extent that it seeks in:formation or docinuents subje_ct to the atto:r.ncy-client
privil0gc~ the work prndud docirfrtc; trade secret prntcclfon~· or any other apphcable ,priv·iJcgc~

im1mmityi.or other ptotection from disclosure.that is· provided by iitati:itc 1 rule, d0cision 1 contract-,
or any other source.

The u.ndcrs1gn.~d
objqcts to cai:;:h and every rnterrogotory and Reqi1est for Produ~;tion
of
.
.

Doc~tm·1cntsfo thc·cxtent

that it se<)ks.jnfonnation.or documents tfrataro (a) beyond the .scope ()f

GEN'EllAL 1\1'.ILi..8; INC/S A'ND GENERAL ·MILLS' OPimATlONS, L-LC'S R!i;SPONSES ' to
n,AlN'rU<'F'S .FlRS1' lU)QUmn f,'()ft,.JHSCOVl~J:t\i · 2
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any par.ty's dahns and/or defoi1~es>or (b) not relevant or reasonably cRlculnted to lend to dw

discovery- of adrnissible t:;,.'Vi_dcri.ce.
Th.e undersigned objects to ench und wery lntcrrogato:ry and Request Jbr Pr<>d.uction of

Documents. to the ·extent it caiis tor lc~al conclusions thut are

11<)t

properly the_subject of fi1ct·

discove'i·y;.

Doaun:i ctlts
to the extent i1. is v·.a-gu~; iu:'nhigucrus,
overly brottd;. tmdllly b:urder:tsonw, hnnrssing,
.
.
'

dur;licuffve,_~omp<YUnd1 -~~tks-inibnnatiot1 ot d~c,m1ent~ ~~at- nr~ n~t id.c11.tite'd \X?t~h renso~bfo
partict1ladtyt or otherwise-seeks fo .impose upon tho m1dcrsi~cd any obHgatfot1$ bc~ond th<>se·
b11posed by'the Idaho R:ulcs bf Civ.il P1;6'e¢du:i'c.
The,·w)dcrsigned object;, t6 .-¢ac;h and every fnterr{}g~
1tory and R.equ.est fo.r .l>r()duc,tfon of

Documents t~:-the-~xhmt it-<loes not.specify a !Jm~ fr_ame.

The -undersig,,wd obje:cts·t(.) c'.'lch_and ·every-I1:formgatory -and ~cquest.fbr l)l"Od_i1c_~ion C?f~
Doctii11.ei1ts to lhe exte11t iUissumGsJocfa i1()t in e\ridehce:

assl}rted,
lN1~ERROGATORY N0.1

t)lcase identify .all exhihit:s you intend or expect to introduce into evidence at .a ny heatings
or trial of the above-entitled matter :and identify the_. person presently. having possession of each
ex·hibit.
.RESPONSE: General Mills. objects to this interrogatory on the grounds that General

Mills has not yet detennined-whaf exhibits .ft will use in this matier and the time to disclose such
exliibits·has not .occurred. Witl1out ~liTaiving .any ol)jediQns~ Geneml MUls may utilize as. an

GENERAi, MILLS, INC'S AND GENJ~RAL Mll,I;S OPERA'ffONS,. LLC'S RltSJ>ONS~:S TO
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ex.hi.bit any document prodrn..:cd by nny of the parties during discovery. General Mills shttLl

tiupplcment this response_in accord.nncc .with the Idaho Rules of Civil Prncedum,
lNTE\RROGATOUY
. NO. 2

",

Please kkntHy e11ch and every.fact witness you plan to call to t_e~tify ntHn.y hearing .or tht~

tr.inl in this adhm and prnvidt1 a hrfof-sumrnnry()ffhefacts.fo whi.ch each.such fiict wifnesswHl
testify,

Mill
'\Nh(:rnit
h.. \.,1tl
onU to.tc!l4H1ya.fid.
th~ tfmt:to di$ck_~ge wit,.1cS$<;:s has
. s. lms -1,ot .yct d.~1:erf)'1h:cd
· ..
.
.
. . .
.
' .,

'

'

' '

'

'

'

.,

'

nQf ticecurrcd. Without waiVing any ob)c~tfons, Gen~m~l MHls sfatcs. that ..It m-ay call.

'

us

~i

h1ct

witness any indivl.dua1 identifk:d by any of the :Pitrtles as pti'sons i1/Ith kl1frwle:dge,

I'lt:u~e idontiJy cac.;h and every e},PC:l't witmms y90 pim.1 to .cnlJ to testify nt the tr.ial fn-this
act:i.o.n.

A~ ~o .eac;h expert. wftncs~ v1oase provide(!} .a completq statement of' all -opinl011s to be
1

expr6s'.isecl iir:id

l}HJ basis

arid t~1im)ns.thei'eforei (2) the d1fra ·or othcr-lilfor.rnaffon considered ·by the

witness in forrnfog the opinions; (3) any exhibits: to be used as. a summmy of 0 1· s11pport for the

opinions·; (4) any ·qualifications of the witi1ess, including a. li st of all ptib!icati<ms·authored by the.
witness within the preceding ten ymws; (5) th0 compensation h> he J)aid for tl~e expert testimony~.

and (6) a lisHttg of any other case in which the witness ha.s tesfrffed as un expert by trial or.by
depo_sition within the preced-ing foucyears.

RESPONSJ!:; General Mills objt'CtS to this .intetrogfftory ·o:li the-grounds that it ca:lls for
information protected

by the work product doctrine. Without waiving any objections, General

Mills st.ates- that as of this time, rm decisions have been rnade with respect to what expert

GENERAL . MlLLSr lNC.'S A.Ni) GENERAL .!V.f.ILLS OPE.RATIONS) LLC~s RESPON,SES TO
PLAlNTWF'S F.tRST Rli:Qt.i,tCST vo,:l .Dl$COVE)lY • 4
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witnesses may be called to testify in connection with this .matter. (}cncml Mills shalJ: supplcmc11t

tllis response in·· m!.cordance.-with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,

Please idenfHy all agreem<mts between T'htrd Party Defendants and Dcfondimt LP
Broadband, .fo.c. a1td/or Mic.1·0S(:,·rve, Inc•.with tegard to the ·Property. FoteHch such agl·t.-etn.et1t,

U:Esi>~)NSm: (len~1·aJ .Mm.~ c1hJccts tr> fhis intc1Tog:).tory as vngu.e. ovol'ly brond~ nnd
1'".

'

.

•

•

•

•

'•

,,

'

'

•

unduly l-nm1cn::,01nc, Without waivh1t~ any cibjectfons) General Mms states that :lf was a party fo
the Roof.:'r<)p R(fottil Agtecmi,mt atfa.ched tis Exhib-it B lo Plaintiff's First·R¢q11cst ·Jbr·Discovt?ry

to Genen:d Mil.ls~Inc. and Generiil Mills Op:etatiqns~ LLC, The tt~rms datE\ and s11:,,11utori6-~of
1

that document
:s..peak
far. themselves.
General
any addltion~l
.
.
.
',.
. Mills is
. in the ..process
. ,. Qf identityinH
.
'

'

'

'

,••

at?l~~cmcnts and will suppfcm~nt thi.s response·. in accordance

,• ,

wm~ th,:\ ldi~ho

Rul_es

ot· dvil

INTJJ:RROGATORY NO, Si
Pkase-icknt.ify all agreti.nent':i b~tween .Plaintiff aird Thitd Party DefendtUits ·with tegawl
to the Property, For ea.ch such agreement, identify the cfate- the agTeement was. entered_-int(r,
\Vhether the agreement.was oral or.in writing, and the terms of the agreement

RESPONSE: General Mills o~jects to this interrogatory as vague,

ovcdy bro-ad,

ai'id

unduly burdensome, partiqularly giyen that. plainti.ff is a party to_the. requested a.gree:111e1tts and
presumably bas access to the reqm:sted infom1at~on. Without wafoing any objections, General

'tv1il1s identifies the Lease as such an agreement. 'l'he Lease fa dated for June :26'10 and is jn
wri1jng. The terms of the document speak for thc.tnselvcs and the .sigr1:it'o1fos to the Lease .ate

GKNERAL MILLS, INC:rs AND G.ltNRRAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC'S RESPONSES TO
l:'l:A ll'!'J'HW'S·.FlRS'f R ICQ{Jf ..,~1' .FOR mscovrrn.Y. ~
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staled in the I,ease. Oe,H;ral Mills also states that it is hi th~ rirncess of identifying_any additio.nui

agreements and. wrn supplc.ment this response in accordtmci;; with the ldaht) Rti'les of Civil
Proc_edm·Q.,

Please identify all payrr11::l1iti-l rec.:<tived by. YOU in exd1;Jnge
l<n' I)cfcnd ~n1.fs use. of thq
.·
.,,

'

pred1catcc!_ on an \H1tn1c .sti:11:ernerit (_)f :focts since- Dt~fondapt m'ilY .used a sm.alt ptn.ti-on

{Jf - the.

Property. Wihmut wnivfog any olijectfons, dencrni Milli~ states that-It is i"n .thq p:r(>vc~s <>f
'

I

•

, ,

'

'

'

'

•

idctltify11'1g_nfiy .s,,ch 1my:nwnts and ,vil'l supJilet110nf this-resporn;e. in {1ccotdanc.c. wHh the ldaho.
Rules of ClviI Proceditte.
1NTERROGA'TORY NO. 7~
Please ·idcnti1)' aH documen:\'s, agreemcms, or stat:emen_ts

)IO}l

assett gave De:fendapt _the

1'ight to inst.all any anfon:nae Ol"i)ther eq-ulpn1:eni·o-n })Ju"J.nfrff'il Property.

Rll:SJ~ONSE: OeriefaI MiHs <>bjects· to this ii1t-erro.gafory us Va&'tt.ei oved'r '!woad; and
cal.ls for a kga1 conclusion. Without ·wili:ving ;my objections, General .Mills states that it was n
party to the Roof-Top Rental Agreement attached as Exhibit B to Plaintiffs. Fhst Request for

Dfscovery to General Mf11s) lnc. and General Mills Operations1 LLC) and pofontb~lly other

agnx:wnents.

General TvliUs 'is in the process ofldenUfying any nddltional agreements and will

st1pplem.e.nt: thfa resp<mse·.in .accordance·with the Jdabo Rules.of-Civil Procedure.
!~_TI{~R()GATOR.Y NO. 8:

Please idcnti{y all. documents 1 agrccrnents, or statQments you assert gave Defendant the
right to utilize uny antenna.c or other equipment on Plaintiff's Propetty ..

GENERAL MILLS; INc~s ANI) GENERAL MILLS OPim.ATJONS~- LLC'S RESPONS.l~S TO.
~t,A.I.NTl:fl··~srm._
sT RtQt:H!:.$T FOR msc ovamy •.·15
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an facts and circumstances you allege support y >ur Fourth Affirmative

Defense~ specifically th nt ,,:rf'hinl«PHI'ty Plafotiff:assum.ed the r~sk of t:he matters, eve.ntsi {tnd

int0tr'ogttl:oty:
.

"'-(I] ntci·1·<)g(1t<,rie1:1
may· fibt. sM1ply trade the· nlk:gatitma it. th¢· _\ifipmfoig 15,Htt.y's
.
.
, •

Sec1.tri~F Lttfga.t1'Qn~ 108 FR.I:>. .3¢8, 337 (N.D.C,-ii.1985).

'

'

.

A "blunderbuss demand' fvr

production, ulb~fr dH;gufaed in::the fh1:'n1. offriterrogntorfos, is lmpmper/i Nm1kofv. ARA° $;ervicc1s;

Further,, discovery in this 1n1iU(~dsjtist bcginniii'g~aiid Genel'nl Mins· iii trot yet in:1/ai·c of
air of the-facts related to this matter. Accordingly, this interrogatory is premature.and unduly
burdensome. Additiona11y~ t his intorrogatory ·is aimed at General Mills, against whom Plaintiff

does not l1ave a clairn and cedaln1y does not. have any interest in its affirmative defon.:-;es
t'1:1g-t1.rdJng indemnity, Discovery is ongoing. Ge1iera.l Mills shflll siJpplcmenl this l'esponsi:l.in
acco:rdun.ce.with the-Idaho Ruies ·of Civil Procedure.
INTltRROGA TORYNO. 10:

Please i-dcnfrfy

an

facts and circumstances you allege support your Fift11 A.ffirrnative

Defense, specifically that '"'"fhe damages. alleged in the Third-Party Con'.lplajnt reu-st'>O{lbly .could

GENERAL MlLLS, JNC.'S AND GENJi:RAL iY.HLL-S OPERATIONS; LI.CS· RKSPONSH:S T()
PLA1N'l'IFF.tS F IRS.T RKQlJie:ST H)R IHSCOV.JJ.~RY • 7
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have been avoided by Tbkd~.Pnrty Plaintiff and Thjrd-Party Plaintiff has failed lo m.iti.gat~ the
aUcg;ed damages."

il')ter~:r.~gn:tory, ' [.I]JJte.n:ogato~fos

1:1 1Ity

1101:

simply track the uUcgnti.-oiis fn th1;1 :n_
pi:iosh1it p.itrty's

pltmding1
p-~ragraph by p:.l.r:~grttph,
askfog,
fbt· nJi. facts. fo. .SU:P.P.-Oi't of. the. rrn:rt.ts (mntc11tfon$. .fo.
.
. .
.
.. . .
'

~

ea.ch _p. ar-::1.~t·aph ...• · ·.his' 'is ii..soi·krns form -o f discbvery 11buse1 'bccausc·sue.h -intcrrogntori
s can be
.
'
'

SmJ Jyf oot·~¼
~ .:.ed.·rn:l

_r>1.a-ct1'9!.'l -~P, § 3·3_.74, a~ 33-59, .60 ( citi1:1g /n

Sfcuril)1 .l;m~adonj~

H>'H° 17;Jt'D; j28;- tn (N.p .(~aU 9$5)..

'

•"

•

, Iv .

,. '

•

'

~

','

'

'

re CafrytJ1:~-em 1'-•e.hno/9gletr

A ·hh.mderhu~s demtmd for
1

•

'

•

••

ptcdu6tiottj ·albciit dit;:brtrised in. the form ,of in:ten:ogatories(·is·hnprop~r. 1 . Nankofv. 1/f?A ·_Servfoes,
lnc:f 465 N,Y.S:2.cl $1:5 (l.983).

Fu;1:tb:et, d.isc_c:rvery in ;th:i~ mutter is ju~t beginnitrg:, .an:d Ge-tYetiil Mills i·s J10t :ytiu1,1/:-fre of

all ofthe facts re~a~'Cd tD this matter.

Accordh1gly, this imen:O'gutory is prema:turri and unduly

burdensome-. AcfcHtionally 1. this ·.inforrnga.tory is. aimed at deneral Mills, -Hgainst whom Plaintiff
does not have a clufo:t :and' certainly does not .have ttny interest in Hs affirmatrve defenses .

rcgn.rding iodemni.ty. Without waiving any objections; .General Mills states· thttt: the rights i1nd.
r.esponsibilities .of G eneral Mins and the Tl1ird-Party Plnintiff vis .a vis each other are.. partiy set

forth in the Roof-rop. Renta1 Agreer.neat
.
. attached as ExhibH l3 to Plaintiffs· First Request for

Discovery to Genera] M-Hls;· Jnc. and General Mills Operations, L'.LC; Discovery 1s ongoing.
General Mi11s shall su:ppternent this response in accordance- ,vith the Idaho Ru-les t)f'Civil
Procedure.

GKNEIML MILLSf INC.'S AND GENKRAL MILLS OPERATlONS! Ll,C'S RESPONSES TO
PLAJ.NTXtil•'S-FIR$1'
..Dl$COV~nv
. .
. . Hli:Ql)l\:ST 1~(.1R
' .
'.
. · 8.
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Plect_sc identify Hll :facts. nnd c.ircumstfln<.X\s you allogc support your Sixth Afllrmutive

Defense, specitically .thnt "Thi.rd~Ptirty Plainti:ff-s claims me harred in. whole or hl part, hy the
1

doctrines of e,,;toppt1t (all vadn:n~s), waiver,_and ur1e.le.m.n J,ands. Purther, .,,l•.hird ..Party Phr_in_tiffhad
ki1.owfodgc: iW1d/or actual

Oi'

con.strnc::tlvt~.11otke oTt.h,~, ownership tnmshi:CJtt bctwl;Jen Plt11ntiff tt1'!.d

il1.tGrl'.og.nttwy. '~[l]nt:erroitntorl os m«.y nnt simply t1·11ck the .;.\Hega.tfotts in tho ()PP.o-sh1g partf1

pl¢ndh1g: pnrn;grnph by paragraph~ asking tor ali .foch, fri ;13upport o:i' Hrn padf5, (.;l)ntcnfiom; in

used to impc(se gt'ent burdens on tlic-opposing 1m1ty, ·tfad almost always arc e<:iunforpn,ductive,"

A f\bfo11derb1.rns demand for,
'

pfodiiotion~ aJbcit disgt{iscd h1 t}te .fi)Jin ofinlettog_atories, is-improper. 1' i ./ank.ofv..Ail4 Services,
.- · > 46i:::
l ·TW.
u N..Y. ..S'..-2Cl ::,- ·15 '(l· ,')8'3.)•

Furthe.t\ discovery .in this matter. is just beginning, imd General Mills is n9t_.yet aware of
ull of Hie frtcts- related to this matter. .Accordingly, this Li1tcrrogatory is premahire and unduly
bmi!cns.omc. Additionally, this interrogatory ls a{mi;:d at General Mills; against whom J>laintiff
docs not have a claim. and certainly does n()t have any ii1terest in· its .afftnnrilivc defenses
regarding) nden1n1 ty. Without waiving- any objections, General Mills states that the rights and
responsibilities

e>f General J\tlilis and the Third ..Party Plai'ntiff yis a- vjs each otbcr m·e .partly set

forth in the Roof..'J'op Rental Agreement attached as Exhibit B· to Phintiff's First Requec.t f<Jr

Dis:tovcry to Gc1'!:cral Mills, Iiw. and. General Mills Operations, Ll.iC. That· agreement states,

Gf~NERAL MILLS, INC. -S AND GtLNinUl, MILLS - OPKRATJONS, LLC'S RESPONSES TO
PJ..AINTIFU''S t:-TRS'.l' RF:QUEST FOR nJSCOV.1/:IW - ·\}
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among other things) that ...MicnJserv Computer Technologies, Inc... . hereby agrees to pay $50

per 1nonth to Geueral Mill$ . . . in exchnnge for roof..top. space on tht~ ··Evans ·Gn1.incry''
. grain
'

s_t:orage bins:" Discovery-is. ou~oing. General Mnls shal1 supplcmentthrs.-1·cs1m11sc. in accordance

with the ldahq _Rules ol' CtvH Pmceduro.

Plt1rise identify all fm::ts ~tnd. ~!h'cnmstmwcs-you -nllegc· sup:i,ort your s~venfh.Affii·rmttive
Defi.mst\ spe,;ifi.call:y that ··111ird-Pmi:y :PJnintiff'·s claim f(Jr ii1demnH-icntioI\ is bnlted, itJ whole or

in part, ~y ~~c-lm:igmige·(){(he r~icvari:t co1.1trncts.i ~:

!!E~!,J)NSf1 Ccnernl M.Hls objects on the grounds fha.f this ls .an hnprQpcr.contention.
intetr6gatory. ''[l]ntci'.ftJ~atodes rnay

!1{Yt

siinply trac'k tho .,Hegatfons in the qpp<>"sing partis.

ple!lding, pnragraph hy parf:tgraph, 11$king for aH facts: in. suppot't Qf the part/s coutenti,ms· ilt

ouchparagraph .,.' Th1sJS a-SCJl.101.lS-form. of <ll_SC()VOfY abuse, hec{-\US~ SllCh interrogatorics ,t;:a,n b_e
used·to .impose grca(.burdcns on-tire opposing_pmty) and almost ulways are countorpmciuctfvc;·~·
'
.See

~-.-

. ., .

tv1c)ote s

.; J . ·1
.,. · • ··' ·:.1D,
.. §,l ·--;;,.:..·3..·1·-·4·.;at
,,
"() .,.
. " ., ·
/
-,,
. '' f'
•'
•
l·<:Xieta
I' ractice·
.33~5..r,
60-(c1bi1g. N -re Convergent ,. ed mol<>gtt:s

Sm:'Ufity- .U tigatfon, l08 F.R.D.. 32:8, 337 (N:D.Ci,l.198.5).

A "blunder.buss demand- for

production, albeit _disguise-din the form of interrogatories. is improper}'· Nankof v. ARA Services,
Inc .., 465 N.Y.S ..2cl".Sl5 (1983).

:Fm{her,. dlscovery in this matter is just heginn.ing, and General Mms is ;not yet .aware of

an of-the facts related to thi s .matter. Accordingly, this interrogatory is premature a.ml n.nduly
burdensome.. Additionally} this inten-ogatory ?S ahned at General MHl_s, .against wbom Plaintiff
does .not have a claim and certafoty does noi have. any intc:rest :in its affirmative defenses·

regard111g indemnity.. Withouf waiving any objections,. General Mills states. that .the 1ights and
re-sponsibilities of ,General Mflls and the Third-Party Plaintiff vis .a vis each other arc.partl? ,set-

GRNERAL MILLS, INC.'S AND GENltRAL MILLS OJ>KRATlONS;_ Ll.,C S RI~SPONSRS TO
}.,LAI.NTIFH'S FlRSl' IUCQtll~ST-FQR D.lSCOVKRY - lO
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forth in the Roof~Top Rental Agreenie-J1.t atl:acht.'i.l us Exhibit B to Plaintlff's firs1 Request fbr

Disco\rery to Gouera1 1\rlills! Inc. and Gem.ral Mil.ls. Operations, LLC. Discovery is ongoing.

Genual Mills .s.haU supplement this 1:espmls1:,~ ill accordance ~ith the. lclaho Rules of CivH

1 ·1Ji(
·1.N.·:-~1·r:··1
..J..riA'fio
· · 1,:1 Y
JL I\
~
~~
: N
' -.0 .•.1"
,..u

Defon:S'Q, . t>·ecifie~Uy that "Thi.rd-.l~a:rty Plaint'iff',;s t;l&.i mfot .in:dcm:nifh;:atifrn is bm1:eqt :i.ti whoJ~ or
ilt ·p

rt b_ec~use th~-:dthly ~ _seeking _
.indc 1;i.t1'ificati~n. ~mo,~1g o.thcl' thi1~gs,,- -aused Gen.eta} MiJls.

prejt1dice. Y

·.RltSJ~O:NSltt dci1:eral JvfiUs obJc(~t's
'

01\.

the g1·<m11ds that thls 1s .a.n improper contention

'

intet.i:'o,gatory. "[I)mt~t'i\Igntori.es ·m.ay J'.l(it simply tnHik the lillegal:ions in. the cippt)i:J.ing party~s

plepding_, pru-agra:ph by paragrnph, aski1~g for aU fo;c.ts: in ~uppmt tJf-th(!.pa.rty'i:; cont.0n:tions· fn
each pi.n:ug1:aph .. ·. This i~ a _sc~rfot~s.fo~,m o-f di~covcry ri~rnse, because··!3pt:h. in:terrogatories _can be .
used to Jmpose great -burdens on .the opposing party,. and

-ntmost always are countert,roductivef

See Moo · '·s Fedcrnl Practice 3D, § 33.-74, at.33-'59;. 60 -(citiilg In re Convergent Tecfmologle.
Security Utigation, 108 F.R.D. 328, 337 (N.D.Cal.l 985).

A 1'hhu1derbuss ckman.d. for

prodw::tit:1nj aibeitdisguised )n. the form ofinten•ogatol'ies, is improper!' Nankofv. ARA Sen,ices,

"i·

·. .J,) 465
!!' ·1.')r: ('·19°·
• \''
111<
') · N
. ··•·Y. , S,.c.(l ·~-,
_ <'D),

. Fut'thcr, discovcty .in this· matter 1s just beginning, and-General MHls is not yet .aware.of
all of the· facts re.lated to ·this matter, Accordingly, tl1is inte1To-gatory is. premature and unduly
burdensome. AdditionaJly, this jnterrogatory .is aimed at General Mills against wJ10m Plaintiff

doe, not have a claim ruJd :certainiy does not have any· interest in its affirmative de~cnses
.regarding indemnity. W1t11out waiving any -objections1. General M'il1s states that fr .was -only

GENERAL MILLS. lNC.'S AND GENlJ,RAL MILLS OP'lm.ATfONS, . LLC'S RESPONSES TO
PLAlN'l'WWi:,·~··W.f.i't H.~~-Qt!:EST J10lt D!S(:.OV~:l~Y - :t l
.
.
'

'

:

'

~

.

'

'.

,,
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brought into this lawsuit whe.n trial was :months away, That, among othce things, docs not nltnw

sufficient time to defend its interests and prejuchc<~s-General Mms ability to indemnify Thint~
Party-Defendant, if tber, is such. a duty; Dis<~ov,:ry is ongoing, General Mills shall supplomm1t

Pleasti\. idchtiff lilt facts nhd cli·d1histi;iii:t:es· y6u allege si.11111t.Wt ytnxi· Tctlth Affi.hnntive
'

'

h¢c~11sc~ nnd did not
· .· confer n foasehold interest.~'
.
'

.

.

'

'

'

'

'

'

~UtS.PONSih~-(fone-ral MHts ob:fc,~t~ on th~ ~1·o~u1ds that this is- un impror,~r c<mtentfot1
int~'lrro,gatory. 'TUnterrngrrfod.es may not siMply frack the allcgffti<Jhs fo. -tht} qppnsing pnt(.i ~

each p~ra.graph ._•. , This i&a ~.erious form of~llscovery11buse, hecaust~sucl1. :interrogutorks can be
'

used to hnpose·;great burdens

'

'

on thc-oppm~lng ,party, and almost alwoys_,m! -COLmtcrprod11s:Gve,,:~

See M()ore·)s Federal Pntctke 'JD,. § 33.74;,. nl 33.,59~ 6() (dting.- ln .re Convergeni 'Technologies
Sc<:.utily Lltigation 1 108 F.R.D. 328. '337 (N.D,CaL 1:985).

A 1'hlm1derbl1ss demand for

production, albeit disguised in the form ofinteh'ogutories, is improper,'' Nankofv. ARA Services,
'N',J
"I;,('., 0,
L' 2·
.!11(,·,., 46'
· ' 5' ..
U·1

"' ·15 ..( 1{\8'
"). .
.'J. c1

.J .

Further,.d1scoyery :111 this rnatter i.s Just beginning, fmd General Mills is not yet a.ware .of

a11 of the· facts related to th[s matter. Accordingly~ this ii'.itcrrogatory .is _premature: and unduly
burdensome. AdditionaUy) this. interrogatory is aimed. at General Mills, against whom PJa.intiff

does not have a claim and certainly does not have any interest in its affirr:nativc defons~s

regatdii1g indemnity. Without waiving any objcctkms: General Mills states that the rights and
responsibilities of General M.ills ()nd .the Tllird·Party Plaintiff vis a vis each other are iSartly ~et

Gl!;NERAL MILLS, INC'S AND C'ENKRAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LI.C'S R.ESPONSii'.S TO
P.tt\l.N'UFI'i''S .1~1'HST :REQlf1,;s-r I•'()R llJ$C(>VERY - 12
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forth in the Rool~TQp Rental Agreement: nttad)9d m, Exhibit .B to Plaintiffs First Request for

Disc:ovcry to .General Mills, Inc, .Md General Mill.~ Operatjom11 1.,LC. Oencnll Mil.ls further
responds that discovei·y·fs ongoing.. Generni MHb .,shall st11'.plen1.ent this:r0sponse .Jn accordance
with the Idaho Rules ,of Civil Pr(1ccdurc.

Defonsc1 .subpnrt (,1) :specifically 1h11t "Plaintiff' canrmt ..Pro'V0:,ti1c e.lern:ents ofun;just eni1e,hment

c)r thntJ>Jnintff1fls nthtJr:Wise-I~ntl:i:ied t:(> rdicf'i

j!:E,_[!:~}J~~.E-:,: ecmcrn1 Mil1s obj.¢cts on the gn>mtds that thi$ 'is i,fr irt1:i:1rope1: eonten.ti6'.ii
''[IJntetTogatorits
:rn:ay trot s:imply track the 1:\llcgati<mt in the opj,tising party's
.
.

int¢i'.t'6giftot'y,

pleading, paragrH1,h by J>trrngraph,. n$klng for i1tl frrots :in suppo1t of the. party's co11te11Jions in

each paragraph ... This is. a. ~erious
form .o f <lisc.ovory ,rihu$c;
'becaus1.rsndi
interrnMato-rics.
CtU1 be
.
..
.
, ..
'

'

' , ,'

,,

used .to frnpose .great burdern;· on thc.op1msfog .:Party! ·nnthd.i1wst alway$ are coLmtcrproductivc/,.
Sc?.e Moofe's 1~\xforill Jliircticc JD,§ 33.74, at 31-~19,

60 (dtfo:g;: Jh re

Security Litigation;. 108 FJtD. 328·, 337 (N.D.. CnU985).

Cor1Vergem ThcJmolpglcs

A "blunderbuss. demand for

production, albe:it disguised in the.form ofintcrrogfltodcs) fa irnpropcr/' Nnnkof'v. ARA S~1rvice~, .
Inc., 465 N.Y.S.2d 515,(1983 ).
Further, discovery in His mattc.r is just beginnirlg, and General ·Mms is not yet .await:· of
all of the· tacts -related to this matter. Accordingly, this interrogatory is pre.1nature and m1duly
burdensome. Without waiving any objections, Li11coln. Land has no .claim fot unjust:enrlchmenL
Among other thfags, it did not con-fer a benefi t d.irectly upo11 Third-Party PlaintHt

That is

required. Moreover, focre is ,no evidence in the record that ThirdwParty Plaintiff appreciated the

alleged b1;,·rJ.efit (,vhich requires, at a minimum; actual klm\vled.ge of the unjust benefit) or was

GI~NKRAL MILLS;. JNC: tS ANI> GENERAL M.lLLS OPER.ATIONS, LLCS RltSPONSES TO
J>t.,AJNTJ.:F.F~S l<'.lJlST REQUtcST.Ji'OH '.l>ISCOVItRV - 1~
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unjustly enriched at Plaintiff's expense since Gc1K~r-a.l Mills had been paying. rent to lense. the

Prnt,otW,· whkh .includes the gtain cl.ev1Hors, Furth¢1\ the agreements between t lm parties nre

Defom~e~.subpnrt (2) sp¢cj Ji.c,iUy thtil " Pltrinfrff so~l~s .an ·intpt'opct dtrnbl<Jree.oyoty.''

RESPONSK: Gc11erfll

.,..""';, .. ,,:.....,.,...rlt!-;,~ ....

1a:a,,,;,w "'*"

•

Mihs :(}bJ(~cts (Hi. the gt'OlttHl$ that this•is 811 itnpi'Oper contention
.

'

'

'

<

•••

'

•'

•

•

."·'

•

·'

•

•

used. tCJ imposc. w~H .burdens 011 :the oppa~ing party, and almgsUilWHYS are c::c:n.mterrm~ductive;ii
SrH! Moore~
s. Fe(leral
i'ractice
jl)~
§ :;J.74,
at. . ~3-,59,. t,O-· (citing
'.
. .
,,
.
.
.
'

ln rr; Convergent
tedmoiogles
.
.
' ,
'

prodnctio11, a1beitdisg:t::1lsed i1, the fonn ofintetf'Ogntories~ is impfoµer/' Nankof,i. ARA Servtc"iJs,
fne.~ 465 N.Y .S.2d .51.S. (1983).
Further~ discovery in this.matter isjust hegirrni1~g, a~d General MiUs is :not yct .rrwaro of

all of

me facts related :to fhis matter.

Accordin[dy, .thts int:enognfory :fa .premature and unduly

burdensome. Without waiving any .objections, Plaintiff chMged Gei1eta1 Mills .rent tbr the use of
the grain c!cvtih:,rs in accordarice With the terms _o f thc. lcas.e.attached

it.'> .Exhibit

E to _
Pla:infrtrs.

First. Request for Discovery to General Mills, Inc. and General Mills Ope.rations, LLC; Pfaintiff

now .seeks lo recover additiomil money from defendant rnlating .to the use of the J~rnin eievaiors
even t11ough Plaintiff has been compensated for the · use in queshon.

To recover rent and

GENERAi.,. MILLS; JNC:'S AND GEN.KRAL MILLS OPERA'UONS, LLCS RftSPONSl~S TO
PLAlNTH~lP$
rm.ST .lUtQll.lj}$T
FOR ))k:COVE:J~Y
,. 14 .
' '
.
.
.
.
"

-'
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dam.ages for the use of the grain elevators w<.iuld he a windfall. Discovery is ongoi.ng. (ienernl

Mi.Us .shall sui,p'lement thi.s.response.in ac-t:ordanc::c1! with the ·Icfaho Rnles.-ofC:ivil Ji1x:lcedurc,
JNTEH.ROGATORY NO. 17:

~ ~ ~ , ,., ~ N l ( i t l l l 1 ~ ~wl,

inten.·og.atm'):l;_ ·tI]nterrogc-i:ttn"kH n"iay .not -simply track the flUcgat:ion.~ fu tho optiosln.g. partts,

pfouding,_
paragrt~Jh
by. parai:_~;ruph. askfng ~
fo;r aii fhcts. in. :support
.in
.
.
.
.0,{ the pa:rti,s ·contentions
.~
.
'

,' .

•'

'

'

'

"

'

' '

'

,,

'

''

'

'

'

'

•'

•'

,,

'

each paraitraph .-.., ·this is a scrfous lhrm ofdiscovcry ribuse; becausc&uch-intcrro:gatodes can be

Secw·il-}' Litigation, 1.08 FJLD .. 328, 3-3? .(NJ).Cal.1985).

A Hhlum:kfbuss demand for

production, afoeitdisgui:sed in tho form o.flnterrogatories.,.fs.improperY Nanko.fv. ARA .Ser:vicc<s,

!nc.,A6S N.Y.S.-2d 515 (19'83).
Further, discovery in this 1lintter is just begin111ng·, ._a.i1d General Mills.is -11(}t yer at,,are of
all of the facts related to this matter. Accordingly, this Jnten·ogatory is_. premature .and unduly
~
· · any o·bJectrnns,
' '
" en:nc·
' 1nncnt 1s
. not an awn'1a,l Ie reme d y
' ·1
l)lllX,ensome.
\,.•11t.1out
waivmg
unJust

whhout proof tha( the contn1cts ass.odatecl with the claim for relief are unenforceable. General
Mills docs no~ believe that the agreemr.mts at issue are unenlbrceable. If true1 .Plaintiff _
cannot
recover in equity.

Gen.era! Mins states that- discovery is ongoing.

General Mills shall.

suppfoment -this1csponse in .accordance wi.th the 1daho Rules of Civil Procedmc.

GENERAL M.1LLS, .lNC. 1S AND GICNIJ:RAL MILLS OPl£.RA'rIONS, U . . C'S RESl)ONSES TO
Pl~AtN'UFF'S
FlRSl'
s·r FOR
DlSCOVIC
RY
.
.
. Rl!:Qui~
. .
.
. .
.
. .• 15. .
'

'

'

'

'
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lf'fL~l.lRPGATORY NO. ;!8:

Please·identify all. facts and ci1·cumstanccs you all,:gl1 support yQur Eleventh A ffirrnnU.ve

I)ef'ensl':) subpart (4) 1. !lpeclficrllly that "Plaintiff--s clainTS arc barred by the applicable statut~~ of
u:,'
, -~ ' If ,' '·1,.i:,· ~-!r
hrn1ta.t1m.rn, _rduho Code
~. _,~2 . I· ·
I

I

L

t

,•

•

JtlfSPO:NS:E:: -tJeueral MHls -obj(}cfa~ on the grounc:ls.. thut this :is an improper contention

• , 7 ;, : ,·

~ ...

/

~- ~ h

~ .,

,

••

'ti

,

•

1Ja.
d1 p1.wagraph
, .. Th1~ is. n. scdm.1s
of' disc<)vcry
-abus:c
bc~au.sc-suc:h
intcrrogatod·
.
. .
. . ... -:ihrm
. ..
.
.
. 1
. -··
. ,
. es.c::m h1~
.-

•'

,

'

• ,,

ust',d to irnpose grent 1mrdens -on Uw .Qpposfn_g party~.and almost always

m'G

cmmtcrproduc:tive/\

SdtJ. M{?Ohf$ .Fetfotal PrM:.lit::6 3D; § 3$.:74s it 33~59-~ 60 (citing ln: rr: Conver,wmt Technolo¥ii/:,;

. ; '.' •· ·.- . .. ·., .,,, ,·1 ... "· (" {"6; ..
/nc,,465 N.Y:-S .~c 515 .U o3).
Further, discovery in th.1s mutt.er is just ·beginning~ and Oem-irril TVHI!s is 1101.,yet a."\"rti'rc 6f

al l of the.fact: related to this matter, A.ccordingly, this interrogatory is premitt:ure ·and. umlnly
burden. ome. Without wa:iying any ob_iet..,tion:;, unjust enrichment contains a foirr~yoat ·statute of
1.i.mitutj"on._ Acorm:Hngfr, to the extent Phtntiff seeks recovel"Y beyond the four"·year perit)d
immediately prior to

this suit, that recovery is barted.

Di·s covet:( is ongoing;. General Mills shall

supplement this rcsJ)oiltt: in ,tccordance with the Idaho Rules of.Civil Procedure·.
iNT.11":RROGATOR:V NO. 19:
Please identiJy all facts and cfrcums.tanccs you allege suppmt your Eleventh Affinnative

Defense} subpart: (5),_specifically that "Plaintiff rafrfied the agreement behveen Third~I\uty

Plaintiff and General Mills.''

GENERAL MH,LS, INC'S AND CENKRAJ., MILLS OP1IRATlONS, LLC'S · RlrnPONSES TO
PLAINTWI•''S
l~.EQUli:s ·r l?QR lHS(;OVRRY ~ 16
. . F.RS'J'
'
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Rl~SPONSE: General. Mills objects on the gnit111ds that this is: ml in1prQper contention

interrogatory. "(J]n.tei·rngatories .1nay mit simply trntk the allegations in the oppt)sing party's.
plead.ing, paragr~ph by .para.graph, .a(S_kJng for aH fi1cts il'l suppol't of the party's_.contentinm· in.

used to impos.e -~rcttt burdens.-on the opposfo_g pnrfrr :imd almost t,1wo.y~ im~ ;cou.nterp1·odm:; tivei\>'

:n:-S9i .$<J Citi:i'fg .Jti .re

Ser;: Motfre'§ Fod~·al Pracfi<:e. 31)j. § 33'.14, at

or/l.ib.)·gini
:'f 'c:i.:hru>l6ttl<:!s
.
.

ln ;·,.465 N,Yl L2<i·-515 (l9$'3.).

·FiJi'l'her,. d'iscovi:ry in tl i ·. i11att.ef hi jns:t.'.beg·in.uin~; .an.a. tk..:.nernl M'ills·is .not yet aware of
all

t)f

the :facts· rch1ted to thls· matter. Acct>rdi.ngly, thi.s. interrogatory is prettu1tpre :~md t1m:I-u.Iy.

burden.some., Wi.thout waiving ~ny objc ~tiqns, Oon.er:a1Mills· h~1i\-'ve·$ thRt .discovery may sl,iow
tha(P:lain iff wu~ folly awar~ :?f the pr~perry: use.i!l. questim1 :and ~c:qu}escecr t~ sn:cJ~use, t~1~reby
ra:tffying. the· ·s ame, Discovery is ongoing. Gener.aJ M'ilL s1rn:H suri)1ement this teSJ:>onse in.

ac<.mrdance with the .Idaho Rules of Civil Pt'.Ocedure,

:IN1ERROGATORY NO. .20:
Please i,dentify a.ll focts and circumstances ym1 uHegc support-your El'eventh Affirrnative.

Defense, subpart _(6)~ _specifically that--'''I">laintiff had acfoal/con tmctive notke and/or knowledge

of the ex.istcnce .of .the applic..1ble. agreements between Ge11era'l Mills and Third-Pfrrty Plaintif(
and, therefore, assumed tl,e_ risk of their existence and any claimed los · (Whether eqi.:1itablc or
l.egal) ratified the same, waived the ability to file suit on the bas:is usserted, and/or is cstopped

from doing.so.'.'

GENERAL MILLS; INC.'S AND GENERAL MILLS · OPERATIONS, LLC'S RESPONSES TO
PL;.HNTU•'Ji''S
RlCQUlt~·r·
FQR NSCOVl~llY
- t.7
.. li'UlSt
'
.
.
'
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tU~SFO;N~l~.~
that this is. an itnproper
contention
. .. . .
. . , .. General Milts object~ on the grounds
,
.
.
'

"

,'

interrogat11ry,.
''[J]nterrogatortei.;.
may not. simply. track the aHegat1.ons in the opposi11g
party·~
,.
.
,
plending, paragraph by paragritphi .asking for -slt facts in Stlf)J?Oft of the p~rty's. e<.,)1'.l.t¢1}t.iut)S hl

-used to i1n1,o.~e _. grortt b_m·dens on ~he: 01,J~(Htitrg:pnrty, rt.lief ftl111ost i1hvf1ys m:e: coun'terprod:uct.iveJi
S<;<t

Moqro's Fedctal PracH~e-ib~.§ 3·3,74i. at 3'3~59;
6(}. (citing)~ .re-· Convergent
iccimolog/cs
.
.
.
.

Furlher,,- d1scov-ery
in. this
rm1tier fa ji)st· begi_nning; and -General
.
,
.
'

alt of the facts re'fatod

t()

Mms is not yet .n:ware
cl
.
'

this -1.na,ti:er. .A¢cotdltigl.y~ th.is intettogatory is prematur e·.and unduly

burde11sqn,e. Without waiVing·.1.\11Y oh'jeetim1s, Gei1eral Mills believes. that .discovery will s.how
that Plaintiffkne,". or-s hould have k.J1ow11-o fthc-·use -to which Plaintiff.now _objects·:sincej amc>.ng
other thi11gs. it pre-existed Pl.aintlfr"-s purchase_of the Property and

conspicuous. Ihirnt l:s

'M IS

the case, Plaintiff's su.it is han·cd because Plaintiff's acquiescence to such use. operai-es as a

waiver, a.~sumptinn. of 1isk, estoj>S Plaintiff frotn. -claiming a

loss,.

-mld, at a min1mmn 1

<leml1nstrates fha1 equity ·does· not require Third-Party Plaintiff .to. disgorge any claimed benefit
LP Broadband may have obtained. Discove1y is ongofr1g. General Mills shall supplement this

response in ac.cordance.wit11 the Idaho Rules o'f Civil Procedure
.. . .
INTER~OGATORYNO, Zl;

Please· iden'tifY ea'.ch ins'tance in which. y(m· .claim-that Plaintiff ratified any agrccmenl
between

Third~Patty

Plaintiff

and

General

Mill.s.

RESPONSE: . Gcncrnl Mills ·objects on the grounds., that this is an improper
.
. contention

GENERAL· MILLS, INC:1S AND Gl~NERAL. Ml.LLS OPRRATJ.ONS, LLC'S ,RESPONSES ·TO
P'~A~TWl.t'S f}HST l:U~Q'tll~S'l' r--on.])JSCOYE.RY l.8
w
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interrogatory. "'[l]ntc:ti-og_at01ies may not si_roply track the allegations in the opposing part.is

,.,leading; pa1<ggraph by paragraph;· Mki11g fol: -all facts in support of the party's tontellticms in

ust-<l. to iriJp(?se grcHt.

hi:u·dens .(.ln ~he .o:p:posil1g patty~ and {:lJ111.ost -~Jways ~·t'e .c.<>unt~rpn)(h1~tiv~.1·

Sea :Moorc;s Fedet·at 'Pt'HC-tfoe 3'Dt § :n.74) .~t 3'3~59, ~b (cittng/n t't'. (io.i·JVt;/t·gtmt. Tu:lmo!ogics
Set;:!{Pi'ty'.. ,r.;fi{gaifon;. {()8 PJ'(J); ·ns·,.. ·3:f7· {},t.D,Cal.1'9.SS),·
.

A- ''bfonderb\tS$ demand for

Inc., 46~ N.Y ..~.-24 5:15 (1983).

'further, df~.c~ve1:y iff~1n~ ~natt~r i_s ju~t_beginnJng,.. imtl O,enerat MIUs-is not yet a_\~rai:e of
all of the facts relfttcd .i:o .this mafrer.. A<::cordingfy'. this fntenogatory _fs _premature .aud· unclu)y·
burde11~ome. Q'cncrnl MiUr,; -also obj(;}'C:t$· 'tO this inter:i-ogaicfry' as

vtig1.1e . and '.it call$ fot

a legal

conclusion. .Oisoovery -is ongoing. General Mill~. shall supplem_ent this rE-~pons:e in a-ccotdnnce
with the. Idaho Rp:les of-Civil J>roccdurc.

fNTltRROGATOJ:lY N0..22:
Please identify each instance m whith you assert Lincoln Land received actual or

const111ctive notice of.ai'ly-tipj)licable agreement between General Mill::; and TI1frd-Party -Pfahttiff.

,RESPONSE~ Genernl Mills objects on the grounds that this i,s an jmproper contentiQ11
interrogatory. "([]nt.errogatorles may not simply track the altegnt:ions in. thc-opposi:11g party's

pleading, paragraph by. paragraphi asking for

an facts in support of the party's contentions in

eacb paragraph ... . This -is.a serious form ofdiSC()vety abu~e~ bccatisc .s uch intcrrogMories.can be
used to impose great _burdens on the opposing party, and almost always are counterproductive."

See Moore's-Federal J>ractice 3D, § 33.74, at 33-59, 60 (citing In re Cd11verge1Zt Technologies
Security Litigation., 108" F.R:..D. 328, 3.37 (N.O.Cal.:I 985).

A ·'blunderbuss demand· for

GENERAL M.ILLS, INC'S ANO GRNltRAL MlLLS ()PERATIO~S 1 LLC'S RESPONSES TO
Pl,AfNl'Wl<''S.FIRS'.l'
l"OH. JJJSC()Vl~J
rf ~ i9
.
. . l~l!QUES'f
.
.
'.
~

'

'
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production, a1bei_tdisguised in the form of interrogat(nfos, is irnpr<)pcr.;' Nanko/1-1, ARA Services.

bu:.; 465 N,Y..S"..2d 5J-5 f f983).

all of tlw . foqt s J'el.atcd t<:> this rnatter. Accm'tl.irtgly. this ihter.rngf1tory is prer\mture flhd unduly

hurdOl'\S(m.1e..

(i¢11end

ivi.U-:1s llis-o _objMl:s to this ilt inteffogatory as vngue. W'ithm~t waiving- a1ly

obJcctions;· (Jcmmd MHls.-states 1:hni the ·existence ol the nntcnna <m top o't' the .gr-ain -silos on the

ptop¢t(y·w1is 6pe1t -fihd 6bv.iNis-to- a.U, iheh.idil'lfJ J'.ifofhhffat the.-timc f.1iid aTtei' :r..J.aintift ptfrchas6d
the:Property. X)isco"very" is. ong()ing. Geitcral Mill~ sh.~U supple.rncnt this response i11 accordan.ce

with the Id.aho Rules. of-Givii l1mccclure,
.
'

.

~

'

'

,.

Subm.it.tcd h<;lrewitb nre Phdnt.i.ff's First Request for Admission. As. to ~ach Request not
unc:onditionu!Jy admitted~please set fol'th in det.tiil ench fact trpo11 which you 1.·ely:in.(kmyi11g such

Request for.Admi ssim.1.
RESPONSE: _General Mills_ ob_tect_s

to

thi_s intent)gatory us ovcdy broad, unduly

burdensome, and as ex.ceeding the permissible number of foten:ogatorics al.lowed under the

Idaho Rules of Civil ,Proccdur-e. W"ithmit waiving:any objectiohs, pleast>sce responses below; all.
of which shall count against Plaintiff's permissible lnterrngatories. Discovery is ongoin:g.
General Mills sl1all supplement this response in accordancG with H1e Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure;

Rl~SPONSES TO.PLAlNTIFl1''S RltQUESTS l•'OR PRODUCTION
U~OUESTNO. 1:
Please produce a copy of each and every document which You intend to subm-it .as an.

exhibit at tri al or any hearing to be held -in this ~ction.

GENlmAL MILLS, JNC.'S -AND Gf<:NERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC'S JU~SP~NS~S TO

r~AIN>rrrri~·s .Frns1· 1U~QUEST FPJt msc oY~RY ~ 20
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J15!'9NS[C:
on the g:munds that General
.........
.. (kneral Mills_ obJe.cts to this interrogatory
.

,.., .......

.R.

"

'' "

Mills ha.snot yet determined what exhibits it wm use in t1lis nHttter- and tho tHnr.-) t:o disclosc,such

cx.hibit fn1y dt1'ctin.1L-nt proth.1-ccd by ttt\y of fh e. i;mttitis during.. tHs.ct)very. Oenefa1 MH1!3 shall
st:lflp1ctnent .this fOSj)()!)S,C "1tl-MCnl'danccwfth, tho, ldtih:e;_lbJ]C~ '.<}f Cfv"il p '0~CdUl'C.

Rl~~SPON$1~~: General Mills. nhjt;cts

to

this :interrogatory us. overly br9adl nnc,tu1y

rcquost lfrcrally 1rnk!{ for a copy of any siatcments mJ1,fc by any. potential witness-:whether ihey

tho statements are at iil) tek.'Vnht to thi s lawsuit That Js-not pfoper. Frnthm\ discovery :in this.
mutter is just begi nning. Without. waiving any ol~·jections} Gen.em! ;Mills his

M

responsive.

doc_u1:ncnts in .Hs possession.at this time,

&RQUR'ST N0.3:

Please p1\)duce a .copy of-any writter1. agreeme11t whlch YOU purport gave the Dc:lendant.
the right to install any antenntt equipment on Plaintiff~/ p-ro11e1ty.

RESllfONSE: .General Mins objects.<>n the gr.onnds that it is vagite _and cans fot a legal

conclusion,

With n.1t waiv1ng_any objections. General Mills refers plaintiff to -the Rooft:op

Rental Agreement attad1cd as Exhibit B to Plaintiff' s First Request for Discovery to General
Mills, tnc. and General Mills Operations, LLC. .Discovery is ongoing.

Gcnctal Mills. shall

supplern.ent this _response in .accordance with the rdaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

C,ENRRAL MILLS, JNC,'S AND GRNKRA.L JVULl,S OPERATIONS, Ll,C 1 S R£SPO"NSJi:S TO
PL(\lN'rlFJP$ 1<:nts~i lUi~QUJ~S'. l' Ji()R .lllSC OVl~UY.·

;n
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REQUEST
NO.
.
. .
. ...4:
,.

Please produce a copy of any written u.i,,,rreeme.nt whi.ch YOU puqJoJt gave tbe. Defendant
the·t·ight. to utili ?,e 0.n y·nntcntiff equ_
ipment.-0n Phiirttiff's p,rcipelty.

ltnci·t·ogatories ~nd/or Requests.for Adn1issiot1s.
R.ESPQ:NSE~ W,lthout waiving. any ·objections,. GeJ_1en1l Mills l.'efers plaintlff ~C?· the

Exhibits attached to .Plaintiff's
for Dfacovery
10 General
Mills,
.
. tfrst Rcq\lest
. . .
. .
.. ,
,'

.'

ri,c-.·tin<l Ge1wraf
'

Mills .6pcration~, Lu;: Discovery i's ongoing.. General Mills· shall suppkmc11fthis. response in:

accoi-drmce.w.ith flie Jdaht) Rtiles·of GiYil-·P1'0-c~tliite+REQUEST NO. 6:,
.Please produce u copy of any dl)cumcnt which you US$ert suppot.'ls rrny of YOTJR
Affirmative Defenses.

RESPONSE~-'\1/ifuo.ut waiving any o~iectioi1s; General. :M.ms 1·efo1-s _pfaiiltiff to th~
Exhib.it-s attached to Pl'aintiff•_s First Requt)st. for Dh;covery to General Mrns, Inc. and General
Mills Operations, LLC. Discovery is· ongoing. General Mills shall supplem.e nt this response in

accorcfance..wlth lhe 1daho Rules .of Civil .J>rocedure.

REQUESTS H)R ADMJSSlONS
.
.
REQUEST FORADMlSSION NO. 1:
P lease a.dmit that Plaintiff was not the agent of General Mills for any purpose related to

the Property.

RESPONS~: Admitted._

GENERAL Ml.LLS, INC.'S AND GJ~NlmAL MU,LS (WERAT.lONS, LLC'S RESl'ONSES TO

.PL"1Nil.FF'~ l'lRS'l' ll_P;_QVJ~Sl'-~•'()R DJSCOV£.~W - .n
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PleiaSe adrnit tlfot antennae equipment instal.lcd on the Property by MicroServ wns 11ot
visihle from gr und levd to tho u.m.dded human.eye.

what .grot.md level
and i~ mfr:Jendfog.
The . t<!quest. is. an.. utte.mpt to· ·dett1qnsti·ato
that
. n1enns
..
.
.
,
'

' '

''

'

huve l1et.11 visible .b y other
111c1ms.' Wlthout·
tl ~·s. pbj¢ction,
the.request
'
. . waiving
,
.
.
.
.
. . IS denfod., This'
.
'

'

sf't1foment.is .nol:1n rn. i o th.0.be:a1i .of Gcncral Mm.·1 knowleclge, -the equfprncnt. can he -~en;from
the . gtound.

REQUEST :U'O_B ADMISSION NO. 3~
P!ease admit that Lincoln Land' owners did

11(>t

inspe_c1'. :tlie .silo l'Ot'>ttops di1'iug the

ternrncy of General Mills until 2014.

RltS'JlO:NSlt: Genetal Mil.ls objects fo this request as vague in. that .it is 110t cleat- what

plaintiff means by the term "inspeet." F:mthcr; there is no way General MiHs can con me.nt as ·to
Plaintiff'.s h1speGtion .efforts.

That is something pure1y within th~ knowledge of Plaintiff,.

nlthough General Miils believes that as part ofdu-e.diligence) any potendal purchaser would k1ve

inspected the .Property.in full :pri-or to .purchase, .Subject to this objection, deni'ed: .
}IB:Q.UEST IrOR ADMlSSlON NO. 4:

Please admit that the·.Roof-Top .Rental Agreement, attached as Exhib1t."B" extend·ed until
no later Hum March 20,. .2005.

G .NERAL MJLLS. INC. 1S Ai~D GENERAL M.lLLS OPERATIONS, U,C'S RESPONSES TO
P:l.,MN'.J'tll':
l•''S l.l'I.R.S't
.nEQf)l;'.!:S'l: ftOR DISCovmn'·"
Z3
'
.· '
·. ,.
.
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it is vague a.nd

unclear. Without waiving any objections;· the reqilcst is denied.

'fl1ease admit ,thnt the.- Antennn. Spnc;e, Le1:1se..Agreem.ent _attached us Exhibit. ''C'~ WH.S,l~CVCr
subscribed hy Yb(i.

R€SPON'SI~:· Aditiitrnd ,
REQUEST FOR AOl\USSIQN :NO, ·6~·.

was. never
suhsct{bed
. .
..
. 1)y YOU.
lt'ESPbNSm. Adn1itlfd.fil~:Q'lrn:ST FOR ADMlSSlON -NO'. 7:·

Pl~)ase· admlt-.that thc.Rq<yllop Rental _.A,:grcem.c11t, ·attached -~1·s· Exhihit ''H'1 l)er~to·contidtl_s
m) legal desc11p_tion..·(hr,the:Pla:intiff·s ,Propt!t'ty.

RESi,ONSE: . Oeneral ·Mms.admits that there is no legal descliptlon ft.tl.achcd to Exhihit
B.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8:

Please admit that the Antennae Sp~ccLease.A.greement, attached as Exhibit "C" co:ntains

RRSPONS:lt: General Mills. admits that there is no legal description attached·to Exhibit
C.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9:

Please admit that the To~cr Agreement attnched as Ex)1ibit ":O" col'itnins

110

~cgal

description for Plaintifl"s Property.

GJ<~NlrnAL. MILLS, INC'S AND GENl(RAL, MlLl,S OPJ.mATIONS, LLC'S - 1u:sPONSES· TO
l1~,i\JNT.Ui"f'~ :l<'ll~STJ~tQ_U:t sr l<()J?. PISCQV.J:mY ~ :Z4
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RESPONSE: General MiJJs admits thal there is no legal description atta1..:he<l

t_t.1

6xh1hit

D.

20 l () 1easc· bet.wee:n
tm:id ~u1d Genernl
ff's . Pro1,erty.
..
.Linc<iln
.
. . Mill}i·"
. b perntions,
.
.. . foe:
. . for the·
. Pit1foti:
.
,
.
'

''

'

'

'

'

"

REQUEST '.f ()U .AJ>l\;'.USSION NO, n:·
.J

•

;

, ;; •

Pl'l;!llSe ,u.l,mit tlmf .you di,d n.Qt fofo1'.1~ :L.it'l~ln· tn11d that .yt:rn hlild permitted an i1_1tc-r'csl-' ii1
the. hmse a~tac11ed _
-as

:g~ilihit ~'E'1 -to

~d

sup1~l). assi_gn~d .qr _transferred in. any _mnr,nc1: .to,

Micro'Scrv1 Jnc.-·ol' LP- B'roudband; inc.
RESPONSIC: Gen@t:a.1, Milfa objects. i6' this reqWest ns. vague fo . that it is

1101:- cloa1·.wha:t

mannert· -Subject to .this objection, Geiteral Mills·denies tlJ'.istequest.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12:

Please admit that Lincoln Land did not give YOU permission to sublet, assign, or

trru.1sfer, in a1Jy maimer, any interest in the .lease attached as Exhibit •;E" to .MicrnServ; ·Iiic. or LP
B1:ondbat1d, foe.

JU;Sl>ONSit; General Mi.lls obiects
..
. to this request as vague in that it js not clear what
plaintiff means by the phrases, "interest in the lease'! and ,·,sublet; .assigned., or tram:ferred in any
manner." Subject to this objection, General Mms·denfos this -request.

REQUEST I«OR Al>M1SS10N NO. 13:

? lease admit that Lincoln Land did not give petmiss.tOll t(> MicroScrv, li'ic.

bf

LP

Broadband, Tnc, to locate or utilize.any antennae equ~pment·o:o.the Pl.aintjff s Propert_y.

GENERAL MILLS; INC.'S AND G.ENERAL MlLl;S_ OPERA1'_IONS, LLC:'S R.ti:SPONS'ES TO
1
t>LAIN'l'l'Fli'SYIRS'l'
lU'.QtJl~S'f.
)tY. '" :~~
..
.
.
.. .
. l 0R. Dl'SCOVli~
''
'

'
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RESPONSE; General Mills objects to this request since it is not possible within the

scope of Plaintiff .s knowledge. Subject to this objeGtfon~ General Mills denies this request.
'1~
DATED this ...J.,_ day ofM:iu·ch 1 2016.
w,,

GKNERAL i\'llLLS, INC/S AND GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC~s RES PONSKS TO
PLAINTJl!'PS FlRST :REQUE~ST FOR nISCQVl~RY ~ J6
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CRRTUtlCATE 01;· SI~R.V.(C.E

-7i,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -·~1-smr, clay of March. 2016, 1 caused a true ancl correct
copy of the foregoing GE.Nf~RAL MlLLS, INC.'S AND GENERAL M ILLS OPERATIONS,
LLC'S RE:SPONSES TO PLAlNTlFF'S Ji'IRST REQUEST :FOR 0JSCOVERY to be
served by the :m ethod indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Mark R. Fuller

Danfol R. Beck
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICE, .PLLC
410 Memori,111 l)rive, Sui te2.0 I

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Pn}paid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~acsimi.lc (208.524. 7 l 67)

P.O. Box 50935
ld aho Fulls, ID 8'3405-0935

Rc'>'n.nld L. Swaffi,rd
Trevor L. Castleton
Lnn:cn K. Covert
SWAFFORD LAW1 P.C.
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 8340'1

( ) U.S. Mn.ii, Postage Pt•cpnfd
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Ovci-night MaH

6Jf

·

ncsimik (208.524.413 l )

CENElt AL MlLLS, JNC.'S ANl) GltNltRAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC'S RJ!:SPO.NS1LS
l'l-AlN1'WF'S PmsT J:H:QUE$T FO.t IH$Q()Vtm'\' - l7

ro
361

Mar B7 ZB16 1o:3B:45 ZBB-3BB-130r

->

2085244131 Gi

LLP

·s Purse ly

Page BZ9

Alex.aDder P. Mc.Laughl in, I.SB No. 7977
Jeffrey W. Hower; ISB No, 8938·
GlVENS PURSLEY · LLP
P.0. .Box 2·120
60'1 Wes031l1:tn:ock.Street

Boi'sc, Icfoho 8370'2
Teloph.01:w (208.) 388.. I.·200
I•\icshttile (108) 3lf8. JJOO

alexrnc.laughlin@gl.vcnspurs1oy.cou)
j efihow~r@'givenspul'stey.corn. •'
Attorney for Third~Party Defend.ant

rNTHE DISTRICT OURT OF THE. SEVENT!-:I JUDICIAL DlSTR.lCT

-OF' Ti-u;·
itrATE 01:: IDAHO IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE C01.]NTY
.
.

UNCOLNLAN_D COMPANY~ LLC

)

)
)
)
)

Ph1fr1tiff~V,

)
) ~asc No. CV .,zOJ.5-3927
)

I P F)ROADHANDr JNC.

) N0TICE -0 lt .SRRVJCE 01•

) GENEll.AL-MILLS,.JN't:~. 'SAND
) G.ENERAL MILLS 0PERATlONS.,
) L.LC'S·RESPONSES TO .
..
) J>:.LAIN1'U•.F'S FIRST REQUtSt' FOR

LP BROADBAND, INC.,

) DiSCOV.E RY
)
)

Defondant!Third-Party Plaintiff:
V.

)

)

GENERAL MJLLSi lNC. and GENERA_[.

)

M'JLLS O.PERA'TTONS1 LLC

)

'l'i1frd ..Pm_ty-befondants ..

)

NOTI -, ., -IS HER!;J3Y GIVEN tha:H~1,Mm~h 7, 2{)1fjd. cl):u,:;ed t ~e.sc\~cd.-true..itnd
c )rtect cop{e, o·ftheGl~NJ~UA~ ·MlL'l.;S, L.~C.'S- AND GEN'ER.AL- -MU1liS OPERATIONS,
'

'

I

'

'

'

t

'

,,1'

;

••

I

'
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LLC'S .RESPONSES TO PLAINTI.FlitS FIRST REQUEST FOR lllSCOVERY, along with
a copy of this NOTICI~ OF SERVICE, upon tht} individuals und hy tlw method indicated
below:

Mark R. Fuller
Dan:iel R. Beck
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICE, PLLC
4 10 Memorial Drive, Suite 201

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overn.ight Mail

(4Facsimilc (208.524.7167)

P,{), Be>:-<: 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405~0935

Ronald L. Swafford
Trevor L. CHgt]ct:on

Larren K. Covert
$WAFFORD LAW} P.C.
655 S. Woodruff
Idnho Falls1 rD 83401

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand l)(;)Jivered
( ) Overnight Mail

0 .FacsirnHe (208,524.413 1)

N0 TlO'. OF SERVICE - 2

363

(
r,,.~ • . ·- .E COUNTY

".'QII.H ]f,\i\j \
~

\O f:.JIO

Alexander P. McLaughlin, lSB No. 7977
Jeffrey W. .Bower,. JSB- No, 8938
GIVENS Pl)RSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock S treet
P.O . Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2720
Office; (208) 388- 1200
Fax: (208) 388-1 300

2lll6 MAR 30 PM 3: 41

(ilexmclaughlin@t,ri.venspursley. com
jeftbower@givenspurs1 ey .corn
l!09623~ __i iDJ4 1-2l

A ttorn<::ys for Third-Party Defond~mts

IN THE t)ISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DlSTR1CT
QF THE STATE OF fDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Gase, No. CV-20'15-3927

UECLARA fION OF ALEXANDER P.
MCLAUGHLIN
vs.

1. p· BRO. A·D1.k.3A·ND
·· .. ·, . ; .INC·
.. . ·•
J ..

. .:

i~

Defendant.
LP BROADBAND1 INC.,
Defcndanttrhird-Party Plaintiff,

vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL

MILLS OPERATIONS, LL(~

Third-Party Defendants.

ALEXANDER P. .MCLAUGHLIN, under penalty of perjury. hereby declares
and states as. follows:

nECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P. MCLA UGHLIN -1

364

1.

J am above the age of 18 and am the attorney of record for the Third-Party

Defendants in the above,eaptioned matter.

2.

Accordingly, l have personal knowledge of the facts herein ancl make this

Declun1tion on ll1 e lnisis of such personal knowledge and belief.
3.

Attached as Exhibit A arid incorporated herein by reference is a true and correct

copy of the Roof Top Rental Agreement between General Mills and MicroScrv Compnter

Technologies, Inc., that has been produced by the parties in discovery and is attached to
Plaintiff's Complaint.

4.

Attached as Exhibit B and incorporated herein by reference is a ln10 and correct

copy of tho 20l0 lease between General Mills Operations, lnc., and LinGo h1 Land Company;
LLC, that has been produced by the parties in di scovery.
1 declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Jdaho that the

fr)rcgoing fa true and correct.
DATED this 30 th day of March, 2016.

DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER J>. MCLAUGHLIN ~ 2
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CERTlFICATE OF SERVICE
I HER BY CERTIFY thal on !hi~ 30th day of March, 2016 r caused a true and currccl
copy
tl, e foregoing DECLAR Tl ON O ALEXAND .R P. MCLAUCITLJN to bt: served
by the i.r1ethod indicated below, and uddressed to the fol lowing:

or

Murk R. Fu ll er
Oaniel R. Ucck
FULLl::m. & BECK LAW OFFlCJJ, PLLC
4 10 Memorial Drive, Suite 20 1
P.0. Box 50935
ldahc Falls, ID 83405-0935

( ) U.S. Mai l, Postage Prcpald
( ) lland Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
fx?Facsimilc (208.524.7167)

Rona ld L. Swafford
Trevor L. Castleton

( ) U.S. Mail, Postagi.; Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

Larrcn K. Covert

( ) Qverni.ght Mail
't)(Facsimile (208.524.413 1)

WAFFORD LAW, P.C.

655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, 1D 8340 1

'DECLARATION OF ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN~ 3
366

EXHIBIT A

367

"'
)

'Roof•top Rental Agreement
3/20/2000

Microserv Computer T~chnologics, fuc. located at 1808 E. l 7~h Street, 1¢.lho 'Ji f.llls, lD,
83404 hereby agrees to p ay $50 per month to General l-yiills loea1e(J m _ _ _ __ in
exchange forroof-top spac~ on the "JZvun's Grain.cry' grain storage birn; 1ocate<l at_·_
Lincoln Road In Tdnho 'f' ulls, ldaho. Gerner.ii Mills al&a aerccs to pay the electricity bill

/or Micrl.)serv's <;Qu.'ipmcmt (-..$5 pci· month) locu~cl al lllittle location. MicrosCTV will
contract for any power requirements ncccss:uy to install their c:quipmc:nt a:, pe-r cityt state
and county elcctsfoal and safety codes.

Microscrv will not hold General Mills or nny of 1ts employees liable fot any cl.images,
liabilities or problems r elAted to this installntion or operation of any ofMicroscrv's
~uipment. All oftho equipment and personnel asso<;foted with this project will be
covered by Microscrv's insurances.
This contract shall bQ valid for no les:. th,m 3 ye01·s1 nnd up to 5 years with annual
rcmowah; ::i.11cr the first 3 years. Jr either party wishos 10 cancel this contrt'.ct, thoy )11u:;1

1>rovido written notice or such cancellation al lc::ist 3 months prior to date: of co.nc~l!u,ion.

368

EXHIBITB

369

LEASE
TUIS LEASE. tm1dc thh; _, ____ dny of' Ju1H..1. 2010, by uncl bclwecn UN COLN
LAND C01vIPt\NY L.LC. ("Lamllord"), mul GENEl-U\L MILLS OPFR1\ 'J'!ONS, lNC. ,
A Dc·lnwiuc corporation (" Tenant"),

In considcrnt ion of the covenants. co11ditlons rmd ngl'ccmcnts ht~rcin cirntain ed,
the pnrties hereby agree as fo ll ows:
l . PlH)Pl.:RT),. Landh)rd in cunsidcrntlon ol'lhc n. 111 ::; and cov~ ttnnl ·
l1t:rl:ina flcr momioncd, lo be pnld nnd performed by Tcnnnt, her!)~' dcniises.
knses nnd kl~ un!o said Tena nt, nnd Tenon! IK~rcby Iii res and takes from
Landlord the pi"opcrty as legally de-scribed 1.ill F:.;hiblt A nttHdicd hereto m,d
made f1 pal'! he.rent: !m:akd in the Cilv of Un cd l11, County ot'l3onnrvillc ,
Sti1tc of lcbho ("Proµ~rty' ' ).
1

2, Tf~RM. The term of th i:; Lease shall be torn period of approximatdy Jive
(S) ycnr-. commcnci11 g on lvlay I, '.Wl () ,1nd kmJinatinf~ on 1\ pri l l , 20 IS.
3. RENT. T~~ihllll agrees Lo pay tl11; Landlord as rent lc>r the Propt!l"t)' wirlmul
offset or ded w:;ti0n the sum of One Hundred Twc1ily Thous::rnd ,wd no! I00
Dolh1rs (:i> l.20,000), pc1y_t1bk n1rn unlly on tht: Ist or Ju ly of enc;h c,1kndm yc:11·
h0rc i1i co11Hnencing Jul y I , 7-0 IO. ·
cl, }JS'-· The Properly :;hnll. ~;uh.k c\ to 1hc provisions of Pnrngrnph. <i nnd 17
herei n, be ust:d wilhou t res1 ricl ion by Tonnnt dming the tunn <11' Lhh L1::1s~.

5,

.fil.l1!!!:L'.!1\N....:. There is incl udi;;d in the lensl'.Ythe t'ollowillg equipment:
Case Ski.dslcr
}v!m;scx Ft•rgUM>11

/\lli~ Cholincr;;

Modd 184 '" ('
Modcl 1500
i\•lodd 745]04T27

Scriri1 No.JAF01038 11 S .UOO
St~t"inl No. 9C:O(l 1~04

Serial NiL 96M0243,I

$ !.000
$ 4,000

The TcnmH slrnll mninrnln the: cq L1ipmcn l and re111rn the sH111c of I.nnd l. ord at
the ~~nninntion or lhe Lcn<;t; in tood c1)11di1ion and 1'cpnir stt bjc-c t Lo n.;:a!;onahk
!.kprccbtion, lf the cost lo rcpnir said t'quirnll'll( excenl. \Iv: v1 dtic spccifi ud.
l he knnn1 may purch ase the cqu ip1Mnl ai \hl: spcci fic d 'ah ,;;.

370

6. rvtAINTl~NANCI·: AND ~Ulrn.ENQEl3~Tc1rn1H slrnll keep. nt lr:; ex pense.
the Property and every piirt thereof in gen~rol repair anti condition duri ng
the 1ern1- 'I cnant will not use 01· permit nnything upon the l'ropc:rt y thal may
be dangerous lt) life or limb, Tc11tmt shall nut in any rnanncr deface or
it\i urc the Proper ty thnl will create a nu isa11cc. Tcnn111 shall nol use or
perm ii lhc use nf lhe prnpcrt;. or any part thcrco l: for till} illegal pwposc,;
includ ing any violation of cnvironmctllnl rcgulnt ion::.. Ti.'nant shall rd urn
the Property pcnccnbly nnd promptly to J.nndtord at the eml (Jf the tern; or
!his Len~c, or ,·1I any earl ier tcrminnt icm thereof: in good cond ition. loss by
f1rc and ordinary weur and tear acccj)ll.'d.
7. U'J_'lLl TES. Tcuunl shall prom p1 ly pny all rnks, costs mid charves ror
uti lities conswned by Tenan t al the Property.
8. SIGNS. Tenant may erect, place or permit to be erected or placed on the
Property a11y customary business signs including signagl.': on th<J ~;-.;tcl'ior ul
any bui ldings wilhout the prior written (.) Oilscnt of th e L:mdlnrd . Tenant
wil l n.·movc :rny such sign~ ut the tcnni11atio11 of the l.eftsc.
9. CONOITION OJ•' PREM ISES. To th<; best Qfits kno wledge. Land lord
acknowledges herein thnt the l'rnpcny, includi ng nil buildi 11gs localt.'d
thereon, is in good condition and rep,1ir 111t.:ludi11g but not li111iled to
co1nplia11cc with all applitnb!c lnws nnd regulutions including nil
t.:nvironrnc11tal requirements. To the best it::; knowledge, Landlord
:11:lrnowhxlgcs tlrnl the Property nnd till: equipment. pl umbi ng. drains.
fi xtmcs, npplinnccs and nrnchincry ir uny therein, nrc nl the ti me the
Least· tOi\inwnccnwnt in i:.,\00d <,·n11d itio11 illld 1·,,:pait'. 'l\:nant htis lcasctl the
Property since Jill ~· of I9()5 and ngr~~cs thnt the PropN\y is in good C()ndi1 io11
m1d rcp,dr 1111d has don(.' noth ing to the Propert y that would change thi:;
co11ditio11.

or

or

10. ,!ll·~FECT. Landlord -.ha ll 1101 b<.: n.:lcnst.:cl from miy <:lnims urisi11g from u11y
latent lk lc 1:t in the condit ion the~Property. or lhc eq uipment. th llln:s or
uppli,1rn:cs. il' l1ny. in or serving the Properl y, and tin: builder buildings or
which tht'y un; a part. nnd the streets. nllcys. nrens. ar~a-wnys. passages or
sidcwnlks ndj oining or appurtenant thcrc10.

or

11. fHJBLEAS l NG. Tenant wil l not sublet the l'1\'1pc r1~. or nn y pnrt thereof. and
will 1101 a.'>sign this l.ea:-.c or r111y intcrest tlterd n. ni:1r pcnnit thi::; L1:,1:,;e tu be
trn1i sfc rrcd i11 nny manner without tlw prior wri tt"li consent of I.andlord in
enc.:11 nnd L' \'Cl')' ense or underlctting or assignment , l cnnnt shall 1101 he
rclii.:vcd from liability tn 1.nodkird l'or the knns 1111d 1:omli tion of this Lvusc.

12. BANKlHJPTCY . ;\n y nssignnwnt. sak in b:inkrnpl c) or in:;olw11cy (Ii'
Tc-:n,1nt may. at the option or I ,andlord be consiJcn:d :in i1~sig11111cnt wi thin
the 111cn 11i ng rd' this I,cn,;c ,1nd ,is n brc;1ch iJf the t:l1w1w nt:; hcreul'.
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or

l 3, _LIAHll ,11 \ ()I<' LANl>l J)gn. Unless dut· 10 the 11cg ligc ncl~ l.:111dlord.
i1s ngenl!. or employees. I.nndlord shnll not he liable for m1y damngc or luss
tu prnperty. inj ury t)r dl\nth OCl' tu-ring in or 11ho1111hc l'roperly or in ,111y \\ (-1)'
rdalccl to Tcn,rn l's use tlwrcof.' or clue 10 the hnpp ·ni11g nny 1ll'eid1·111. m
any 11<.:t or nt!gkd nl' th(.) Tenant, or any 01 hcr lcnonl or occupunt ol' 1111y

or

building. or or ony other person, persons or corvorations. or oc;c:1~io11ed by
ony mii:mm:c 111ndc or su fthcd thereon. N111wi1hs1nncling. the foregoing.
Landlofd shall he Iinblc for co111pl ioncc \\ ith nny cn\'ironml!lllal rt·gul:-it ion~
rcgardinµ conditions existing al lhtJ Property nt the ti me ol' the Li:nsc
com m1.:n~·cmcnl date.
1.,andlorcl .igrccs to i11ck111J1ify. dclcml. and lwld T<;;1wnt harn1 lcss rt'Om nny
lossc~, costs, clamugcs rmd expenses, lint:$. pcnaltil'S. allor111:ys' l~~s and
costs resulting from nny claim ass1:ncd ugainst Tcnnnt (i) u1-i::1ing out or
Land lord's actions, opcrntions, rn acti,·ities at the lensed prem ises: (i i)
nrising from thu actions or m1y co-tcnnnts, agent, rcprcscnlativc. 1)r invitee
leased pn;mises, inl'illding the presence of' hazardous :mhstanc.:cs nr the
discbnrge or rclensc nf h111::trd(l11s suhstanccs. ll~)t cnu c;cd hy Tennnt; ni1d l 1v}
Landlord':,, brcacl1 or any rt·µre Sl'nlations and wmrnntics.

14. LIADII.ITY OF 'l'C-:N/\NT . l'enanl assumes liability ;111d nb ligntion fur ;il l
tlanwgcs as spci:i ficd in paragrnph 13, nbo,'t\ nnd agr(:'CS to hold LnncllOl'li
h:1r111lcss. nnd t () i11de11111i l'y I.andlcird thc1·cforc. In cn;;c or su,li damages.
L:mdlord may. al its option , re pair :;uch clamnge nnd ' l\~n,mt sh:111 tlk'1·cup~, 11
rcimb11rsc l .nnd lord I'M lht· rcosonahk costs or rcpniring s:, id damage. and ii'
Tcm111t fo ils In perform :iny or the c:ovenanls or :igrc:emenls herei n prnvitled
to be kept or perfo1 med by Tcnanl. I.nndlord nrny pcrfor111 the snnh: tt rHI
thnl'gC Tcnn111 with tlt1.~ n:nsonabk cxprnsl! or such pcrformancc. and ·1 t tHllll
.igrees promptly on dt:m nncl to rcp:iy L«ncl lorcl the rcnsonnblc expense cir
such pcrfornwm~c by I,allcllnrd.
15. ·nu~SJ>AS~ RS. ·1he 1e11;111t slwll use ils bc-s1 dTort~ to prcwnt tr~spass tu
the kasccl property and to the c1djact'11t rm 1pcr ty mrne<I by 1J1c l.c1ndl1)1d.
Stich best (.'m1rts shall inclttdc bttl I\Ot lirn itcd 10 piisting
app ro priate !ii gm,
uml nuti !': iug, local m1thori tics 0J' rn1y trespass.

or

l(i. J.~fill HA_N[f~ Tcnnnt shall !-(:cure nnd mninw in thrnughnu t lhc h'rn1 IH:r..:n l'
genera l li,1bilil y i1rn1n1111,:r or not k ss thnt Two Million ,ind No/ 100 l)olhirs
(52.000,000.00), \\ith bodily inj ury limi t!'l 11~11 less lhnn Two Million nnd
NO/J OO Do llars per pen;nn and T\\'o 1'-·lillion nnd No/100 Dnl l:ll'S p1;r
:1ccidc-nt, n11d property in~urnnc:1: for physical damage 1:m1scd in uny w11y. lo
the buildings and improve,rn.' nls b,sccl by ·1cnanl \\'i th dn111ng(' limits of not
less lh:rn Two Mil lion Twn I Iunclr~d l hnu:-arnl und Noi l 00 Dullars
($2,200.000.00) pt:r w.:cidl.!111. 'l'cnm1I shall hn,·c lite nption t1> co\\;1 ull

or
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r q11ii·o::tl in ' urHncc under its corpornt bl11nkct insurance policies 1rnmint
I.:ind lord on o 'crli 1icat · oi' ln:rnnuir · us 1111 ncld itit'l11nl im; ir 'ti.

18. TAf [
'.FOR PlJBLIC llSE. Tc11a11 l n~rccs 1hut i the Proper! . t> 1· a11 y
pnit 1h rcof. i-hall be tnkcn for, ny strr.: t nr other puhlk 11 ::a:, nr dcslroy ·d b ·
th e a<.:tiun of lhc pu blic nuthnri ti c·. o lhH l Tennnt cannot con ucl it. nornwl
bllsit\CSS tlwrcon, thh I ·u:c :-hall. thcn:upon lcrminalc.

Tl ON UY 1-'UH~ .I I' dmi nt! the term or this I.i::a~(; Iii· l'r lpr.:rly
or th" improvcm nts thcr · 11 . hull be dn111agcd or dei;troycd by tir • or the
clement . or on I other cnusic r ·ml ·ring the l1mpcrly unlit lor oc ·111 ancy, m
I I such an 1a:x.h:11t thal th~y cannot be reasonably repaired \\ 'thin sbay (60 l
dnys from the bappcni111.! of su h inju ry, then Lnndlord may with the wrill~~n
con~ent o i' Tcnunt l(irniinntc 11 h.: u~n.1c rrom the date or stl ·h da11111 gc or
dcstrni:tivn, n11d ·l'c1rn nt ~hn ll i1rnm:diatel y s 111T ·nder the Property 11
Lmtdlo1'Cl. and TcM1111: ; hull pny n.: nt only tr, the time ul"suc h ::;urri:nd<.:r: m1 I
in Cils<: of 1my sttch dcstrllt: tio n Ln11d lord 111ay re-ente r and n.'posscs:- the
propc.:rty . I lowcvcl', if tli~ fli·opc rty i.;u n be r\_jasotwbly restored wi th in ~: i:-;!y
(GO) day:,; from the happcnin p 01' die injury lhti\ :to, nml Landl ord with
lil'tccn ('I 5) dny l'rom th · rn: 'lll'l'Cll • • tir :ud1 injury ch;ts in writin g to
rcs tnrc the Propcrl. wilhi11 sixt} (60) clays from the hnp1 cni1tii ul' i11jm '
thi:ruto. tl u:11 thi s Leai,,c ·hall not ten ninatc 011 HC<.:Olllll ol"sm:h injmy but th e
rent shall nbmc during lhi.; pm ·c ·: or repair~ up L11 1hc lim • the n:pnirs :ire:
con1plckd. except thal lenunl i;hall. drn1 i11g such time, pay II pro r:H:1 portion
of ~:ucb re111 upport ionc I in th ' portion ol' lhc Prop rty , -hich nrc in
comlil~on for occu pnncy. If. howc\'CI'. th e Properly sh(1II be so sligh tly
injured by any ,nu8c afrm~. aid, ll$ not lo b ~ ren ·ler~d \IIHil for occupanl'
thl:11 l:111d lurd sh;il l n.:pnir the sall\c with rca~1H1nb l-e rrolnptrn.:ss mid. in 1h~1t
case, tilt rent slrn ll not ccus~ DI' h r1b,ikd duri11g such rcpaiting pcriod , !\II
improvements or bcl l<:nncnt~ pl11 i:d hy Tcn;rn\ on the Prop rty shall. in u11y
c•vi.:nL be JT !Jaircd and rcp lncctl by Tenant at its ow11 1:xpc11sl: .
20. $ lJI ~T 1,:1 'JOY

n: ··r. Landlot'<I ·ovc,iants and agrc ·s lhal T •11ant , un

paying th1: rc;-nl ,llld pc.::1formi nf !he own-nnts hcrcund01. shall nnd mn}'
pi:ac ·ably nnd qu ietl y haw hL> ld nnd enjoy the Properly tor tho l\:m IM\:or,
Lm1<Honl r(:prcsc11 IRhcrel u that us or lhe Lct,se (:Ommcnccm nt dntc. il htis
legal ow11er~hip of th ' I ro1(·rly ai 1d the .'lC1 tn 1.: is ·til~jct:I lo m• un ·u111bntnl' CJ;
which cn11 ld inti:1'fl'I\~ with Tcm111t'::: intcn<k-d use 01'1ht.• Pnpcrl y.
21. DEFAULT.. tr"I cnant shnll lli,;!lll'c l ur r, ii to kc·ep, ob Ct'\\ . nncl p..:rli 1m a 11y
of it:-; i.:C1\'c11a11ts and ag1ui:nn:n1s cn11tai1ll:d h1::1\·i11 (i in n:spct:t the

or

373

pnymc11t ot'a1i1 ou11t s !'or a period or ten (J0) dnys alt er written 11oti cc thm
snid sums nr~ due: (ii) f'or non-mon )' nrnlt1;rs for ;;i p riod of th irty (30) da ':-i
after wrillcn no tice.· d · scribing said brcnch or lcfnull: or (iii) ii' th\. lcosi..!hnld
interest l\ f' l ennn t . hal I b' tnk 'rl on execu tion n •ther proc ss l r Im\. or it'
Tc nnnt sh, II pcl il i n t ) t • r be dccl nrn(l l M I llf)I. or insn h· •nl a ·i.:ording ln
Jnw. then and in an o r aid cnscs l.rnitll m l mny imm ·diatcly and withnul
further no tic' or dcmnnd. enr~r iill and upon the P :lpcrt • ~md 11\kc ubsoh 1t •
possession or lht;> i:;anh? without. u ·h r -entry wo rkin g a r n·foi lu re or th,
rc111 s to b, paid .incl tl1 e r.;nvc11u1u ~ 10 be pe.rfon1H:d by th ~ 'J'cna nl for th e ft1l l
!cnn o r thi : T.ens<:, ~nd 111ay at Lund l ord' s election le11s • ui- !- t1 bk1 the
Property, or any pa11 th ·re< f, on such tcnm. and cond ilinns nnd r r such
rents nnd fu r such time as Ln1 dlol'<I mny ckc;t, and t1ft1:r ·rl•diting th · rent
actu:=il ly C( llc.clcd by Landl ord from such rclclting on the rentals stipnlattd
to be µnid undl'r this I. case by Tc11.nn1 l'ro m tlmc to time, collect rom Tenant
:my b1.il uni..:t:: n.: m11ining dLh: ih> l!11im' 10 rim e on the rent rei-:Cl' \'i..'tl tl!llkl' !h i:;
Le~1se, C'h<1rgin • l T'nn111 sut:h rcilSl)lHLbl c e~pc nscs ns l ,C1ndl1)rd nrn y
ex pend in pulling the Property in tcn,mtablc conditinn . Or Landlord ma y al
it:, elcd ion u1)nn \\ iittcn notice ll) Tcn,,nl dcdarc thi~ l.i;as · liJrl"i.;il ·d ancl
vo id, i1nt.l may thercllpnn re-en ter nnd tnk • f\111 imd al>:;olu tc p\'issession or
the Property ns the owner tlll:rcof.. and free from any ri ght or claim or
Tcnu nl. Such el ec ti on 011d re- 1llry sh,111co n:titut 011. bso h11c bni tci any
ri ght to enter by 'l'crnmt upon th pn, ·mcnt of all ,1m:-11rng~·s 111' r nl and costs
,dh:r n di spnt:sc. !-iion 11ndcr n11~· sui l or I Tl c-c~s few h1c:icll pt' any of lhc
COVC lWJlt S or ll \i l.c n:l\ and the CO ll)IHCrlC~'llli,;Jl t by Landlurd or fl il \' (H.:tion
to rccov r possession or 1!1c Property a ron;sa id shall l c deemed Ii S\l!Ti icnt
notice of ckcli on orsui d l.nndlord lo !rent I his l.e::isc flS void and l ·rn1in·11cd,
witho ut the written notice above :ipccilicd, unkss Lnndlo1·cl shall in writing,
b % n.: bc.;ginni ng st1d1 prncccdi11g. 11olilY Tctrn nl that nfler nhl;1i ni11u. s11cl1

posse sion Lnndlord \ ·ill continue to lnok lo Tcnnl1l for the peri'nnmmc:c of'
the Lease nnd will submit lh1:: Pn)pCrty on Tennnt's 11cc, \1J1t , in til l' mnnncr
ns ,1bovc provided,
22. TAXES. T ·1w1H slrnll pn_ ns nddilionnl n:nl .-ill rea l t~s ln tc tnxl:s L>ll tlic
pmp rly of' !lie L:mdlord lcus~·d by llw Tenant a:; "'ell as ·1djar ·nt pmpi.:rty
ow1H:d by the Lnnd lord 1'1:11 i:; uni !<:used by the T emmt. I .and lmd .igrt:c<; lo
cotmcrotc with Tc11an1 in any tax r,·d udi on cvalun liun pnx·et· lin gs which
'l'ciimil may initiutc.

i.J . I E-OELl\'l·]~Y 0 1" eHO.PER'J"\. Ten.int. upon the tcrn,i ant!nn L)f this
Lease sh nll nt hs own cxpt·nse rl' m 1w0 :i ll dirL, n1bhb h n11tl rt ru~e ,, hid 1
T1:1rn ut slmll h11 v~ pl.11.:cd ·\! the Prop Tt) durin g lht' term ortl,is ease. nnd
upon T cnnn 1' -; L':<p n!- .. \\h k h T-·1w111sl\11 11 pn) 11pnn rc l:cipl ofn bill for
Silll\ e rron, I f\ i) llunl.

5
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2·L lY.AJ\'l~R Tcmmt ngrl.'cs 1hn1 no assent by Liu1dlord to nny brcnc h ofn11y of
Tcnnnt" s <.: cwcnn111s or ,1gl'cl'mc111s shnll be deemed a w:ti ver nf' any
suc:cccd ing breach or such t ovcnanl.

25. RICIIT OF E~'l'HY . Landlord shnll al all lJlll()S t1po11 prior written n11Liee
to Tenant (except in the t'\'~nt of nn e1ncrgt·nc) ) hav1.: the right lo cnkr upon
ll1c.: Propt)rty to inspect its Clmdition, am! to make re pair~ required hcri::umkr .
Landlord slrnll have the righ t during the Inst thi rty (30) days of the tt:nn
hereof to place and maintai n on the l'ropcny and in the windows thereof the
ctistornnry nt1tic1.· of "To Let'' or "To Rent'\ nnd tn show th1: Propcil y to
pro:;pecti ve lcn:mt~.
26. RAILROAD 'l'l~ACKA<; E. Landlord ngn:cs hcn:in thnt <hiring tht~term of
this Lca!:iC. Tenant shnll be cntilkd nt no nddit ional chnrgf: to shnrc in the use
or the mi lroad trncks which lie 011 the 1.nudlord'x properly ndjoining the
k-nscd Properly. Land lor·d ackllowkdgcs that ii owns the trncknge and h.ns
1hc l1nrc1;trictcd rights of usngc such trncknge \\'hich will remain
uninterrupted during the term or this Lease. Landlord docs not use s\lch
trnckace, therefore, nil necessary, all m:ccss.:11')' repairs nnd 1rn1inkna11<:1.~oi'
the trackage will be at the- Tenant's expense.

or

27. flRST l{JfflJS AL. Provided Tenant is nut in dcfoult IH; rct11Hk1·1 r.andlord
shall within one hundred lwcmy day-; ( 120) before !he expiration of the
L1:ns1.: and bdbr~ the el'i piralion or ninety (90) days bdun.: tht: Cl'i pirntion or
lhc Lcas1: offer to the 'l't'llitllt th<: 1igl1t 10 cith1.'r rc- k asc or to purclwM; th<.:
proptrly ns in the di s1;rclion ol' the Landlord. Whether to sc-11 or lease ix
within the discretion or the I.and lonl. The price the lcnsc or the purcha:ic
shall be commw,katcd lo tile Tcnm11 nnd if lhc p11rtk s thl:ti cm, agree on that
or olher priec ol'tlw lease or the purd1ase then the same shall be rcd11t:L~d 1n
npproprintc contrnct. (f thc p;irli\'!1$ cmn101 :·1gn)\,\ upon the terms or the lcusc
or the purchase then in suc h cwn the I .nn<llord shall be nL libert y lo otfor th1..·
s:11n c to fl bona fide thit·d party on 11knsc or,\ purchasr. provided, howc, ·er.
the Lnndl<>rd shal I not lease or sell the Property during the term of thi s
Lease, a~~umin g no defnult s, trn 111\\n: l'n vornbk lt'l'll\5 and conditiuns Own
was offcrt d to the Tenant. Jl' thc Lnndlonl and tin; Tenant h:l\'L' not agreed
upon the terms oi' n h:ase or l)ltrchnse du1·ing lhc lcrm 1h0 I .case then in
such cv,:nt the rigltt ol' the 'l'cnnnt lo le;ist'. or pmcha~e the Properl y alkr the
cxpi rn\inn or t 11~~ I.ens~~ shnl I be orno l'nrtht r for<:c and cffo<.:l. The Tc11an1
shall hnv¢ thirty (30) days frnrn the ti me any nfft.:r to purdmsc.: or rc•k asc i$
comm unicated IQ it ,Yi thin which to ucccpt the ti;-rms nnd if no! n<:ccptcd the
sr1mc sha ll be deemed 1·cj1~c1ed aud the La11dlnrcl may then nq.!ntiatc with
nny bona fide lh ird party rcl;11ive lo the terms or snk or lcosc bllt llp(1 n 111'1
man: l'avornbll' terms th,111 ofl'cired Tenant.

or

or

28, .LtlGilT TO S!ilik l.:111dlord 11l:1y ~ell the Pro1,l·rly nt an) time during the
term 1>1' this Lca~1.: lP a bo1H1 lick third JXtl'l). I lowc,·cr. l'rna111:;h{lll b~·
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given the righl or flrsl refusal upon thi: ~nrnc terms nrforl!d uny bona Ihle
thi rd party and shall ha\·c thidy (30) days rrom the time any 11ffcr 10
put-chase is comm unicated to it wirhin which to accl!pl the terms ,ind i r not
ucccptcd the :;umc ~hal l bti deemed rejected nnd the Lnndlord may then
neuotiatc with any bona fide third pnrly rdntivi.! to the terms of sale hut upon
110 more fovorabk term s than offered T 011ant.

21). Irnm.:-; AND OJIJ El~. Fnch of the

CC>\'cnant s, provisions, terms and
agrcc111cn1s o!' this Lease shidl inun: to tilt' bcndit of nnd shnll be binding
npon the rcspecrivc hei rs, e;-:ecutms, administrators, :-;uc1;cssnrs nnd assigns
of the rc!>pcctivc parties.

30, ~o·ncl!:s. 1\II not ices required hcn:umh:r sh,111 b1.'. by demand effective nn
validly given il'pcrsonnlly dclivcr1.;d or sent by llnitcd Statc8 ccrt ilkd mnil.
return rccdpt requested, postag~ prepaid and addressed to the parties nl the
address opposite thdr sign~1tur~: on the signature page hereof or such other
11ddrcs): ns not iced in \\'rit i11g by tht.: parties lhrni time to time.
IN WITNESS WHEREO.l", the Landlord and Tenant haw executed 1his Lease
011

tl 1c day nnd year first written.

NOTICE ADDRl ~SS:

Li\NDLORD :

P.O . BOX 1768
l d:i ho 1:nlls, lclaho l:U40'.l ~l '/ (l8

By__ ·····
Its.

L--·-· -~~·

·-·-·- ,~..

~

-·--~,.,.~,..

.:.~<L. .

NOTICJ·: AU DJU:SS:
I' U Box 111 :I

Minn~npolis. MN 55,140
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EXLI.IBI i\
Lega l [)c:; T iplion

The fol lo win g real pr<)pcrty in Bon f\ev il lr~ ounry, ldah ;
Beginnin g nr a po1nr tha r is N.89 ·'52' l 8'''vV . along the Section !lne J 807 .72 feet from the

Soulhcast corn !r of ccu on I 0, Township 2 North, l.~ange 38 East of lh l: !Joi se i'v er[dian;
runrnng thence ·. 89" 52 ' I 8" \,V. aiong said Secti on line 57-U9 foe ; lhence N.00'·'i 9' i.l ' ' W .

81 6.00 feet ; thence S .8 °20 ' 23''E, 857. 50 feet to th e West bank of Sa11d Crc-:d; th ence
S.32°29 '40"W. 280.49 f et; thence S.26° I 2'3 5"W . l 88. 91 feet; thr.;nce S. I 1°28' 37"W .
122,98 fcc.;t: th ence S.02° 53 '5,l''W. 267.63 feet to th e point of begi nning.
0

Subject

Lo

ex. is lin g; Coun ty road Ri ght -of Way and Easements of record .
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No . 2698)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES , PLLC .
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE , SUITE 201
P . o . Box 5 O9 3 5
I DAHO FALLS , ID 83405 - 0935
TELEPHONE : (208) 524-5400
FACSIMILE: ( 2 0 8 ) 5 2 4 - 716 7
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
liability
limited
Idaho
company ,

Case No. CV- 15-3927

Pla i ntiff ,
v.

LP BROADBAND, INC ., a Co l orado
by
successor
corporat i on ,
merger to MicroServ , Inc ., an
Ida ho corporation ,

AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE H. BECK
IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION
FOR ENFORCEMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO LP BROADBAND'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant .
State of Idaho
County of Bonneville

)
) ss.
)

DOYLE H. BECK, being first duly sworn, deposes and states:
1. Affiant is an adult, is competent to testify and does so upon his personal
knowledge.
2. Affiant is the managing member of Lincoln Land Company, LLC, Plaintiff in the
above-entitled action .
3. The June, 2010 Lease Agreement between Lincoln Land Company, LLC and
General Mills, para. 11 , specifically prohibited General Mills from subletting the
property or any part thereof without the prior written consent of Lincoln Land

AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE H. BECK - 1
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Company, LLC. Consent to sublease the grain elevator rooftops was never sought
by General Mills and never provided by Lincoln Land Company, LLC. A copy of the
Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 'A'.
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 'B' is a true and correct copy of the Deed conveying the
subject property to Lincoln Land Company, LLC, recorded as Bonneville County
Instrument No. 1236708.
5. After Lincoln Land removed LP Broadband from the rooftops of the grain silos,
Lincoln Land sought bids for the leasing of the rooftops. A copy of the bid request,
dated March 27, 2014, is attached as Exhibit 'C'. Lincoln Land received three
offers, one from LP Broadband, Inc., in the amount of $437.50 per month , one
from FyberCom, LLC, in the amount of $3,450.00 per month , and one from
SafeLink Internet in th e amount of $650.00 per month . Based upon this open
bidding process, Affiant believes that $3,450.00 per month is a fair market rental
value of the rooftops of the grain silos. The rooftops of the silos are currently
rented to FyberCom, LLC at the rate of $3,450.00 per month. Based upon this bid
process, Affiant's ownership of the subject property, and Affiant's experience in the
Bonneville County real estate market, Affiant believes $50.00 per month to be a
grossly inadequate rental amount for the rooftops of the grain silos.
6. At the time Lincoln Land purchased the property, "Evans Grain" was already
painted on the side of the tallest silo and had been so painted well before 2000.
Attached hereto as Exhibit 'D' is a photograph showing "Evans Grain" on the side
of the tallest silo from approximately 3/4 of a mile away.
7. Further this Affiant sayeth not.
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DATED this

;o

day of March , 2016.

Doyl~

-

~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th is 2Q. day of March, 2016.

~

ft efull ,· ''._,-.~

Notary Public for Idaho
_ / , · ·. ~
Residing at:
,;A-IS · ~
My Commission. Expires: - oi-_
oq,t~Z/ :-;
\,-

Jc4'ho

... ',,.,..,..:
' ' ,. .....
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below on this

ju

day of March ,

20 16:

Document Served :

AFFIDAVIT OF DOYLE H. BECK
IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION
FOR ENFORCEMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO LP BROADBAND'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Attorney Served :
Ron Swafford
La rren Covert
655 S. Wood ruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Fax: 208-524-4131
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jeffrey W. Bower
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
P.O . Box 2720
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208-388-1300

U.S. Mail

_±_ Hand Delivery
Facsimile

_

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
q- Facsimile

Mark R. Fuller
FU LLER & BECK
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THIS LEA.SE, made this ___ day of Jum\ 2010, by and between LINCOLN
LAND COMPANY L.LC. ("Landlord"), and GENERAL MILLS OPERATlONS, INC.,
A Delaware corporation ("Tenant").

WITNESSETH:
In consideration of the covenants, conditions and agreements herein contained,
the parties hereby agree as follows:

1. PROPERTY. Landlord in consideration of the l'ents and covenants
hereinafter mentioned, to be paid and pc1fo1mcd by Tenant, berby demises,
leases and lets unto said Tenant, and Tenant hereby hires and takes from
Landlord the property as legally described on Exhibit A attached hereto an·d
made a part hereof, loc-ated in the City of Lincoln, County of Bonneville,
State of Idaho ("Property").
2. TERM. The term of this Lease shall be for a period of approximately five

(5) years, commencing on May!, 2010 and t<:rminating on April 1, 2015.
3. RENT. Tenant agrees to pay the Landlord as rent for the Property without

offset or deduction the sum of One Hundred Twenty Thousand and no/I 00
Dollars ($120,000), payable annually on the !st of July of each calendar year
herein commencing July I, 2010.
4. USE. The Property shall, subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 6 and l 7
herein, be used without restriction by Tenant during the term of this Lease.
5. EQUIPMENT. There is included in the lease the follo\.\-ing equipment:

Case Skidster

Model l 845C
Massey Ferguson Model 1500
A llis Chalmers
Model 7453047327

Serial No. JAF0103811 $5,000
Serial No. 9C001394 $ 1,000
Serial No. 96M02434 $ 4,000

The Tenant shall maintain the equipment and return the same of Landlord at
the termination of the Lease in good condition and repair subject to reasonable
depreciation. If the cost to repair said equipment exceed the value specified,
the tenant may purchase the equipment at the specified value.
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6. MAINTENANCE AND SURRENDER. Tenant shall keep, at its expense,
the Prop_erty and every part thereof in general repair and condition during
the term. Tenant will not use or permit anything upon the Property that may
be dangerous to life or limb. Tenant shall not in any manner deface or
injure the Property that will create a nuisance. Tenant shall not use or
pem1it the use of the property, or any pru.t thereof, for any illegal purpose
including any violation of environmental. regulations. Tenant shall return
the Property peaceably and promptly to Landlord at the end of the term of
this Lease, or at m1y earlier termination thereof, in good condition, loss by
fire arid ordinary we~,r and tear accepted.
7. iUTILITES. Tenant shall promptly pay al l rates, costs and charges for
utilities consumed by Tenant at the Property.
8. SIGNS. Tenant may erect, place or permit to be erected or placed on the
Property any customary business signs including signage on the exterior of
any buildings without the prior written consent of the Landlord. Tenant
wiU remove any such signs at the termination of the Lease.
9. CONDITION OF PREMISES. To the best of its knowledge, Landlord
acknowledges herein that the Property, including all buildings located
thereon, is in good condition and repafr including but not limited to
co mpliance with all applicable laws and regulations including all
environmental requirements. To the best of its knowledge, Landlord
acknowledges that the Property and the equipment, plumbing, drains,
fixtures, appliances and machinery if o.ny therein, rilre at the time of the
Lease commencement in good condition and repair. Tenant has leased the
Prope1ty since July of l 995 and agrees that the Property is in good condi tion
and repair and has done nothing to the Propeny that would change this
condition.

10. DEFECT. Landlord shall not be released from any claims arising from any
latent de.feet in the condition of the Property, or the equipment, fixtures or
appliances, if any, in or serving the Property, and the builder buildings of
which they are a part, and the streets, alleys, areas, area~ways, passages or
sidewalks adjoining or appurtenant thereto.
1.L SUBLEASING. Tenant will not sublet the Property, or any pmt thereof, and
will not assign this Lease or any interest therein, nor pe1mit this Lease to be
transfened in any manner without the prior written consent of Landlord in
each and every case of underk:tling-or- assignment-,--fonant shall not be
relieved from liability to Landlord for the terms and condition of this Lease.

12. :BANKRUPTCY. Any assignment, sale in bankruptcy or insolvency of
Tenant may, at the option of Landlord be considered ru1 assignment within
the meaning of this Lease and as a breach of the covenants hereof.
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B. LIABILITY OF LANDLORD. Unless due to the negligence of Landlord,
its agents or employees, Landlord sh<1ll not be liable for any damage or loss
to property, injury or death occlllTing in or about the Property or in any way
related to Tenant's use thereof or due to the hnppening of any accident, or
any act or neglect of the Tenant, or any other tenant or occupant of any
building, or of any other person, persons or corporations, or occasioned by
any nuisance made or sLLffered thereon. Not,.vithstanding the foregoing,
Landlord shall be liable for compliance with any environmental regulations
regarding conditions existing at the Property at the time of t}?.e Lease
commencement date.
Landlord agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold Tenant hannless from any
loss~s, costs, damages and expenses, fines, penalties, attorneys' fees and
costs resulting from any claim asserted against Tenant (i) arising out of
Landlord's actio11s, operations, or activities at the leased premises; (ii)
arising from the actions of any co-tenants, agent, representative, or invitee
leased premises, including the presence of hazardous substa·nccs or the
discharge or release of hazardous substances, not caused by Tenant; and (iv)
Landlord's breach of any representations and warranties.
14. LIABILITY OF TENANT. Tenant assumes liability and obligation for all
damages as specified in paragraph 13, above, and agrees to hold Landlord
hannless,'and to indemnify Landlord therefore. In case of such damages,
Landlord may, at its option, repair such dan1age and Tenant shall thereupon
reimburse Landlord for the reasonable costs of repairing said damage, and if
Tenant fails to perform any of the covenants or agreements herein provided
to be kept of performed by Tenant, Landlord may perfonn the same and
charge Tenant with the reasonable expense of such performance, and Tenant
agrees promptly on demand to repay Landlord the reasonable expense of
such perfom1ance by Landlord.
15. TRESPASSERS. The tenant shall use its best efforts to prevent trespass to
the leased property and to the adjacent property owned by the Landlord.
Such best efforts shall include but not limited to posting of appropriate signs
and notifying local authorities of any trespass.

16. INSURANCE. Tenant shall secure and maintain throughout the term hereof
general liability insurance of not less that Two Million and No/100 Dollars
($2,000,000.00), with bodily injury limits of not less than Two Million and
NO/I 00 Dollars per person and Two Million and No/100 Dollars per
accident, and property insurance for physical damage caused in any way, to
the buildings and improvements leased by Tenant with damage limits of not
less than Two Million Two Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($2,200,000.00) per accident. Tenant shall have the option to cover all
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required insurance under its corporate blanl.ct insmance pol icies naming
Land lord on a Certificate of lnsurnnce as an additiona l insured.
17. COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS. Tenant covenants and agrees at

its ov/n expense to observe and ke ep all applicable lmvs, regulation s and
requirements of th~: fed eral, state or local authoritles having jurisdict ion over
the Property.
Ul, JAKING FOR PUBLIC USE. Tenant agrees that if the Property , or an y
part thereof, shall be taken for a11y street or other public use, or destroyed by
the action of the public authorities, so that Tenant cannot conduct its normal
bi1siness thereon, this Lease shall thereupon terminate.
19, l!JESJ'RUCTION BY F1RE. If during the terrn of this Lease the Property
or the improvements thereon shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or lhe
elements, or any other cause rendering the Property iinfit for occupancy, or
to such an extent that they cannot be reasonably repaired within sixty (60)
days from the happening of such injury, then Landlord may with the written
consent of Tenant tenninate this Lease from the date of such damage or
destruction, and Tenant shall immediately surrender the Property to
Landlord, and Tenant shall pay rent only to the time of such surrender; and
in case of any such destruction, Landlord may re-enter .and repossess the
property. However, if the Property can be reasonably restored within sixty
(60) days from the happening of the injury thereto, and Landlord with
fifteen (15) days from the occ\lrrence of such injury elects in writing to
restore the Property within sixty (60) days from the happening of injury
thereto, then this Lease shall .not te1minate on account of such injury bat the
rent shall abate during the process of repairs up to the time the repairs are
completed, except that Tenant shall, <luting such time, pay a pro rata portion
of such rent apportioned to the portion of the Prope1ty which are in
condition for occupancy. If however, the Property shall be so slightly
injured by any cause aforesaid, as not to be rendered unfit for occupancy,
then Landlord shall repflir the same with reasonable promptness and. in that
case, the rent shall not cease or be abated during such repairing period. All
impro vements or betterments placed by Tenant on the Property shall, in any
event, be repaired and replaced by Tenant at its own expense.
20. QUIET ENJOYMENT. Landlord covenants and agrees that Tenant, on
paying the rent and perfonning the covenants hereunder, shall and may
peaceably and quietly have, hold and enjoy the Property for the tern hereof.
Landlord represents herein that c1s of the Lease commencement date it has
legal O\vnership of the Property and the same is su~ject to no encumbrances
._,;,,b ich could interfere with Tenanfs intended use of the Property.
lt DEF ALILT. If Tenant shall neglect or foil to ~eep, observe ancl perform any
of its covenants and ag reements contained herein (i) in respect of the
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payment of amounts for a period of ten (10) days after written notice that
said sums are due; (ii) for non-money matters for a period of thirty (30) days
after written notice describing sald breach or default; or (iii) if the leasehold
interest of Tenant shall be taken on execution or other process oftaw, or if
Tenant shall petition to be or be declared bankrupt, or insolvent according to
law, then and in any of said cases Landlord may immediately and without
further notkc or demand, enter into and upon the Property and take absolute
possession of the same without such re-entry working a forfeiture of the
rents to be paid and the covenants to be performed by the Tenan t for the full
term of this Lease, and may at Landl9rd's election lease or _sublet the
Prope1iy, or any part thereof, on such ten11S and conditions m1d for such
rents and for such time as Landlord may elect, and after crediting the rent
actually collected by Landlord from such reletting on the rentals stipulated
to be paid under this Lease by Tenant from time ro time, collect from Tenant
any balance remaining due from time to time on the rent reserved under this
Leasei_Charging to Tenant such reasonable expenses as Landlord may
expend in putting the Property in tenantable condition. Or Landlord may at
its election upon written notice to Tenant declare this Lease forfeited and
void, and may thereupon re~enter and take fol]_and absolute possession of
the Property as the owner thereof, and free from any right or claim or
Tenant. Such election and re-entry shall constitute an absolute bar to any
right to enter by Tenant upon the payment of all arrearages of rent and costs
after a dispossession under any suit or process for breach of any of the
covenants of this Lease, and the commencement by Landlord of any action
to recover possession of the Property aforesaid shall be deemed a. sufficient
notice of election of said Landlord to treat this Lease as void and terminated,
without the written notice above specifi ed, unless Landlord shall in ,vriting.
before beginning such proceeding, notify Tenant that after obtaining such
possession Lruid1ord will continue to look to Tenant for the performance of
the Lease and will submit the Prope11y on Tenant's account, in the manner
as above provided.
2Z. TAXES. Tenant shall pay as additional rent all real estate taxes on the
property of the Landlord leased by the Tenant as well as adjacent prope11y
owned by the Landlord that is not leased by the Tenant. Landlord agrees to
cooperate with Tenant in any tax reduction evaluation proceedings \Vhich
Tenant may initiate.
23, !FIB-DELIVERY OF PROPERTY. Tenant, upon the tennination of this
Lease, shall at its own expense remove all dirt, rubbish and refuse which
Tenant shall have placed at Lhe Property during the term of this Lease, and
upon Tenant's expense, \vhich Tenant shall pay upon receipt of a bill for
same from Landlord.
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24, WAI.VER. Tenant agrees that no assent by Lru1dlord to any breach of any of
Tenant's covenants OL' agreemen s sha!l be deemed a \vaiver ofF.my
succeeding breach of such covenant.
25. RIG HT OF ENTRY. Landlord shall at all times upon prior \,vTitten notice
to Tenant (except in the event of an emergency) have the right to enter upon
the Property to inspect its condition, and to make epai ·s requi e.d 1ereunde.r.
Land lord shalI have the right during the last thi1iy (30) days of the term
he reof to place and maintain on the Prop erty and in the wind o1,vs thereof t11e
customary noti ce of "To Let" or "To Rent", and to sho\v the Property to
prospective tenant s.

26. RAILROAD TRA..CKAGE. Landlord agrees herein tbat during the term of
this Lease, Tenant shall be entitled at no additional charge to share in the use
of the railroad tracks which lie on the Landlord's propetiy adjo1ning the
leased Property. Landlo rd acknowledges that it owns the trackage and has
the unrestricted rights of usage of such trackage which will remain
uninterrupted during the term of this Lease. Landlord does not use such
trackage, therefore, all necessary, all necessary repairs and maintenance of
the trackage will be at the Tenant's expense.
27. FI RST REFUSAL. Provided Tenant is not in default hereunder, Landlord
shall with.in one hundred twenty days (120) before the expiration of the
Lease and before the expiration of ninety (90) days before the expiration of
the Lease offer to the Tenant the right to either re-lease or to purchase the
property <1S in the discretion of the Landlord. Whether to sell or lease is
within the discretion of the Landlord. Th!:! price of the lease or the purchase
shall be communicated to the Tenant and if the parties then can agree on 1hat
or other price of the lease or the purchase then the same shall be reduced to
appropriate contract. If th e pa11ies can.not agree upon the terms of the lease
or the purchase then in sue], even the Landlord shall be at liberty to offer the
same to a bom1 fide thirp party on a lease or a purchase, provided, however.
the Landlord shall not lease or sell the Property durin g the term of this
Lease, assuming no defaults on more favorable tenns and conditions than
wns offered to the Tenant. If the Landlord and the Tenant have not agreed
upon the terms of a lease or purchase during the term of the Lease then in
such event the right of the Tenant to lease or purchase the Property after the
expiration of the Lease shall be of no further force. and effect The Tenant
shall have thirty (30) days from the time any offer to pmchase or re-lease is
communicated to it within which to accept the ter ms and if not accepted the
same shall be deemed rejected and the Landlord may then negotiate witl
any bona fide third party relative to the terms of sale or lease but upon no
mare favorable terms than offered Tenan1.

28. RIGHT TO SELL. Landlord may sell the Property at anytime during the
term of this Lease to a bona fide third party. Hoi-vever, Tenant shall be
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given the right of first refu sal upon the same terms offered any bo1ia fide
third party f.¼n<i shall have thiiiy (3 0) days from the time any offer to
purchase is communicated to it within which to accept the terms and if not
accepted the same sha11 be deemed rejected and the Landlord may-then
negotiate with any bona fide third party relative to the terms of sale but upon
no more favorable terms than offered Tenant.

29. HEIRS AND OTHERS. Each of the covenru1ts, provisions, terms and
agreements of thLs Lease shall inure.to the benefit of and siiall be binding
upon the respective heirs, executors, administrntors, successors and assigns
of the respective parties.
30. NOTICES. AH notices required hereur1der shall be by demand effective an
validly given if personally delivered or sent by United States certified mail,
return receipt requested, postage prepaid and addressed to the parties at the
address opposite their signature on tbe signature page hereof or such other
address as noticed in wTiting by the parties from time to ti'me.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Landlord and Tenant have executed this Lease
on the day and year first written.

NOTICE ADDRESS:

LANDLORD:

P.O. BOX 1768
ldaho Fall s, Idaho 83403- l 768

NOTICE ADDRESS:

TENANT:

P O Box 1113
Minneapolis, MN 55440

GENERAL MIL

Attn., Grain Operations
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EXHIBIT A
Legal Description

The following real property in Bonneville County, Idaho:
Beginning at a po int that is N.89°52' 18"W. along the Section line 1807.72 feet from the
Southeast comer of Section 10, Township 2 North, Ran ge 38 East of the Boise Meridian;
runnmg thence N. 89°52' l 8''W. along sajd Section iine 574.19 feet; thence N.00° 19' 13''W.
816.00 feet; thence S.88°20'23"E. 857.50 feet to the West bank of Sand Creed; thence
S.32°29'40"W. 280.49 feet; thence S.26°12'35"W. 188.91 feet; thence S.l4°28 '37"W.
122.98 feet; thence S.02°53' 54"W. 267.63 feet to the point of beginning.
Subject to existing County road Right-of Way and Easements of record.
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SPECIAL WAR.~ANTY DEED

Evans Grain & Elevator Co., a Utah Corporation a/kla Evans Grain & Elevator Company, Inc., a Utah
Corporation a/kla Evans Grain & Elevator Company, Ince., as GRANTOR,
for good rmd valuable considerations, the receipt of whiclt is hereby acknowledged, does hereby grant, bargain, sell and coimey unto
Lincoln Land Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company, as GRANTEE,
w/Jose address is PO Box 1768, Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403 and Grantee's successors and assigns, all of the following described real property, to-wit:
Beginning at lite South Q1111rter Comer of Seclio11 10, Township 2 North, Range 38 East of Uie Boise Meridian, Bonneville County, Idaho; n1n11i11g
tlie11ce N89°52 ' 1B"W 127.20 feet along the Section line; thence N1°53 '13 "W 2631.48 feet to the East-Wes I Centerline of said Section 10; then ce
589°42 ' 26" E along said Centerline 2449.97 feet to a point that is N89°42'26"W 396.97 feetfrom the Enst Quarter Corner of said Section 10, said point
also being 011 the West pmik of Sand Creek; thence 523°11 '03"W162 .91 feel; thence 532°29'4:0"W 2269.35 feel; thence 526°12'35 "W 188.91 feet; thence
514°28' 37"W 122 ,98 feet; thence 52°53'54"W267.63 feet to the South line of said Section 10; thence N89°52' 18"W 825.10 feet to the point of
beginning.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM AU.. OF THE FOLLOWING DESRIBED PROEPRTlES:

a.

Beginning al a point that is N89°52 ' 18"W 97.20 Jee /from tile Soutli Quarter Corner of Section 10, Township 2 Nor/It, Range 38
East of the Boise Meridian, Bonneville County, [d11ho; running thence N89°52'18"W 30.00 feel; t/1ence N1°53'13"W 332.16 feet;
tltcnce Soutl-1e11sterly to a point that is N1°53 ' 13 "W 254.16 Jeetfro,u the point of begi,rning; thence S1°53 ' 13 " E 254.16 feel to tile
point of beginning.

b.

Dwt certain properly conveyed to Bonneville Co1.111hJ for roadway purposes by that certain Quitdaim Deed rewnlet.l in Book 76 at
Page 535 of Deed Records on Mnrcl1 28, 1951, al 11 :16 a.m., records of Bonneville County, Idalzo,

TOGETHER vVITH any and all improvements, water and ditch rig/lts, easements, tenemenls, /Jereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or

in anywise npperfai11ing, and any reversion, remni11de1; rents, issues, and profits thereof
ln co11slruing this Deed and where the context so requires, the singular includes the plural, and the masculine, the feminine and neu ler.

r----~----1N5T:rn MEN T NO. /2.,3' 7

-o,

Dated August~ 2006

DATE
~ -C
Hi T. ame
~S
IMAGED PGS
FF.F,
S'f'A'!"[ or fDi\HO
) 5S
COUNTY OF BONNEVJU.E )
1
1 hc,diy certify th~I the witJii n
1
111.<1nm1c111 was rcc<1rded.
!
Rc,1111:d
Coun1y Rccordc1 j

7~
3fil -·

Evans Grain & Elevator Co., a Utnli Corporation
Bit:

13Aa/ ;:~

_ _c.;gc.c;_:)_r_-,_t-1
_ _,f?c..,___,"'-, __,e_,,_t'_l_ c-(_~, its

LonE.

STATE OF I ~ Ur/ii/

)

0

) SS

COUNTY OF

@_,./uu./

Hy\ -),_-·pt-

Request of

)

~j

/J:-,h, ____

Z/]

On - - ~ + - - + T - - - - r -- - - , - - ~ before me, the undersigned, personally appeared
:1c2d ffY!:;/.Ll(t..,,,.
known or identified
to 111e to be tlie 'I !ft.A./ of the corporation t/-H1t executed the wilhin instrument, and acknowledged to me that such rorporalio 11
executed tlw same.

No,!!!Pf ublic for tlie State of frmJw Ur/I I/Commission Expimtio11 Date:
7

Ub /tJ 9

I

!

•

Wn rrn t1 t)' Deed (.1/9 7) - Page I
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March ?..7, 2014

Kevin Neal < kevin([ilsafelinkinterne t.com

.J8red Stowell <jared@~igitalsa tllc.com

.

Adam Gi llings <ag illir.1J£:~@corp~.iligjs. nc1

Lincoln Land company invites yo ur proposal to lease the concrete towers at J075 East
Lincol n Road, Idaho Falls, Idaho

Lincol n Land company will awa rd a contract to the hig[1esl responsible bidder for leasing
of rnternct antenna space
Lincoln T,and company reserves the righl to accccpt or reject m1y and all proposals based
on the best interest of Lincoln land company
Li ncoln Land company wi lt make all offers available fo1· inspection to any other offers
prov iding the proposals on th is RPP
Lincol n Land cornpnny will award to the highest responsib le bidder all of th.e base bid.
The "Exclusive" line item may be re.<;ubmilted to unsuccess ful proposers for further
consideration of co-locnlion
A II proposals must be submitted on or before 14:00pm MDT Monday March 31, 2014.

Please foc i free to contact me at your cot1v(;nience, cell 208 -589-2326 wk '208-529-9891.

Sincerely,

~-~
t\ttRchmcnl: Wireless Prici ng Evan (irnin

EXHl31T t,

r> o n ox l'/G8· 1DAHO Fi\U SL_1n. aJ,lOJ·(208)'j29-_Q_891 ·<208lS?2-Jt912
391
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uUMl~·i1LL..L OUN1Y
IO AHO
Alexander P. Mc aughlin, ISB No. 7977
JeffreyW. Bower, ISB No. 8938
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Stteet
P.O. Box. 2720
Boi e. Jdaho 83701~2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
alexmolaughlin@givenspurslcy.coin
je1fhower@givenspursley.com

2016 MAR 30 PH 3: 41

S800Ql)8_1 [13141-2)

Attorneys for Tlrird-l~aity·Defondants

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE .SEVENTH JUDIClAl' DJSTRIC
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 1 fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

UNCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2015-3927

DEC ARATION OF COLLEEN BENSON

vs.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party PJaintift:
vs.

GENERAL MILLS, JNC, and GENERAL

MILLS OPERATIONS, LLCt
Third-n1rty DefendanLS.

Dll:CLARATTC>N OF COLLEEN BENSION - 1

393

l, Colleen Benson, under penally of perjm:y, hereby <lecltire. and slate as follows:
1.

I ant a ·$enio1· ·inancial Analyst for General Mills Services, Inc., which is an

affil iate of G neral Mills Operati ons, Inc. and other General Mills related enti ties.

2.

I have 1-e\~icwcd t11c 2010 .lease between. Ge11erai Mills Operations, lnc., and

Lincoln Lan.cl Company} LLC that has been produced by the parties in discovery in this case.
3.

r have

also Teviewed certain company records relating to the payments made

under that lease. Accordingly, I have personal knowledge of U1e facts herein.
4.

Based on that knowledge, payment bas be.en remitted_to Lincoln Land Company

LLC, pursuant to the above lease as follows: (1) $126,190.54 on or about August 6, 201 0; (2)
$ 1.27, 109. 17 on or about August 4, 20J l; (3) $126,538.06 on July l 0, 2012; and (4)

$126,54.5.60

o.u July 10; 2013, for a total payment under the lease to Lincoln Land Company, LLC; of at least
$506,383,37.
l declare uni:te.r penalty·of pe1jmy under the laws of the state of ldaho that the
foi'egoing is tme and correct.

DA ED thi_s 2£i_th day of Nhlrch, 2.016.
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CERTIFICATE OF S~RVlClf;
I lIE~B~ CER;IFY tha~ ?11 this 1f._1h day?; !'4arch, 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregomg DECLARAllON OF COLLEEN llENSION to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Mark R. Fu II er
Daniel R, Beck

FULLER & DECK LAW OFFICE, PLLC
410 Memoria.l Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
l,daho FaJls, ID 83405-0935

Ronald L. Swafford
Trevor L. Castleton
.arre11 K. Coven
SWAJ7FORD LAW, P.C.
655 S. Woodruff
1daho Falls, ID 83401

Dr

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hanel Delivered
S ~vemight Mail
~

.rac.si111ile (208.524.7167)

{ ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
\ ~vernight Ma i.l
1.~·acsimile (208.524.4131)
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Affidavit of Paul L. Fuller in Support of Plaintifrs Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
dated March 30, 2017 (this document itself was not sealed but the Exhibit A
attached to this document is sealed pursuant to the Protective Order dated February 3,
20 17) Please see the attached Confidential Exhibit file
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Alexander P; McLaughlin> IS B Nt_;, 7977
Jeffrey W. Bower, lS.B No, 8938
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
60 l West Bannock Street

2016 MAR 30 PM 3: 41

P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ldaho 83701 -2720
Office: (208) 388~1200
Fax: (208) 388- 1300
tilcxmclanghlin@givenspursley.c-0111
jeffuowcr@givenspursl ey.cotn
8116862_ 1 ( !Jl41 -2]

Attomexs for Third~Parly Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LlNCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927

vs.

.MEMORANDUM JN OPllOSITlON TO
PLA[NTIF 'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENTRE: UNJUST

LP BROADBAND, INC. ,

ENRICHMENT CLAIM AND BURDENS
OFPROOF

Plaintitl:

Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,

vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL
MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,

COME NOW, Third-Party Defendants, General Mills, Inc. and General Mills

Operations, LLC (90Jlectively; "General

..M.illt;), by and through their attorneys of record,

MEMORANDUM iN OPPOSJ.TIQN TO PLAINTIJ.l'F'S MOTION FOR. PARtlAL SUMMARY
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Givens Pursley LLP, nnd hefeb

·ub11it this Memorandum in Opposition to Plaltitiff' il Motion

for Partial Sumrnai·y .Judgm ent Re: Unjust
. Enrichment Claim and Burdens of Proof
.

I.

.

INTRODUCTION

Plairitiff~ Linco ln Land Company, LLC, ("Lincol n Lan.d") seeks partial summary

judgment against Defendant, LP Broadl and, Inc. ("LP Bro:idband''). Lincoln Land first argues
that "it is clear that each oJ the elements" of an ''unjust enrichment claim have been met'' as to
LP Broadband, with the exccpt10J1 of damages. Brief in Support of Motion for Parti8] Sumrna:ry
Judgment Re: Unjust Enrichment Claim and .Burdens of Proof ("Qp_cnin ri Btjg_f'), at 8. Lincoln
Land next asserts that this Court should disregard any defenses raist:d by LP Brnadhand rcfated
to tJnY "Suble.i e/Rental Agreement afrcr March 20, 2008, for tho rooftops of the grain elevators
located at 3075 E. Lincoln lload, Idaho Falls, ldahn." Opening Brief~ at 2.

Lincoln Land;s niotion for partial summary judgment should be denied and
jl:tdgment should be (;!Jiter(;!d dism_is ·ing Lincoln Land's Complaint because Lincoln Land ca1111ot

establ.ish the ekrn ents of unjust enrichment or prove that the agr0ement at i::;sue is somehow

urn.mforceable .
First, Lincoln Land has not conferred a direct benefit on LP Broadband. General

Mills allowed LP Broadband use of the roof tops on top of tbc grain elevators ("Rooftops")
owned by Lincoln Land, but leased' t.o General Mills. Thus, if Lincoln Land cni'tferrcd a bencfi L,

H was1 al best., only in.diruc.;t. In a recent decision, our Supreme Court nrndu c'Jear that a claim for
unjust enrichment requires that a plaintiff cHrcctl y confer a benefit on the defcnd unt. Med.

1 The lease is actually between General Mills Opera tions, 1nc. and not Oenernl Mills Opera!ions, LLC,
wh ich ls the name of the Thitd·PHrly Defendant. Gcn.:nil Mills Operations, LLC, however, i the successor·lnintcl'CSI to Geno1·al Mills OperaLiom1, Inc.

MF.MORANVUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAIN'J1FF'8 MOTION FOR PARTIAL SlJMMARY
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Rer·ove,y Sen•s .. LLC v. /Jon n evi/le Hilling, 157 Idaho 395, 399, 336 P.3d 802, 806 (2014 ). This
is fatal to Lin coln Land's motion; indeed, it is fata l to Lincoln Land's enti re sui t.
Second, it would not be inequitable for LP Broadband to retain the alleged benefit
in this case. Not every claimed wrong gives rise to recovery. Ilcrc, Lincoln Land has received
more than $500,000.00 under the 20'! 0 lease with General Mills for use of the grain t:l cvat<>rs,

including the Rooftops ('' Lease'} Further, because Lincoln Land leased the propert y in question
to General Mills, Lincoln Land could not have used the Rooilops or leased them to a third-pm1y.
There is likewise no cvi c.lenec thut 1hc Rooftops arc somehow damaged. In short, Lincoln Land
is out nothing. Yet, on top of the half-m illion dollars in rent it already reeeived, Lincoln Land

seeks to disgorge the profits LP Broadband made whi le using property that Lin~oln Land coul d
not have used during the timcframes at issue anyway. Under these circumstances, there is no

ineq uity requiring court intervention and a judgment against LP Broadband in an amount
exceeding $ 100,000.00, as requested by Lincoln Land.
Third, the 2000 Roof-top Rental Agreement docs not run afoul of the Statute of

Frauds. Lincoln Land is a stranger to the agreement. As stHtcd by one CO LU' t, but echoed almost
universally by jurists: "The statute of frauds concerns only the parties to a eontruct and their
privies, and the fact that lhc contract must be in writing in order to be enforecablc us between the
parties is o r no concern to a third pmt y and cannot be invoked by hirn for his benefit." !)peer v.

Dodge, 636 P.2d 178, 18 1-82 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
Fourt h, Linco ln Land' s Statuh.J of Frauds argument lacks meri t in any event
because there is ample proof or part and/or full performance. Quayle v. Mackert, 92 lc.laho 563,
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569-70, 447 P.2d )79, 68 -86 (1 68) (holding that pnrlia lly per!c:mncd contrncts arc enforceable
despite non-compliance with the statLtlc of fraud· .2

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, tb

'ourt should DE Y Lin ·oln

Land's motion fr>r pt rtial summary judgment imd enter a judgment dismis8ing Lincoln Land's
claims, with prejudice. Peterson v. Sltore, 146 h.foho 476, 479 197 P.Jd 789, 792 (Ct. App .
2008) ( 'ff a trial coi,ut denies a pa1ty's motion for i:;urnmury judgment, it has discretion to grant
summary judgment to the opposing party").
lJ.

B

' I GROU 1D

In Match of 2000, Oenern l Mill s entered into Lhat eertai n Roof-top R ·ntal

1.

Agreement ("Roof Top Agn~ement") with LP Broadband s prcdcccs or, Mi -rosc1-v for the use of
·roof-top spau<:.: on the 'Evans

raincry. "' Cornplainl, Ex . C; see al.·o Affidavit of Adam Gillings

in Support of Objection to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Q_illings Affidavit T"), iii[ 78.
Un der the Roof Top Agreement, LP Broadb·md agree l to pay $50.00 per

2.

rnonlh Lo General Mills for permission to locnt

anle111u1e equipment on the Rooftops. Gilli ngs

A llidavit I, ifil I 0- 12.

2 There i8 alsu a qucstfon a~ lo ,vhe1he.r stm1.mary jmlg111cnt is the appropriate vehicle for a request that a
court deny cettflin defenses. "A parly ~ccking to recover upon fl claim, cottn lcrdaim, ur crns~·clnim or io obtain n
declarnto1y judgmen t may ... move with cir without supportin_i affidavits for a su111n111ry judgment in thnt par1y'8
fovor upon nl l 01· any part thcreor.' 1~·sww of Holland v. Metropolitan Property, 15] ld11lto 94, Ioo 279 f' .3d RO, 86
(2012) (citing T.R. .P. 56(a)). "1'hc ' claim, counterclaim, or c1·os ··claim' memioned in the m ie is a 'claim for relier
in Rule (a)( I) of the Idaho Rule. of Civi I Procedure." Id. A judgment st<1es lh:11 n party is or is not cntiUcd Lo
relier on his or her affirmative claim . 'ee ldaho R. Civ. Prnc. 54(a) ( 'A judgn1 nl shall ·tate the rdief to which u
parly i:- cnLitlcd 011 one 01· 11wr,? claim .for relie.f fo the action") ( ·mphasi:, udckd). 11crc, in reqllcsting thal the cot1rl
enter a judgment denying defenses, Lincoln Land doc. not appear lo be seeking r lief on an af11nnmivc clnim.
Aci;O rding ly, even if I,incoln !,and has shown no ge11ul11 · Jisputc qf fact, J,incoln I,and hl'ls foiled to show thnt lt is
enlitlcd to "judgmeni a~ matter of la w." LR.C.I>. 56(c.). Thctcfon.:, summary judgm nl is not appropriate,

,i
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3.

On or about Man;h 15 , 2006, Lincoln Land purclnued

t]1c

Evans Uraincry

as parl of a l 031 exchange from then . ell r Evans Grain Elevator. Affidavit of Counsel

[Lurren K. CovcrtJ in Support of Mo lion for Summ,wy Judgment, ii 3 Ex. A, p. 9.
4.

ln June of 201 0, Lincoln Land leased to General Mills, among other

things, the Evans Grainery (" Property'"). Affidavit of Doyle H. Beck C- fleck

ffid vit'"), ii 3; see

also Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin (' Md,augh lin De ·laration''), Ex. B (attaching the
Leasc as di~t.:losed by Linco111 Land in di. ·overy).
5.

The Len c allows General Mills to u ·e the Property without restriction

during the term of tl1is Lease.'' McLaughlin Declaration, Ex. B, 14.
6.

The i·enlul

am.ount

under the Lease wa.

$120 000.00 p r year.

McLaughlin Duclan1lion, Ex. B, i[ 3.
7.

J. ursuant to the Lm1So,

cncral Mills has 1 aid Linco ln Land more than

$500,000.00 in rent. Declaration of Colleen Bi;:nson, at 2.
8.

On or about July 20, 20 15 Lincoln Land initiated thi s action.

9.

Lincoln Land alleges that LP Broa<lband has been unju tly enriched

hccausc LP Broadband has been using the Roortops owned by Lincoln Land, but pr

iow;ly

least:d t.o G ·nernl Mills. without Lincoln Land ' s permission. Opening Brief at 5.

10.

Lincoln Land docs not ullege that it has not received r ntal payments from

Ceneral Mills pursuant to the Lease for the entirety of the Property, including the Rooftops. See
Complaint, Kenera!Ly .
I I.

Rather, Lincoln Land s unjust cnrichm.ent claim is based on the all gation

that " LP has not paid any amount to Lincoln Land for the use of Linc In Land s prop rly.'
Compluint, ii 8.
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l 2.

Lincoln Land has moved for parti al summary judgment.

13.

Genera l Mills opposes the motion and asks that the Court <l ismiss Lincol n

I ,and' s Complaint with prejudice, thereby mooting LP Broadhand 's Third Party-Com pl ai nt , thus
resulti ng in dismissal of this case, with prejudice.

HI.

"One
di spose

or r·a ctually

or the

SUMMARY J UDGMENT STANDARD

principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and

uns upported claims or defenses." Celotex, Co,p. v. Catrett, 477 U.S . 3 17,

323- 24 (1986). "Summary judgment ... is properly regarded uot as a <lisfi.tvored procedural

shorlcul" but instead as a tool '·to secure the just, speedy aud inexpensive determination of' every
action.'' id. at 327; see also Chandler v. Hayden, 147 ldaho 765, n.2, 215 P.3d 485, n.2 (2009) (
adopting the language and reasoning of Celotex) (quotation omitted) .
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, clcpositi ons, and
admi ssions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there i~ no genuinc issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law."

1.R.C.P. 56(c). ''/\ material issue of fact, for summary judgment purposes, is one that is relevant

to an clement or the dai m <1r defense and whose existence might affect the outcome or the case."
!?({ct v. /,ong. 127 ld uho 841, 849, 908 P.2d 143, LS l (I 995). Materi ality alone is not sufflcicnt to

surviv<:: summary judgment 1 the factual dispute in question must also be "gtmuine.' 1 Anderson v.

Uberty lobby. lnc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 ( 1986). A disputed issue of fact is "gcnuine" " if the
ev idence is such that a reasonable jury could return n verdict for the nonmoving party." id. ''A
mere scintilla of evidence or only sl ighl doubt is not sufficient to create a genu ine issue of
material fact. " Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 ld aho 434,436, 196 P.Jd 352,354 (2008).

1\111<.:MO RANDIJM lN OPPOSITION TO PLAlN'flf'F'S MOTION FOR PART IAL SUMMAIW
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Lincoln Land Cannot S how T hat It Is Entitled to Judg ment As a Mattei· of Law on
its Unjus t Enrichment Claim.

A prima facic case for unjust enri chment exis ts \'vhcrc: " (I) there was a bene fit
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the de fondant of such benefit;
and (3) acccpltlncc or the bene fit und er circum stances that would be inequitable fl.)1' the defendant

to retain th<.: benefit without payment to the plainti ff for the value thereof:'

Steve11son v.

Windermerf> Real ,~~state/ Capital Grp., htc., 152 Id aho 824, 827, 275 P.3d 839, 842 (201 2).

Lincoln Land cannot establish (he ck1m.:nts of unjust enrichment because:

(I) Lincoln Land did not confer a benefit lo LP Broadband; and (2) it would not be inequ itable to
allow LP 13roadband to retain the henelit it allegedly received.

Fina lly, General Mill s wi ll

discuss Lincoln LamPs at.tempt to shi ft the burden of proof on Lincoln Land 's claim to LP
Broadband . Each argument will be addressed in tur n.
L

Lincoln Land Did Not Con fer a Benefit Upon LP Broadband.

"To confer a bene fit in the context of unjust enri chment, the plaintiff must give
the defendant an interest in money, land, or possessions, or perform services benefi cial to, or at

the request of: U,e other." M<!d. Recovery Services, lLC, 157 Idaho at 399, 336 P.3d at 806
(citing 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts§ 9 (20 13)). J\<ldi Lionally, the benefit conferred must come
diret:tly from the plaintiff to the defendant. Id. ("Here, li ke the plainti ffs in both Sle\le//son and
lfoco, M.RS has not conferred any direct benefit on BBC").

Stevenson is directly on point. ln Stevenson, the Stevcnsons sollght lo purcha:-;e a

condominium from sell er, Jefferson. 152 ldaho at 825, 275 P.3d at 840. The Stevensons and
Jefferson cxeculed a purcha5e agreement and the Stcvensons depositt:d $38,000 in earnest money
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with Jefferson 's broker, Windermere. Id. Windermere releused the earnest money to Jefferson.
Id. Jefferson then paid Windermere a $9,500 commission based on a separate agreement whi ch

obligated Jefferson to pay Windermere whenever it procured a purchaser. fd.
Unforttmatcly, the deal went bad . .ldlerson decided not to sell and did not return
the earnest money. Id. The Slevensons filed suit aguinst Windermere and Jefferson claiming
unjust enrichment, buL settled with Jefferson wl1<.~n Jefferson agreed to refund the earnest money,
less the $9, 500 paid to Windermere. id. at 826, 275 P.3d at 841. The trial court dismi ssed the
Stevcnsons' unjust enrichment claim nnd the lclaho Supreme Court affinned. ln doing so, the

Court summarized the unjust enrichment argument against Windermere a-; l'o llows:
It is true that Jeffe rson conferred a benefit on Windermere. T he
Stevcnsons' argument, reduced to its essen<.:e, is that beccm..,·e they
conferred a benefit upon Jefferson, and Jejferso11 co,~f'erred a
benefit upon Windermere, they ca11 cut out the middleman anti
directly recover.fi-lmt Windermere.for unjust mricltment.
Id. at 827, 275 P.3d at 842 (emphasis added).

The above argument, which is the same Lincoln Lan<l poses to this Court, wus
squarely rejeclcd hy the Idaho Supn::me C()urt.

To that end, the Court concluded that the

Stcvensons ' unjust enrichrnenl cluim against Windermere could not be maintained because
Jef'forson conforre<l the $9,500 benefit on Windermere and thus, it was "not a bcncl'it that the
Stevt!nsons conferred on Windt~rmcrc." id. at 829, 275 P.1d at 844.
llcre, Lincoln Land is not entitled to summary judgment. As in Stevenson and

Med Recovery Services, Lincoln Land did Ml corifer a henef'it upon LP Rrou<lband or "give [LP

Broadbnnd·I an interest in money or lund." lrn;tead, General Mills, not Lincoln Land, ullowecl LP

Broadband lo use

a portion of the Evans Grainery. See Gillings Affidavit I, nt 2, i1i1 8-14.
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Acconllngly, as in Stevenson, Linc()ln Land seeks lo "cut out the middleman and dinx:tly recover
from [LP BroadbandJ fbrunjust enrichment.'' Stevenson, l 52 Idaho at 82 7,2 75 P.3d at 842.

Recclll Idaho case authority is clear: To recover under 'Unjust enri.chm ent, it is not
enough Lhat a benefi t be received by u defendant. Rather the p laintiff rnust directfv confer the
benefit upon th e defendant. See Med. RecoveJ:Jl Servs., 157 Jdaho at 399,336 P.3d at 806 ('"Here,

like the plaintiffs in both Stevenson ar1el Beco, MRS has not conferred any direct benefit on
13 B '"). In this case, Lincoln Land has confor:red no direct benefit on LP Broadband. Therefore,
Lincoln Land is not entitled to summary judgment and its suit should he dismissed with
prejudice.

2.

rt Would Not Be luequitable to Allow LP Broadband to Rec:ain the Alleged
Benefit Without Payment to Lincoln :Land .Because Lincoln Land had
Already Lea ed the Property to Gen rn l Mill and was Paid by GenHal Mills
for the Use of the Entirety of die Pro pert

The last element of unjust enrichment that Lincoln Land 1nust prove is
"acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to
retain the ben efit withmrt payment to the plai11.ti ff for lhe value thereof," Stevenson, 152 Idaho at
827,275 P,3d at 842. As addressed above, no benefit has been conferred by Lincoln Land.
In any event~it is not inequitable for LP Broadbnnd to retain the va lue of using of
the grain elevator roof tops •iwithout payment'' because Ocncra1 Mills already paid Li11et1ln Land
for such use. For instance; Gencrn1 Mills could have erected the same antennae equipment on the
Rooftops that were demised in the Lease, and Linco ln Land would not ht: enti tled to additi onal
rent amount::; or the profits General Mills derived from the operation of the antenna equipment.
Additionully, sin ce Lin coln Land was already getting paid for the use of the entire property,
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Lim:oln Land could not have leased the property to a third-patty an<l derived an additional
economic benefit.
Yet, Linco ln Land argu<;s tha1 equity demands that Lincoln Land r<;ceivc rental
payments from General Mills and a six~ figure judgment disgorging from LP Broadband profits
derived from use of property that Lincoln Land already leased to General Mill s and for wh ich
Lincoln Land received payment. That is not equity.

IC unylhing, allowing Lincoln Land to

recover a judgment from LP Broaclban<l, on lop of rents already received, would result in a
windfall to Li11eoln Land. C/ Ho!laday v. !.indsay, 143 Idaho 767, 772, l 52 P.3d 638. 643 (Ct.
/\pp. 2007) (tlcnying rt:lief' on grounds that the nward requested was less likely to right a wrong
tha11 it wa~ to constitute a windfa ll). Accordingly. summary juclgrncnt is not appropriate.

Dismissal is.
3.

This is n Su ,umary ,Judgment Motion- not a Motion in Limiuc.
The burden of proof' on a party asse1iing unjust enrichment is on the elain1ing

party. Rrickson v. F/y1111, 138 lduho 430, 43 5. 64 P.J d 959, 964 (Cl. /\pp. 2002) (stuting that
under 4uasi -estoppel or quantum mcruit, "the plaintiff carries the burden or proof'). To that end,

a ' plaintiff must" prove ' the amount of enrichment as between the two purties it wou ld be unjust
for one patty to retain.,,. Hines v. Wells, 120 Idaho 177, 8154 P.2d 437 (Ct. /\pp. 199 1) (citing
Cominental Forest Prods. , Inc. v. Chandler S11pp~)1Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 5 18 P.2cl 120 I, 1205

(1974)). Thus, as is the case with legal damages, "the value of any benefit unjustly received by
lite dcf'cndant in an uction based upon unjust enrichment, rnust be proven lo u n;asonable
<;crtainly." (;i/letfe v. Storm Circle Ra11ch, l 0 l Idaho 663, 667, 619 P.2<l 111 6, 11 20 (1980).

llere, Lincoln Land, despite filing a summary judgment 111otion, is not seeking

juclgm0nt at all. In essence, Li11coln Land is asking the Court to adopt a formula to calculate the
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amount of the alleged unjust c11ricl 1111cnl.

That is not the pmposc of a summary judgment

motion. Lincoln Lan<l must prove the amount it claims LP Broadband was cmichcd. lt must do
so with rnasonuble certainty. If that number is below Lht:: claimed fa ir market rental value orthe
top of' the Roo'ftops, then so be it. Once Linco ln Land is finished with its case-i n-chicf: the
evidence may then be rebu tted by LP Broadband and then the fintlcr of fact can determine if
J.incoln Land is cntitlc<l to relier.
B.

Lincoln Lund's Summary Jud~ment Motion S hould be Denied Bccn usc Lincoln
Land Cannot, as a Stranger to Any Agreement Between General Mills ~tnd LP
Broadbaud, Assert that They arc Unenforceable Under tile Statute of Frauds.
Third-parties to eontrncts may not challenge their enforceabili ty under the Statute

of Frauds;

[1.]t is well settled lhal the Statute of Frauds may not be invokt::d by
a stranger to the CQnt,w::t.... An oral contract is not Y(Yi<l, il lt.:gal, or
inherently wrong because i.t fails to conform lo the requirern<.mts of
the Slatute of Frauds .... The Statute cstahl ishes a rul e of evidence,
whi<:/1 is personal to the p erson to be charged mu/er the terms of
the contract. .. . Ile may avail himself of it or not, as lie elects;
but it does ,tot reM with others- strangers to the comract to say
that the parties will not abide by their agreement regardless or Lhc
Statute of Frauds.

IO

WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS

§ 27: 12 (4th ed.) ( emphasis added).

J\llhough lduho courts do not appear lo have addn!i:;sed thls issue, Williston·s
comments regarding th e inabi lity of a stranger lo an agreement to challenge the same reprcsunts
the Ovt;rwhelming maj ority rule in the Un ited States. Restatcmenl (Second) of Conlracls

~

144

( 108 1) (''Only a party to a contract or n lransforec or successor of a party to the contract can
assert that the contract is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds''); 73 Am . Jur. 2d Statute of

Fmuds § 462 ("The dcfon~e of the Stntute of Frauds is not availahle to strangers to the
agrccmcn! or to tl 1e puhlic at large. A s long as the party who the Statute

or Frauds intends lo
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prnlccl is willing to treat the contract as valid, it wi ll not be considered void. and the other pmty
may not assert the stan1tc against the protected pnrly' '); c.f.' 2 Anderson U .C.C. § 2-20 I :24 (3d.

ed.) (''A stranger cannot attack the va lidity or a sale on the ground that the statute of' frauds had
not bcon satisfied, so that the landlord of the tenant could not attack a sale of personal property
hy lho tenant to a th ird person because there was no writing that sati sfied the statute of fraud s").
Courts in other j L1risdictions follow this ru le as well. See In re Reichmann J'errole11m Corp. , 434
B.R. 790, 797 (S.D .Tcx.2010) ("Under Texas lnw, non-parties lo a contract do not have standi ng

to assert the statute of frauds as a tlcfonsc to that contract's enforcement, wh ich Conoco attempts
to do here"); JJauckus

11•

Lyme, 96 A.D.3d 1248, 125 l (N.Y. 20 12) (" Lyme cannot asscrl u slatulc

of frauds c.lcfensc lo defeat plaintifTs assertion that be held equitable ti llc pursuant to the oral
agrec111cnt as the defense is personal and ca nnot be raised by a stranger to the agreement"");

/,ancnster v. Farrell, 397 S. W .3d 606, 6 13 (Tenn . 20 I I) ("However, u third pa rty cannot ob,i ect:
to enforcement of a contract by rai:,;ing tho stat ute of frauds"); JJurns v. Peters, 55 P.2d 11 82,
11 85 (Cal. 1936) (" fl would seem to be the rul e that third parties cannot avail th emselves of the
defense of' the statute if the two principal s acquiesce"); Chapman v. Ford, 227 A.2d 26, 31 (Md.

1967) (" It is generally accepted that third parti es cannot assert the Statute of Frauds as a dcfonsc
to an action aga inst them by the direct purlics to a contract"); Vincent v. Seoman, 152 A.D .2d
84 l , 544 N.Y.S .2d 225 ( 1989) (holding that a strnnger to a contract may not assert the statute of
frauds to defeat the contract); Scott v.

Ranch Uoy- L, lnc., 182 S.W.3d 627, 634

(Mo.Ct./\pp.2005) ("[pll aintiHs cannot challenge the validity of that assignrncnt on lbe basis that
il violated the Slatute of Frauds because they were not parties to the assignment''); Madem

Production Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., I07 S.W.3 d 652, 662 (Tx.Ct.App.2003) ("a stranger to

the [agreement] ... would not have . landing lo challenge the agreement on the statute

or frauds

orrosrno

M l~MORAN DUM IN
TO PLAI NTIFF'S M OTlON FOR PARTJAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RE: UNJUST ENlUCJJMENT CL AI M AND RlJIWENS Of,' PROOF- 12

408

ground'')~ Lamereaux v. Pag11e, 513 P.2cl 1053, 1055 (Wash., 1913) (holding that the statute of

fra uds is a pcl'Sonal defense that cannot be availed ofby a tbi rd person).
ln its motion for pm'tial summary judgm nt Lincoln Land argues that the Courl
should di sregard the agrcem

11t

between General Mills and LP Broadband becnuse it is defici ·nt

under the statute offrauas. Opei1ing Bric-f, at 13. Ho~vcvor, Lincoln Land's argun1ent l.acks merit
because Lincoln Land is a stranger to any agreement between LP Brondband and General Mill s.
That is undi.sputcd.

In facf, Lincoln Land adnrl ts that it l.s not u party to the R.oof Top Agreement and
"h(ls no legalf.y e1{f'on:eable righ ts" under it See Brief in Opposit'ion to Motion for Additional

Time, at 5 (ernph}tsis added) . Lincoln Land., therefore, cannot invoke tho Statute of Fnmd8.
Thus, if any patty is entitled to judgment, it is LP Broadband and Gerieral Mills.
C.

Even if Uncoil\ Laud Could Jn okc the Stanite. of ltrauds the Statute has no
Meaningful Effect Because LP Broadband Performed the Agreement, Pa rtial)
a1id/or I•ully ..3

" [T]he object of the stututc [of frauds] ts to prevent potential fraud by f<)rbidding
disputed assertions of enumerated kinds of contracts without any wtitlen basb."

Kally v.

Jl<Jdges, 119 Idaho 872, 874, 8 t1 P .2d 48 (CL App . 1991 ). Fraud i8 not alleged by any party in
thi s action, With good rcasoi1. There is none. Thus; Lincoln Land s invocation of the Statute of
Frauds is rooted in taking advantage of a tcdmicality, rather than correct application of
Section 9-505 backed by th e policies underlying the statute 1 s codification.

In any event,

] There is also strong amhotity to st1ggest that 1he Sta(utc of Frauds i~ simply not appli<.;ablo t the fact · of'
this cai,e. Fir ·t, tbe agreement nt issue does no t contemplate (he sale or lease of "real properly or ,m interest
therein." See I.C. § 9-505(4). Inst:ead, it only iilvolws the use of the gtnincty rooftops, which arc not ''real
property." Second, the Srnltlte of Frauds, by its plain terms, does not app ly to licenses, which the agreement at issue
is. /\ccordingly, because there is no "real property' at issue, the Statute of Frauds doct1 noL appl y.
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"ldaho'~ Statute of Frauds is set forth at I.C . § 9-505." Bank of Commerce ,,. Jefferson H11ters.,
LLC, 20l 3 WL 3372750 ( Idaho 20 13). It provides. in relevant part that:
In the fo llowing cases the agreement is invalid, un less the same or
some note or memorand um thereo f, be in wri ting und subscribed
by the pmty charged, or by his agent. Evidt:nce, therefore, of the
agreement cannot be received wi thout the writing or secondary
evidence of its contents:
4. An agreement ror the leasin g, for a longer period than om: ( I)
year, or for the sale, of real property, or of an interest therein, and
such agreement, i f made by an agent of the party sought lo be
charged, is invalid, unle~s the authority of the agent be in writing,
subsc1·ibcd by the party sougbt to be charged.
l. C. § 9-505 .

However, the ''(T]hc doctrine of' part pcrfonnuncG is a weU~cstablishcd excepti on
to the strict application of the Statlltc of Frauds." Watson

11•

Watson, 144 Idaho 2 14, 217, 159

l' .3d 85 l , 855 (2007). "The doc trine of part performance provides that when the parties to an
agreement fai l to reduce the agreement to writ ing, or otherwise !-ail to sntisfy the statute of
l'rnutls, the agreement may nevertheless be spcci!icall y enforced when the purchasur has partly
performed the agreement." Bear Island Water ;Jss ·n, v.

Brown,

125 Idaho 717, 722, 874 P.2d

528, 533 ( 1994) (quotati on omillo<l).
Part performance does not actually take th e contract "outside" the Statute of
Frauds. Rather, part perform ance is better understood and characteri zed us a fo rm of equitable
csloppcl. Frantz v. Parke, 11 l Idaho 1005, 1008 10, 729 P.2<1 1068, l 07 l- 73 (Ct.J\pp.1 986).
J\s staled in Wolske. !nc. v. Hudspeth Sawmill Company:

We acknowledge that in some circumstances an oral agreement
may be removed from the strictures of the statute of fraud s by pnrl
or full pcrfo1mancc. Thi s exception to the statute of frauds is
grounded in equity. The exceptio11 protects " party ,vlto
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de11ww,·trates reliruwe upon an orul contrac.t by acts that would
not have been done but for the contract.
116 Idaho 714, 779 P.2d 28 (Ct. App .1989) (emphasis added). In addition to part per!c1nnunce1
full pel'formance of an agreement is also an exception to application of the Statute of Frnuds.

Quayle v. Mackert, 92 Idaho at 5p9M7(), 447 P.2d nl 68 5- 86 (' 1 Appe!lants argue that this contract

did not comply with the Statute of Frauds. However, since there was full performance by Manx
Quayle, the contract is enfotceable in equity") (citath'rns omitted).
Union Centrcil v. Nielson , 62 Idaho 483, 114 P.2d 252 (1941) and Mikesell v.
Newworld, 122 Idaho 868, 840 P.2d 1090 (Ct. App. 1992) arc directly on poinL

In Union

Cen tral, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a party' s part pcrformar1ce of a mortgage extension

acted as an exception io cnfbrcemcnt of the Statute of Frauds where: (a) the pa1iies both treated
the cxtens-ion agreement as being valid; (h) appellant made payments under the agrccnwnt; and
( c) respondent received

and a~cepted such payments.

62 ldaho at ·---' l 14 P .2d at 255

("Furthermore, both parties treated the iristrnment as a consmnmated ext.ensi.on agreement
aj)pdhmt making and respondent receiving payments under its Ler111s").

Similarly, in Mikesell~ the Court

or Appeal:; hdu that a party was cstoppcd under

the port performance doetrine frorn as±-.erling the St,1tute of Frauds as a defense. 122 1daho at 874,
840 P.2d at ·.1096. hl Mikcselli an owner of a disputed parcel pursuant to oral agreem ent sued the
purchaser for quiet title. The purchaser r si ·ted suit, assc1ting the Statute o 1· Frand8. The Court

rejected thb argument. According to the Comt:

In the present case, it is undi sputed that the MikeseHs took
possession of the thirty~foot parcel and exercised exclw;ive control
over the prem ise: fo r approximately three yea.rs. The Mikcsclls
made permanent and subshtntial valu ..1ble improvements relative to
the value or the di s1nrtcd parcel , and they paid the Burgesses
$ I 200 of the $1,5 00 purchase price. 11tus; the Mikesell.\·, in
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reliance on their

Ol'fll agt'cement with the Burge ·ses, cliange f
their position to th ?ir ti triment h taking ru:tual posr;es. ·ion of the
property, paying th , majority ()j the purc/Ja. ·e price, awl making
permanent w1/u{lbl' imprm 1em 1 11/s on the property. These actfom·
by the Mik ,,;ell · can only be mtributetl to the existeuce ,~{' the oral
coutract the. entered into with the Bm·;:esses.

fd. (cmplrn. i~ added) .

Here even assuming Lincoln Land can get hy the fact that it has no ability to

ir1vok a lhc Statute of Frauds, the statute doc. not tel Lir\coln Lm<l wher it w·rnts to be du to
LIP do ·trine::; of pat1 and/or full performance.
First, Lincoln Land judicially admits that LP Broadband used and occ11picd U1e

R oHops. Complaint, ,i 4 (stating that LP Broadband 'co ntinued to occt1py tho roof-top of Lh
property"); see also Complaint,

~!

( ·tating that LP Broadband has not paiu

"fo r Lhc use of

Linco ln Land's property"). "The party making a judicial admission is bound by th e statement

and muy nc>t contro\icrt the statement on trial or appeal." Strouse v. 1(. 'fok, Jnc., 129 ldaho 6 1E,
619,930 P.2d 136 1 1364 (Ct. App. 1997); Chri ten en

11.

124 P. 3cl 1008 1013 (2005) (" An t.1d111ission is of

ursc, binding on the admitting patty").

City of Pocatello .142 ldaho 132, 137,

Thus as in Mikesell, occu1 ancy a.nd use "can only be atLributed to the existence of lan] oral
contract." Mikes ell, 122 ldaho nt 874, 40 P.2d at 1096.

Second, in addition to occupying lhe Rootl:ops, LP Broadband paid for such use
under the Roof Top Agreement. Those constitute Hacts that would not have been done hut for
the ·ontract.'' Wolske, Inc., 11 6 fdaho at 715-16, 779 P.2d at 29- J0. Accordingly, ba:-;cd on the

ca c law cited above and Llncoln Land '::; own admissions, the doctrine of purt/f-ul l p(;)rfonnance
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renders Lincoln Land's Statute of Frauds challenge mcritless. As such, Lincoln Land's motion
should be denied.' 1

V.

CONCLUSlON

General M ills respectful ly requests that th is Court DENY Lincoln Land's Motion

for Partial Summn.ry Judgment and DISM]SS this suit.
DA'LED this 30111 day of March, 2016.
GIVENS PURSLEY L~

//:::

___,,r-",,....../

~

..,,.,.,.......----

B- y___.....,...,..._,..,;;,rn,_a..
<,,/ / / - ~ -- - - - - Alexa ef,i(McLaughlin - Ofthe Finn
Atton)Z:9-'l fo r Third-Party Defendants

/~

·1 Lincohl Land alS<} ~eeks 11 jwJgmcnl :;ta\i.ng that the Roof Top Agreement expired, at the latest, in 2008.
Opening Brtet: at 2. The prob lem, h()Wevcr, with this argument is th11t even if it is trne, which it is no t: (1) Linco lu
Land is still a Lhit'd-party that cannot nuack art agreement to which it was not a s(gnntory; and (2) parties are free to
modify thcil' ngreements and may do so by condtwl, c.g,; conti nuing L<) occupy space, contiuuing to pny for llse of
space, and accepting snch payments for such use ( 1713 C.J .S. Contracts § 979) ("Parties to an exiNting contract may,
by mutual assent, modify their contract, and the modification can be proved by an explkit agreement to modify or
by the action:,; and conduct of the parties, so long as the intention to mo<liJY is mutual ,md clear'' ); see also Ore-Ida
Potato Products, Inc. v. Lor.wm, 83 ld,1ho 290, 296, 362 1'.2d 384, 387 (1961) ("The fuel of ,1greement 111ay be
imp lied from 1:1 unar~e of conduct in accordimce wi Lh its existence mid assent nrny be implied from the ,1ct~ of one
parl.y in accordance with the terms of !he c;hange proposed by the other."). Here, as noted, LP Broadband paid for
use of the RoMtc; ps for llix (6) year:; after DH~ alleged expir.ition of the Roof Top Agreement. There is no cvidcnq~
that the parties i111t:ndcd Lo tcrm inaho the Roof Top ,\gr~Jemcnt, Therefore, the H.oof Top Agreement was continued
either by modification o r operation of l(:lw.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30111 day of March, 2016, I cansed a trnc and com.:cl
copy of the fbregoing to be served by the method indicated below, and addresscd to th e
folk1w ing:
Ma rk R. fuller
Daniel R. Beck
FULLEP & BECK LAW OFFICh, PLLC
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Ovcrni.ght Mail
W Facsimilc (208.524. 716 7)

Idaho Falls, ID 83405~0935

Ronald L. Swafford
Trevor L. Castleton

( ) U.S. Mail; Postage Prepaid

Lanen K. Covert

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail

SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.

0;A?acsimile (208 .524.4131)

655 S. Woodrnff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
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GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP

P.O. Box 2720

601 West Bannock Street
Boise, IcJuho ~3 702
Telephone (208) 388-1 200
Fac:;;irn:ilc (208) 388-1300
alexmciaughlin@givenspursJey.com
jcffbowcr@giv¢nspursley.com
Attorney forThird-Party Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COORT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LlNCOLN LANOCOMPANY, LLC
Plaintiff~

v.

)
)
)
)
)

)

LP BROADBAND, INC.

) Case No. cv;.2015.,;3927
)

Defcnda:ni.

LP BROADBAND, INC.;

V.

GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL
MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,

Thitd-Party Defendants.

) G:ENERAL MILLS, INC.'S AND
) GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS,
) LLC'S MEMORANDUM IN
) OPPOSITION TO LP BROADB
D,
) INC.'S MOTION ,FOR SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW, Third~Party Dete11dantsj General Mills, Tnc, and General M111s
Operations, LLC (collectively, ''General

Mills'\ by and through their attorneys of record,
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Givens Pursley LLP, and hereby subrnit this Memorandum

Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgn'l

111

Opp ) 'ilion l i LP BrC>udband,

'11t..

I.
Dercndant and Third~Party Plaintiff LP Broadband, Jnc, (''J:-,!_e_Broadband" has
moved for :,LUJ!lnary judgmc11t again

t

General Mith,, clctirning that as a niattcr of law Gunerul

Mills is l'equired to indemnify it under a theory of in1pli d indemnity. LP Broadband 's bri ·f is
under two page long. lt ba ldly a eits alrnost in pas ing. tlrnt General Mills is liable to LP

Broudband without any citation to relevant controlling law,
LP Broadband's n1otfon shoul d be dcuicd for at least two reasons. l'irst, th Roof~
top Rental Agreement- wh ich il:i the contract that governs thC:l rel ationship betw1.;cn LP
Broadband and General Mills- expressly bar. LP Broadbun<l from asserting a claim for impli ed
indemnity. Se\.:ond , LP Broadband has not set forth the elements ohm irnplicd ·indemnity claim.

Indeed, LP Broadband must, but car1nut, cstabli 'h: (a) the existence of an indtmmity relation hip
between the parties u1 dcr Idaho law; (b) that LP Broadband has been held liable to plaintiff;
Lincoln Land Cumpany, LLC ( 'J.,incol11.Land '); or (c) as

or yet, any amount of liabili ty that hus

been l1cld to be reasonable. For at least thcst:: teasons, the Court shoul d deny LP Broadband's
pre-muture ·ummary judgment motion.

U.

BACKGROUND

On March 20, 2000, LP Brnadbi.md ;s predecessor, Microscrv Computer
Techn logic , entered into a li cense agreement with General Mills the ~Roof-to

A ,rcemcnt"). 1

See

Rental

Declaratit.1n of Alexander P. McLaughlin (' Mc aughlin Declaration' ),

1 Although the issue i~ nClL pre/;ented in the context of LI> Urnadbund'H 1110Li n, there can be no liability
bt:canse G ncn1I Mills did 11ot viulatc the m1ti-subl easc pro ision of the lease agrccmc1,t wiU1 Lincoln Land. lndcc<l,
the Roof~top Rcnrnl Agreement is riot a !.ublcase it merely grnnt LP l3roadhan<l ti lie ·nse lo us· a portion of the
property in e, hange for payment.
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.. x. A

Pur uant to that agreement, G nernl Mill s granted LP l3roadbaml penn is ion t use the

roof t p If ' ~van's Grainery" grain . torage bins located at Lincoln Road in Idaho Fall s, lc.laho
the " Prop tty") for it1, wlr~I · ·s Int rnct e;:qujplll ·nt in ex.change +or mon thly paym ··nt of
$50.00.

1

id.

The Root:.top Rental Agreement provided, among otht.:r things, that:

'[LP

Br nd band] will not hold General Mill · or any of its employee,,· liable fo,· any dmuaKe,,·,
liahilities or prohle,m· ;-elating to this inswllation or operation of any /LP Bror,dbmul '.,·/
equipment." Se, id. (emphasis added). Although tho Roor.. top Rental !\gn.ic11enl contained an

xpiration date, the partie. waived thi . elate and continued lo perform th e agn :ement until April
2 014 . Affidavit of Adam Gillings, at 1i[8-10.

During the term of the Roof-top Rental Agreement., Lincoln Land pur hasc::d the

Propc1iy and

sutT

unding real property. In June 20l0, Lincoln Land entered into a written I.case

agreen,unl witb Genera.I !Vli llsi for, among other things, the Property. McLaughlin Declaration,

E . 13. That lease allowed General Mills to use the Property "without restriction'' dt1ring its term..
See id. at l , ii 4. Under the lease, Gener, I Mi Ils paid Linco1n Land approximately $ no 000.00
per your thrc)t1gh the end ot its tern, in Apri I 2014. Decl aration of Co lleer\ B enson .it 2.

On July 20, 201 5) Lincoln r,and fih:d lls complaint against LP Uroad band
as8erting a single cluirn for unju ·t ernichment. On or about December 16, 2015, LP Broadband
brought its thin.i~purty complaint against Ocncrnl Mills, seeking implied indemnity.

LP

Broadband has now moved the Court for summary judgment against General Mil ls on its
indcmn i.fication claim. Its motion lacks merit and hould be denied .

2 The knsc is nctu.ally b tween Gc ncrnl
ill s Opcrn tions, Inc. and 110 1 encr11 I Mi lls p n Hion, LC.
which is 1he name of the Thitd-Pnrty Def ndnnt. Genera l ills Operntions, L" C, howe er, i: tli~ . uc::ccssor-inintere 't to General M"ills Opermions, lnc.
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HI.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

''One of the principal purposes

or the summary judgment

rule is to isolate nnd

dispose of factually unsupported claims or defense ·.'' Celotex Corp. v. Cotrell, 477 U.S. 3 17,
j23- 24 ( 1986). "S ummary j udgment ... is pro perly regarded not us a di sfavored prnecdural
shortcu1 " but instead as a tool "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive J ctenninalion or <Nery
ud ion." id. at: 327; see also Chandler v. /!aye/en, 147 Idaho 765, n.2, 215 P.1 cl 485, n,2 (2009) (

adopting the language and reasoning of Celotex) (quotation omilled).
Summary judgment "shall he rendered fo rthwith ifthe pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on fi le, together with the affidavi ts, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any mnlcrial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.··
l.R.C. P. 56(c). "A material i:,;suc of fact, for summary judgment purposes, is

ot10

thal is relevant

to an element of the claim or defense and whose ex istence rn ighl affect lhe outcome of the case."
R~fe v. Long, 127 Idaho 84 1, 849, 908 P.2d 143, 15 1 (1995). Material ity alone is not sufficient to
survive summary j udgment, the foc;tual dispute in question must also be ''genuine."' Anderson v.

Uherty l.obby, Inc., 477 U.S . 242, 248 (1 986). A disputed issue of fact is "gcnui11e" "i f' Lhe
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could rctrnn a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "A
mere scinti lJa of evidence or only slight doubt is not surtJ.cient to create a genuine issue of
material fact.'' Mendenhall v. Aldous, 146 Idaho 434,436; 196 P.jd 352, 354 (2008).

l~

LEGALSTANDARDS

LP Broadband seeks summary judgment on its indem nity cl.aim against General
Mills. Indemnity is an equitabl e pri ncipl<.! 'based on the general theory that one compelled lo pay

damages caused by another should be able to seek recovery from that party." Clume,y v. Agri-

Lines Corp., 11 5 1daho 28 1,284, 766 P.2d 75 1, 754 (1988) (q uoling May Trucking Co. v. Intl.
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1/arvester Co., 97 Idaho 3 J 9, 321, 543 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1975)). indemnity refers to a claim fo r
rcimburscrncnt and rcimbursc1ncnt is tho right or one party who has sati.~fied a claim to seek
repuyincnt from another party. See id. Indemnity is bused on the "concept t-hat a party should be

held responsible for his own wrongs, and if another is compelled to pay damages caused by the
wrongdoer, that party is entitled to recover from the wrongdoer." Id. (emphasis added).

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Roof-Top Rental Agreement Ba1·s LP Brnadbantl From Secl<in~ Implied
Indemnity.

The first reason LP Broa<lband's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied

is because the Roof·:.top Rental Agreement, by its terms, bars LP Broudban<J from seeking
implied indemnity. That ugrccrnenl spcci fically provides:
Mi croscrv [LP Broadband's predecessor] will not hold General
Mills or any of its employees liable for any damages, liabilities or
problems related to thi s installation or operation or any or
Microscrv's equipment.
McLaughlin Declurntion, Ex. A
LP Bron<lbamPs claim fa lls squarely withi n this contructual prov1s1011. Indeed,
the contract expressly and broadly provides that LP Broadband will not seek to bold General

Mills liable for darnagcs, liabilities, or problems relating to the installation of its equipment. Yet
despite this language, this is precisely what LP Broadband attempts to do in this action. LP
Brnadbnnd's indemnity claim is contractually barred, plain and simple.

n.

LP Broadband Fails To Establish The l£1cmcnts Of Implied Jndcmnity As A Matter
Of Law.

The second reason that LP Broaclhand's motion shou ld be denied is because LP
Broadband cannot establish the clements of impli ed indemnity as a matter of law. The Idaho
Supreme Court hns stated that the three prima facie clements of ind emnity arc ·'(I) nn indemnity
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relationship, (2) ac.:tLml liability of an inden:mitee to the third party, and (3) a reasonabl e
settlement amount.'' Chenery, l I 5 Jdaho at 284, 7()(i P. 2d at 754; Williams v. Johnston, 92 Idaho
292, 442 P .2d 178 ( I %8). LP Broadband cannot establish any of tliese elemerits.
L

There is No indemnity Relationship Bctwe LP Broadband and Gen ra l
Mill beca use General Mill 'Alleg d LfabiHt . is Not Premised . pon n Tort.

Jn order for the doctrine of implied indernnity to apply, there generally must be

some basis for ton liability againsi the proposed indcmnitor. See Chener:Y, l l 5 Id aho at 284, 766
P.2d at 754; 4 l Arn. J ur. 2d Indemnity

s 20 (2005); see also Vreeken v. Lockwood l:,,' ng 'g, B. V.

148 Idaho 89 1 281 P.3d 1150, 1166 (2009) (applying Massachusetts law).

Hew, there is nu allegation or cJaim, Jct ah)ne evidence, that any liubility Oeneral
Mills rnay haw lo LP Broadband (and (here is none) is premised upon a tort. lnsteud, LP
Broadband ictsserls that General Mills breached the lt:ase (which is untrue) with Lincoln Land by
granting LP Broadbund a license to use a small portion of the rooftop of the storage bins· in other
words, liability is premised upon breach of a contract, a contract to which LP Broadband is not a
party. This is not sufficient.
2.

LP Broadband,s Motion ts Premature BecatlSI~- LP .Broadband Has Not Been
Found LiabJe to Lincoln Land.

Under Idaho law, "implied indenuiity is an equitable principle based upon the
general theory that one compelled to pay for the damage caused ~Y another should be ahle to
seek recovery Ji-om that party.;; Griggs v. Sqfi.1co Ins. Co. r~f Ainerica; 654 P.2d 378, 380 (Idaho
1982) (emphasis added); see Chenetyi 766 P.2d at 754- -55. As of now; no jlldgment has been
entered in favor of Lincoln Land and against LP Broadband and LP Broadbm,d is not being

compelled to pay Lincoln Land a dime. Without such liab.ility, any u.lai111 by LP t3roudbancl for
indemnity is premature.
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As of Yet, Any Amount That Muy he Owed by LP Brondbancl to Lincoln
Land. Has Not R ·c 1 1 ouitd to be R a onablc.

3;

LP Brnadband cunnot establish that nny amount it may owe to Lincoln Land is
n;;u ·onabJc.

s noted above, under Id ah lawi there can be no liahilily ror indemnity tmles· the

amount owed is rea onablc. See Chene,y) t 15 Idali at 284, 766 P .2<l at 7 4. Here, even if LP
Broadband had been found liable to Linc( In Land; LP Broadband cannot at this early stage prov
that any such amount it muy owe Lincoln Lmd is reasonable becuus that quc tion ha not bc1,;n
asked or answered. Even if' it were, there are certainly genuine t "UCS of material fact on th"
point a. Linqiln Land seeks moru tlrnn $150,000.00 for the use of property that GcncJ'al Mills
allowl;l<l LP Broadband to use for $50.00 per month. Accordingly, LP Broadband 's motion i~
premature and, even ifit is not, issues offoct preclude sununaryrdicC
VI.

CONCLUSION

LP Broadband's Motion frir Suminury Judgment against Ceneral Mills should be
dunied.

The contract between LP Broadband and General Mills bar LP Broadband from

seeking implied indemnity. Moreover, LP Broadband has not and cannot establish the elements

of irnpli~xi indemnity as a matter of law. General Mill s, thercfoi·e; respocLfully r~qu(jsts that the
Court deny LP Broadband's Motion.
DATED this 30th duy of March, 201

GIVENS PURSLEY 1.1.P

GE ERAL MILLS, l 'C. S A D GE l~IUL MJLLS OPKRATIONS, LLC'S OPPOSITION
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CERTI FICATE O F SERVICE

I HER EBY CERTIFY that on thi s 30th <lay or March, 20 16, I caused a true anti con·cct
copy of lhe foregoing to be servecl by the m<::thod indicated below, and addressed to tho
followin g:
Mark R. Fulkr
Oanid R. Beck
FU I .1 ,F.R & BECK LAW OF:FlCE, PI ,I ,C
4 10 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. 13ox 50935
ldaho Falls, II) 83405-0935

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Ov<::rnigbl Mail
~ ~Facsimile (208.524. 7 167)

Ronald L. Swafford

( ) U.S. Mail, Pos1age Prepaid

Trevor L. Castleton
Larrcn K. Covert
SWAFf-OR.D LAW, P.C.
655 S. Woodrnff
Idaho Falls>ID 8340 I

( ) Hand Deli vered
( ) Overnight Ma il
t4·Facsimi1e (208.524.4 13 1)

GJ<:Nli:RA L MILLS, JNC.'S ANl> GENl<.:RAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC'S OJ'J'OSITlON TO LP
BHOADBAND, INC.'S MOTION FOR SlJMMARY ,HJOGMENT- 8
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(
MARK R. FULLER (ISB No . 2698)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES , PLLC .
41 0

MEMORI AL DRIVE ,

S UITE

201

P • o . Box 5 o9 3 5

I DAHO FALLS , ID 8340 5- 0935
T ELEPHONE :

(208 )

5 2 4- 5 4 0 0

FACSIMILE: (208) 524-7167
ATTORNEY FOR P LAINT IFF

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
I daho limited li abili ty company ,

Case No. CV- 1 5-3927

Plaintiff ,
V.

LP BROADBAND , INC . , a Colo ra do
corporation , success or by merger
to MicroServ ,
In c .,
an Idaho
co r poration ,

AFFIDAVIT OF JIM ROONEY IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant .
LP BROADBAND , INC .,
Third-Party Plai ntiff ,
v.

GEN ERAL MILLS , I NC. and GENERAL
MI LLS OPERATIONS , LLC ,
Third-Pa rty Defendants .

State of Idaho

)

) ss.
County of Bonneville

)

Jim Rooney, being fi rst duly sworn, upon his oath states and alleges as follows:
1. Affiant is an adult, residing in Bonneville County, Idaho, and provides this Affidavit
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upon his personal information.
2. Between January, 2000 and August, 2013, Affiant was General Manager of
Genera l Mills, Inc., for the Idaho Falls area and was responsible for directing the
activ ities at the Evan's Grainery grain storage bins, located at 3075 E. Lincoln
Road, Idaho Falls, ID.
3. General Mills, Inc., leased the subject premises from Evan's Grain and/or Lincoln
Land Company, LLC in five-year increments as follows: July, 1995 - June, 2000;
June, 2000 - May, 2005 ; May, 2005 -April , 201 O; April, 2010 - March, 2015.
4. As Genera l Manager, Affiant received a copy of the Roof-top Rental Agreement,
dated March 20, 2000, attached hereto as Exhibit 'A', which had been signed by
Kerry Schaeffer, Regional Manager for General Mills. Affiant understood this was a
trade for services to allow General Mills to acquire internet services. This 2000
Roof-top Rental Agreement extended for a term of no less than three years, and up
to five years, with annual renewa ls after the first three years. It was the intention of
General Mills that this 2000 Roof-top Rental Agreement not extend beyond the end
of the June, 2000 - May, 2005 Lease Agreement between General Mills and Evan's
Grain . General Mills could not agree to a term beyond May, 2005 until after General
Mills renewed its lease with Evan's Grain. The 2000 Roof-top Rental Agreement
was entered into by the Regional Manager of General Mills.
5. Subsequent to receiving _ the 2000 Roof-top Rental Agreement from Kerry
Schaeffer, Affiant reviewed General Mills' Lease Agreement with Evan's Grain
extend ing between June, 2000 - May, 2005 , and learned that General Mills had no
authority to sublease any interest in the grain storage bins, including the roof-top
space.
AF FIDAVIT OF JIM ROONE Y - 2
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6. During early 2004, Affiant was contacted by Travis Johnson , President of MicroServ
Computer Technologies, Inc., regarding extending the 2000 Roof-Top Rental
Agreement for an additional five years. Affiant again informed Travis Johnson that
General Mills did not own the premises and cou ld not enter into any Roof-top
Rental Agreement, as it was not General Mills' place to sign a roof-top lease. Any
such extension or new sublease agreement would be in violation of General Mills'
lease with Evan's Grain and would not co incide with the five-year lease periods
explained above. Affiant instructed Travis Johnson to make direct contact with the
building owner, Evan's Grain , to negotiate any long-term agreement.
7. Affiant has subsequently reviewed the unsigned Antenna Space Lease Agreement,
prepared by Travis Johnson at MicroServ, for signature by Evan's Grain and
Elevator Company, for the term extending June 1, 2004 - June 1, 2009. Such
Antenna Space Lease Ag reement is attached hereto as Exhibit 'B'. To the best of
Affiant's knowledge and belief, such 2004 Antenna Space Lease Agreement was
never executed by Evan's Grain & Elevator Company.
8. During early 2012, Affiant was again contacted by Travis Johnson, President of
MicroServ, Inc., and provided with a copy of the April 10, 2013 Tower Agreement,
attached hereto as Exhibit 'C', by which MicroServ sought a lease extending from
April 10, 2013 through March 31, 2018. Affiant again informed Travis Johnson that
General Mills did not own the premises and could not execute an agreement wh ich
would extend beyond the March, 2015, expiration of General Mills' lease with
Lincoln Land , and it was not General Mills' place to sign a lease agreement. Affiant
instructed Travis Johnson to make direct contact with the building owner, Lin coln
Land Company, to negotiate any long-term agreement.
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM ROONEY - 3
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9. Throughout these proceedings, Affiant understood that MicroServ was trying
desperately to secure continued access to the roof-top of the silos because of the
substantial revenue generated by the placement of the internet antennas. General
Mil ls did not demand the removal of MicroServ, but had no authority to authorize
MicroServ to remain on the roof-top without owner consent. Affiant knew that
MicroServ continued to pay $50 .00 for the month-to-month occupancy. After the
September 11 , 2001 bombings, homeland security concerns about the United
States food supply lead to concerns by General Mills about site security and
san itation . Sometime around 2004, Affiant started having conversations with
MicroServ's representatives concern ing the roof top access. Specifically Affiant told
them on more than one occasion that General Mills may at any time tell MicroServ
that General Mills could no longer allow internet companies access to the top of the
elevators . When MicroServ was looking for a new agreement they were told that
General Mills did not care about the nominal fee they had been paying and is more
concerned about security issues. MicroServ was also told at that time that General
Mills didn't own the space and was on a lease that did not allow for sublease and
that the owner was Evans Grain. Furthermore , General Mills didn't even have a
new lease for the term MicroServ was requesting .
10. From at least June, 2004, MicroServ had absolute knowledge that General Mills
was not the owner of the subject premise, and that any lease agreement must be
negotiated between MicroServ and the owner of the building .
11. Further this Affiant sayeth not.
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.-

DATED this

30

day of March , 2016.

SUBSC RIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30 day of March, 2016.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
l~ &- 0~ - Zi? lf
My Commission Expires: r;2,,rh J

~

?--o/1~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below on this

?0

day of March ,

2016:

Document Served :

AFFIDAVIT OF JIM ROONEY IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Attorney Served :
Ron Swafford
Hand Delivery
Larren Covert
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Fax: 208-524-4131

U.S. Mail

¥

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jeffrey W . Bower
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208-388-1300

Facsimile

_
..!("

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Ad1A/4-s:_.;fak
r,Jark R. Fuller
FU LLER & BECK
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Roof-top Rental Agreement
3/20/2000

Microserv Computer Technologies, Inc. located at 1808 E. 17th Street, Tdaho Falls, ID,
83404 hereby agrees to pay $50 per month to General *ills located .at _ _ _ __ in
exchange for roof-top space on the "Evan's Grainezy'' grain storage bins located at __
·_
Lincoln Road in 'Idaho Falls, Tdaho. General Mills also agrees to pay the electricity bill
for !vfii.::roserv's t:qLl"ipment (.-.,$5 pc1' month) loca!..cd ai same locai.ion. Microserv wjiJ
contract for any power requirements necessary to install their equipment as per city, state
and county electrical and safety codes.
Microserv will not hold General Mills or any of its employees liable for any damages,
liabilities or problems related to this installation or operation of any of Microscrv' s
equipment. All of the equipment and personnel associated. with this project will be
covered by Microscrv's insurances.
This contract shall be valid for no less than 3 years, and u.p to 5 years with ana.ual
renewals after the fiTsr 3 years . If either party wishes to cancel this contract, they rnll.5t
prov1de written notice of su.ch cance11ation at least 3 months prior to date of cancell.i.ticn.
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Date

. .. -: ·· 1. .

Brad Kapple, Secretary/Treasurer
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April 10, 2013

Tower agreement

Microserv, Inc. hereby agrees to pay $ 100 per month in exchange for space and 120VAC
elecbical power to install wireless equipment on the "Evan's Grainery" located at 2910
E. Lincoln Road, Idaho Falls, ID. Microserv shall have exclusive use of the 902928:rvtliz, 2.400-2.499GHz, 3.600-3 .700GHz and 5.200-5 .899GHz frequency ranges at
this location.
This agreement shall be valid from 04/ 10/2013 to 3/31/2018.

Travis Johnson President
Microserv, Inc.

Jim Rooney
General Mills

~'n
P 11r
\ .. .1, l 1 I,.} i
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RECEIVED
MAR 3 0 2016
Per ______

SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, LP Broadband, by and through its attorney ofrecord,
Larren K. Covert, Esq. and hereby objects to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by
the Plaintiff as follows:
RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE
LP Broadband, Inc.("LP Broadband) is the successor by merger to MicroServ Computer
Technologies, Inc. ("MicroServ"). As such, LP Broadband is entitled to all defenses, rights and
obligations of MicorServ.
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On March 20, 2000, MicroServ entered into an agreement with General Mills for the use
of a grain elevator rooftop for a location for antenna equipment. This agreement is attached as
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Adam Gi llings and fully incorporated herein. This agreement was
for the Evans Grainery location owned, operated or in use by General Mills. This agreement
allowed for MicroServ to install and utilize equipment on the property for the payment of $50.00
per month. The agreement requires that any party seeking to terminate the agreement must give a
30 day notice before termination.
MicroServ installed equipment at this location and utilized the equipment unti l April,
2014. Pursuant to the rental agreement, MicroServ and then LP Broadband paid the monthl y rent
pursuant to the agreement with General Mills for each month beginning March , 2000 until April,
20 14. A copy of the payments is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Adam Gillings and
fu lly incorporated herein.
LP Broadband and MicroServ did not have any notice or knowledge of any change of
ownership of the property by Plaintiff until April, 20 14 when Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant.
There was no notification or signage on the property to indicate any ownership change to
Plaintiff. Photographs of the property are attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Adam Gillings
and fully incorporated herein.
At all times from March, 2000 until April , 20 I 4, General Mills operated as if it had all
authority to rent the property to Defendant. General Mills allowed access to the property and
collected the rent payments.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper onl y when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When assessing a motion for summary
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judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonrnoving party.
Furthermore the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pai1y res.isting the
motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co. 119 Idaho 514, 517 808 P.2d 851,854 (1991);
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist. , 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
The party moving for summary judgment initially cm-ries the burden to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matt r of
law. Eliopu/os v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App. l 992). The burden may
be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be
required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475,478
(Ct.App.1994 ). Such an absence of evi dence may be establ ished either by an affirmative showing
with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving pai1y's evidence and
the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc. , 134
Idaho 711 712 8 P .3d 1254 1255 (Ct.App.2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been
established, th burden then shifts to the party oppo ing the motion to show, via further
depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to
offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P . 56(f). Sanders 125 Idaho at 874
876 P.2d at 156.
'Unjust emichrnent occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which would be
inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust.'
Vanderford o. v. Knudson 144 Idaho 547, 557 165 P.3d 261 , 271 (2007) (citing Beco

onslr.

Co. v. Bannock Paving Co. , 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990)). A prima facie case
for unjust enrichment exists where: " (1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the
plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit
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under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without
payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital

Grp. , Inc. 152 Idaho 824, 827 275 P.3d 839, 842(20 12)
I.C. §9-503 states: Transfers of real property to be in writing. No estate or interest in real
prope1iy, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one (1) year, nor any trust or power over
or conceming it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other
instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.

ARGUMENT
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Plaintiff initially seeks sLUnmary judgment on its claim for unjust enrichment, asking the
Court to rule as a matter of law that Defendant was unjustly enri.ched by Plaintiff. Plaintiff
attempts to discharge its responsibility and burden of proof on summary judgment by simply
stating "In the present action, it is clear that each of the elements [for unjust emichment] are
present the on ly legitimate question is the amount by which LP Broadband was unjustly
enriched." Brief in Support of Motion fo r Partial Summary Judgment p . 8.
In its summary judgment motion, Plaintiff has completely failed to meet its high burden
on showing each and every element of the unjust emichment claim has been met and that there is
a complete lack of disputed, material facts . As Plai ntiff bears the burden of prov ing unjust
enrichment at trial and is the moving paiiy on summai·y judgment Plaintiff also bears the
burden on summary judgment. P lainti ff may no t simp ly rest on allegations but must have an
affirmative hewing for each and every element for which it seeks summary judgment .
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Plaintiff did not and cannot now show a lack of disputed, material facts for its unjust
emichment claim. In fact , Defendant has sought its own summary judgment on the unjust
enrichment claim, alleging that Defendant was not unjustly enriched by the Plaintiff and that
Plaintiff cannot prove its case. Defendant incorporates all of its arguments, facts and law
presented in its summary judgment moti.on full y herein.
As Plaintiff did not meet its burden in its summary judgment motion, summary judgment
on the issue of tmjust emichment must be denied. Any attempt to bolster its unsupported claim at
this point should be stricken as against proper procedme, leaving Defendant without the
opportunity to respond in Plaintiffs motion.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND LEASE AGREEMENT
Plaintiffs summary judgment motion also seeks summary judgment on "any and all
defenses asserted by Defendant, LP Broadband, Inc. claiming that MicroS erv, Inc. LP
Broadband's predecessor in interest, entered into a valid Sublease/Rental Agreement after March
20 2008 for the rooftops of the grain elevators located at 3075 E. Lincoln Road Idaho Falls
Idaho. ' The singular legal theory ass rted by the Plaintiff is that any agreements between LP
Broadband and General Mills violated the Statute of Frauds. For the reasons noted below
Plaintiffs arguments fail.
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS PROSPECTIVE IN NATURE
Plaintiff attempts to have the Statute of Frauds operate to negate the past agreement
between General Mills and Defendant. This is contrary to the purpose of the statute. The statute's
purpose is to limit enforcement of agreements pertaining to interests in land to only those
agr ments that are in writing and meet statutory requirements.
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The cases cited by the Plaintiff and used to support its position are all cases dealing with
the prospective enforcement of an agreement relating to real property.
The case of Wake/am v. Hagood, 151 Idaho 688, 263 P.3d 742 (2011) dealt with the
issues surrounding the sale of a property at an auction. Wakelam was the high bidder at an
auction for real property sold by Hagood. The legal issue was the relationship between the
auction proc du.res and the statute of frauds. Hagood argued the Stah1te of Frauds prohibited the
transfer of his property as a result of the auction, as no written document was executed by the
parties. The analysis by the Court examined the auction procedures, the agreements and
documents prepared at the auction. The Court concluded that sufficient docw11entation existed to
enforce the sale of the auctioned property. The entire issue addressed by the Court was the
prospective application of the Statute of Frauds for the sale of the property.

The case of Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d 218 (198 1) involved a
request for specific performance or damages related to a sale and purchase of real prope11y.
Hoffman negotiated with Sun Valley Company for the purchase of a 1.64 acre lot. The Court
examined the negotiations between the parties, the documentation that was provided betw en the
parties and the actions taken by each party concerning the prope1iy. The Court found that the
events and record indicated an oral contract, however this oral contract did not comply with the
Statute of Frauds. Therefore, the Court refused the prospective application of the agreement
based on the Statute of Frauds and denied any damages from that agreement.
The Plaintiff is not seeking to utilize the Statute of Frauds to prohibit prospective
enforcement of an agreement or to limit damages from futme performance. Plaintiff is seeking to
have the statue invalidate a prior agreement, to which the Plaintiff was not a pai1y, which prior
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agreement was fully performed. Thi.s retroactive application of the Statute of Fraud is not
suppo1t by the law cited by the Plaintiff and supp01ting case law has not been located.
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND GENERAL MIL S IS OUTSIDE
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The agreement between the Defendant and General Mills was one for the rental of real
property. This agreement was not only entered into by the Defendant and General Mi ll s and the
Defendant but performed for 14 years. This p rformance of the agreement removes the
agreement from the application of the Statute of Frauds.
In McMahon v. Auger, 83 Idaho 27 375 P.2d 374 (1960) the Idaho Supreme Court stated,
"This Court has repeatedly said that an oral contract for the conveyance of real prope1iy wil l be
enforced and is binding upon the parties thereto, and is not within the statute of frauds when
there is partial or complete performance of th same." Id. at 37, 380, quoting Anselmo v.
Beardmore, 70 Idaho 392,2 19 P.2d 946; Wood v. Hill, 70 Idaho 93 ,2 12 P.2d 39 1; Jones v.
Adams, 67 Idaho 402, 182 P.2d 963.
Additionally, the Court in McMahon stated,
Another underlying principle applicable where the contract does
not comply with the statute of frauds is that equity will not enforce
it except in cases where a refusal to do so would be inequitable.
Conversely, where a party has so performed, or changed his
position in reliance on the contract, that to allow the other party to
interpose the statute of frauds as a defense, would perpetrate a
fraud on the performing party, and the legal remedy is inadequate,
equity will decree specific performance. Id. at 37, 379.
In this matter, there is no question that General Mills and Defendant entered into an
agree ment in March, 2000. This agreement allowed the Defendant to place and utilize equipment
on the Evans Grainery location. The agre m nt required the Defendant to pay monthly rent.
Defendant complied with this requirement. Genera.I Mills accepted the payments and allowed for
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the installation and utilization of the rooftop location. This performance of the agreement by both
parties to the agreement removes the agreement from the limitations of the Statute of Frauds.
Prohibiting the defenses pertaining to the agreement between General Mills and
Defendant would be inequitable and impermissible. Based on the performance of the agreement
between General Mill s and the Defendant for 14 years, both the law and equity require removal
of the agreement from the limitations and obligations of the Statute of Frauds.
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GENERAL MILLS AND DEFENDANT CONTINUED
BEYOND MARCI. 2008
The agreement between General Mills and the Defendant continued to operate far beyond
2008 as alleged by the Plaintiff. The agreement itself indicates that a party wishing to terminate
the agreement must give a 30 day notice of the cancelation of the agreement. No such notice was
ever given by General Mills or Defendant. The termination of the Defendant' s occupancy of the
property came from notices from the Plaintiff, not General Mills.
In addition to the language of the agreement Idaho law provides for an additional term of
occupancy based on a hold over. In the case of Levviston Pre -Mix Concrete, lnc. v. Rohde, 11 0
Idaho 640, 718 P .2d 55 1 (1985 review denied 1985) the Idaho Court of Appeals stated the law
related to a hold over and the impact on tenancy and tenancy agreements. The Court stated,
When a lessee holds over after his tenancy for a fixed term of years
expires, the lessor must elect to either treat the lessee as a
trespasser or hold him to a new tenancy. If he treats the lessee as a
trespasser, the lessor may bring an action for unlawful detainer. If,
however, the lessor seeks, implicitly or explicitly, to hold the
1 ssee to a new tenancy a new lease arises by operation of law.
(internal citations omitted) Id at 644-645 555-556.
To determine what rights the hold over tenant will have requires the Court to look at the
lessor s intent. ld. This intent is determined by the lessor' s words and actions. Id. 'If the lessor
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demands or accepts rent from the lessee he will be presumed to have elected to hold the lessee
to a new tenancy absent of course a clearly expressed intention to the contrary. ' Id.
In this matter, General Mills accepted rental payments from Defendant from March,
2000 until April, 2014. These payments were timely and regular. No payment was ever refused.
There is no indication that General Mills ever expressed an intention to cancel the agreement
with Defendant.
The continued performance of the March, 2000 agreement between General Mills and
the Defendant resulted in a mutually accepted hold over and a continuing new t nancy by
operation oflaw. This continuing new tenancy is not subject to the Statute of Frauds ru1d could
only be terminated by written notice. I. C.§55-208 requires that a tenancy at will may be
terminated only by the giving of written notice requiring removal from the premises within a
period of not less than one month.

1 he language of the March 2000 agreement and the law on hold over both provide for
Defendant to continue to occupy and utilize the Evans Grainery location. The Statute of Frauds
ha no control over the law on hold over tenancy and therefore Plaintiffs smmnary judgment
reque t fail s.

DAMAGES
Plaintiff's fina l position on summary judgment is to have a determination as a matter of
law, as to how the Court will measure damages in this matter. Plaintiff has asked for this finding
based, not on actual Idaho law, but an argument as to what damages should be. As the issue of
damage is not a matter of settled law in Idaho, and the factual factors are not yet determined as
a tri al in this matter is still pending, summary judgment on this issue is impossible.
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Plaintiff badly asserts that' Idaho case law (sic.) and the Restatement (Th ird) of
R stitution and Unjust Enrichment, the amount of restitution to be disgorger under an unjust
enrichment cause of action is the net profit attributable to the underlying wrong. ' Brief in
upport a/Motion for Partial Summary Judgment pp. 18-19. This asse1iion, however, is

comp lete ly devoid of any suppo rting Idaho case law. Wherefore, as in every other area, it is
incumb nt on the moving party on summary judgment to show that it is entitled to judgment, as
a matter of law. Without any actual showing of Idaho law, Plaintiff fails to meet its burden and

summary judgment should be denied.

If the Court is not inclined to deny summary judgment based on the Plaintifr s fai lure to
show adequate Idaho law for summary judgment, the analysis of Plaintiffs claim shows that its
arguments likewise fai l.
Plaintiffs arguments for its measuring of damages initially fails on the language of the

!DANT.A case and the restatement itself. The cited language requires a finding that the defendant
be a conscious wrongdoer" in order for a disgorgement of profits remedy to be applied. The

Re ·tatement goes on to again affim1 the requirement of this finding by stating, the unjust
emichment of a conscious wrongdoer, or of ad faulting fiduc iary without regard to notice or
fault is the net profit attributable to the underlying wrong." Restatement (Third) Section 51 (4).

1.t is also important to note the facts of the JDANTA case, as this sheds much light on the
California court's determination to order a disgorgement of profits . IDANTA involved the use of
a specialized method to purchase property to avoid funll'e tax consequences. This method stood
to resu lt in large profits for the company utilizing the process. The initial compan

AML was

created and formed agreements to not compete with the company and to not use this purchasing
process outside the company. Afters veral years and successful use of the property some of the
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initial members of AML created their own company and used the method to make the same
property purchases that had been used by AML. AML brought suit for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty.
The Court in IDANTA found a disgorgement of profits was an appropriate remedy for the
aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty. The court stated, "a person acting in conscious
disregard of the rights of another should be required to disgorge all profit because disgorgement
both benefits the injured parties and deters the perpetrator from committing the same unlawful
actions again.' Am. Master Lease LLC v. Jdanta Partners, Ltd., 225 Cal. App. 4th 1451, 1482,
171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 548, 573 (2014), as modified (May 27, 20 14). The entire focus of the decision
to al low the disgorgernent of profits as the measure of damages was based COMPLETELY on
the finding that there was a willful breach of a fiduciary duty. It was that willful breach that
resulted in profits and required restitution.
Even pursuantto the incorrect arguments of the Plaintiff, if this were the measure of
damages, it would require an initial finding of the Cou11 that the Defendant is a conscious
wrongdoer. The Defendant is absolutely

OT a conscious wrongdoer a fact that is not disputed

by the Plaintiff nor the Defendant. Both parties have stated that they did not know about the
other party and the involvement in the property until April of 2014. Without the establishment of
the undisputed fact of the conscious wrongdoing of the Defendant, based on the authority stated
by th Plaintiff, summary judgment cannot be granted on the measure of damages.
Plaintiffs asse1tion that there is a lack of applicable case law in Idaho concerning
damages in unjust enrichment cases is very wrong. The only lack of case law in Idaho is any case
law to up port Plaintiffs request for disgorgement of profits.
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The case of Toews v. Funk, 129 Idaho 316, 924 P .2d 217 (1984) evaluated how damages
were to be detennined. Toews stated
Restitution has been recognized as a means of granting relief to
prevent unjust emichrnent. In Idaho at least, a patty who is liab le in
restitution for a sum of money must pay an amount equal to that
part of the benefit bestowed upon him which would be unjust for
the recipient to retain. Brown v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene, Ltd.,
supra, stated it this way:
If it is determined that benefits achially were
bestowed, other elements of the unjust enrichment
doctrine must be satisfied. The value of the
benefits must be realized by the breaching patty
under circumstances where it would be inequitable
to avoid payment.
111 Idaho at 199, 722 P.2d at 1066.
Thus, " [t]he measure of damages is not necessarily the value of the
money, labor and materials provided by the plaintiff to the
defendant, but the amount of benefit the defendat1t received which
would be unjust for the defendant to retain." Gillette v. Storm
Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 666, 619 P.2d 111 6, 1119 (1980).
See also Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 710 P.2d 647
(Ct.App.1985); Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110
Idaho 640, 718 P.2d 551 (Ct.App. 1985). The party who has
conferred the benefit and who is seeking the return of the full
an10unt thereof has the burden of proving that it would be unjust
for the recipient to retain any pa1t of the benefit. Lewiston Pre-Mix
Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde 110 Idaho at 647,718 P. 2d at 558

Thus aft r a showing of ALL the other elements of unjust enrichment, the mea ure of damages
MUST be evaluated as follows :
l. Amount of the benefit given from the Plaintiff to the Defendant
2. The amount of that benefit (if any) that was actually received by the Defendant.
3. The p01tion of the amount of the benefit actually received by the Defendant (if any)
that would be unjust for the Defendant to retain.
The Plaintiffs formulistic requirement of disgorgement of net profit is contrary to actual Idaho
case law.
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ln this matter, the Plaintiff must first meet all of the elements for unjust enrichment. Then
the Plaintiff must show the amount or value of the benefit it provided to the Defendant. Here, it
is argued that the Plaintiff did not actually give any benefit to the Defendant, however for the
purposes of the argument only on damages, the Plaintiff would have to show the values of the
use or rental of the rooftop space uti lized by the Defendant. Then, the Plaintiff would have to
establish that the Defendant actually received any part of that benefit. Again this requirement is
disputed by the Defendant. For th.e sak of the damages argument, the Plaintiff would have to
show what portion of the value of the rooftop rental that was received by the Defendant. Finally
the Plaintiff would have to show what portion of the benefit, the value of the rooftop rental
actually received by the Defendant would be unjust for the Defendant to retain.
Based on the above Idaho law, in order to recover the amounts the Plaintiff is claiming,
Plaintiff would have to show that Plaintiff bestowed the net profit on the Defendant, solely and
completely. It is impossible for Plaintiff to so prove, and even more impossible for this Court to
determine, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs benefit it gave to the Defendant was the net profit.
In Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663,667,619 P.2d 1116, 11 20 (1980) the
Idaho Supreme Court stated, 'Unj ust enrichment is an equitable doctrine and is inapplicable
where the plaintiff in an action fails to provide the proof necessary to establish the value of the
benefit conferred upon the defendant. " Again, the initial burden must be to establish the "value
of the benefit" not what the Defendant did with the alleged benefit. The only benefit the Plaintiff
all ged in its complaint is the rental of the property. As such the value is only th value of the
rental nothing else. Summary judgment must be denied based on thj s relevant Idaho case law.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs request for summary judgment must be denied and there is no applicable case
law in Idaho to support Plaintiffs position and a resolution of the fact is necessary for proper
determination.
7, 't '

DATED this _a_,£!_ day of March, 20 16 .

.::::?%~
LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
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ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
Case No. CV- 15 - 3927

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC, an
I daho
limited
liability
company ,

BRIEF IN REPLY TO
LP BROADBAND'$ AND GENERAL
MILLS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM
AND BURDENS OF PROOF

Pl aintiff,
V.

LP BROADBAND, INC., a Colorado
corporation ,
successor
by
merger to MicroServ , Inc ., an
Idaho corpora t ion ,
Defendant .
LP BROADBAND , I NC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff ,

v.
GENERAL
MILLS ,
INC .
and
GENERAL MILLS OP ERATIONS , LLC ,
Third-Party Defendan ts .

COMES NOW the

Pl aintiff ,

Linco ln Land Company ,

through i ts att orney of r eco rd , Mark R.

Fu ll er ,

LLC ,

by and

of Fuller & Bec k

Law Offices, PLLC, and fi l es this Brief in Reply to LP Br oadband 's
and

General

Judgment

Re :

Mills '
Unjust

Opposition
En richme n t

to

Motion

Claim

and

for

Partia l

Burdens

of

Summary
Proof.
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Plaintiff reques ts that the Court f i nd as a matter of law that
Lincoln Land is entitled to Partial Summary Judgment regarding all
elements of Lincoln Land ' s

claim for unjust enrichment ,

leav i ng

only the amo unt of damages to be determi n ed at trial . The Cour t
shoul d

deny

any

and

all

Broadband ,

defenses

Defendant ,

LP

Broadband ' s

predecessor in interest)

agreement

after March

20 ,

elevators

located at

3075

(hereafter
Inc .,

"the Rooftops") .

Inc .,

2008 ,
E.

based

upon

assertions

MicroServ ,

t h at

by

I nc .

(LP

possessed a valid sublease

for

the

Lincoln

rooftops

Road ,

(LP Broadband ,

of

Idaho
Inc .,

the

grain

Falls ,

Idaho

and MicroServ ,

which have now merged , shall be jointly referred to herein

as " LP Broadband " ) . As a matter of law , LP Broadband did not have
a val id sublease agreement for the Rooftop s af t er March 20 ,

2008

and any agre ement ( s)

LP Broadband had wit h Genera 7 Mi J ls ,

Tnc .

and/or

Gene ral

Operations ,

is/are

not

Mills

relevant

to

LLC

Lincoln Land ' s

( joint ly

"General

unjust

enrichment

Mills " )
claims

against LP Broadband .
Lincoln Land withdraws

its

Motion

regarding

allocation

of

Burdens of Proof and will refile s uch i ssue as a Motion in Limine
before trial .
ARGUMENT

1 . REPLY
TO
GENERAL
MILLS '
MEMORAN DUM
IN
OPPOSITION
PLAINTIFF ' S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT .

TO

a . Lincoln Land is entitled to Partial Summary Judgment on
its Unjust Enrichment Claim.

Lincoln Land has already argued its entitlement to summary
judgment regard i ng unjust enrichment in its initial briefing and
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in its Brief in Opposition to LP Broadband ' s Motion for Summary
filed

Judgment ,

March

30 ,

2016 .

Lincoln

Land

realleges

and

reincorporate s the arguments set forth in those two briefs as if
fully stated her e in .
General Mills relies upon Medical Recovery Services , LLC v .
Bonneville Billing and Collections , Inc ., 157 Idaho 395 , 336 P . 3d

802

(2014)

(wh i ch

Lincoln

Land

addressed

in

its

Brief

in

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment , p . 5-7) , and Stevenson

v . Windermere Real Esta te/Capital Grp ., Inc . , 152 Idaho 824 ,
P . 3d 839
must

(2012) ,

come

be n efit

f or the proposition that " the benefit conferred

directly

Memorandum o f

275

from

Genera l

the

Mi l ls ,

plaintiff
p.

(wage s/earnest money)

7.

to

the

I n both o f

defendant ."

See

these cases ,

the

was owned and conf erred by a third

party , not the pla i ntiff . In neither case did t he third party do
anything i l legal or contrary to con tractual agreements related to
the plaintiff ' s

property .

152

Idaho at

829 , nt . 4 , " Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy ."

(emphasis

in original) .

The

violation

contractual

of

As noted in Windermere ,

unclean

hands

of parties acting in conscious

agreements

should

not

be

ignored

in

fashioning an equ it able remedy . General Mil ls had no authority to
co n fer

any

violation

be nef it
of

the

on
Lease

LP

Broadband .
and

LP

General

Broadband

Mills '

continuing

complicity

in

that

violation must be considered .
In the present action ,

it is not disputed that LP Broadband

received a benefit by accessing and utilizing the rooftop space of
Lincoln Land ' s

property .

Under the terms of the Lease Agreement
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between Lincoln Land and General
allowed

to

attached

use

as

the

property .

Exhib it

' A'

to

Mills ,

See

the

only General

Lease

Affidavit

Mills

was

para .

4,

Agreement ,
of

Doyle

Beck ,

dated

March 30 , 2016 . A more detailed examination of this provision will
follow . The Lease further stated as follows :
SUBLEASING . Tenant will not sublet the Property , or any
part thereof, and will not assign t his Lease or any
interest
therein,
nor
permit
this
Lease
to
be
transferred in any manner without the prior wri tten
consent
of
La n dlord
in
each
case
and every
of
under letting
or
assignment .
not
Tena n t
be
sha l l
relieved from liability to Landlord for the terms and
conditions of this Lease .
at para .

Id.

Genera l

11

Mills

(emph as i s

had

no

added) .

right

to

The Lease states clearly that

assign ,

sublease

or

license

any

interest in the property without written permission from Li ncoln
Land.

The Lease ant i cipated the occupancy of " any other tenant "

and " co-tenants ",
that

co - tenancy

(Id .
was

at para .

retained

13) ,
by

Recover Services and Windermere ,
( General

Mills)

did

not

benefit t o LP Broadband ,
possessed by General

have

but the authority to grant

Lincoln

Land .

Unlike

Medical

the third party in this action

the

legal

capacity

to

confer

because such conferral was not a power

Mills .

If General Mills

could not

legally

confer any benefit upon LP Broadband under General Mills '
with

Lincoln

Land ,

any

then

the

use

and

occupancy

benefit

Lease
must

necessarily h ave invol untarily come from Linco ln Land Company. The
fact tha t
to

use

a

Memorandum ,

"General Mi l l s ,
portion
p.

8) ,

of

the

no t

Li ncoln Land ,

Evans

Granery "

allowed LP Broadband
(see

General

Mills '

is an admission of a breach of the Lease and

does not negate the fact that General Mills had no authority to
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confer

any benefit

to

LP Broadband .

The

benefit of use

of

the

rooftops could flow only from Lincoln Land .
In a baseless effort to support this argument , General Mills
asserts in Paragraph 5 , in the "Background Section" of its Brief ,
as follo ws :
5 . The Lease allows General Mills t o use the Property
" without restriction during the term of this Lease ."
McLaughlin Declaration , Ex . B, Para . 4 .
To maintain this

construction ,

General Mills

two words of vital significance .

surgically omitted

The correct quotation from the

Lease states that the property may "be used without restriction by
tenant

during

attached

as

March 30 ,

the

Exhib it

term

of

' A'

to

this
the

Lease. "

See

Affidavit

of

Lease ,
Doyle

para .

Beck ,

4,

dated

2016 . No exp lanation is g i ven f o r t h e deletion of these

two critica l words , wh i ch precisely limit u s e o f the property only
to

General

ellipsis

Mi ll s .
showing

The

failure

removal

of
of

Gene r al

Mills

to

these

decisive

include

an

words

is

Broadband

to

incomprehensible .
General

Mills

had

no

authority

to

allow

LP

utilize the rooftops . Lincoln Land is not seeking to " cut out the
middleman " because there was no middleman with authority to allow
LP Broadband to access Lincoln Land ' s property . General Mills must
not

be

allowed

to

violate

the

lease

and

simult aneously

seek

protection from the Lease to avoid any indemnification duty . The
facts are clear , General Mills could not confer use of the rooftop
space to LP Broadband ,

therefore ,

the benefit came directly from

the owner , Lincoln Land Company .
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While not spec i fically addressed in General Mills ' Memorandum
in

Opposition

Judgment ,

to

Lincoln

Land ' s

Mills

asserts

General

Mot i o n

for

its

in

Partial

Summary

Opposit i on

to

LP

Broadband ' s Mot i on for Summary Judgment , p. 2 , fn . 1 , t hat " there
can b e

no

liabi l i t y becau s e

Ge n eral Mi l ls

did not

vio l ate

the

ant i - sublease prov ision of t h e lease agreement with Lincoln Land ."
General Mills cla ims that it granted LP Broadband a license to use
the

Id .

property .

Under

the

Subleasing

provision

contained

in

Para graph 4 of the Lease between General Mil l s and Lincoln Land ,
as

cited

to

assign ,

which

General

without

written

Should t h is Court de termi ne that General Mills wa s

somehow

sublet ,
Mi lls

above ,
lease ,

gained

General
license

under

Mill s
or

the

lacked

transfer

Lea s e

in

the

any
any

authority

interest
manner

authori zation f r om Linco l n La nd .

authorized to grant licenses to use Lincoln Land ' s property , this
Court

should

a l so

determine

that

the

2000

Roof - top

Rental

Agreement was i n fact a subl ea s e , not a licen se . Un d er I d a h o case
law , " [i]t is wel l - settled tha t a license i s ordinarily revocable
at will . Branson v . Miracle , 111 Idaho 933 , 936 , 729 P . 2d 408 , 411
citing West v . Smith ,

(C t . App . 1986) ,
(1 973) ."

State

(Ct.App .

1993) ;

Idaho

423 ,

Agreement

428 ,
was

notification
Agreement ,

v.

Bowman /

Idaho

see also

Statewide

247

650

not

a

period

Para .

124

3.

P . 3d

This

to
is

936 ,

Const .

(2011) .

license because
prior

95 Ida h o 550 ,

The
it

866

P . 2d

193

Pietri/

150

Inc .

v.

2000

Roof - top

r equired

cancellat i on .
two months

945 ,

51 1 P . 2d 1326

See

longer

a

Rental

th r ee month

Roof- top

Rental

than

notice

the
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required to b e

given to Gene r al Mil l s

wi th Lincoln La nd .

upon breach of the Lease

Lease Agreement ,

See

para.

21 .

General Mi lls

a t tempted to gran t more notice r i ghts to LP Broadband t han Genera l
Mills possessed under the Lease Agr e ement .
t ha t

Based upon the

fact

the 2000 Roo f -top Rental Agreement was not r evocable at will

and that the Agreement allowed LP Broadband to affix equipment to
Li n coln Land ' s

real

Broadband was
Agreement .

n ot

prope r ty ,

a

license

General Mi l ls '
and violated

Agreement

General

wi th LP

Mil l s '

Lease

Gen eral Mi l ls recogn ized it h ad no sublease authority

under its Lease Agreements with the property owners and r e f used to
enter

i nto

Broadband.

s ubsequent
See

rooftop

Affida vit

of

sublease

Jim Rooney ,

agreements
paras .

5,

with
6,

and

LP
8.

[ " Affiant aga i n i n fo rmed Travis John son that General Mills did not
own

the

premi ses

and

could

no t

ent er

Agreement , as it was not General Mills '

i n to

a ny

Roof - top

Rental

place to sign a roof-top

l ease . Any such extension or n ew sublease ag r eement

would be in

vio lat i on of Genera l Mil l s ' lease wi th Evan ' s Grain . . . . u ]
b. LP Broadband' s Retention of the Benefit is Inequi table .

As noted above ,

Lincoln Lan d and General Mi lls entered i nto

an Lease Agreement whereby Gene r al Mills alone could use Lincoln
Land ' s

property .

Broadband
payments

to

Lincoln

access

and

under the Leas e

Land

never

utilize

Lincoln

General

Mills

had

the

or

Land ' s

authorized
property .

LP
All

Agreement by General Mills to Lincoln

Land were to acquire General Mills '
acquire General Mil l s '

agreed

a nd

use of the property ,

LP Broadband ' s

auth ority

to

erect

not to

use of the property .
signs

and

its

own
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antennae
Mi ll s

equipment

who

on the

actually

rooftops ,

erected

antennae

however

it

equ i pment

was
and

not

General

occupied t h e

roof t op , it was LP Broadband , an unaut h orized occupier .
It
from

is

admi tted that Lincoln Land did not

LP Broadband .

Reques t

for

Admission

Aff i davit

of

admi t ted

tha t

Ma r k

author i zation
Lincoln

Land ' s

Judgment , p.

No .

R.

LP
from

LP Broadband ' s

See

5,

attached

Fu ller ,

dated

Broadband
Lincoln

was

Land .

Opposition

to

Answer

LP

as

receive any
to

on

10,

No .

Broadba n d ' s

'A '

to

2015 .

roof t op

the

at

Id .

Lincoln Land ' s

Exhibit

November

rent

3- 4 .

As

Motion

the

It

is

without
noted

f or

in

Summary

8 , under Idaho case l aw "The quest i on i s : Did he , to

the de t r i ment of someone e l se , obtain someth i ng of va l ue to which
he was not ent i t l ed ?" Citing Hixon v . Allphin , 7 6 Idaho 327 , 333,
281

P . 2d

1042

(1955).

Here ,

LP

Broadband

obtained

access

to

Lincoln Land ' s property, wit h out authoriza t i on from or payment to
Lincoln Land . Any attempt by LP Broadba n d or Genera l Mi l ls to hide
t hi s u nd i sputed fact must be re j ect ed .
c . Lincoln Land has standing to challenge the unauthorized
sublease agreement.
Next

Genera l

Mi l l s

seeks

to

prevent

Li ncoln

Land

from

cha l leng i ng the unau t hor iz ed sub l ease between Genera l Mills and LP
Broadband , c l aiming that Linco l n Land is a th i rd pa r ty and wi thout
s ta nding .

Th i s

Cour t

should

"stranger " t o the sublease ,

not

treat

Lincoln

Land

as

a

t r ue

e v en t hough Lincol n Land was unaware

of the sublease and never autho riz ed such . The alleged sub le ase ,
to

which

Genera l

General Mi ll s '

Mills

claims

Li ncol n

Land

is

a

stra nger,

is

u naut h o r i zed gra n t i ng of acc e ss t o Lin coln Land's
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property . General Mills asserts its lease with Lincoln Land as its
authority to grant such a use benefit to LP Broadband . See General
Mills '

Memorandum

in

Opposit ion

to

Plaintif f ' s

Motion ,

p.

2:

" General Mills a llowed LP Broadband use o f the roof tops on top of
the grain eleva to rs (" Rooftops " ) o wned by Li ncoln Land , but leased
to General Mi lls ." A landowner i s not a "s tranger to a contract "
when a sublease dea l s directly with the landowner ' s property and
violates the
true

landowner ' s

stranger to

sublease ' s

the

val i dity

General Mills ,

rights .

Lincoln Land

sublease and has

under

the

Statute

is clearly not a

standing
of

to contest

Frauds .

As

noted

the
by

Idaho courts have not addr essed this issue and it

is a matter of first impress ion to this Di stri ct Court .
The esse nce of General Mills '

ar gument

i s that a tenant with

strictly l i mit ed use rights may form a subl ease with a subte nant ,
using a document in complete violation of the Statute of Frauds ,
and

the

property

sublease .
Mills

owner

has

no

standing

to

attack

the

illegal

Both General Mills and LP Broadband knew that General

had

no

authority

to

extend

the

2000

Roof-Top

Rent al

Agreement or to e nter into a new roof-top sublease . See Affidavit
of

Jim

Rooney ,

n e g o t iate

any

l ong

building owner.
LP

pa ra .

6.

term

LP

Broadband

sublease

was

agreement

twice

instructed

directly

wi th

to
the

Id . at paras . 6 and 8 . Neither General Mills nor

Broadband asser t

that

the

three

comply with the Statute of Frauds ,

alleged

sublease agreements

they instead seek to prevent

application of the Statute of Frauds based on standing and partial
performance .

These

arguments

should

be

rejected

and

all

three
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sublease agreements determined to be invalid under the Statute of
Frauds .
Even ass uming General Mills and LP Broadband complied with
some requirements under the Statute of Frauds ,

includ ing General

Mills signing the sub l ease agreements and t he sublease agreements
containing
disputes)
of Frauds.

the

correct

l ega l

descriptions ,

(wh ich

Lincoln

Land

the sublease agreements wou l d sti ll violate the Statute
One of the key elements of the Statute of Frauds is

that any transfer of interest in real property must be " subscribed
by the party charged , or his a gent ." See I d aho Code Section 9- 505 .
As the owner , Lincoln Land is the party to be charged . No sublease
agreement

between

General

Mills

and

LP

Broadband can

be

valid

under the Statut e of Frauds unless signed b y Lincoln Land.
Contrary to the assertion by General Mills in Footnote 3 of
its Memorandum , Idaho Code 55-101(2) defines real property as that
"which

is

affixed

to

land . "

The

grain

silos ,

including

the

rooftops , are affixed to the land . Therefore , the rooftops of the
grain silos are real property . Idaho Code 55-101(1)

inc l ude s land

and possessory rights to land in its definition of real property ,
with land being defined to "inc l ude free or occupied space for an
i ndef i ni te distance upwards as we ll as downwards .... " I daho Code
55 - l0lA . All of the space above the property is real property by
definition . By placing antennae on top of the silos and extending
into the free space above Lincoln Land ' s grain silos , LP Broadband
was both upon and occupying Lincoln Land ' s real property without
owner

authorizat i on .

Because

real

prope rt y

is

at

issue,

the
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Statute of Frauds does apply in all respects .
of

d . The
doctrine
inapplicable.

"Part /Full

Performance "

is

General Mills next asserts that the Statute of Frauds should
be disregarded because there wa s part or ful l
unauthorized

sub l ease .

This

argument

performance of the

comp l etely

distorts

the

undisputed facts . As noted by General Mills , "The doctrine of part
performance provides that when the parties to an agreement fail to
reduce the agreement to writing , or otherwise fail to satisfy the
statute of frauds , the agreement may nevertheless be specifically
enforced when the purchaser has partly performed the agreement .n
See Genera l

Mills '

Memorandum ,

p.

14 ;

citing Bear

Island Water

Ass ' n v . Brown , 125 Idhao 7 17 , 722 , 874 P . 2d 528 , 533 (1994) . This

exceptio n to the St atute of Frauds is designed to prevent a seller
from tak ing advantage of a purchaser who partial l y performs based
upon the sell er ' s oral agreement . The exception is not intended to
validate an agreement clearly in violation of the rights of the
property

owner ,

when

those

rights

are

usurped by a

tenant

and

purported subtenant in direct violation o f the Lease .
General Mi lls '

did not have any authority to enter into any

sublease agreement wit h LP Broadband for the use in any manner of
Lincoln

Land ' s

property.

LP

Broadband ' s

partial

or

full

performance of an ill egal sublease with a General Mills does not
change the fact that LP Broadband did not have owner authority to
occupy

the

property .

agreement cannot

Performance

of

an

unauthorized

sublease

serve to legitimize the sublease agreement .

LP

Broadband may have an indemnification claim against General Mil l s
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i n re l ation to th i s sub l ease agreement , but t h e fac t
LP

Broa dband

knowingly occupied Li ncoln Land ' s

owner authorization.
"is

e s to ppe l ."

See

Genera l

Pla i n t iff 's Mot ion ,

property without

As note d by General Mills ,

better unde r s t ood a nd characterized as

p.

Memo r andum

Mi l ls '
14 .

"T he

a

remains that

part perfo rmance
fo rm o f

in

equitable

Opp os it i on

excep tion protect s

a

to

pa r ty who

demons t rat es r e l iance upon a n ora l contract by acts that would not
have bee n done but for
Wolske ,

28

Inc . v.

t he

co n trac t."

at .

Id.

p.

14 -15 ;

Hudspeth Sawmill Company, 116 I daho 714,

citing

77 9 P . 2d

(Ct . App . 1 989) . LP Broadband cannot hide behind this exception

because

it

was

wel l

aware

a gr eements with Ge n eral Mi l l s

that

any

for

without l egal ba s i s . See Aff idav i t

rel ian ce

use of th e

upon

sublease

r oof top space was

o f J im Ro oney , paras.

6 and 8 .

L P Broadband was a conscious wrongdoer , not an innocent party.

As fur t her noted by General Mil l s, "the ob ject of t he s t atute
[of fr auds]

is to prevent potent ia l

f ra ud by forbidd i ng disputed

assert i ons of e nume rat e d kinds of contracts wit h out any written
bas i s." Id . at p. 13 , citing Kelly v. Hodges / 119 I dhao 872 , 87 4,
811

P.2d

Li ncoln

48

(Ct.App .

Land .

See

Admission 3 and 4 ,
Mar k

R.

Fu l l er ,

1991) .
LP

LP Broadband had no agreemen t

Broadband's

Respons es

a t tached as Exh i b it

dated

November

10,

' A'

20 1 6.

to

with

Requests

f or

t o t he Affidavit o f
Rather

than

" tak i ng

advantage o f a te c hn i ca l it y" as c l aimed by Ge neral Mi l ls , Linco l n
Land is relying upon the Statute of Frauds t o prevent the exact
fraudulent

conduct

which

the

Statute

of

Frauds

is

inte nded

to

preven t , where a p arty as serts righ ts which were never agreed upon
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by the pa r ty sought to be charged . LP Broadband d i d not have an
agreement

with

property ,

access Lincoln Land ' s

Lincoln La nd to

Gene r al Mills did not have auth ority t o ent er into any sub l ease
agreements to allow LP Br oadband to access in a n y manner Lincoln
Land ' s property , and any evidence suggesting tha t LP Broadban d had
a

sublease agreement

wi t h General Mil l s

should not be received

under the Statute of Fr a u ds because t he sub l ease agreement was not
signed by Lincoln Land .
This Court shoul d reject General Mills '
Lincoln

Land ' s

Broadband . This Court
deprive

third

a

f or

Motion

Partial

Summary

arguments and grant
Judgment

against

LP

should not pe r mi t two parties to col l ude to

party

of

its

property

rights .

The

Statute

Frauds is designed to prevent unauthorized transfers o f

of

i nt e rest

in real prope r ty . Lincoln Land owns the rea l property at issue and
agreed t o lease the property for General Mills '
Land a uthoriz e

time did Linco l n

sole use. At

no

LP Broadband to a c cess Lincoln

Land ' s rea l prope rty . Any sublease agreement between LP Broadband
and

General

c hange

Mi lls

the

v i olates

tha t

the undi sputed f act

Statute of

Frauds

LP Broadband wa s

and does

not

b e n ef i t ted by

using Li ncoln Land ' s prop erty without owner autho ri zation.
2. RESPONSE TO LP BROADBAND ' S OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT .

a . The

Statute
nature.

of

Frauds

is

not

simply

prospecti ve

in

LP Br oadband aga in at temp ts t o create a dist i n ct i on between
pro s pect i ve

a nd

r et r oac ti ve

a pp l i cat i o n

Fr auds . Su ch a d is t i nction is not

under

t he

Statut e

of

sup ported by t h e case s cited by
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LP Broadband,

nor is it suppo r ted by s t atute or alternative case

l a w. All Cou rt r uli ngs on Sta tute of Fra ud cases are necessarily
retroactive because the Cour t

is determin ing t h e va l i dity of an

agreement at the time the agreement was a ll egedly entered .
Co d e Section 9-503 states i n part tha t

I daho

" No esta te or in t erest i n

rea l p r operty . .. can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or
declared,

ot he r

ot herwise than by operation of la w,

ins trume n t

in wr iting ,

o r a conveyance or

subsc ri bed by th e

par ty creat in g ,

granting, ass i gn ing, sur r ender i ng or dec l aring the same, or by h i s
la wful age n t
The

t he reun t o authorized by wr iting ."

Statute o f

Frauds

(Emph asis adde d.)

is necessarily r e troactiv e

in app li cation

beca u se vio l ation of the Statute of Fr auds inva lidates the initial
c r ea t i on ,

grant ,

attempted by

the

assignment ,
writi ng

or

surrender

oral

and/or

agreeme n t.

Further ,

declar at i on
I daho

Code

Section 9- 505(4) states as fo ll ows :
In the fo ll owi ng ca ses t he agreement is invalid, unless
the same or some note o r me mo r a ndum the reo f , be i n
writing and subscr i bed by the par t y c ha rg ed, or by his
agent . Evidence , theref ore , of the agreement cannot be
received without the wr iting or secondary evidence of
it s contents :

***
4 . An agreeme nt for the leasing , f o r a l onge r period
than one ( 1 ) year, o r for the sale , of re a l p rope r ty ,
or o f an i nteres t therei n , and such agreemen t , if made
by an agent of the party sought to be c harged , is
i nval id,
un le ss the authori t y o f the age n t
be in
wri ting, subscribed by the part y soug ht to be charged .
(Emphas i s

added) .

Sect i on

9-505 ( 4)

does

not

d ist ingu is h between

p r osp e c tive or retroactive applica tion of t he Statute of Frauds ,
but

states

th at

an

agreement

is

invalid,

no t

sub ject

to

b eing
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invalidated ,

unless

charged

his

or

there

is a

authorized

writing

agent .

subscribed by the party

Evidence

simply

received by the Court without the proper writing ,

cannot

be

rendering the

evidence inadmissible .
The De fendant po ints to Wakelam v. Hagood, 151 Ida h o 688 , 263
P . 3d 742 (2011) , and Hoffman v . Hoffman v . SV Co ., Inc ., 102 Idaho
187 ,

628

P . 2d

218

(1981) ,

in

its

prospective/retroactive distinction .

attempt

to

Retroactive

create

the

application

was

upheld by the Court in Wakelam , because the Court determined that
the

parties

determined

complied

that

the

with

the

contract

Statute

was

val id

of
fr om

Frauds .
its

The

court

creation

because the cont ra ct was found to be retroactively va li d ,

and

the re

was no need for the court to make retroactive modifications .
Retroactive applicati on of the Statute of Frauds occurred in

Hoffman when the Court determined that the oral agreement between

the parties violated the Statute of Frauds , and refused to enforce
a

verbal

agreement

to convey real property in its entirety .

In

Hoffman, the seller refused to convey real property pursuant to an

alleged oral agreement and the buyer sought specific performance
or

damages

based

retroactively

upon

the

determined

seller ' s

that

the

refusal.
o ra l

Because

agreement

the

Cour t

violated

the

Statute of Frauds , and could not be enforced , it was not necessary
for

the

Hoffman

Court to order retroactive damages

or specific

performanc e because the property was never legally conveyed .
In

addition ,

Wakelam

and

Hoffmane

can

be

distinguished

because the present case deals with retroactive damages based on
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actual p o ssession under an invalid agreement whic h vi o la ted t he
Statue

of

agreement
claim

Frauds .

Lincoln

Land

invalidated by the

for

unjust

enri c hment

is

not

trying

Statute

of

Frauds .

is

based

not

to

enforce

an

Lincoln Land ' s

upon

any

agreement

be t we e n LP Br oadband and General Mills . Lincoln Land ' s claims are
based upon the LP Broadband ' s occupancy of Lincoln Land ' s property
after

July ,

2010

without

authorization

from

Lincoln

La nd .

Any

agreement between the LP Broadband and General Mills could at best
serve

as

claims .

an

offset

to

Lincoln

prevent

the

Linco ln Land h as already c redited LP Broadband fo r

all

payments made to General Mills .

Land ' s

claims ,

See Compl a int ,

not

Prayer ,

Para .

1,

Page 4 . Al l other benef it s received by LP Broadband through use of
Lincoln Land ' s property are unjus t and s houl d be disgorged .
b. The agreement between LP Broadband and General Mills is

not outside the Statute of Frauds.

Th is is similar to arguments ra ised by Genera l Mil ls and was
dis cussed above in Section 1 (d) .

Genera l

Mills did not have the

authority to allow LP Broadband to access Lincoln Land ' s property .
The

Statute

of

Frauds

requires

a

writing

s i gned

sought to be charged or an authorized agent .
neither

the

party

to

be

charged ,

nor

an

by

the

party

Gene ral Mi ll s

authorized

agent

was
of

Lincoln La nd . LP Broadband ca nnot claim a valid agreement exists
when its agreement was with a pa rt y who lacked authority to ente r
into the agreement . This is the exact fraudu lent conduct which the
Statue of Frauds i s designed to prevent . Li ncoln Land simply never
authorized LP Broadband to access Lincoln Land ' s property and the
Court should no t receive evidence of an agreeme nt with a party who
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l acked authority . LP Broadband should not be al l owed to rely upon
ag reements which i t

knew were inva l id.

c . The 2000 Roof - Top agreement between General Mil l s
LP Broadband
2008.

could

not

have

extended

and
March,

beyond

Even assuming for purposes of this Motion t hat there was a
valid agreement between Ge n eral . Mi l ls and LP Broadband based upon
the 2000 Roo f-top Renta l Agreement , such agreement did , not extend
beyond Mar ch,

2008 . General Mills leased the grain si l os in five-

year increments .
Roo f- top
Mi lls'
Mills

See Aff i davit

Renta l

Agreement

was

of Jim Rooney ,
draf t ed t o

Lease for the period of J une ,
could not

agree

to

a

para .

3.

coincide wit h

2000 - May ,

term beyond May ,

2005 .

2005

The 2000
General
"General

unt il

after

General Mills renew ed its lease with Evan ' s Grain . " Id . a t

para.

4 . The Roo f-top Rental Agreement clearly states that the subleas e

is " valid for no l ess than 3 years , and up to 5 year s with annual
renewa l s after the f i rst 3 years."
added) .

LP Br oadband chooses

to

Id .

at

s i mply

Exhibit

i gnore

' A'

this

(emphasis

unambiguous

time limit.
In

2004,

agreement ,
own

t he

LP

Broadband

sought

to

renew

the

sublease

LP Broadband was in formed "that General Mil ls did not

premises

Agreement ,
lease."

when

and

could not

enter

as it was not General Mills '

Id .

at

para.

6.

LP

Broadband

into

any

Roof -top Rental

p l ace to sign a roof-top
was

instruc t ed

" to

make

direc t contact wi t h the bui lding owne r , Evan's Grain , to negotiate
any long-term agreement. "

Id.

at para.

6.

The same commun i cation

occurred in 20 1 2 , when Genera l Mil l s informed LP Broadband to make
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" direct contact with the building owner , Lincoln Land Company , to
negotiate any long-term agreement . " Id . at para. 8 .
Based upon the language of the Roof - top Rental Agreement and
the

repeated

c lea rly

statements

made

by

knew and under stood that

Genera l
it was

Mills ,

LP

Broadband

occupying the property

without au thorization from the l and own e r, yet continued to remain
on

the

property

beyond

the

five

year

t ime

limit ,

reaping

the

windfall benefits . LP Broadband was a consc i ous wrongdoer . This is
not

a

situation

occupancy ,

with

of

a

lessee

knowledge

of

holdover ,

lack

of

but

of

authority .

unauthorized
The

fact

that

General Mills benefitted in the amount of $50 per month for such
occupancy does not legitimize the unauthorized access .
CONCLUSION

In

spite

argumentation

of the

amount

presented ,

of briefing ,

Lincoln

Land ' s

affidavit s
Motion

Summary Judgment is really quite a simple matter .

for

and

other

Partial

" The question

is : Did he , to the detriment of someone else , obtain something of
value to which he was not entitled? " Hixon v.

Allphin, 7 6 Idaho

327 , 333 , 28 1 P . 2d 1042 (1955) . The undisputed facts in the record
establish

that

LP

Broadband

used

Linco l n

Land ' s

real

property

without a uthorizat ion from Lincoln Land . General Mil ls lacked the
authority

to

grant

LP

Broadband

access

to

the

rooftops .

LP

Broadband placed internet antennae and other equipment on Lincoln
Land ' s property and used that equipment to generate profits , while
only paying General Mills $50 . 00 per month . LP Broadband obtained
and utilized Lincoln Land ' s property , to Lincoln Land ' s detriment
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and obtained r evenue
remaining

is

t he

in the process .

amount

of

that

The only factual

revenue

which

was

question
unjustly

received by LP Broadba nd .
It i s requested tha t

this Court gra n t

Lincoln Land ' s Mot ion

f or Par t ial Summary Judgment and deny LP Broadband ' s Motion for
Summa ry

Judgment .

through

use

of

Th e

un just ben e fits

Lincoln

Land ' s

received by LP Broadband

p rope rt y

should

be

disgorged .

Further proceedings in this mat t e r will determine the amount which
LP Broadband unjustly received by use of Lincol n Land ' s property .
DATED this

0

day of April , 2016 .
FULLER & BECK

Mark R. Ful l er
At to r ne y for Pl~ i n t iff
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Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant, LP Broadband, by and through its attorney of record,
LaITen K. Covert, Esq. and hereby provides the following Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment as follows:
ARGUMENT

THERE WAS NO BENEFIT CONFERRED UPON THE DEFENDANT BY THE PLAINTIFF
The case of Brewer v. Washington RSA No.8 Ltd. Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 739, 184
P.3d 860, 864 (2008) provides valuable insight into what the Plaintiff must show in this matter
for its prima facie case for unjust enrichment. While no two cases will bear the exact same facts,
the factual situation in Brewer is similar to the situation in this matter.
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In the case of Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership 145 fdaho 735 184
P .3d 860 (2008) the underlying matter was a case brought between the Brewers and th Kinzers.
Both parties shared an interest in real property that was being leased to Inland Cellular for its use
for cellular transmissions. The Brewers and Kinzers had claims for breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty and other related claims. The Brewers also brought a claim for unjust enrichment
against Inland Cellular for unjust enrichment. The Brewers claimed Inland Cellular was unjustly
enriched by the use of the property and for receiving a below market lease.
On summary judgement, the Brewers only alleged that the use of the property was a
benefit and that the amount paid by Inland Cellular for the property was less than a market value
for this type of lease. The district court on the case below and the Supreme Court on appeal held
that these allegations were insufficient to show the prima facie case for unjust enrichment and
granted summary judgment for Inland Cellular. This case stands for the requirement for the
Plaintiff in an unjust enrichment case based on use of property and a below market lease to do
more that make those allegations to prove a benefit was provided.
In this matter, Plaintiff is now making the exact same allegations against the Defendant
that Defendant use the property and that the rental amount was below market value. Plaintiff
must do more to show that there was a benefit given to the Defendant than simply make these
all egations. It is the Plaintiff that must prove its case, not the Defendant' s obligation to disprove.
Without more than the allegations of use of the prope1ty and below market lease the Brewer
case stands for the position that smmnary judgment should be granted.
The case of Medical Recovery ervices, LLC v. Bonneville Billing and
olleclion , Inc., 157 Idaho 395 336 P.3d 802 (2014) states that recovery for unjust enrichment

could not be had where the requesting party did not DIRECTLY confer a benefit on the other
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party. Medical Recovery states, A person confers a benefit upon another if he or she gives the
other some interest in money land or possessions perfom1s services beneficial to or at the
request of the other, satisfies the debt of the other, or in any other way adds to the other s
advantage." So the questio n is simply what interest in money, land, or possessions, or service
was performed from the Plaintiff to the Defendant in this matter. The answer is that Plaintiff did
none of these things.
In Medical Recovery, Medical Recovery Services obtained a judgment against a debtor.
Medical Recovery Services then undertook efforts to have wages garnished from the employer of
debtor. The garnishment was sent from the employer to another collection company Bonneville
Billing and Collections, which also had outstanding amounts owed by the same debtor. Medical
Recovery Services sought to obtain the funds from Bonneville Billing and Co ll ections, but was
unsuccessful. Medical Recovery Services then filed suit against Bonneville Billing and
Collections for unjust enrichment.
The Supreme Court's analysis of this case overturned the District Com1's determination
that Medical Recovery Services was entitled to relief based on unjust enrichment. The Court
noted that none of the actions of Medical Recovery Services were done to give anyone else a
benefit. The Com1 also held that it was not the conduct of Medical Recovery Services that
resulted in a benefit to Bonneville Billings and Co llections, but the actions of the third patty.
In this matter, the analysis is exactly the same. Plaintiff did nothing to directly benefit
Defendant. Plaintiff has clearly stated that it did not give anything to the Defendant. Plaintiff
stated that it gave no interest in the prope11y and did not provide any service to the Defendant.
Clearly the Plaintiff confe1Ted absolutely nothing on the Defendant. Having conferred nothing on
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the Defendant, Plaintiff cannot support its claim for summary judgment. Any benefit was
provided by the third party, General Mi lls in thi s case.
Plaintiff's argument in this matter is identi cal to the argument rej ected by the Supreme
Court in Medical Recovery. When distilled to its essence, Plaintiff claims that but for its
ownership in the property Defendant would not have received a benefit. Plaintiff requests the
court abandon the direct conferring of a benefit for the " but for causation" test for unjust
enrichment.
In this matter, Plaintiff did not directly convey any actual benefit to the Defendant. The
Plai ntiff did not undertake any action at the Defendant's request and did not directly provide any
interest in property to the Defendant. It is the actions of General Mills that prov ided a benefit to
Defendant, not Plaintiff. General Mills entered into the rental agreement with Defendant,
collected the rent and provided the access and use of the property. Plaintiff prov ided abso lutely
nothjng.
APPRECIATION OF THE BENEFIT BY THE DEFENDANT
Plaintiff argues that this co urt should ignore the requirement of the appreciation of any
benefit in determining unjust enrichment. Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
pp. 8-9. Plaintiff cites to several cases in other jurisdictions to support this claim. Plaintiff
attem pts to mi sdirect the Court from the actual standard in Idaho. The second element for unjust
enrichment is the apprec iation of the benefit. There is no case in Idaho that supports the
Plaintiffs position that Idaho has removed this requirement.
T he Court must look at the plain language to determine what the requirement should
mean. Black 's Law Dictiona,y (10 th Edition 20 I 4) defines appreciate as " to understand the
significance or meaning of." Plaintiff badly asserts that Defendant knew it was access ing the
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Plaintiffs prope11y for its equipment. Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment p.
10. This is absolutely incorrect. Defendant did not know that the property was the Plaintiff's

until April, 2014. Therefore, Defendant could not appreciate any benefit from Plaintiff when it
did not know of Plaintiffs existence.
In this matter, the Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendant appreciated any benefit from
the Plaintiff, as the Plaintiff never knew it was providing a benefit. Without a showing that the
Defendant knew and accepted any benefit given by the Plaintiff, Plaintiff cannot establish the
facts necessary for its claim of unjust enrichment. Summary judgment should be granted.
PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW THE VALUE OF THE BENEFIT AND THE AMOUNT THAT
WOULD BE UNJUST TO RETAIN
The final element Plaintiff must show is the amount of the benefit and the amount that
would be unjust for the Defendant to retain. Plaintiff fails to produce any argument or facts to
support a claim that Defendant's retention of any benefit would be unjust. Plaintiff simply asserts
this is a factual issue that must be detem1ined at a later time.
By failing to provide more than a simple statement or argument that damages are a
factual issue, Plaintiff has not met its burden on summary judgment. As Plaintiff bears the
burden at trial, it does so on summary judgement as well.
As noted above, the Plaintiff cannot point to any benefit that has directly given to the
Defendant in this matter. As such, it cannot show the value of the benefit and the amount of that
value that would be unjust to retain. Without this showing by Plaintiff to meets its burden,
summary judgment against the Plaintiff must be grated.
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM ANY RECOVERY
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It is well established that recovery for unjust emichment is unavailable if the benefits are
created incidentally by a party pursuing hi.sown economic advantage. Indian ,prings LLC v.
Anderson, 154 Idaho 708, 713, 302 P.3d 333, 338 (2012) quoting Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126
Idaho 467, 471 886 P.2d 772, 776 ( 1994). Plaintiff seeks to assert that any benefit provided to
the Defendant was not a direct result of Plaintiff seeking its own economic advantage, but from
some other unidentified reason. Plaintiff attempts to present a confusing arguments against the
Indian Springs case to support this argument. The attempt fails.
Plaintiff cannot argue that the purchase of the prope11y at issue herein was for its own
economic advantage, and in fact has not so done. The purchase of the Evans Grainery property
was for the economic advantage of Plaintiff. This was the action that provided th alleged benefit
to the Defendant.
Plaintiff sought the economic advantage of owning this property. As a direct result of that
ownership, and for no other reason, Plaintiff alleges it benefited the Defendant. There was no
other intervening event or action according to the Plaintiff for the benefit being given to the
D fi ndant. Therefore, the alleged benefit was only and completely incidental to the purchase of
the property by the Plaintiff.
Being incidental to the purchase of the property, the benefit is not subject to the recovery
under unjust enriclm1ent. General Mill s has shown the great economi c advantage Plaintiff has
gained in acquiring the property. Declaration of Colleen Benston. Plaintiff ca1mot say that this
advantage was anything but the causation for the incidental benefit allegedly given to the
Defendant.
Plaintiff is also barred for recovery based on the principle of the officious intermeddler"
and unclean hands. The main requirement for these doctrines is that the person receiving the
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benefits did not solicit the benefit. The analysis of these doctrines in the case Curtis v. Becker,
130 Idaho 378,382,941 P.2d 350,354 (Ct. App. 1997) echoes the situation in this case. In

Curtis , the Plaintiff provided an unsolicited benefit to the Defendant, the paving of a road. In that
case, it would have been obvious that the road was constructed. However, the Court held that as
the Defendant did not request the road from the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff never sought the
permission from the Defendant to provide the road, the Defendant could not be liable for any
benefit from the Plaintiff. The clean hands doctrine requires a party seeking equity must come
before the couii with clean hands, meaning, that the plaintiffs actions were not inequitable,
unfair, dishonest, fraudulent or deceitful as to the controversy at issue. Curtis at 355, 383.
In this case, Plaintiff is seeking to impose enormous consequences on the Defendant for
something the Defendant never requested. In fact, Defendant paid General Mills for the benefit it
received, the access and use of the prope1iy from General Mills. Defendant never made a request
from the Plaintiff for any benefit. Plaintiff is an officious intermeddler and does not come
before the Court with clean hands.
Since March, 2000, Defendant had been using the property and had made monthly
payments to General Mills for this use. The payments were never refused and access was never
denied by General Mills. The use of the property was open to be viewed, and could have been
known by the Plaintiff. Plaintiff chose to perform only a "ground level" inspection of the
property. Even then, the equipment of the Defendant was visible to the naked eye. Second

Affidavit ofAdam Gillings p. 2 and attachments.
Plaintiff is seeking to thrust a benefit upon the Defendant that Defendant never asked for
form the Plaintiff. In so doing, Plaintiff is seeking a windfall from its own bad actions and bad
bargain in the purchase of the property. This is simply a case of Plaintiff being willfully ignorant
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of the status of the property and the agreement with General Mills and the Plaintiff not seeking to
enforce its contract with General Mil l.s and the breach thereof. The doctrine of unjust enrichment
should not operate to give the Plaintiff its sought after windfall when the Plaintiff is out nothing.
Plaintiff now seeks to claim that Defendant is a conscious wrongdo r desp ite previous
statements to the contrary. This claim is unsupported. The affidavits provided by the Plaintiff are
insufficient to show the Plaintiff was requested to provide a benefit and is perfectly clean before
the eyes of the Court.

REPLY ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST GENERAL MILLS FOR
INDEMNIFICATION
General Mills asserts two defenses to Plaintiffs request for summary judgment on
indemnification: 1- Language in the agreement between the parties and 2- elements for
indemnification.
ROOF-TOP AGREEMENT INDEMNIFICATION
General Mills asserts that the roof-top rental agreement excludes the Defendant's claim
for indemnification. This is incorrect. The language of the agreement does not preclude
D fi ndant from seeking indemnification for the liability sought to be imposed for General
Mill's improper renting of the property.
The language in the agreement simply states that General Mills will not be liable for any
damages caused by the installation and operation of the equipment. This language does not
absolve General Mills of the requirement for indemnification based on the actions of General
Mills. The relief Defendant is seeking is not the result of Defendant s actions but the actions of
General Mills.
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Griggs v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am . 103 Idaho 790, 792 654 P.2d 378 380 (1982) stated,
"Implied indemnity is an equitable principle based upon the general theory that one compelled
to pay for the damage caused by another should be able to seek recovery from that party.
The March, 2000 agreement entered into by the Defendant and General Mi ll s created a
contractual relationship between the parties. As prut of this agreement, Defendant pay the
agreed upon amount of $50.00 per month. General Mills continually accepted this amount and
provided the Defendant access to the location for installation and maintenance. The ability to
contract and meet the terms of the contract are implied in every contract. The Plaintiff in this
matter has asserted that General Mills bad no actual ability to entered into and continue into this
agreement.
As a result of General Mills actions, the Plaintiff has now brought the present suit
against the Defendant for Defendant 's use of the prope1ty it was leasing from General Mills,
claiming General Mills had no right to provide the property to Defendant. In this matter, any
liability the Defendant may have to the Plaintiff is the direct result of the actions of General
Mills.
Defendant has already suffered damage in the defense of this action against Plaintiff.
Further damage is likely to continue in this matt r, ce1tainly if there is any liability found in the
pending matter. Plaintiff is seeking large damages for the alleged unjust enri chment caused
from the actions of General Mills.
Tbe requirements are that the dan1age results from the actions of another. Damage has
been done to the Defendant and continues to be done. Defendant should be indemnified by
General Mill s for any and all an1ow1ts that are sought by Plaintiff in this matter. It is the actions
of General Mills that has subjected the Defendant to this suit and possible judgment.
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(

(
CONCLUSION

Defendant should be granted summary judgment in this matter. Summary judgment
should be granted against the Plaintiff for the inability of the Plaintiff to meet the required
elements for unjust enrichment and the inability of the Plaintiff to recover. Sun1mary judgment
should also be granted in favor of the Defendant in its claim against General Mills for
indemnification.
DATED this_
, _ day of April, 2016.

~c,..Q_

LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
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D
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D

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
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Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D
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Hand-delivered
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918A.2d565
173 Md. App. 261
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION
v.

Lynne Margaret GIBBONS.
No. 0033, Sept. Term, 2006.
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
March 13, 2007.

William M. Rudow (Brett R. Myerson, on brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Katherine B. Eller (Thomas M. DiBiagio, on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Panel DAVIS, HOLLANDER, ADKINS, JJ.
Opinion by ADKINS, J.
Header ends here.
Over a six year period, Thomas Patrick Gibbons, the husband of appellee Lynne
Margaret Gibbons (Mrs. Gibbons), pocketed proceeds from unauthorized sales of securities
owned by several customers of his employer, appellant Bank of America Corporation (the
Bank). The value of these misappropriated stocks allegedly exceeds $1.5 million.
Thomas Gibbons deposited ill-gotten funds into an account at Provident Bank of
Maryland, held in the name of L & S Computer Consultants (LSSC). From this account, Mr.
Gibbons regularly withdrew funds that he then deposited into a different Provident account
he held jointly v.rith Mrs. Gibbons, and thereafter into jointly held Bank of America accounts. 1
The misappropriated monies were commingled with $502,331 in salary and bonus earnings
that Mr. Gibbons also deposited into that joint Bank account over this period. Mrs. Gibbons
wrote most of the checks drawn
[918 A.2d 568]
on this account, primarily for household and family purposes.
In an effort to recover some of the stolen funds allegedly deposited into and spent to
fund a lavish lifestyle for Mrs. Gibbons and the Gibbons children, Bank of America filed suit
against Mrs. Gibbons. During the litigation, it became clear that Mrs. Gibbons had no
knowledge of her husband's theft, her belief being that the source of funds he deposited into
the joint household account was her husband's legitimate earnings. The Bank pursued
conversion and unjust enrichment claims against Mrs. Gibbons.
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On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Circuit Court for Harford County held that
Mrs. Gibbons is entitled to judgment on the Bank's conversion and unjust enrichment
claims. The court explained its ruling in a written opinion that analyzed each element of
unjust enrichment and concluded that the Bank "failed to meet [its] burden on all three
prongs of the cause of action." The Bank argues that the motion court committed legal error
by applying the wrong legal principles to each element. We agree.
DISCUSSION
Review Of Summary Judgment
Although "[s]ummary judgment unquestionably is an important device . . . for
streamlining litigation[,]" in that it "saves the parties expense and the delays of protracted
and non-meritorious litigation[,]" the "dismissal of [a] case deprives the parties of a trial and
the opportunity to develop their claims and present them to a jury." Sadler v. Dimensions
Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 534, 836 A.2d 655 (2003). The Court of Appeals "has
therefore been careful to restrict application of summary judgment to cases that present no
material facts that may reasonably be said to be disputed." Id. "The purpose of the summary
judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide
whether there is an issue of fact, which is sufficiently material to be tried[.]" Jones v. MidAtl. Funding Co., 362 Md. 661, 675, 766 A.2d 617 (2001). "The standard of review for a grant
of summary judgment is whether the trial court was legally correct." Goodwich v. Sinai
Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185, 204, 680 A.2d 1067 (1996). But before "determining
whether the trial court was legally correct, an appellate court must first determine whether
there is any genuine dispute of material facts ." Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149,913 A.2d 10,
18 (2006).
Appellate review is based on the same record presented to the motion court. See
Rockwood Cas. Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 385 Md. 99, 106, 867 A.2d 1026
(2005). We "must consider the facts reflected in the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and affidavits in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties, the
plaintiffs. Even if it appears that the relevant facts are undisputed, 'if those facts are
susceptible to inferences supporting the position of the party opposing summary judgment,
then a grant of summary judgment is improper."' Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 79, 660 A.2d
447 (1995) (citation omitted).
Unjust Enrichment
"One whose money or property is taken by fraud or embezzlement, or by conversion, is
entitled to restitution[.]" 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 4.1(1), at 553 (2d
ed.1993)(hereinafter cited as "Dobbs"). Under the restitutionary remedies of quasi-contract
and constructive trust, "[t]he idea is that the plaintiffs property has been found in the hands
of the defendant and must be restored to the plaintiff, even if legal title has passed, and even
if the property has undergone a change in form
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by reason of an exchange or otherwise." 2 Dobbs § 6.1(3), at 11. "A person who receives a
benefit by reason of an infringement of another person's interest, or of loss suffered by the
other, owes restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment." Berry & Gould v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151, 757 A.2d 108 (2000) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Restitution§ 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983)).
"The restitutionary remedies and unjust enrichment are simply flip sides of the same
coin." Alternatives Unlimited, Inc. v. New Baltimore City Bd. of School Comm'rs, 155
Md.App. 415, 454, 843 A.2d 252 (2004). Thus, "[r]estitution involves the disgorgement of
unjust enrichment." Consumer Protection Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 168, 874 A.2d 919
(2005). "In explaining the law's reluctance to permit instances of unjust enrichment, John P.
Dawson, 'The Self-Serving Intermeddler,' 87 Harv. L.Rev. 1409, 1411 (1974), traces back to
the Book of Matthew the belief that men 'should not reap where they have not sown."'
Alternatives Unltd., 155 Md. App. at 455, 843 A.2d 252. "The doctrine of unjust enrichment
is applicable where 'the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties
of natural justice and equity to refund the money,' and gives rise to the policy of restitution as
a remedy." Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 172 Md.App. 350, 914 A.2d 231 (2007)
(citations omitted). The purpose of restitution, therefore, "is to prevent the defendant's
unjust enrichment by recapturing the gains the defendant secured in a transaction." 1 Dobbs
§ 4.1(1), at 552.
"Restitution measures the remedy by the defendant's gain and seeks to force
disgorgement of that gain." 1 Dobbs § 4.1(1), at 555. '" [A] constructive trust [may] be
imposed to avoid unjust enrichment arising out of ... the violation of any fiduciary duty or
any other wrongdoing."' Bailif.f v. Woolman, 169 Md.App. 646, 654, 906 A.2d 409 (quoting
Md. Nat. Bank v. Tower, 374 F.2d 381, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1967)), cert. denied, 396 Md. 12, 912
A.2d 648 (2006).
"In an action for unjust enrichment the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that the
defendant holds plaintiffs money and that it would be unconscionable for him to retain it."
Plitt v. Greenberg, 242 Md. 359, 364, 219 A.2d 237 (1966). Under Maryland law,
[a] claim of unjust enrichment is established when: (1) the plaintiff confers a benefit
upon the defendant; (2) the defendant knows or appreciates the benefit; and (3) the
defendant's acceptance or retention of the benefit under the circumstances is such that it
would be inequitable to allow the defendant to retain the benefit without the paying of value
in return.

Benson v. State, 389 Md. 615, 651-52, 887 A.2d 525 (2005). As we discuss below, the
motion court erred in concluding as a matter of law that Bank of America could not establish
any of these three elements.
I.
First Element: Benefit Conferred
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"A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to the other possession of or some
other interest in money[.]" Restatement of Restitution § 1 cmt. a (1937, updated through
2006). The Bank challenges the motion court's ruling that the Bank did not confer a benefit
on Mrs. Gibbons. The court reasoned as follows:
A. Benefit conferred on the Defendant by the Plaintiff. At the heart of the
concept of unjust enrichment is the willingness of the court under appropriate facts to say
that there was an implied or constructive
[918 A.2d 570]

contract between the plaintiff and the defendant .... [T]here is absolutely no allegation that
the Plaintiff and this particular Defendant had any dealings with one another either directly
or indirectly. This court can find no reported appellate case in this state in which there was a
claim for unjust enrichment where the claim did not arise out of dealings directly between
the parties. With an implied or constructive contract, as with any other contract,
there must be found to be some "meeting of the minds" that creates the
obligation from one party to the other and that is absent in this particular case.
Under the Plaintiffs theory, they could pursue an unjust enrichment claim against anyone to
whom Mr. Gibbons had given any of the money that he misappropriated from the Plaintiffs
clients. This court cannot see how the Defendant in this particular case stands in
any different position from a car dealership where Mr. Gibbons may have
purchased a car, a casino where he may have gambled away a portion of the
money or a restaurant where he may have bought expensive dinners for his
various female companions. To satisfy the first element of this cause of action,
the Plaintiff must have conferred some sort of benefit directly on the Defendant
from whom the restitution is sought. The only individual in this case with whom the
bank had any direct dealings was Mr. Gibbons and there is not one scintilla of evidence that
has been produced that any direct benefit was conferred on Mrs. Gibbons. (Emphasis
added.)
The Bank argues that the motion court committed several legal errors in concluding that
the Bank cannot establish the threshold "benefit conferred" element of its unjust enrichment
claim. In its view, the court's threshold error was to premise its benefit analysis on impliedin-fact contract principles, which require some evidence from which a mutual agreement can
be inferred, rather than on quasi-contract (also know as implied-in-law contract) principles,
which "involve[ ] no assent between the parties, no ' meeting of the minds."' The Bank
contends that the motion court then compounded this error by holding that the Bank had to
directly deal with Mrs. Gibbons in order to warrant recovery under a theory of unjust
enrichment. Finally, the Bank argues, the court erred in concluding that "there is not one
scintilla of evidence ... that any direct benefit was conferred on Ms. Gibbons," despite the
obviou cash benefits conferred upon both Mr. and Mrs. Gibbons by the Bank. We agree with
all three contentions.

A.
-4-
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No Meeting Of The Minds Required
The motion court erroneously believed that, for an implied contract, there must be some
"meeting of the minds" that creates the obligation to perform. The Court of Appeals has
distinguished between contracts that are implied-in-fact, which require evidence of a
"meeting of the minds," and contracts that are implied as a matter of law, for which a
meeting of the minds is not required.
"An implied contract is an agreement which legitimately can be inferred from intention
of the parties as evidenced by the circumstances and ' the ordinary course of dealing and the
common understanding of men.'" ... Black's Law Dictionary ... defines [a quasi-contract] as
a

[l]egal fiction invented by common law courts to permit recovery by contractual remedy
in cases where, in fact, there is no contract, but where circumstances are such that justice
warrants a recovery as though there had been a promise. It is not based on
[918 A.2d 571]
intention or consent of the parties, but is founded on considerations of justice and equity,
and on doctrine of unjust enrichment. It is not in fact a contract, but an obligation which the
law creates in absence of any agreement, when and because the acts of the parties or others
have placed in the possession of one person money, or its equivalent, under such
circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it.

See County Comm 'rs of Caroline County v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358 Md. 83,
94-95, 747 A.2d 600 (2000) (citations omitted). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 4 cmt. b (1981, updated through 2007)(contracts implied in law "are not based on the
apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances"; "[t]hey are obligations
created by law for reasons of justice").
Because an "unjust enrichment claim is based on a quasi-contract or an implied-in-law
contract[,]" Alternatives Unltd., 155 Md.App. at 461, 843 A.2d 252, "it is simply a rule of law
that requires restitution to the plaintiff of something that came into defendant's hands but
belongs to the plaintiff in some sense.'" Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr. Co., 57
Md.App. 766, 775, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984)(quoting 1 Dobbs § 4.2). The motion court erred in
holding that the Bank's unjust enrichment claim fails for lack of evidence showing a meeting
of the minds.

B.
No Dealings Directly Between The Parties Required
The court also erroneously required direct dealings between the Bank and Mrs. Gibbons.
Contrary to the motion court's legal conclusion, a cause of action for unjust enrichment may
lie against a transferee with whom the plaintiff had no contract, transaction, or dealing,
either directly or indirectly.
-5-
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Plitt v. Greenberg, 242 Md. 359, 219 A.2d 237 (1966), is instructive, in that the Court of
Appeals explicitly rejected a similar contention that unjust enrichment requires transactional
privity between the party who conferred the benefit and the party who received it. Blacker,
an attorney, represented Plitt in a number of financial transactions. Plitt agreed to loan
Blacker and his partner, Greenberg, the sum of $38,333.34. Plitt wrote a check in that
amount, payable to Blacker and his wife. Blacker endorsed the check and forged his wife's
signature. Unaware of that forgery, Plitt then endorsed the check with a special endorsement
that it be paid "to the order of the First National Bank of Balta. for wire transfer to the
Central National Banks Richmond, Va. for credit Theodore E. Greenberg."' Id. at 362, 219
A.2d 237. Although Plitt never had direct contact with Greenberg, he endorsed payment to
Greenberg because Blacker told him that he "could look to Greenberg and the Blackers for
repayment." Id. The funds were deposited into Greenberg's checking account.
As security for the debt, Blacker endorsed over to Plitt a $45,000 note payable to the

Blackers from Alsage Realty Corporation, as well as Blacker's oral promise that replacement
collateral would be secured via Greenberg. But no replacement collateral ever materialized,
the notemaker proved to be a paper corporation with no assets, and the Blackers filed
bankruptcy. As a result, Plitt sued Greenberg, ,,vith whom he had never dealt directly, for
debt, fraudulent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. The trial court directed a verdict
on the unjust enrichment claims in favor of defendant Greenberg.
[918 A.2d 572]
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plitt had "a colorable cause of action
grounded on a theory of unjust enrichment or restitution[,]" even though there was no
evidence that Greenberg dealt with Plitt or otherwise participated in Blacker's fraud. See id.
at 363, 219 A.2d 237. The Court explained:
Although Greenberg may not have known that he had received the proceeds of Plitt's
check into his account, and no express contract for debt existed between Plitt and Greenberg,
the law implies a debt "whenever the defendant has obtained possession of money which, in
equity and good conscience, he ought not to be allowed to retain." According to the
Restatement, Restitution§ 123:
"A person who, non-tortiously and without notice that another has the

beneficial ownership of it, acquires property which it would have been wrongful
for him to acquire with notice of the facts and of which he is not a purchaser for
value is, upon discovery of the facts, under a duty to account to the other for the
direct product of the subject matter and the value of the use to him, if any[.]" ....
"It is immaterial how the money may have come into the defendant's hands,
and the fact that it was received from a third person will not affect his liability,
if, in equity and good conscience, he is not entitled to hold it against the true
owner."
-6-
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Id. at 363-64, 219 A.2d 237 (emphasis added and citation omitted). See also Hill v. Cross
Country Settlements, LLC, 172 Md. App. 350, 914 A.2d 231, 2007 WL 29191, *6 ("The lack of
an express contract or privity between appellant and [defendant] does not preclude
application of the principles of unjust enrichment").

The Court of Appeals explained that Greenberg's innocence could not shield him because
he had given no consideration for the loan.
It has been held that a plaintiff could recover money from even an innocent
transferee who was without knowledge that he possessed the plaintiff's money.
However, if a transferee came into possession of a plaintiffs money in good faith after paying
a good and valuable consideration for it, then the plaintiff could not prevail and recover back
the funds in that transferee's possession.

In order to make out a case of unjust enrichment, the burden rested upon Plitt to
prove that the proceeds of his check, which were deposited into Greenberg's
acconnt, were received without the payment of valuable consideration from
Greenberg to Blacker.
Plitt, 242 Md. at 364-65, 219 A.2d 237 (emphasis added and citations omitted).

Although Greenberg claimed that he paid Blacker $38,333.34 in exchange for Plitt's
check in that amount, Greenberg was "unable to produce any checks, check stubs or records"
showing payments from Greenberg to Blacker totaling that amount. See id. at 365-66, 219
A.2d 237. Pointing to bank statements that contradicted Greenberg's testimony, the Court of
Appeals held that there was "sufficient evidence of lack of payment to Blacker for the
proceeds of Plitt's check received into Greenberg's account as would justify taking the case to
the jury." Id. at 367, 219 A2d 237. If the jury found that Greenberg did not pay for the
$38,333.34 deposit from Plitt, Greenberg could not establish an "innocent transferee for
value" defense to Plitt's claim for unjust enrichment. See id. at 365-66, 219 A2d 237.
As Mrs. Gibbons correctly points out, Plitt differs from this case in that the

[918 A.2d 573]
party seeking restitution in that case (Plitt) directly endorsed payment of the disputed funds
to the defendant from whom he sought to recover those funds (Greenberg), whereas there is
no evidence in this case that Bank of America approved payment of the disputed funds to
Mrs. Gibbons. We do not find that factual distinction material, however. In Plitt, the Court of
Appeals made it clear that the dispositive element would not be whether Greenberg "dealt"
with Plitt, but whether Greenberg, as the defendant transferee, paid value for the funds
transferred to him as a result of the actions of Blacker, the culpable third party. Thus, the fact
that Bank of America neither "endorsed" nor otherwise approved Thomas Gibbons' transfer
of stolen money to Mrs. Gibbons does not preclude the Bank's claim for unjust enrichment.
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Instead, the dispositive question is whether Lynne Gibbons, as the defendant transferee,
paid value for the funds transferred to her by Thomas Gibbons, the culpable third party. If
th.e misappropriated Bank funds can be traced into her account, 2 there was no consideration
for such deposits, and there is no other defense to the Bank's claim for restitution,3 then the
Bank could prevail on its unjust enrichment cause of action.
The motion court's emphasis on "direct dealings" between the Bank and Lynne Gibbons
ignores the potential significance of evidence that Mrs. Gibbons did not pay value. In
particular, the court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that stolen funds traced into the
Gibbons' joint accounts should be treated as if those funds had been used to purchase cars,
gamble at casinos, or dine in fine restaurants. As Bank of America points out, if an innocent
transferee may retain the benefit of stolen funds without paying value for them, not only
would she receive a windfall, but so would the thief. He would benefit from his wrongdoing
by being permitted to place the funds beyond reach of the victim simply by depositing them
into a joint account with his spouse and shielding her from any knowledge of his
wrongdoing.

c.
Benefit Conferred

Bank of America argues that the court's third error with respect to the first element of
unjust enrichment was to conclude that there was no evidence "that any direct benefit was
conferred on Mrs. Gibbons." The Bank points to Mrs. Gibbons' admission that proceeds from
her husband's thefts were deposited into her joint checking account. Those funds belonged to
the Bank and its customers. See, e.g., Keller v. Fredericktown Sav. Inst., 193 Md. 292, 296,
66 A.2d 924 (1949)(recognizing that bank owns the money deposited by its customers,
"subject to the right of the depositor to draw on it"); Suburban Trust v. Waller, 44 Md.App.
335, 339-40, 408 A.2d 758(1979)(relationship between bank and its customers is one of
debtor and creditor).
Mrs. Gibbons responds that ''there is no authority under Maryland law supporting th[e]
proposition" that the benefit conferred element of an unjust enrichment cause of action may
be satisfied by evidence
[918 A.2d 574]
that such benefit was conferred upon the defendant by the third-party wrongdoer, rather
than by the plaintiff itself. To the contrary, she cites Crosby v. Crosby, 769 F.Supp. 197, 20001 (D.Md. 1991), affd on other grounds 986 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.1993), as precedent for her
thesis that summary judgment is appropriate when the claimed benefits were not directly
conferred by the plaintiff.
We do not agree that Crosby supports Mrs. Gibbons' argument. There, the plaintiff,
Margaret Crosby, was the deceased husband's wife, from whom he was never divorced.
Margaret sued Joan Crosby, the husband's purported second wife, seeking a declaration that
-8-
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Margaret was entitled, inter alia, to the deceased's interest in his home, car, and pension
benefits. Margaret argued that the pension benefits were payable to her as surviving spouse,
because "they were 'constructively or indirectly' conferred upon the defendant [Joan] by the
plaintiff [Margaret]." Id. at 201. The federal district court noted that it found no authority for
that proposition, but then granted summary judgment on alternative equitable grounds:
[W]ere this Court to determine that the benefits were conferred by plaintiff upon
defendant, plaintiff still could not prevail. Margaret Crosby fails to prove that defendant's
acceptance or retention of the benefit under the circumstances of this case make it
inequitable for her to retain the payments. Joan Crosby accepted the pension benefits of a
man with whom she lived for twenty two years. Defendant believed until after Leonard
Crosby's death that the tvvo were legally married. Margaret Crosby has come forward after
having no contact with Leonard Crosby for as many as fifteen years and seeks his pension
benefits. Under these circumstances it is not inequitable for defendant to retain
the benefits already conferred upon her.

Id. (emphasis added). The Fou1th Circuit affirmed on grounds relating to the exercise of
discretion under ERISA. See id., 986 F.2d at 82-84. Thus, the decision in Crosby does not
rest on any requirement that the plaintiff must directly confer the benefit upon the
defendant.
In our view, Plitt illustrates that the benefit may be conferred by the wrongdoer or the
plaintiff seeking restitution. See also Restatement (First) of Restitution§ 123 (1937, updated
through 2006)(innocent recipient of property that he could not lavvfully acquire must
account to true owner if he is not a purchaser for value). Many courts have held an innocent
spouse accountable for a benefit conferred by the embezzling mate, rather than the unjust
enrichment claimant. See, e.g., In 1·e Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d 651, 659 (Colo.1986)(exwife whose husband deposited embezzled funds into family account used to purchase family
home and other property was subject to unjust enrichment claim); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 144
F.Supp.2d 507, 524-25 (E.D.Va.2001), affd, 63 Fed.Appx. 630, 634-35 (4th Cir. 2003)
(innocent spouse of embezzler who used stolen funds to satisfy spouse's personal and joint
obligations and expenses held liable under conversion theory); Bransom v. Std. Hardware,
Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919, 927 (Tex.App.1994)(husband of embezzler who used stolen funds for
household purposes held liable on unjust enrichment claim). Here, the motion court erred in
concluding that lack of evidence that the Bank approved Mrs. Gibbons' receipt of the stolen
money prevented the Bank from prevailing on its unjust enrichment claim.
II.
Second Element: Knowledge Of The Benefit

In evaluating the second element of whether "the defendant knows or appreciates
[918 A.2d 575]
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the benefit," the motion court relied on evidence provided in the affidavits of Mr. and Mrs.
Gibbons:
B. Appreciation or knowledge by the Defendant of the benefit conferred . ...
Mr. Gibbons stated in his affidavit that the great majority of the funds that he
misappropriated during the course of employment was spent by him on personal
entertainment, trips and other activities that his wife did not know about or participate in.
While some of the funds were deposited into the family's checking account, they were
commingled with the money that he earned as salary and bonuses and Ms. Gibbons did not
know the source of these additional funds. He further stated that he kept strict control over
the family's finances and all banking statements and checking accounts were sent to
addresses other than the family residence. He also stated that he told Ms. Gibbons that all of
the monies that were available to him were legitimately obtained and that she had no
knowledge that he obtained money from unlawful activities.

Ms. Gibbons in her Affidavit stated that her husband maintained control over the family
accounts and records and did not share any financial information with her. She went on to
state that her husband had actively concealed his various activities, illegal and otherwise,
from her, that she had no knowledge that he was engaged in unlawful activities or was
placing money from third parties into their joint account and that whatever money was
placed into the joint account was used by her for family expenses.
The circuit court concluded that, because this evidence was unrebutted, the Bank failed
to establish a dispute as to whether Mrs. Gibbons knew that the funds deposited by her
husband were stolen. It then ruled that Mrs. Gibbons' lack of awareness that the funds
deposited by her husband resulted from misappropriation barred the Bank's unjust
enrichment claim:
It is clear from the unrebutted facts as set forth in the affidavits of the Defendant and
Mr. Gibbons that Ms. Gibbons had no actual knowledge that some "benefit" was
being conferred upon her by the Plaintiff, albeit indirectly, by reason of Mr.
Gibbons' making a small percentage of the funds that he stole available to her
for her use and the use of their family. The court therefore believes that the Plaintiffs
claim fails on this particular element of the cause of action pled. (Emphasis added.)

Bank of America asserts that the erroneous "view taken by the trial court was that a
defendant must have actual or constructive knowledge of the source of the benefit received
in order to satisfy the second element[.]" (Emphasis added.) Citing Plitt, the Bank argues
that a transferee's innocence as to the source of the deposited funds is not a bar to recovery
for a claim based on unjust enrichment. Acknowledging that the good faith of Mrs. Gibbons
is a factor that the court can consider when determining the third element of unjust
enrichment, the Bank urges that her good faith is not the "determining factor" on this second
element.
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We agree that Bank of America is not required to prove Mrs. Gibbons knew of her
husband's thefts. The Restatement (First) of Restitution section 123, as cited and applied in
Plitt, explains that the knowledge necessary to establish the second element of an unjust
enrichment claim is not necessarily knowledge that the funds were obtained by wrongful
conduct against the plaintiff who seeks their return:
[918 A.2d 576]
§ 123. Bona Fide Transferee Who Is Not A Purchaser For Value

A person who, non-tortiously and without notice that another has the
beneficial ownership of it, acquires property which it would have been wrongful for him
to acquire with notice of the facts and of which he is not a purchaser for value is, upon
discovery of the facts, under a duty to account to the other for the direct product of the
subject matter and the value of the use to him, if any, and in addition, to:
(a) return the subject matter in specie, if he has it;
(b) pay its value to him, if he has non-tortiously consumed it in beneficial use;

(c) pay its value or what he received therefore at his election, if he has disposed of it.
(Emphasis added.)
This rule "is applicable to a person who, by gratuitous grant, by will or by descent, has
received the title to property, either real or personal, in which another has a beneficial
ownership of which the transferee has no notice at the time of the receipt." Id. ,
cmt. a (emphasis added).
This principle was applied explicitly in Plitt, where the Court of Appeals held that Plitt's
claim for unjust enrichment could be supported by evidence that Greenberg was a transferee
who was not a purchaser for value. In doing so, the Court observed that,
[a]lthough Greenberg may not have known that he had received the proceeds of Plitt's
check into his account, ... the law implies a debt "whenever the defendant has obtained
possession of money which, in equity and good conscience, he ought not to be allowed to
retain." ...
[A] plaintiff could recover money from even an innocent transferee who
was without knowledge that he possessed the plaintiff's money.

Plitt, 242 Md. at 363-64, 219 A.2d 237 (citation omitted and emphasis added). See also
In re Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d at 659 (collecting cases). Here, the motion court erred in
granting summary judgment on the ground that Bank of America failed to establish that Mrs.
Gibbons knew her husband was depositing the proceeds of his thefts from Bank clients into
their joint bank accounts .

..
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III.
Third Element: Unjust Retention Of The Benefit

"(W]hile 'a person is enriched if he has received a benefit,' the law does not consider
him unjustly enriched unless 'the circumstances of the receipt of the benefit are such as
between the two that to retain it would be unjust."' First Nat'l Bank v . Shpritz, 63 Md.App.
623, 640, 493 A.2d 410 (quoting Hamilton v. Bd. of Educ., 233 Md. 196, 201, 195 A.2d 710
(1963)), cert. denied, 304 Md. 297, 498 A.2d 1184 (1985). With respect to this final element,
the motion court also determined that Bank of America failed to establish a dispute:
C. The acceptance or retention of the benefits under circumstances that
make it inequitable to retain benefits without payment of their value. This court
believes that considering the totality of the circumstances and even viewing the pleadings
and facts in the light most favorable to the bank, the Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient
facts and allegations that would meet this particular element of the cause of action. The
Plaintiff in its Complaint asserts that Ms. Gibbons had knowledge of her husband's theft but
backs this up with no facts and, as set forth above, this allegation is completely rebutted by
Mr. and Mrs. Gibbons' affidavits. The Plaintiff goes on to allege that the Defendant

(918 A.2d 577]
lived a "lavish lifestyle" and cites as examples the fact that in mid-2005 tl1e Gibbons' son
went to Europe at a cost of $2,388 and the rest of the family went to Disney World. Even
accepting these facts as true, neither of the activities in question are outside the scope of
families with the Defendant's base income. It is also noted that both trips took place in mid2005, after the embezzlement by Mr. Gibbons had been discovered.
Considering the Defendant's total lack of knowledge of the source of the
supplemental funds that were placed in the family account and the lack of any
factual assertions by the Plaintiff that there was any reason that Ms. Gibbons
should have been aware of any wrongdoing on her husband's part, it is difficult
to see how the circumstances are such that it would be equitable to require the
Defendant to pay money to the Plaintiff.

The Bank argues that the motion court mistakenly relied on Lynne Gibbons' innocence
regarding her husband's thefts in concluding that she should not be required to return the
money he stole from the Bank. Citing Plitt and the Restatement, the Bank also contends that
"consideration of the respective financial positions of the parties is ... improper(.]" Although
Mrs. Gibbons' good faith "is a factor that the court can consider when determining whether
the circumstances are such tl1at it would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit
without payment of its value, it is neither the exclusive nor determining factor."
We conclude that the motion court' almost exclusive focus on Lynne Gibbons' lack of
knowledge undermined and unduly limited its analysis about whether, as a matter of law, it
would be equitable to require her to pay money to the Bank as restitution. Although Mrs.
-1 2 -

490

--------Bank of Amt

Corp. v. Gibbons, 918 A.2d 565. 173 Md. App. 2,

_

,Id. App ., 2007)

_.,;...;.,.,,.;..._...,__

_____

Gibbon's good faith is a highly relevant factor, it does not, by itself, support a determination
as a matter of law that "'the circumstances of the receipt of the benefit are such as between
the [Bank and Mrs. Gibbons] that to retain it would be unjust."' See also Ammons v. Coffee
County, 716 So.2d 1227 (A1a.Civ.App.1998)(affirming verdict against innocent spouse when
stolen funds were used to acquire boat and trailer.)
Courts often have required an innocent recipient benefitted by third party wrongdoing to
establish a change of circumstances that makes it inequitable to or~er restitution. See Fed.
Ins. Co., 144 F.Supp.2d at 524-25; Restatement Restitution § 142. Thus, when the recipient's
change of circumstances was not caused by his or her wrongful conduct, "the primary rule is
that if repayment will cause the recipient loss, restitution is barred to the extent that such
loss would occur." Hilliard v. Fox, 735 F.Supp. 674, 677-78 (W.D.Va.1990). See also
Restatement Restitution§ 142 cmt. b (''Any change of circumstances which would cause ...
the recipient entire or partial loss if the claimant were to obtain full restitution, is such a
change as prevents full restitution"). This rule rests on the recognition that the innocent
recipient's repayment of ill-gotten funds "will not normally cause the recipient any net loss he will merely be returned to the status quo ante." Hilliard, 735 F.Supp. at 678.
An innocent spouse could also avoid liability by proving that the money deposited in a
joint account was used by the wrongdoing spouse for his (or her) own benefit, without any
benefit to the family. Cf McMerty v. Herzog, 702 F.2d 127, 130 (8th Cir.1983)(burden on
innocent spouse to prove, with respect to joint property bought with wrongfully obtained
funds, which part of purchase price, if any, was not wrongfully diverted); Namow Corp. v.
[918 A.2d 578]

Egger, 99 Nev. 590, 668 P.2d 265, 267 (1983)(when misappropriated funds are used to
purchase real property, innocent donee of property is entitled to offset principal mortgage
payments, and payments for improvements and taxes against party seeking constructive
trust).
In sum, the motion court erred in granting summary judgment based on Mrs. Gibbons'
lack of knowledge. The innocence of Mrs. Gibbons, by itself, does not preclude a claim for
unjust enrichment. The motion court did not consider whether exclusive use of money by Mr.
Gibbons (without benefitting the family), a change in Mrs. Gibbons' circumstances, or other
equitable circumstances might warrant denial or reduction of the Bank's unjust enrichment
claim. On remand, the parties may present evidence pertinent to these equitable
considerations.
JUDGMENT VACATED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE.

Notes:
-13-
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_ _ _ _ _ _B_a_n_k_o_fA_m_e_.

;orp. v. Gibbons, 918 A.2d 565, 173 Md. App. 26

_d_.A-p_p_.,_2_00_7_)_ _ _ __

Bank of America alleges that Mr. Gibbons transferred from the LSSC account to the joint
Provident account all but $40,420.85 of the total $1,537,772.53 deposited into the joint
Provident account. He then transferred from his Provident account a total of $53,058.00 to
the Gibbons' joint checking account at Bank of America, and $136,185-47 to their joint
savings account.
1.

2. "A special tracing problem occurs when the plaintiffs monies are mingled with funds of
the defendant or funds of others." 2 Dobbs§ 6.1(4), at 16. For tracing issues that may arise
when withdrawals have been made from a commingled account and when wrongfully
obtained funds from several victims have been commingled with each other, see generally id.
at§ 6.1(4)(discussing mingled funds).
3. See generally 1 Dobbs § 4.6-4.7 (defenses of change of position, bona fide purchase); 2
Dobbs § 6.1 (Misappropriation of Money - Tracing).

492

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH mDICIAL DISTRICT OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC., a Colorado
corporation, successor by merger to
MicroServ, Inc., an Idaho corporation,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL
MILLS OPERA TIO NS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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2016 HAY 18 PH 12: 09

Case No. CV-2015-3927
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves LP Broadband Inc. 's (and its predecessor's, MicroServ Computer
Technologies, Inc.) placement and use of antenna equipment on the rooftop of property owned
by Lincoln Land Company, LLC. In 2000, the subject real property was owned by Evans
Grainery and leased to General Mills Operations LLC 1 ("General Mills"). In March of 2000,
General Mills entered into a Roof-top Rental Agreement ("Roof Top Agreement") with LP
Broadband's predecessor, Microserv2 . The Roof Top Agreement allowed LP Broadband to use

1 The lease was actually executed by General Mill s Operations, Inc. General Mrns Operations, LLC is the
successor-in interest to General M ill s Operations, Inc.
2 This Court uses LP Broadband to refer to both LP Broadband, Inc. and its predecessor Microserv.
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the roof top space of the grain storage bins in exchange for payment to General Mil ls in the
amount of $50 per month.
Lincoln Land purchased the subject property from Evans Grainery on March 15, 2006.
General Mills continued to lease the property after Lincoln Land purchased it. Lincoln Land and
General Mills executed a lease ("Lease Agreement") in June 2010. The Lease Agreement
prohibits General Mills from subleasing the property.
On July 20, 20 15, Lincoln Land fi led a Complaint against LP Broadband, alleging a
cause of action for unjust enriclunent.
On November 30, 2015, LP Broadband moved to amend its answer and add a third-party
complaint against General Mills. At its December 10 20 15, hearing this Court granted LP
Broadband's motion to amend, in part. LP Broadband filed a Tbird-Paiiy Complaint against
General Mills on December 16, 20 15, asserting a cause of action for indemnification.
On March 4, 20 16, Lincoln Land filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Unjust Enrichment Claim and Burden of Proof and a brief in support thereof.
On March 16, 2016, LP Broadband filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a
memorandum in support thereof and the Affidavit of Larren K. Covert, LP Broadband's counsel.
On March 30, 2016, General Mills filed: (1) a Memorandun1 in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Sununary Judgment Re: Unjust Enrichment Claim and Burdens of Proof, (2) a
Memorandum in Opposition to LP Broadband, Inc. 's Motion for Summary Judgment, (3) the
Declai·ation of Alexander P. McLaughlin, and (4) the Declaration of Colleen Benson.
On that same date, Linco ln Lai1d filed : (1) a Brief in Opposition to Defendant' s Motion
for Summary Judgment, (2) the Affidavit of Doyle H. Beck, and (3) the Affidavit of Jim Rooney,
and (4) the Affidavit of Paul L. F uller.
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Also on March 30, 2016

P Broadband filed an Objection to Lincoln Land's Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment.
On April 6, 2016 Lincoln Land filed a reply brief in support of its motion for partial
summary judgment.
Also on that date, LP Broadband filed a reply brief in supp01i of its motion for summary
judgm nt.
On April 13, 2016, this Court heard argument on the pa11ies' motions for summary
judgment. The Com1 gave the pat1ies one week to consider mediation. Thjs Court took the
matter under advisement on April 20 2016.
II.

STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION

A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, and adrnissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105 ; Rockefeller v.
Graboiv, 136 Idaho 637 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times on the moving party to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21
P.3d 908 (2001).
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 4 77 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct.
2548 (1 986) stated:
Of course, a party seeking summru·y judgment always bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any ' which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike
the Court of Appeals, we find no xpress or implied requirement in Rul 56 that
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to 'the
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affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement.
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in thj s regard, such
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that,
regardl ess of whether the moving party accomparues its summary judgment
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should , be granted so long as
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal
purposes of the swnmary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way
that allows it to accomplish this purpose.

Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original).
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co. ,
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a
court is not pern1itted to weigh the evidence to reso lve controverted factual issues. Meyers v.
Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-

moving party requires the court to draw al l reasonable factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 Idaho 237, 999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000).
The Idaho appellate courts have fo llowed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Celotex, which stated:

Summary judgment procedme is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
acti.on." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the
Rule, prior to trial , that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.
id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win ofMichigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc. ,
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137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P .3d 488
(2002).
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his pleadings
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of materi al
issues of fact, whj ch preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth,
136 Idaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a
mere scinti lla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle,
Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P .3d 220 (2001 ).
The moving party is entitled to j udgment when the non-moving party fails to make a
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. Primary Health Ner,,vork, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin. , 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307
(2002). Facts in di spute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Frede kind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, ( 1998). In such
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete fai Iure of proof
concerrung an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial. Id.
Generally, the trial court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or resolve
controverted factual issues when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. AID
Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 11 9 Idaho 897, 900, 8 11 P .2d 507, 510 (Ct.App.199 1).
However, where the "evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial comt rather
than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
possibility of confli cting inferences because the court alone will be responsible
for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co.
v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 5 15,5 19, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See also AID Ins. Co.,
119 Idaho at 900,811 P.2d at 5 10 (if the court will be the ultimate finder of fact,
both parties have moved for summary judgment and the motions are based on the
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same evidentiary facts, then "summary judgment is appropriate even though
conflicting inferences are possible, so long as all the evidence is confined entirely
to the record"); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470, 700 P.2d 91, 92
(Ct.App.1985) (when the judge will be the trier of fact, he or she is free to arrive
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary
facts).
Small v. State 132 Idaho 327, 334,971 P.2d 1151 , 1158 (Ct. App. 1998); accord Drew v.
Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 539, 989 P.2d 276,281 (1999).
III.

DISCUSSION

A. Unjust Enrichment
Lincoln Land seeks pa1tial summary judgment that LP Broadband was unjustly enriched
with the amount of unjust enrichment to be determined at trial. Lincoln Land also requests that
thi s Court find, as a matter oflaw, that the appropriate calculation of dan1ages is the amount of
profit the LP Broadband has recognized from its use of the property, 1.ess any legitimate expenses
and costs.
LP Broadband likewise moves for summary judgment, seeking a determination that
Lincoln Land's claim for unjust enrichment fails as a matter oflaw.
"Unjust enrichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which would be
inequitable to retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention
is unjust." Vandetford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261, 271
(2007) (citing Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co. 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797
P.2d 863, 866 (1990)). A prima facie case for unjust enrichment exists where: "(1)
there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation
by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit
without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Stevenson v. Windermere
Real Estate/Capital G,p. , Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 827 275 P.3d 839, 842 (2012)
(quoting Vande,:ford Co. , 144 Idaho at 558, 165 P.3d at 272). "A person confers a
benefit upon another if he or she gives the other some interest in money, land or
possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the oth r, satisfie
the debt of the other or in any other way adds to the other's advantage." 42 C.J.S.
Jmpli d Contracts§ 9 (2013).
7

MEMORANDUM DECISIO

A D ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6

498

Med. Recovery Servs. , LL v. Bonneville Billing & ollections, li1c. 157 Idaho 395, 398, 336
P.3d 802, 805 (20 14), reh'g denied (Sept. 15, 2014).
In Medical Recovery Services, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed in depth what is
required to satisfy the first element of a claim for unjust enrichment. In that case, Medical
Recovery Services, LLC ("MRS") obtained a judgment and garnishment order against Stacie
Christ. Christ's employer Western States Equipment Company ("WSEC"), mistakenly s nt the
garnished wages to Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. ("BBC"). BBC considered the
garnishments as payment on debts, which Christ owed it and refused to refund any portion of the
money. MRS brought suit against BBC, alleging several causes of action, including unjust
enrichment.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that MRS could not establish BBC was
unjustly emiched because MRS had not conferred any benefit on BBC. The Com1 explained:
"A person confers a benefit upon another if he or she gives the other some interest
in money, land, or possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of
the other, satisfies the debt of the other, or in any other way adds to the other's
advantage." 42 C.J.S. Implied ontracts § 9 (20 13).
BBC was not unjustly enriched by MRS because MRS did not confer any benefit
on BBC; thus, MRS cannot maintain a claim for unjust enrichment. On appeal ,
MRS argues that it has conferred a benefit on BBC "by filing suit, obtaining a
judgment, and garnishing wages from ... Christ on whom [BBC] had a collection
account and from whose employer [BBC] serendipitously received three checks."
Conversely, BBC argues that MRS has not conferred any benefit on BBC. BBC
asserts that it was not the conduct of MRS that resulted in BBC receiving the
disputed checks· it was the mi take of WSEC. We agree. MRS ' claim that it
unjustly enriched BBC is without merit because MRS has not conferred any
benefit on BBC and therefore has failed to satisfy the first element of unjust
enrichment.

Here .. . MRS has not conferred any direct benefit on BBC. To con.fer a benefit
in the context of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must give the defendant an
intere t in money land or possessions, or perform services beneficial to, or at the
reque t of, the other. See 42 C.J .. Implied ontracts § 9. MRS has done none of
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these things for the benefit of BBC. The benefit enjoyed by BBC in this case
funds from three checks totaling $1,083. 2 1 was conferred on BBC by WSE
becaus WSEC sent the checks ....
It is also worth noting that this case includes an additional fact rendering MRS '
conduct and the benefit received by BBC ven less direct than the situations we
considered in Stevenson and Beco: mistake. Mistake on the part of WSEC not a
party to this case, is the source of the benefit to BBC Distilled to its essence,
MRS ' position is that this Court should abandon the requirement that the party
claiming unjust enrichment "confer a benefit" in favor of a "but for causation"
test. It is true that, but for MRS' writ of garnishment, BBC would not have
received the disputed checks in this matter. However, "but for causation" is not
the standard applied by this Court in its unjust enrichment jurisprudence . ...

The benefit that BBC enjoyed was not the writ of continuing garnishment that
MRS took the effort to procure· it was money in the form of three checks drawn
on WSEC's account that were accidentally sent by WSEC to BBC. It was not the
eff01t of MRS in obtaining the writ that conferred the benefit; it was ultimately
WSEC's mistake that resulted in the benefit. Thus, MRS has not conferred a
benefit on BBC and ca1111ot recover under a theory of unjust eruichment.
Id. at 398-399, 336 P.3d at 805-06 (emphasis added).

In this case, just as in MRS, it was not the plaintiffs conduct that conferred a benefit on
the d fondant. General Mills not Lincoln Land, confened the benefit by granting LP Broadband
pennission to use the property's rooftop area. If, as Lincoln Land argues, General Mills'
decision to permit LP Broadband to use the rooftop was in violation of the Lease Agreement
that decision is analogous to WSEC's mistake in MRS Such a mistake or alleged breach of
contract does not alter the fact that it was General Mills not Lincoln Land which conferred the
benefit.
The case of Brewer v. Washington RSA

o.

Lld. Partnership, 145 Idaho 735 184 P.3d

860 (2008), sheds further light on the Supreme Court's application of the first element of unjust
enrichment. In that case the Idaho Supreme Court examined a claim of unjust enrichment under
facts similar to those in this case. In Brewer, William and Robert Brewer and Madlynn Kinzer
were tenants in common of a parcel of real property. Kinzer entered into a lease agreement with
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Inland Cellular, allowing the cellular company to erect and operate a cellular tower on the
property. Kinzer never informed the Brewers of the lease agreement and lacked the authority
(without the Brewers' consent) to authorize the lease agreement. 3 The Brewers brought suit
against Insular Cellular, alleging that Insular Cellular had been unjustly enriched. Insular
Cellular moved for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim and the district court
grant d the motion. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, stating:

[TJ he Brewers provided no evidence that they had conferred a benefit on Inland
Cellular or that it had received a benefit. Instead, they merely as erted that
Inland Cellular 's use of the land was a benefit and that it was receiving a below
market lease.
The district court then granted Inland Cellula.r's motion for summary judgment. It
determined that the Brewers could not make a prima facie case for unjust
enrichment. It noted that there were no facts in the record suggesting Inland
Cellular had received a below-market lease or that it had received a benefit that
would be inequitable for it to retain.
Here, as the plaintiffs the Brewers bore the burden of proving unjust enrichment
at trial. They also had the burden at summary judgment to show a genuine issue of
material fact as to the elements of unjust enrichment because Inland Ce.llular had
hown that the Brewers could not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to any
of the three elements of unjust enrichment. They failed to point to a single fact in
the record either below or on appeal that creates a genuine issue of material fact.
lnstead, they merely made unsubstantiated allegations relating to the lease.
Therefore, we affirm the district court order granting Inland Cellular summary
judgment on the unjust enrichment claim.

Id. at 739-40, 184 P.3d at 864-65 (emphasis added).
Lincoln Land attempts to distinguish Brewer by arguing that the Supreme Court in that
case dismissed the case because the Brewers did not provide evidence that: (1) Inland Cellular
had used the property or (2) that the lease payment was below market value. As to the first
issue, a close reading of the case indicates that there was no dispute that Inland Cellular was, in

3

Brewer, 145 Idaho at 738, 184 P.3d at 863 ("Although a co-tenant has the right to lease their individual interest in
the common property, a co-tenant has no power to lease the entire estate or a speci tic portion of the entire estate
without the consent of the other tenants.").
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fact, using the property. In his concunenc

Justice Jones, indicates that Inland Cellular's

predecessor in interest had constructed a facility on the property and that Inland Cellular
continued to operate the facility. In light of this, the Supreme Co mi's statement that the Brewers
"mer ly asserted that Inland Cellular's use of the land was a benefit" appears to indicate that the
Idaho Supreme Court did not consider Inland Cellular's use of the prope11y without the Brewers'
authorization to be sufficient, by itself, to establish that the Brewers conferred a benefit on Inland
Cellular. This Comi acknowledges that unlike the plaintiff in Brewer, Lincoln Land has clearly
supported its allegation of a below-market value lease, sufficient to create a question of fact on
that issue. The value of the lease, however, relates more directly to the third element in a cause
of action for unjust enrichment. Because the benefit was conferred by General Mills and not by
Lincoln Land, this Court need not consider whether the lease payment was below market val ue.
The fact remains that Lincoln Land did not, as a matter oflaw, confer a benefit on LP
Broadband, as defined by the Court in MRS and Brewer.
LP Broadband's motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss Lincoln Lan.d 's
complaint should be granted. Lincoln Land's motion for partial summary judgment should be
denied.

B. Indemnification
LP Broadband moved for smnmary judgment on its indemnification claim against
Genera l Mills for indemnification. Because summary judgment should be entered dismissing
Lincoln Land's Complaint, LP Broadband is not liable to Lincoln Land and this Comi need not
consider the question of indemnification. LP Broadband' s motion for summary judgment
against General Mills should be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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LP Broadband's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Lincoln Land's complaint is
granted.
LP Broadband's motion for summary judgment against General Mills is denied.
Lincoln Land's motion for partial summary judgment is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

rr

day of -#-i...+;:':p,J-"'1---

-

2016.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[ hereby certify that on this \ )5
day of V>\0--A--,~
20 16, I did send a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, w ith the
correct postage thereon; by causing the san1e to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox;
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Mark R . F uller
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
Lan·en K. Covert
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Fall s, ID 83401
A lexander P. McLaughlin
GI VENS P URSLEY, LLP
PO Box 2720
Boise, 1D 8370 1-2720

RON ALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the Di strict Court
Bonneville County, Idaho
By
~
Deputy Clerk
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P.O. Box 2720
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Pax: (208)388-1390
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Attorneys for Third-Party Dc{:cndnn!s
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Third-Varty Defendants.
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LLC ("G1.1nerul Mills")> and Dcfcndantn11ird ..1>urty Pluintjff LP Broadband, Inc., by and thtough
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Broadband, lnG, against Genera l Mills WJ.th prejudi ce, except Lo Lhc ox tcnl Lincoln Land

Company, LLC nppcnls the Judgment nod llw decision on nppeal results in the revival of Lincoln

Ln nd Coinpnny, L,l.,C's

1.111jL1sl·

enrichment' claim against LP Broadbnnd, lnc. lt1 that event, the

claim from LP f3rm1dbond, Inc. against Oonornl Mills shnll revive, as well as any and nll cluim~.
rights, nnd defonscs of Gcncra1 Mills, without limitnlfon. LP Broadband, Inc. and Genernl Mills
fmther stiµu ln tc and ngrce that each shnll puy their own aLLonicy ti;:(;)s and cost·s with n:spcct to
LP Brnndhand, Inc.'s imlcmnity cot1nl against General Mills. In effectuation of this ::itiputation,
the partfog to thi s stiplllali()11 ft1rtl1cr agree t:o immediate.: ontry of that cct'!t'lin Order of Dismissal
·in the fo rm as allad1ed hereto as Exhibit A and incorporntccl herein by reference.
l,,.
DA'fED this
day of July, 2016.

A~

GIVhNS PTJRSLEY LLP

___ -.:;?- .,

.,.,.-..---;~::.,.1·'· .. ____,_,. _ -.,;- -..\
--:;~ - --- -
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IN TH B DJ STRI CT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JlJDlCJAL., DISTR ICT

OF '1'1·113 S'l'A'J'E OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR 'r'H I.1 COUNTY OF l)ONNEVIU ,I~

LINCOLN LAND COM PANY, LLC,
Plainlit1:

Case No . CV-2015-3927

ORDER OF J)ISMISSAL

vs.

LP BROADBAND, JNC.,
Do fend ant.
LP BROADBAND, lNC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plninti-n:

vs.
OENl:!.l{AL M JLLS; lNC. and GENERAL
M lLLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Patty Dcfcndan1s.

TH IS MATTER having .coma bofore Lile Court on the Stipulation fo r Dismissnl of LP
nroudbnnd, Inc. 's Claims, nud the Court having 1·0vlewed the same, and good cause appearing
th!;}rtifor;
1T JS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1.

The Stipulation for Dismissal of LP Broadband, lnc.'s Chdms be and is hcrnhy
APPROVED; and

ORDER Oli' DlSJVilSSAL ~ J
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2,

Deibndunt/Tblt·d ~Parly Plninl'iff LP 13roudhand, lnc.'s Tbird"Pmty Comp la int

,ig,iinst General Mills, Inc. und Gcncrnl Mills Operations, l,l.,C (coll ecti vdy
"s:lQ!lCJJlLMWl'), and all clairns asserted by LP Bi·ondbai1d, lnc. in th~ uhovc-

cnptioned mntLor, be and am hereby dismissed with pr~judice and LP Broadband ,
Inc. shall tnko nothing in this action, except to the t~x tont. Linco ln Land Com pany,

LLC nppenl}; lhis Judgment nnd the decision on appcul results in the revival of
Lincoln Latld Company, LLC's unjust cmicbmcnt claim against LP Broadband,

li1c. In tlrnt event, the claim from LP Broadband, Inc. iigainst Gcnci·n1 Mills shnH
revive; -ns wdJ us any nnd all claims, rights, and defenses of OeMnd Mills,
without limitation,
J.

Af; between LP Bmndhnnd; Inc. and Gei1erul Mi lls, each party slrnl l pay their own
uttornoy foes cmd costs with .1'eu(Ject to LP l3rondbnrid, lnc.1s indcrni1ity count

a_gainst Genera l Mills.
DA TBD this ~~- day ol'Ju1y, 20 16.

The Honornblc Dane H. WafkiJJs, Jr.
District Judge

ORDER
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CLERICS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICR

I 1-1 ER EBY CRRTl FY thal on this _ _ day ol' JLily~ 20 16, l caused a lnic and i.:orrect
copy of the fo regoing ORDER OJ"i' DISMISSAL to bt} sei"ved by the method indii::ntql below,
and addressed t:o the following:
Mark R. Fuller
Dani.el R. Beck
FULLER & BECK LAW OPFICE, PLLC
410 Men1orfal Drive, Suite 20 I

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepuid
( ) I-land Dcliv9rccl

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) h1csimile (208 ,524.7167)

P.O. Box 509'.15
Idaho Falb, TD 83405~0935

RmHilcJ r.,, Swafford
Trt:vor

r,. C;islf ett'm

Larrcn K. Covert

SWAFFORD LAW, I'.C.

(
(
(
(

) U.S. Mail, Posto.ge Pri3paid
) Hane.I Delivered
) Overnight Muil
) Facsimi1e (208.524.4131)

655 S, Woodrnff
Idaho 111:1 ll s, ID 8340]
t\loxnncler P. McLm1ghlin
Jeffrey W. Bower

( ) U.S. Mail, Po8tage Prepaid
( ) Hund Delivered

GIVENS PURSLEY LU'

( ) Overnight Mail

601 Wosl BtmMck Sli·ect

( ) Facsimflc(208.388. l 300)

P.O. B<>x 2720
Boiso, Idaho 83701 -2720
9M2U14. ) 11J1 111 ·2]

Clerk

or lhe Coud
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TH, STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVI

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff~

Case No. CV-201 5-3927

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

P BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff:
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL
MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,

Third-Party Defendants.

THIS MATIER having come before the Court on the Stipulation for Dismissal of P

Broadband, Inc. 's Claims, and the Court having reviewed the same, and good cause appearing
therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The Stipulation for Dismissal of LP Broadband, Inc. 's Claims be and is hereby
APPROVED; and

ORDER OF DISMISSAL - 1

' ~- 'Cle~~ ,.

I

-

AUG 1221ili 1J
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(

2.

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff LP Broadband, lnc.'s Third-Paity Complaint
against General Mills, Inc. and General Mills Operations; LLC (coll ectively
' General Mills''), and all claims asserted by LP Broadband, Inc. in the abovecaptioned matter, be and are her by dismissed with prejudice and LP Broadband,
Inc. shall take nothing in this action, except to the extent Lincoln Land Company
C appeals this Judgment and the decision on appeal results in the revival of
incoln Land Company, LLC's unjust enriclunent claim against LP Broadband,
lnc. 1n that event, the claim from LP Broadband, Inc. against General Mills shall
revive, as well as any and all claims, rights, and defenses of General Mills,
without limitation.

3.

A between LP Broadband, Inc. and General Mills, each pmty shall pay their own
attorney fees and costs with respect to LP Broadband, lnc.'s indemnity count
against General Mills.
DATED this

a

day of July,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL - 2

513

(

CLERK'S CERTJFICA TE OF SERVICE

Ji

I HER BY C RTIFY that on this
day of July, 2016, 1 caused a true and co1Tect
copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL to be ·ervecl by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICE, PLLC
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 20 l
P .0. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, TD 83405-0935

'Nu.J.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
cf) Hand Delivered

Ronald L. Swafford
Trevor L. Castleton
Larren K. Covert

-{M.S.

SWAFFORD LAW, P .C.

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (208.524.7 167)

Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mai l
( ) Facsimile (208.524.4 131)

655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, 1D 83401

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jeffrey W. Bower
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P. O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2720

~ . S . Mail, Postage Prepaid

( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile(208.388. l 300)

9842864_ 1 [13 141 -2]
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
JUDGMENT

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL
MILLS OPERA TIO NS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff Lincoln Land Company, LLC's Complaint, and all claims asserted by
Lincoln Land Company, LLC in the above-captioned matter, be and are hereby
dismissed with prejudice and Lincoln Land Company, LLC shall take nothing in
this action.

~fE(C[E~\l,'[E[!) 7
JUDGMENT-1

AUG 12 201

___________ ___ _515
..,

(
2.

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff LP Broadband, Inc. 's Third-Party Complaint
against General Mills, Inc. and General Mills Operations, LLC (collectively
"General Mills"), and all claims asserted by LP Broadband, Inc. in the abovecaptioned matter, be and are hereby dismissed with prejudice and LP Broadband,
Inc. shall take nothing in this action, except to the extent Lincoln Land Company,
LLC appeals this Judgment and the decision on appeal results in the revival of
Lincoln Land Company, LLC's unjust enrichment claim against LP Broadband,
Inc. In that event, the claim from LP Broadband, Inc. against General Mills shall
revive, as well as any and all claims, rights, and defenses of General Mills,
without limitation.

3.

As between LP Broadband, Inc. and General Mills, each party shall pay their own
attorney fees and costs with respect to LP Broadband, Inc.'s indemnity count
against General Mills.
DATED this

JUDGMENT-2

4

day of July,
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(
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J1-

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of July, 2016, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICE, PLLC
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
Ronald L. Swafford
Trevor L. Castleton
Larren K. Covert
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
655 S. Woodruff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jeffrey W. Bower
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720

v'tl].S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (208.524.7167)

~
.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (208.524.4131)

{lu.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile(208.388.1300)

9803489_ 1 (13141-2]
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(

SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq. , Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq. , Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
VS.

GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

To: All Parties and Their Counsel of Record
Please take notice that on the 21 st day of September, 2016, at the hour of9:30 a.m. , or as
soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, Defendant will call up its Motion for Attorney Fees and

NOTICE OF HEARING

- I

ORIGINAL
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.

Costs before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins Jr. , District Judge, at the Bonneville County
Courthouse, Idaho Falls, Idaho.

-y

niJ

DATED this _,:;,<,..;
_ -_ day of September, 2016.

~C-~
LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

;)1'--J day of September,. 2016, I served a true and,

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:

D
D
D

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
[zSJ Fax: 208-524-7167

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 208-388-1300

~

c-~sf

GARRENK.COVERT, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant

NOTICE OF HEARING

-2
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(

(

SW AFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq. Bar No. 5809
LatTen K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131

1 SEP - 2 P 3: 49

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD L.
SWAFFORD IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

)
:ss
)

RONALD L. SWAFFORD, ESQ., being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD L. SW AFFORD IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

I
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(

1. I am Ronald L. Swafford, Esq.
2. I am over the age of 18, a licensed attorney in the State ofldaho and make the
following statements of my own personal knowledge and belief.
3. I am an attorney for the Defendant in this matter.
4. I charge an hourly rate of $225 .00 in civil cases.
5. I have been an attorney in Idaho for over 40 years.
6. My hourly rate is well within the n01mal rate for similar experienced attorneys in
Eastern Idaho.
7. I have reviewed the Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Attorney Fees and Costs
filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 in this matter and believe each of the statements therein
to be true and accurate, and incorporate the same fully herein as if completely
restated.
8. All of the work perfo1med in this matter was reasonably and necessarily incurred in
the defense of the Defendant.

Dated this

d?.y
~

ember, 2016.

Attorney for Defendant
Subscribed and Affirmed before me this

KACIAElDS
NOTARY PUBLIC

STA1'E OF IDAHO

2..

day of September, 2016.

N~~
TrP-oJr,o ~(s
Residing:
Commission expires:

I

7 II~
T·

j'D
/22._

J

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD L. SWAFFORD IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
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(
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

:2. ~

day of September, 2016, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
D Designated comthouse box
D Hand-delivered
j3J' Fax: 208-524-7167

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 208-388-1300

&~ S Q .
Attorneys for Defendant

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD L. SWAFFORD IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

3

522

(
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq. , Bar No. 5809
Larren K . Covert, Esq. , Bar No . 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131

1 SEP-2 PM 3=49

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMP ANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF LARREN K. COVERT
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

)
:ss
)

LARREN K. COVERT ESQ. , being first duly sworn, deposes and says :

AFFIDAVIT OF LARREN K. COVERT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORN EY FEES AND COSTS
l
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(

(

1. I am Larren K. Covert, Esq.
2. I am over the age of 18, a licensed attorney in the State of Idaho and make the
following statements of my own personal knowledge and belief.
3. I am an attorney for the Defendant in this matter.
4. I charge an hourly rate of $175 .00 in civil cases.
5. I have been an attorney in Idaho for over 10 years.
6. My hourly rate is well within the normal rate for similar experienced attorneys in
Eastern Idaho.
7. I have reviewed the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
fi led pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 in this matter and believe each of the statements therein
to be true and accurate, and incorporate the same folly herein as if completely
restated.
8. All of the work performed in this matter was reasonably and necessarily incurred in
the defense of the Defendant.

Dated thi s

;1

,..J
day of September, 2016.

~
LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.

Subscribed and Affirmed before me this

~A~

__2__ day of September, 2016.
N~

:~~~

£ia,,h

Residing:
O ~ (/ s- l l;J)
Commission expires:7/fb / '26z__-z

AFFIDAVIT OF LARREN K. COVERT IN SUPPORT OF MOTTON FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

2 fl I,)

day of September, 2016, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:

D
D
D

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
4 10 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
[El Fax: 208 -524-7167

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated com1house box
Hand-delivered
ll:] Fax: 208-388-1300

~c____)
LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant

AFFIDAVTT OF LARREN K. COVERT fN SUPPORT OF MOT[ON FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No . 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
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Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC. ,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant, LP Broadband, Inc. by and through its attorney of record ,
Lanen K. Covert Esq., and hereby provides the following Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Attorney Fees and Costs pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(5) and 54(3)(5).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - I

ORIGINAL
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This Memorandum fully incorporates the Affidavit of Larren K. Covert filed herewith.

ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO I.C.§12-120
Defendant requests attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 12- 120(3). This section states that in
any civil action involving a commercial transaction, the prevailing party shall be allowed
reasonable attorney fees. A commercial transaction is defined as all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes.
The gravamen of this action involved the use of the rooftop space by the Defendant for
commercial usages. Both the Plaintiff and Defendant are both commercial entities. The
complaints of the Plaintiff centered aro und a commercial lease with the Third-Party Defendant
and alleged violations of that lease.
As this case involves a commercial transaction, Defendant is entitled to an award of
attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 12- 120(3).

ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO I.C.§12-121
Defendant requests attorney fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-121. This section states that the
Court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevai ling party. In this matter, the Defendant is
the clear prevailing party. "The prevailing party question is examined and determined from an
overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis." Advanced Med. Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Cir.
ofIdaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812, 8 14, 303 P.3d 171, 173 (2013). In this case, both an overall view
and a claim by claim analysis show that Defendant is the prevailing party.
Defendant successfully defended agai nst the unfounded claims of Plaintiff. Plaintiff
sought an enormous recovery from Defendant despite no connection what so ever. As such,
Defendant is the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C.§ 12- 12 1.

ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO I.C.§12-123

MEMORANDUM IN SU PPORT OF MOT ION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 2
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Defendant requests attorney fees pursuant to l.C.§12-123. This section states that the
Court may award reasonable attorney fees to any party to an action adversely affected by
frivolous conduct. Defendant requests the Court determine that the actions of the Plaintiff in this
matter were frivolous in the hearing on attorney fees and costs in this matter.
Frivolous conduct is defined as actions and claims that are not supported by the facts or
in law. In this matter, Plaintiff sought over one-hundred thousand dollars from Defendant
without any basis in law or in fact. This Court in its Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Motions for Summary Judgment noted that two Idaho Supreme Comt cases were directly on

point in this matter. Both cases showed that a necessary element of the claim of unjust
enrichment was that the Plaintiff confer a benefit on the Defendant. In this matter, Plaintiff knew
it did not confer any benefit on the Defendant. In Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledged
that Defendant was operating on the property pursuant to an agreement with the third-party
General Mills. Plaintiff knew that General Mills was allowing Defendant to access the property
and was collecting rent for the Defendant's use of th property. There was no benefit given to the
Defendant by the Plaintiff what so eve r.

By its own admissions Plaintiff knew it gave no benefit to the Defendant. As such this
Complaint and every action by Plaintiff thereafter is frivolous, as it was not well founded in fact

or in law. As such, Defendant is enti.tled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C.§12-123.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 54
Defendant seeks an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to LR. C.P. 54. On the issue
of costs this rule states that a prevailing party is entitled to an award of costs as a matter ofright.
These costs include court filing fees preparation of exhibits and records. Defendant seek the
amount of $377 .00 for costs as a matter of right as et fo11h below.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 3
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If the Court were to determine that the below costs are not to be had as a matter of right,

Defendant would request each of the costs be awarded as discretionary costs. Each of the
itemized costs were necessary and reasonably incuned in this matter.
Defendant also seeks to have the attorney fees in this matter awarded as costs pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(e). This rul e states that when provided for in statue or contract attorney fees may be
awarded . Defendant has previously set forth the statutory basis for the award of attorney fees
above.
When determini ng attorney fees, the Court must make a determination that the fees are
reasonable. To assist the Court in making this determination, I.R.C.P. 54(e) sets for several
factors the Court must consider. These are each addressed as follows:
(A) T he Tim e and La bor Required
Defendant itemizes the fo ll owing time and labor required for the defense of this matter:
ITEMIZED FEES AND COSTS
Hours
0.30
1.50

Attorney Date
RLS
08/12/2015
08/16/2015
RLS

1.40

RLS

08/25/20 15

1.70

RLS

08/26/2015

1.20

RLS

08/27/2015

0. 10
2.40

RLS
RLS

08/28/2015
09/03 /2015

DescriQtion
Preparation of engagement letter.
Preparation of Notice of Appearance;
conference with attorney for Lincoln Land
regarding extension.
Review of contracts, insurance issues
complaint and history as provided.
Rview of complaint; analysis for answer and
third party complaint against General Mill s;
preparation ofreview for BWF.
Draft of indemnification letter to General
Mills; call to K. Miller, local manager of
General Mills; email client.
Letter to K. Miller.
Received new lease terms from JAB ; included
in demand letter; revise letter; research on
newest cases on unjust enrichment for future
motion to dismiss· analysis and selection of
appropriate affirmative defenses for answer;
informed adverse counsel that needed until

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 4

Amount
$75.00
$375 .00

$350.00
$425.00

$300.00

$25.00
$600.00

529

0.50
2.20
1.00
0.50

RLS
RLS
RLS
RLS

09/03/2015
09/1 1/2015
09/ 14/2015
09/ 15/2015

0.20
3.50

RLS
RLS

09/1 5/2015
09/ 15/20 15

1.60

RLS

09/ 18/2015

0.20

RLS

09/22/20 15

0.50

RLS

09/22/2015

0.30
0.50

RLS
RLS

09/22/2015
09/24/20 15

0.00

RLS

09/29/2015

0.10
2.80

RLS
LKC

09/30/2015
10/30/20 15

2.30

RLS

11/02/2015

0.30
0.70

PL
RLS

11/05/2015
11/05/2015

2.50

R S

11/05/20 1. 5

1. 50
2.00

RLS
RLS

11 /05/2015
11 /05/2 015

0. 10

RL

11 /06/20 15

September 10 to obtain answer from General
Mills.
Letter to General Mills.
Preparation of Answer.
Preparation of answers to admissions - draft.
Forward documents to General Mills counsel
in Minneapolis; phone conference with
counsel.
Email and forward of pleadings to Simpson.
Preparation of first draft of response to
interrogations.
Completion of discovery response; phone
conference with General Mi ll s attorney;
forward of discovery response to Forsbem1er
for signatures.
Receipt of faxed verification ; attached and
filed with court and counsel.
Office conference with Hulse, attorney for
General Mills· contacts with Adam regarding
location of signed Tower Agreement 2013 .
Preparation of Notice of Service.
Review of response from General Mills;
forward of copies to JAB with explanation;
phone conference with Hulse to determine if
he is authorized to accept service.
Office conference with insurance company
and Katie (no charge)
Letter to Fuller.
Review of file; research; preparation of third
party complaint; prepare memo to file .
Receipt and review of demands from
opposing counsel; review of letter and
discovery responses; finalize draft of answer
and third party demand with assistant.
Revise supplemental discovery response.
Research on correct sub-entity for General
Mills.
Draft of initial amended answer and
counterclaim against General Mills.
Supplementation of discovery responses.
Letter to Fuller regarding trade secrets; review
of Protection Order and trade secret statutes
and case law.
Letter to Fuller.
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$125 .00
$550.00
$250.00
$125 .00

$50.00
$875.00
$400.00

$50.00
$125 .00

$75.00
$125.00

$0.00
$25.00
$490.00
$575 .00

$22.50
$175.00
$625.00
$375 .00
$500.00

$25.00

530

0.50
0.30

LKC
PL

11/12/20 15
11 / 17/2015

0.10
0.50
2.90

RLS
RLS
RLS

11/22/2015
11 /24/2015
11 /28/2015

4.20

LKC

11/30/2015

0.30

RLS

11/30/2015

3.90

RLS

11 /30/2015

4.00

LKC

12/01/20 15

2.20

LKC

12/02/20 15

1. 50
2. 10

LKC
LKC

12/07/2015
12/08/2015

3.00

RLS

12/09/2015

4.50

LKC

12/09/2015

2.20

LKC

12/10/2015

0.50

LKC

12/11/2015

Scheduling conference.
Revise discovery answer and prepare Notice
of Service.
Letter to fuller.
Review of discovery response and objections.
Research on delaying summary judgment;
assistance to Larren in drafting pleadings;
draft and modification of pleadings jointly
with Lan-en.
Research issues on hearings; conference with
counsel; preparation of Motion to Continue
hearing; Motion to Amend Pleadings; Motion
for Protection Order; Motion to Shorten Time;
Notice of Hearing; Conference with client and
conference with Court Clerk.
Telephone conference with Adam Gillings;
phone conference with opposing arraignment
regarding extension for discovery response (914-20 15)
Finalize Answer, Cow1terclaim and
Affirmative Defenses; draft and finalization of
Response to Request for Admissions.
Telephone conference with counsel;
preparation of Affidavit for Motion for
Summary Judgment and Motion for Summary
Judgment response; conference with client.
Revise Affidavit and Objection; meeting with
Adam regarding Affidavit; calls to client on
additional information.
Review of objection and research.
Review of documents from Plaintiff; research
statutes and rule on hearings; preparation of
response to objection.
Research and partial preparation for hearing
on Motion to Continue, summary judgment
and Motion to Amend Complaint.
Preparation of response to objection; research
cases cites in opposition; meeting with Adam
for Affidavit; preparation of Affidavit and
revisions; file documents with Court; review
new documents from Plaintiff.
Preparation for hearing; hearing on motions;
research rule requirement.
Review of proposed orders and protective
order.
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$87.50
$22.50
$25 .00
$125.00
$725.00

$735.00

$75 .00

$975.00

$700.00

$385.00

$262.50
$367.50

$750.00

$787.50

$385.00
$87.50

531

2.80

LKC

12/ 15/2015

1.00

LKC

12/18/2015

1.00

RLS

12/18/2015

0.50

LKC

12/21/2015

0.30

LKC

12/23/2015

1.00

RLS

12/28/2015

0.50

LKC

12/3 0/2015

1.50

LKC

12/31/2015

0.80

RLS

01 /07/2016

0.10

LKC

01/08/2016

0.50

LKC

01/11/2015

0.60

RLS

01/12/2016

2.00

RLS

01/13/2016

0.50

LKC

01/13/2016

2.00

LK

01/15/2016

1.50

LKC

01/ 18/2016

Preparation of Order on Motion to Compel
and Protection Order; communications with
counsel on proposed orders and protective
order· preparation of revised third-party
complaint and answer.
Letter and email to General Mills on thirdpatty complaint and acknowledgment of
service; calls to counsel.
Office conference with staff on Motion for
Reconsideration· additional research on
Motion for S un1IDary Judgment against
General Mills; outline thoughts on Summary
Judgment against General Mills.
Conference with counsel for General Mills on
service and pending dates.
Review of communications from counsel and
proposed order.
Review of documents and work on
Reconsideration and Protective Order.
Conference with counsel on order and
research protective order status.
Review of letter on protective order; e-mail to
counsel; preparation of Requests for
Admission, Interrogatories and Requests for
Production; preparation of Notice of Service
and file witl1 Court.
Telephone conference with General Mills
attorney; discussion of history and issues.
Review of documents from General Mills·
calls to Jeff on status and for discovery
information.
Review of correspondence from counsel on
hearings and client on discovery.
Telephone conference with General Mills
attorney regarding Motion for Summary
Judgment and Motion to Disqualify current
Judge; review of disqualification rules.
Review of notes, files and records in
preparation for hearing.
Telephone conference with client on
discovery case status and additional
indi iduals needed.
Office conference with client on discovery·
work on Protective Order review of
documents from General Mills.
R view of answer and defenses from General
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$490.00

$175.00

$250.00

$87.50
$52.50
$250.00
$87.50
$262.50

$200.00
$17.50

$87.50
$150.00

$500.00
$87.50

$350.00

$262.50

532

0.70

RLS

01/19/20 16

1.00

LKC

01/19/2016

1.00

LKC

01 /2 0/2016

0.30

LKC

01/21/2016

23.00

RLS

01/24/2016

2.80

LKC

01 /27/2016

1.20

LKC

01 /29/2016

0.50

LKC

02/0 1/2016

2.00

LKC

02/02/2016

2.00

LKC

02/03/2016

1.00

LKC

02/04/2016

2.00

LKC

02/ 10/2016

1.00

LKC

02/ 15/2016

0.70

LKC

02/16/2016

0.30
1.50

LKC
LKC

02/ 17/20] 6
02/ 18/2016

1.20

LKC

02/26/2016

2.00

LKC

03/0 1/2016

Mills; review of Motion for additional time;
finalize discovery response and conference
with counsel on Order.
Telephone conference with attorney for
General Mills· review of brief filed by Fuller
opposing continuance and expanding time for
hearings; preparation with Covert for
1/20/20 16 hearing.
Office conference with counsel on Protection
Order; preparation of letter; review of court
fil i11gs from General Mills and Lincoln Land.
Preparation fo r and attend hearin g on Motion
to Continue Trial.
Review of correspondence from counsel;
revise protection order.
Preparation of supplemental discovery;
contact with two experts on comparable
pricing.
Obj ection to fees request, Motion to
Reconsider, Protective Order, discovery out·
outline Motion for Summary Judgment; check
Motion for Summary Judgment response.
Preparation of discovery and review of answer
fro m General Mills.
Review of obj ection and response filed by
Lincoln Land.
Preparation of reply memo ; file with Court
and prepare for hearing.
Hearing on motions and preparation of
discovery response.
Preparation of discovery supplementation and
return for signature.
Preparation of supplemental discovery
respo nses and discovery requests.
E-mail to client on discovery and additional
witnesses; prepare discovery responses.
Preparation of di scovery disc losure and call to
client.
Letter to counsel file discovery.
Preparation of discovery ; review of response
and note defi ciencies.
Review of documents on amended Motion for
Fees; Moti on to Compel and additional
discovery requests.
Preparation of Motion for Summary Judgment
and review of discovery for factual basis.
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$175.00

$175.00

$175.00
$52.50
$5 750.00

$490.00

$210.00
$87 .50
$350.00
$350.00
$ 175 .00
$3 50.00
$175 .00
$122 .50
$52.50
$262 .5 0
$210.00

$350.00

533

0.30
1.00

LKC
LKC

03 /02/2016
03/03/2016

0.80

RLS

03/03/2016

2. 00

LKC

03/07/2016

1.50

LKC

03/ 10/20 16

5.00

LKC

03 / 11/2016

3.00

LKC

03/1 5/20 16

2.00

LKC

03/ 16/2016

1.00

PL

03/23/20 16

1.50

LKC

03/25/2016

3.50

LKC

03/28/2015

2.20

LKC

03/29/2016

2.40
1.40

LKC
LKC

04/04/2016
04/05/2016

3.30

LK

04/06/2016

1.00

LKC

04/12/2016

3.30
0.80

LKC
LKC

04/13/2016
04/ 19/2016

1.20

RLS

05/02/2016

1.50

LKC

05/02/2016

Conference on mediation and mediator.
Review of new motions from Lincoln Land;
calls with LP ' s insurance.
Telephone conference with General Mi lls·
efforts to agree on a mediator; calls to
mediators to obtain availability.
Outline issues in new Motion for Summary
Judgment from Lincoln Land ; research
damages.
Review of Lincoln Land and General Mills
discovery responses; prepare meet and confer
letter on Lincoln Land.
Preparation of our Motion for Summary
Judgment; research enrichment cases for
memorandum.
Complete initial draft of Motion for summary
Judgment and additional research on claims
against General Mills.
Research for Summary Judgment and work on
discovery.
Review of Pre-Trial Order; set and post
deadlines.
Research and review of Motion for Summary
Judgment response.
Preparation ofresponsive brief to their Motion
for Summary Judgment.
Revisions to Motion for Summary Judgment
response.
Research on Summary Judgment rep ly.
Preparation of draft of reply for Motion for
Summary Judgment.
Research, final draft of Reply on Motion for
Smm11ary Judgment and file with Court.
Preparation for hearing on Summary
Judgment.
Hearing on Summary Judgment.
Communications with client on depos ition and
discovery; review of file for all needed items.
Telephone confe rence with Fuller to delay
deposition until after the decision on
Summary Judgment· letter to fuller and Comi
Clerk.
Scheduled deposition preparation of
information on case history and documents for
Ryan .
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$52 .50
$175.00
$200.00

$350.00

$262 .50

$875.00

$525 .00

$350.00
$75.00
$262.50
$6 12.50
$385.00
$420.00
$245 .00
$577.50
$175.00
$577.50
$ 140.00
$300.00

$262.50

534

1.20

RLS

05/02/2016

0.50

LKC

05/05/2016

2.10

LKC

05/06/2016

1.00

LKC

05/11/2016

3.00

LKC

05/12/2016

2.50

LKC

05/ 16/2016

1.00

LKC

05/18/2016

0.8

LKC

06/01/2016

1.0

LKC

06/08/2016

0.5

LKC

06/15/2016

0.5

LKC

07/05/16

1.0

LKC

07/20/16

2.5

LKC

09/02/16

Telephone conference with Fuller to delay
deposition until after the decision on
Summary Judgment. Preparation of letter to
Fuller and the Cou11.
Conference with client and counsel on
deposition dates.
Preparation of Response to Motions, research
and preparation of deposition information.
Te lephone conference with opposing counsel
on hearing, preparation of Motion to
Continue, Motion to Shorten Time,
conference with Court for hearing date and
time.
Preparation of Objection to Motions and
research cases.
Court appearance on Hearing on Motion to
Continue Hearing preparation of documents
and information on case. Discovery and
witnesses for deposition preparation.
Review of decision, email to clients and letter
to counsel on bearings.

$300.00

Call with counsel and research on final order
and stipu lations
Conference with General Mills on judgment
and stipulation, research and draft additional
language for appeal potential
Letter to General Mills on stipulation and
judgment
Review correspondence from General Mills
on stipu lati on and order, revise documents and
return
Review final documents on judgment and
order conference with client on decision,
judgment sand additional documents
Preparation of Motion, Memorandum and
Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs

$140 .00

Total

$87.50
$367 .50
$ 175 .00

$525.00
$437.50

$175.00

$175.00

$87.50
$87.50

$175.00

$437.50
$37,072.50

COSTS
Date
08/ 12/2 015
08/1 6/2 015
12/1 6/2015
12/l 8/2015

Descrigtion
Filing fee.
Filing fee.
Filing fee.
CD of hearing.
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Extended Cost
$136.00
$207.00
$14.00
$ 10.00

535

01/18/2016

Filing Fee.
Total:

$10.00
$377.00

TOTAL COMBINED FEES AND COSTS: $37,449.50

The above time and labor were all reasonable and necessary for the defense of this
matter. This case involved many hearings, communications with counse l for the Plaintiff and
Third-Party Defendant and court hearings. Additionally, Plaintiff requested numerous and
voluminous discovery items that required several hearings and significant time to acquire.
Several motions were fi led and defended by the Defendant each of which was necessary in this
matter.
(B) The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions

The allegation of unjust enrichment by the Plaintiff against the Defendant was not a
simple issue. Additionally, the Plaintiff sought an extraordinary set of remedies in this matter.
The issue of the Plaintiff seeking a disgorgement of profits on an unjust emichment claim where
there was no benefit or contact between the two parties was not an easily untangled claim.
Significant time researching and briefing the issues was required to defend this claim and request
for recovery. Several hearings were set by the Plaintiff to have these complex legal issues
determined by the Court, requiring time to research understand, brief and argue each.
(C) The Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly and the Experience and
Ab ility of the Attorney in the Particular Field of Law

This matter involved numerous motions and h arings to discuss fine points of the law and
complex legal analysis. The case required a high level of skill and ability to properly manage the
discovery hearings, briefing and other aspects of the case. Ronald Swafford has been an attorney
in the State of Idaho for more than 40 years. He is well experienced in commercial property and
contract law. Ron has been both private and corporate counsel for many cases involving prop rty
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and quasi-contract issues. Larren Covert has been an attorney for over 10 years and has been
involved in numerous civil litigations involving real property and commercial transactions.
(D) The Prevailing Charges for Like Work

Ronald Swafford charges an hourly rate of $225.00 and Larren Covert charges an hourly
rate of $175 .00 for civil cases. These amounts are well within the normal range for civil case
work in Eastern Idaho for attorneys of similar experience with each rate being on the lower
range for the experience. Paralegal time in this matter was charged at the hourly rate of $75.00.
(E) Whether the Fee is Fixed or Contingent

Swafford Law, PC entered into a standard hourly fee agreem nt with Defendant, charging
the above listed hourly rate for aU services provided.
{F) The Time Limitations Imposed bv the Client or the Circumstances of the Case

There were no extraordinary time limitations imposed by the client in this matter.
Swafford Law, PC was contacted and retained to represent the Defendant after the Complaint
had already been served, requiring a quick response. Several motions and other actions by the
Plaintiff caused several periods of intense work and briefing to meet applicable time limitations.
(G) The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained

Plaintiff sought, in its Complaint an award of at least $153 450.00 plus attorney fees and
costs. During the course of the litigation Plaintiff sought to obtain a disgorgement of any profits
of the Defendant for the 5 year period the case involved. This amount could have been far
greater. Additionally, Plaintiffs discovery requests provided a potential customer exposure and
loss that would have resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages.
Defendant obtain the best result possible in this matter, a complete dismissal of all claims
against it.
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(H) The Undesirability of the Case

The nature of the case itself was not undesirable, a commercial transaction, breach of
implied contract case. Some of factual issues and paiiies involved made the case somewhat less
desireable.
(I) The Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship with the Client

This was the first matter in which Swafford Law PC and the Defendant worked together.
(J) Awards in Similar Cases

The specific facts and nature of this case are such that there is not a good comparison for
similar awards.
(K) The Reasonable Cost of Automated Legal Research (Computer Assisted Legal
Research

While computer assisted legal research was utili zed in this matter, Defendant has not
sought any additional award specifi cally for this expense.
(L) Any Other Factor Which the Court Deems Appropriate in the Particular Case

The Defendant would encourage the Court to examine any other factors relevan.t to this
case.
Based on these factors the Defendant requests that the Court find that the entire amount
sought of $37,072.50 for attorney fees were reasonably incuned and an appropriate award of
attorney fees in this matter.
CONCLUSION

Defendant requests a total award of$37,449.50 for reasonable attorney fees and costs
against Plaintiff in this matter. Plaintiff is entitled to this award as the prevailing party in a
commercial case where the Plaintiff actions were frivolous. AH work performed and amounts
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(
expended were reasonable and necessary for Defendant to expend to successfully defend this
case and obtain a positive result.

DATED this £

J

day of September, 2016.

~

c=-~

L A ~ . COVERT,ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

~ f\-

J

day of September, 20 16, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:

D
D
D

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
[Kl Fax: 208-524-7167

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

141

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax: 208-388-1300

~

Attorneys for Defendant

E
e;:~
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SW AFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq. Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 8340 I
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131

16 SEP -2 P 3: 49

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS

VS.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant, LP Broadband, Inc. , by and through its attorney of record,
Larren K. Covert, Esq., and hereby moves this Court for its order awarding Defendant attorney

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS - 1

ORIGINAL
540

(
fees and costs. Defendant requests an award pursuant to I.C.§§12-120, 12-121 , 12-123, I.R.C>P.
54 and all other applicable rules and statutes.
This Motion is based on the file and record herein and on the Memorandum in Support of

Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, Affidavit of Ronald L. Swafford and Affidavit of Larren K.
Covert filed herewith and fully incorporated herein.
Oral argument is requested.

DATED this

L

day of September, 20 16.

en:-:
(
~

~
~ _ _ _ _ _ , + --

~~T,EsQ.

Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

d/\-J

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __.."-'--_ day of September, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:

D
D
D

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
~ Fax: 208-524-7167

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83 70 I

D
D
D

,0.

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax: 208-388-1300

LARREN K. COVERT ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No . 2698)
PAULL. FULLER (ISB No. 8435)
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES , PLLC .
4 10 MEMORIAL DRIVE , SUITE 20 1
P . O . Box 5 0 9 3 5
I DAHO FALLS , ID 83405-0935
TELEPHONE : (208) 524 - 5400
FACSIMILE : (208) 524-7167

Oft;.
BONNEVILLE COUNTY 6/,A I/I I
IDAHO
Vrt(
1

2 16 SEP 16 PH 3: 4,

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
I daho
limited
liabi lity
company ,
Plaintiff ,
v.

Case No. CV- 15 - 3927

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Colorado
corporat i on ,
successor
by
merger t o MicroServ , I n c ., an
I daho corporation ,
Defendan t .
LP BROADBAND , INC .,
Third- Par ty Plainti ff ,

v.
GENERAL
MILLS ,
INC .
and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS , LLC ,
Third-Party Defendants .
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Lincoln Land Company, LLC, by and through its
attorney of record , Mark R. Fuller, of Fuller & Beck Law Offices, PLLC, and files this Brief
in Opposition to LP Broadband's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Lincoln Land
requests that the Court deny LP Broadband's Motion for the reasons set forth herein.
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STANDARD
The awarding of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court
and subject to review for an abuse of discretion. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg. , L.P., 143 Idaho
641 , 643, 152 P .3d 2, 4 (2006) .

ARGUMENT
1. NO ATTORNEY FEES ALLOWED UNDER IDAHO CODE §12-120(3) .
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) states as follows :
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill ,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale
of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and
collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions
except transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is
defined to mean any person, partnership , corporation, association, private
organization , the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
In Bryan Trucking, Inc. v. Gier, Docket No. 43461, 2016 Opinion No. 72 (Idaho,
2016), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "[t]here must be a commercial transaction
between the parties for attorney fees to be awarded." Id. at p. 5 (emphasis added);
citing Great Plains Equip. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp. , 136 Idaho 466, 471 , 36 P.3d 218, 223

(2001 ). The Supreme Court further stated that "only the parties to the commercial
transaction are entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3)." Id. at p. 5 (emphasis
added); citing Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc. , 153 Idaho 440, 461 ,
283 P.3d 757, 778 (2012) . In Printcraft Press, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "[a]n
award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12- 120(3) is proper if a 'commercial
transaction is integral to the cla im, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is
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attempting to recover.'" 153 Idaho at 461, 283 P.3d at 778. The Printcraft Press Court
went on to state as follows:
This Court has held that only the parties to the commercial transaction are
entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). E.g. BECO Constr. Co. v.
J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008); Soignier
v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 327, 256 P.3d 730, 735 (2011); Harris, Inc. v.
Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, Inc. , 151 Idaho 761 , 778, 264 P.3d 400, 417
(2011). Thus, even though fees are available in cases involving a tort claim ,
a commercial transaction between the parties to the lawsuit must form the
basis of the claim.
153 Idaho at 461, 283 P.3d at 778 (emphasis in original).
In Printcraft Press, the Plaintiff was the prevailing party and admitted at trial that
there were no contracts between the Plaintiff and any named Defendant. Id. Plaintiff
asserted that even though no contract existed between the parties, it was entitled to
attorney fees under Section 12-120(3) either as (1) a beneficiary of a contract between
the Defendants and a third-party or (2) under a claim of the 'totality of the parties'
dealings' . Id. Both claims were denied by the Supreme Court. Id. The first claim was
denied because the agreement was between the Defendants and a third party. "Thus,
although [Plaintiff] was asserting rights created under that agreement, there was no
commercial transaction between the parties that gave rise to this litigation." Id. The
second claim was similarly denied as follows : "Here, even if there are several commercial
transactions that created the circumstances underlying the claims, none of those
transactions are between the parties. Therefore, we hold that [Plaintiff]'s claims were not
based upon a commercial transaction between the parties and we affirm the trial court's
denial of attorney fees under I.C . § 12-120(3)." 153 Idaho at 461-62 , 283 P.3d at 778-79.
As in Printcraft Press, LP Broadband seeks attorney fees under I.C . §12-120(3)
cla iming both that LP is a beneficiary of a contract between Lincoln Land and General
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Mills ("The complaints of the Plaintiff centered around a commercial lease with the ThirdParty Defendant and alleged violations of that lease." See Memorandum, p. 2), and
asserting a 'totality of the parties' dealings' argument ("The gravamen of this action
involved the use of the rooftop space by the Defendant for· commercial usages." See
Memorandum, p. 2). These arguments were both specifically rejected by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Printcraft Press, and should be similarly rejected by this Court.
This issue was expressly addressed in Great Plains Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline,
136 Idaho 466, 36 P.3d 218 (2001) . As explained by the Court, "In this case, attorney
fees were requested for the separate claim of unjust enrichment pursuant to I.C. §12120(3), and the gravamen of that claim was a commercial transaction." Id. at 472.
However, attorney fees were denied because there was no transaction between the
subcontractors (who asserted materialman's liens) and Northwest Pipeline. Further, there
was no contention that the plaintiff had alleged in its complaint that there was a
transaction between it and Northwest Pipeline. For a detailed explanation of the Great
Plains Equip. holding, the Court is directed to Gamer v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 469-70,
259 P.3d 608 (2011). In order to recover under Section 12-120(3), a claimant must plead
that Section as the law governing the action, must allege supporting facts in their
pleadings , the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and it must be the
basis upon which the claimant seeks to recover. Id. at 470.
Lincoln Land has never asserted any claim that a commercial transaction existed
between Lincoln Land and LP Broadband , and did not assert a claim for its own attorney
fees under I.C. §12-120 . See Complaint, p. 4-5 . This action sought the disgorgements of
profits which were unjustly retained as a result of LP Broadband's failure to engage in a
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commercial transaction with Lincoln Land. LP Broadband itself denies any contractual
relationship with Lincoln Land: "There exists no privity of contract between the parties
hereto. There is no contractual relationship or duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff." See
Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses (a). LP Broadband has repeatedly asserted that
there was no direct benefit conferred by Lincoln Land , and the Court adopted that
position. See Memorandum Decision, entered May 18, 2016, p. 8-10 . If no direct benefit
was conferred by Lincoln Land, then there could be no commercial transaction between
Lincoln Land and LP Broadband.
Further, LP Broadband should be judicially estopped from now claiming that a
commercial transaction existed between Lincoln Land and LP Braodband. In addressing
judicial estoppel, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in McCa/lister v. Gordon Dixon, MO.,
Blackfoot Med. Clinic, Inc., 154 Idaho 891, 303 P.3d 578, as follows:

Idaho adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76
Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). Judicial estoppel precludes a party from
advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second
position that is incompatible with the first. A & J Const. Co. v. Wood, 141
Idaho 682 , 684 , 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). The policy behind judicial estoppel
is to protect "the integrity of the judicial system , by protecting the orderly
administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the judicial
proceeding ." Id. at 685, 116 P.3d at 15 (quoting Robertson Supply Inc. v.
Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99 , 101 , 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct.App .1998)). Broadly
accepted , it is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with
the legal system. Id.; see also 31 C.J .S. Estoppel and Waiver§ 186 (2012).
Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not the
litigants; therefore, it is not necessary to demonstrate individual prejudice.
Wood, 141 Idaho at 686 , 116 P.3d at 16 (citing Hamilton v. State Farm Fire
& Gas. Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2001)) .
McCal/ister, 154 Idaho 891 , 894 . In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222

(1997), the Idaho Supreme Court stated : "Judicial estoppel is meant to prevent taking
inconsistent positions, whether legal or factual , at least absent newly discovered evidence
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or fraud. "
Throughout this litigation , LP Broadband has taken a consistent position that there
was no relationship between LP Broadband and Lincoln Land, that LP Broadband only
dealt with General Mills and was unaware of Lincoln Land 's ownership interests in the
subject property. On Page 2 of LP's Memorandum for Attorney Fees, the very same page
on which LP is seeking attorney fees under Section 12-120(3), LP states: "Plaintiff sought
an enormous recovery from Defendant despite no connection what so ever."
(Emphasis added) . Having succeeded in getting the Court to determine that there was no
connection between Lincoln Land and LP Broadband, now LP Broadband seeks to play
fast and loose with the Court by claiming that there is a connection sufficient to create a
"commercial transaction". This Court shouid not allow LP Broadband to advantageously
take the position that no transaction exists whatsoever for purposes of the merits of the
litigation, and now assert a second incompatible position that a transaction did exist for
purposes of attorney fees . LP Broadband's attempts at playing fast and loose with the
legal system must be rejected to protect the integrity of judicial system . Alternatively, if LP
Broadband continues to insist that a commercial transaction existed between the parties,
the Court should reconsider its Memorandum Decision , which made the determination
that there was no direct transactional relationship between LP Broadband and Lincoln
Land . If a commercial transaction existed between LP Broadband and Lincoln Land , then
Lincoln Land must have provided a direct benefit to LP Broadband and the Court's
Memorandum Decision should be vacated. LP Broadband cannot have it both ways. The
principles of Jud icia l Estoppel are designed to prevent this exact tactic.
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2. NO ATTORNEY FEES ALLOWED UNDER IDAHO CODE §12-1 21 .
With regards to attorney fees claimed under Idaho Code § 12-121 , the Idaho
Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code
section 12-121 is inappropriate where a party merely cites to the code section and fails to
provide any argument as to why the party is entitled to the award pursuant to the code
section ." Marek v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50 , 57, 278 P.3d 920 (2012); citing Bagley v.
Thomason , 149 Idaho 799 , 805, 241 P.3d 972 , 978 (2010).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) specifically states that "[a]ttorney fees under
Idaho Code Section 12-12 1 may be awarded by the court only when it finds that the case
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, wh ich
finding must be in writing and include the basis and reasons for the award. " The Idaho
Supreme Court has further stated in Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 302 P.3d
349 (2013) as follows:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party." I.C. § 12-121. "An award of attorney fees under [I.C.] §
12- 121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party." Michalk v. Michalk,
148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009). However, th is Court
"perm its the award of attorneys fees to the prevailing party if the court
determi nes the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation ." Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M.
& Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 218-19, 177 P.3d 955 , 965--66
(2008) . When deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded under I.C .
§ 12-121 , the "entire course of the litigation must be taken into account and
if there is at least one legitimate issue presented , attorney fees may not be
awarded even though the losing party has asserted other factual or legal
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation ." Michalk, 148
Idaho at 235 , 220 P.3d at 591.
154 Idaho at 73 1, 302 P.3d at 356.
LP Broadband has simply cited the Court to Idaho Code Section 12-12 1 and
asserted that as prevailing party it is entitled to attorney fees , without providing any
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argument as to why LP Broadband is entitled to such an award , as required in Merek. LP
Broadband's entire argument is expressed in the following two sentences: "Defendant
successfully defended against the unfounded claims of Plaintiff. Plaintiff sought an
enormous recovery from Defendant despite no connection what so ever." See
Memorandum, p. 2. LP Broadband has presented no argument that Lincoln Land's claims
were brought frivolously or pursued unreasonably. LP Broadband has failed to establish
that the litigation was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
At the hearing on Lincoln Land 's Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court noted that
unjust enrichment claims have been the subject of several recent Idaho Supreme Court
rulings , and that this case may present another issue for the Idaho Supreme Court to
address. No prior case law has established whether an unjust enrichment claim may exist
when a benefit belonging to the Plaintiff was wrongfully conferred by a third-party to the
Defendant, in direct breach of contract. The MRS case dealt with a mistaken conferral of
a benefit, not a conferral in direct breach of contract. Lincoln Land reasonably believes
that it conferred a benefit on LP Broadband when LP Broadband occupied Lincoln Land 's
property without permission or authorization from Lincoln Land. By express contractual
prohibition , General Mills had no authority to confer any benefit upon LP Broadband. LP
Broadband has utterly failed to argue or establish that Lincoln Land brought or pursued
this action frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation as required for an award of
attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121.
3. NO ATTORNEY FEES ALLOWED UNDER IDAHO CODE §12-123.
Attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-123 are not allowed in the present
action for the same reasons as set forth above regarding attorney fees under Idaho Code
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Section 12-121 . With regard to frivolous claims, the Idaho Supreme Court, in Gamer v.
Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 259 P.3d 608 (2011) , stated as follows :

A district court should only award fees "when it is left with the abiding belief
that the action was pursued , defended , or brought frivolously, unreasonably,
or without foundation. " C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763 , 769, 25 P.3d 76,
82 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "when a party
pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not
considered to be frivo lous and without foundation. " Id. A claim is not
necessarily frivolous simply because the district court concludes it fails as a
matter of law. Gulf Chem. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Williams, 107
Idaho 890, 894, 693 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Ct.App.1984) . Furthermore, "[a]
misperception of the law, or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself,
unreasonable. Rather, the question is whether the position adopted was not
only incorrect, but so plainly fallacious that it could be deemed frivolous ,
unreasonable-, or without foundation." Snipes v. Schalo, 130 Idaho 890,
893, 950 P.2d 262 , 265 (Ct.App. 1997) (internal citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
151 Idaho at 468, 259 P.3d at 614. LP Broadband has failed to establish that Lincoln
Land's unjust enrichment claims were so plainly fallacious that the claims could be
deemed frivolous , unreasonable, or without foundation .
Idaho Code Section 12-123 sanctions frivolous conduct designed to harass or
maliciously injure another party in a civil case. Campbell v. Ki/dew, 141 Idaho 640, 651 ,
115 P.3d 731 (2005) . Attorneys fees may only be awarded under 12-123 after notice is
given to a party or his counsel identifying the conduct alleged to be frivolous. LP
Broadband has not identified any conduct as defined by 12-123(b)(i) as obviously
serving merely to harass or maliciously injure LP Broadband . LP Broadband asserts that
Lincoln Land 's claims in excess of one hundred thousand dollars were "without any basis
in law or in fact. " See Memorandum, p. 3. The Trial Court's decision was based upon the
holdings of Med. Recovery Servs. , LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc. , 157 Idaho
395 , 398, 336 P.3d 802 , 805 (2014), reh'g denied (Sept. 15, 2014) , and Brewer v.
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Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008) . Both of
these cases were extremely fact driven and this Trial Court has acknowledged that,
"unlike the plaintiff in Brewer, Lincoln Land has clearly supported its allegation of a belowmarket value lease, sufficient to create an issue of fact on that issue." See Memorandum
Decision , p. 10. Lincoln Land could not have reasonably anticipated that the Court would
view General Mills' contract breach conferral of benefits upon LP Broadband as
"analogous to WSEC's mistake in MRS." Id. LP Broadband's argument is that the filing of
Lincoln Land's claims was necessarily frivolous conduct and plainly fallacious simply
because the Court granted Summary Judgment. Such an outcome based argument has
been expressly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court and must be rejected by the Court
here.
4. NO ATTORNEY FEES AND/OR COSTS ALLOWED UNDER 1.R.C.P. 54.
a.

Costs

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C) identifies costs which are allowed as a matter of right and
I.R.C.P . 54(d)(1)(D) allows for discretionary costs for items which "were necessary and

exceptional costs, reasonably incurred .. .. " (Emphasis added). LP Broadband has failed to
identify which of the provisions under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C) apply, but simply identifies four
items of cost as "filing fee" and one item of cost as "CD of hearing". Without specifically
identifying what each "filing fee" is, Lincoln Land is unable to determine if such "filing fee"
was actually paid and for what purpose it was incurred . If these costs relate to LP's action
against General Mills, they should be denied , but that cannot presently be determined.
LP Broadband further fails to establish its claims under I.R.C.P. 54 (d)(1)(D) which
requires such costs were "necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred". Simply
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stating that such costs were "necessary and reasonable" (see Memorandum , p. 4) not
only fails to identify why such costs were necessary and reasonable, but also ignores the
standard to be applied of "necessary and exceptional costs , reasonably incurred".
This Court should not accept that the costs asserted in the Memorandum are
"necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred", simply because LP Broadband
claims that they are. Further, simply identifying each costs as "filing fee" should not be
considered sufficient to be included as a cost as a matter of right under I.R.C.P.
54(d)(1 )(C). LP Broadband has failed to meet the applicable standard of proof and its
request for costs should be denied in its entirety.
b.

Attorney Fees

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) does not create any right to attorney fees, but
merely provides a framework for granting attorney fees if such right is "provided for by any

statute or contract. " See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). The Idaho Supreme Court restated in Beach

Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 607, 130 P.3d 1138, 1145 (2006),
that "Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) 'creates no substantive right to attorney fees ,
but merely establishes a framework for applying I.C. § 12-121."' Id. at 607; citing Huff v.

Uhl, 103 Idaho 274, 277 n. 1, 647 P.2d 730, 733 n. 1 (1982).
As discussed above, LP Broadband has not cited to any statute which authorizes
the recovery of attorney fees in the present action and no contract existed between the
parties permitting the recovery of attorney fees. The attorney fees claimed under Rule 54
should be denied.
5. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS NOT PROPERLY DOCUMENTED.
a.

Miscalculations
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There appears to be numerous errors in LP Broadband 's Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Attorney Fees. The most egregious example occurs in the claim asserted for
January 24, 2016 , where Mr. Swafford has asserted that he worked on "Preparation of
supplemental discovery; contact with two experts on comparable pricing" for a period of
twenty-three (23) hours, bi lli ng a total of $5 ,750 .00 . Lincoln Land (and the Court) has no
way of verifying that Mr. Swafford worked on this case for 23 hours on a single day, but
considers it extremely unlikely. This entry and the others listed hereafter show that the
memorandum of attorney fees was not reviewed and found to be "true and accurate" by
both of LP's counsel as asserted in their respective affidavits, Paragraph 7, and should
not be accepted by the Court in the absence of verifying time records. The claim asserted
for January 24, 2016 should be denied in its entirety.
On May 2, 2016, an entry for Ronald L. Swafford for 1.2 hours was claimed twice,
creating a double billing for the same work asserted , in the amount of $300.00 .
The sworn Affidavit of Ronald L. Swafford, para. 4, states that Mr. Swafford
charges an hourly rate of $225.00 in civi l cases . However, throughout the Memorandum
Mr. Swafford's time is cla imed at $250.00 per hour. Based upon the Memorandum, Mr.
Swafford billed a total of 71 .8 hours, with each hour overbilling $25.00 from the sworn
hourly rate, for a total overbilling of $1,795.00.
Based upon these numerous billing errors, LP Broadband was overcharged
nearly $8,000. Lincoln Land is not responsible for these overbillings. These multiple errors
must be taken into account before any award of attorney fees can be considered by the
Court and verifying billing records should be closely examined .
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b.

Fees Not Related to Lincoln Land

Numerous items identified as attorney fees claimed against Lincoln Land include
work directed against General Mills as a Third-Party Defendant. Lincoln Land strongly
opposed the effort of LP Broadband to join General Mills to the present action. See
Plaintiff's Brief in Response to Motions to Amend Answer and to File Third Party
Complaint, filed December 9, 2015. LP Broadband was not successful in recovering
anything from General Mills. Fees and costs incurred by LP Broadband in unsuccessfully
pursuing causes of action against another entity should not be assessed against Lincoln
Land. Examples occur on entries for 8/26/2015, 8/27/2015, 8/28/2015, 9/3/2015,
9/15/2015, 9/18/2015, 9/22/2015, 9/24/2015,
12/15/2015,

12/18/2015,

12/21/2015,

10/30/2015, 11/2/2015,

11/5/2015,

1/7/2016, 1/8/2016, 1/12/2016,

1/15/2016,

1/18/201 6, 1/19/2016, 1/29/2016, 3/3/2016, 3/10/2016, 3/15/2016, 6/8/2016, 6/15/2016,
and 7/5/2016. Based upon these numerous examples, it is clear that LP Broadband's
counsel have not distinguished between efforts directed by LP against Lincoln Land and
efforts directed against General Mills. The burden rests with LP Broadband to isolate its
attorney fee claims against Lincoln Land, which LP has completely failed to do. The time
and costs LP Broadband spent unsuccessfully pursuing General Mills should not be
assessed against Lincoln Land and all commingled claims should be denied in their
entirety, in the total amount of $7,185.00. LP Broadband did not prevail on its third party
complaint and is not entitled to an award of such fees.
CONCLUSION

Lincoln Land requests that this Court deny LP Broadband's Motion for Attorney
Fees and Costs in its entirety for the reasons set forth above. There are numerous billing
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errors in the Memorandum of Attorney Fees. There was no transaction between Lincoln
Land and LP Broadband , a fact asserted by LP throughout this litigation. LP Broadband
must be judicially estopped from prevailing in the underlying litigation by asserting no
transaction occurred , and now playing fast and loose with the judicial system by asserting
a claim for attorney fees when LP knows no transaction in fact occurred . If LP continues
to assert that a commercial transaction exists sufficient to support its claim for attorney
fees, this Court should reconsider its Memorandum Decision and deny LP's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Lincoln Land should not be ordered to pay for any of LP's attorney
fees and costs to unsuccessfully pursue third party claims against General Mills.
DATED this 16th day of September, 2016.
FULLER & BECK

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Plaintiff
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1. I am Ronald L. Swafford, Esq.
2. I am over the age of 18, a licensed attorney in the State of Idaho and make the
foll.owing statements of my own personal knowledge and belief.
3. I am an attorney for the Defendant in this matter.
4. I provide this affidavit to clarify and correct the prior affidavit in this matter and to
explain the time entries.
5. I have previously been charging $225.00 per hour for my time in civil cases.
6. Approximately a year ago, I began to move my hourly rate on cases to $250.00 per
hour to reflect my experience and keep my rate comparable to other attorneys in the
area with my experience.
7. I have been an attorney in Idaho for over 40 years.
8. In this matter, my engagement letter indicated that I would be charging $250.00 per
hour for my time.
9. As such, the calculations for my time are correct.
10. On the January 24, 2016 time entry, the entry should be for 2.3 hours for a total of
$575.00 for the work performed.
11. The May 3, 2016 entry was listed twice, on separate pages of the memorandum and
one should be removed.
12. These corrections amount to a reduction of the request in the a
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIST~l~ t . 'f4t/( ;~t!~e\)F
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONN.lfQlJmF- 5 AH 9: Si
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

LP BROADBAND, INC., a Colorado
corporation, successor by merger to
MicroServ, Inc., an Idaho corporation,
Defendant.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and GENERAL
MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-3927

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case involves LP Broadband Inc. 's (and its predecessor's, MicroServ Computer
Technologies, Inc.) placement and use of antenna equipment on the rooftop of property owned
by Lincoln Land Company, LLC. In 2000, the subject real property was owned by Evans
Grainery and leased to General Mills Operations, LLC 1 ("General Mills"). In March of 2000,
General Mills entered into a Roof-top Rental Agreement ("Roof Top Agreement") with LP

1 The lease was actually executed by General Mills Operations, Inc. General Mills Operations, LLC, is the
successor-in interest to General M ills Operations, [nc.
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Broadband's predecessor, Microserv2. The Roof Top Agreement allowed LP Broadband to use
the roof top space of the grain storage bins in exchange for payment to General Mills in the
amount of $50 per month.
Lincoln Land purchased the subject property from Evans Grainery on March 15, 2006.
General Mills continued to lease the property after Lincoln Land purchased it. Lincoln Land and
General Mills executed a lease ("Lease Agreement") in June 2010. The Lease Agreement
prohibits General Mills from subleasing the property.
On July 20, 2015 Lincoln Land filed a Complaint against LP Broadband alleging a
cause of action for unjust enrichment. LP Broadband subsequently filed a Third-Party
Complaint against General Mills, asserting a cause of action for indemnification.
Lincoln Land and LP Broadband filed opposing motions for summary judgment.
On May 18, 2016 this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order, granting LP
Broadband's motion for summary judgment against Lincoln Land, denying LP Broadband's
motion for summary judgment against General Mills, denying Lincoln Land's motion for partial
summary judgment, and dismissing Lincoln Land's Complaint. This Court entered Judgment on
August 19, 2016.
On September 2, 2016, LP Broadband filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, the
Affidavit of Larren K. Covert in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, and the
Affidavit of Ronald L. Swafford in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.
On September 16, 20 16, Lincoln Land filed a Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Attorney Fees and Costs.
On September 19, 2015 LP Broadband filed the Supplemental Affidavit of Ronald L.
Swafford in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.
2

This Court use LP Broadband to refer to both LP Broadband Inc. and its predecessor Microserv.
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This Court heard argument on the motion for attorney fees and costs on September 21,
201 6.

II.

STAND ARD OF ADJUDICATION

The decision whether to award attorney fees is left to the discretion of the district court.
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80, 278 P.3d 943, 950 (2012); Bennett v.
Patrick, 152 Idaho 854, 856, 276 P.3d 726, 728 (201 2).

The awarding of attorney fees under J.C. 12- 120(3) is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Fox v. Mountain WesLElec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 711 ,
52 P.3d 848, 856 (2002). To prove an abuse of discretion this Court looks
to three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of
its discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Id. However, whether a statute awarding attorney
fees applies to a given set of facts is a question of law and subject to free
review. Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P. , 143 Idaho 64 1, 644, 152 P.3d 2,
5 (2006).
Vande,f ord Co., 144 Idaho at 552, 165 P. 3d at 266. "Whether a district court has
correctly determined that a case is based on a ' commercial transaction' for the
purpose of LC. § 12-120(3) is a question of law. This Court exercises free review
over questions of law." FriLts v. Liddle & Moeller Const., Inc. , 144 Idaho 171,
173, 158 P.3d 947, 949 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 461, 283 P.3d 757, 778

(2012).

III.

DISCUSSION

LP Broadband seeks attorney fees and costs from Lincoln Land under LC. §§ 12- 120, 12121, 12-123 and I.R.C.P. 54.

A. Idaho Code§ 12-120(3)
LP Broadband argues it is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-1 20(3) because
thi s action revolved around its commercial use of rooftop space owned by Lincoln Land. It
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contends that both it and Lincoln Land are commercial entities and that Lincoln Land's
complaint centered on a commercial lease between LP Broadband and General Mills.
Lincoln Land argues that LC.§ 12-1 20(3) does not apply because a commercial
transaction never occurred between it and LP Broadband. Lincoln Land cites Printcrafi Press,
Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 283 P.3d 757 (2012) and Great Plains
Equ;p. v. Northwest PipeUne, 136 Idaho 466, 36 P .3d 218 (2001) in support of its position.
Idaho Code§ 12-1 20(3) provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unl ess
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
In Printcraft Press, Printcraft Press prevailed against defendants at trial. Printcraft Press
sought attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-1 20(3), which the trial court denied. On appeal, the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court, explaining:
This Comi has held that only the patiies to the commercial transaction are entitled
to attorney fees under LC. § 12-120(3). E.g. BECO Constr. Co. v. J- U-B Eng 'rs,
Inc., 145 Idaho 71 9, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008); Soignier v. Fletcher, 151
Idaho 322, 327, 256 P.3d 730, 735 (2011 ); Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const,·. &
Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761 , 778, 264 P.3d 400, 417 (2011). Thus, even though
fees are available in cases involving a tort claim, a commercial transaction
between the parties to the lawsuit must form the basis of the claim.
In this case, the issue is whether there was a commercial transaction between
Printcraft and any of the defendants. Waters admitted at trial that there were no
contracts between Printcraft and either Beck, Woolf, or SPU. Instead, Printcraft
points to two other potential commercial transactions: the Third Prui y Beneficiary
Agreement and the "totality of the pruiies' dealings." The first suggested basis
does not suppo1i application of LC. § 12- 120(3) because the Third Party
Beneficiru·y Agreement was not an agreement between Printcraft and the
defendants, but rather an agreement between the industrial park and the
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defendants. Thus, although Printcraft was asserting rights created under that
agreement, there was no commercial transaction between the parties that gave rise
to thi s litigation.
The second claimed basis suffers from the same defect. Printcraft contends that
the lawsuit originated from "a series of interactions between the parties."
However, as previously explained, there were no transactions between Printcraft
and the defendants. Printcraft cites Lettunich v. Key Bank National Association,
141 Idaho 362, 109 P .3d 1104 (2005), for the proposition that claims arising in a
"commercial context," even in the absence of a contract, constitute claims based
upon a commercial transaction. However, in that case, the fraud claim was based
upon statements allegedly made to the plaintiff by the defendant's employee.
Thus, the "commercial context" clearly referred to conduct or transactions
between the parties. Here, even if there are several commercial transactions that
created the circumstances underlying the claims, none of those transactions are
between the parties. Therefore, we hold that Printcraft's claims were not based
upon a commercial transaction between the parties and we affirm the trial court's
denial of attorney fees under LC. § 12- 120(3).
Prin/craft Press, 153 Idaho at 461-62, 283 P.3d at 778-79 (note omitted; italicized emphasis in

original; underlined emphasis added). Similarly, in Great Plains, plaintiff subcontractors
appealed the district court's grant of attorney fees to defendant, NWP, under Idaho Code § 12120(3). The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the di strict court, holding that NWP could not rely
on Idaho Code § 12-1 20(3) for an award of attorney fees because "There was no transaction
between the subcontractors and NWP." Great Plains, 136 Idaho at 473, 36 P.3d at 225.
A commercial transaction has never occurred between Lincoln Land and LP Broadband.
Rather the commercial transaction that exists at the heart of this lawsuit occurred between
General Mills and LP Broadband. Consequently, LP Broadband cannot rely on Idaho Code 12120(3) fo r an award of attorney fees.
B. Idaho Code§ 12-121

LP Broadband, as the prevailing party, seeks attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12- 12 1. It
argues that Lincoln Land sought an enormous recovery against LP Broadband despite having
unfounded claims and no connection between LP Broadband and Lincoln Land.
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Lincoln Land indicates that LP Broadband has not offered any argument as to why it
would be entitled to fees under Section 12-1 2 1. Lincoln Land further obj ects to LP Broadband's
motion for fees under Idaho Code § 12-1 21 because its action was not brought frivolously or
unreasonably.
Idaho Code § 12- 121 provides:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The
term "paiiy" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
I.R. C.P. 54(e)(2) provides:

Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 . Attorney fees under Idaho Code Section
12-121 may be awarded by the court only when it finds that the case was brought,
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which
finding must be in writing and include the basis and reasons for the award. No
attorney fees may he awarded pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12- 121 on a default
judgment.
(Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court ofldaho has discussed Idaho Code Section 12-121, stating:
An award of attorney fees under Idal10 Code § 12-1 21 is not a matter of right to
the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left
with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended
fri volously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho
224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 59 1 (2009) (citing McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 55 1,
562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003)). While it is a close case, we decline to award
attorney fees as we are unable to conclude that this appeal was pursued wholly
frivolously, unreasonably, or without merit.

Hoover v. Hunler, 150 Idaho 658, 664, 249 P.3d 85 1, 857 (2011) (emphasis added).
The parties do not dispute that LP Broadband is the prevailing party in this action.
General Mills clearly did not have the authority to sublease the rooftop space to LP Broadband.
Fmihermore, Lincoln Land provided evidence that the sublease' s value was below-market.
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Although Lincoln Land was unable to prevail against LP Broadband under a claim of unjust
enrichment, its claim was not frivo lous, unreasonable or without foundation.
LP Broadband should not be awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12- 121.
C. Idaho Code § 12-123
LP Broadband argues that Lincoln Land acted frivolously in this matter and seeks
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-123.
Lincoln Land responds that its conduct was not frivolous.
Idaho Code§ 12-1 23 provides :
( 1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim, defense, or
other position in connection with a civil action, or taking any other action
in connection with a civil action.
(b) "Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his
counsel of record that satisfies either of the following:
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously mJure
another party to the civil action;
(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and
cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.
(2)(a) In accordance with the provisions of this section, at any time prior to the
commencement of the trial in a civil action or within twenty-one (2 1) days after
the entry of judgment in a civil action, the court may award reasonable attorney's
fees to any party to that action adversely affected by frivolous conduct.
This Court does not conclude that Lincoln Land's action served merely to harass or
maliciously injury LP Broadband. Rather, as discussed above, it was based on a violation of
Lincoln Land 's rights as owner of the subj ect property. Furthermore, Lincoln Land's arguments
under its claim of unjust enrichment were supported by a good faith argument for an extension of
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existing law. Consequently, this Court cannot conclude that Lincoln Land's conduct was
frivo lous.
LP Broadband should not be awarded fees under Idaho Code § 12-123.
D. Costs Under I.R.C.P. 54
1. Costs as a Matter of Right
LP Broadband argues that it should be awarded $3 77.00 in costs as a matter of right
under I.R.C.P. 54.
Linco ln Land objects to LP Broadband's claimed fees as it does not indicate how the fees
were incurred and whether any of them were incurred as filing fees against General Mills
I.R.C.P. 54(d) provides:
(d) Costs.
(1) In General; Items Allowed.
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these
rules, costs are allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or
parties, unless otherwise ordered by t he court.

(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, that
party is entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right:
(i) court filing fees ;

The tria l court may, on objection, disallow any of the above-described costs on a
finding that the costs were not reasonably incurred; were incurred for the purpose
of harassment; were incurred in bad faith ; or were incurred for the purpose of
increasing the costs to any other party. The mere fact that a deposition is not used
in the trial of an action, either as evidence read into the record or for the purposes
of impeachment, does not indicate that the taking of the deposition was not
reasonable, or that a copy of a deposition was not reasonably obtained, or that the
cost of the deposition should otherw ise be disall owed, so long as its taking was
reasonable for trial preparation.
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Filing fees are an allowed cost as a matter of right under Rule 54( d)(l )(C)(i). As noted
by Lincoln Land LP Broadband did not clarify what each filing fee was applied towards.
Nonetheless, this Court can take judicial notice from the registry of action3 in this case to
determine the following: (1) the $136.00 fee incurred on August 14 2015 , was for LP
Broadband's initial appearance in answer to Lincoln Land's complaint; (2) the $14.00 fee
incurred on December 16 2015 was for LP Broadband's third-party complaint filed against
General Mills; (3) the $10.00 fee incurred on December 18, 2015 , was a "copy tape fee"; and (4)
the $10.00 fee incun-ed on January 21 2016 was another "copy tape fee. " This Court could not
deten ine from the registry of action whether or how LP Broadband's claimed $207.00 fee was
incurred.
LP Broadband's $136.00 fee incurred on August 14, 2015 for its initial appearance is a
cost a a matter of right under Rule 54(d)(l)(C)(i). Although the $14.00, December 16, 2015
fee is also a cost as a matter of right Lincoln Land should not bear that cost inasmuch as the fee
was incurred to file a third-party complaint against General Mills. 4 Rule 54(d)(l)(C) does not
permit copy tape fees as a matter of right.
LP Broadband should be awarded $136.00 in costs as a matter of right against Lincoln
Land.

2. Discretionary Costs
LP Broadband argues that its costs should be awarded as discretionary costs if not
awarded as a matter ofright.

3

ee Saxton v. State, No. 39080 201 2 WL 9494 I69 at * I n. I (Idaho Ct. App. Jul y 24 201 2) (wherein Idaho
Supreme Cour1 permitted judicial notice of the registry of action).

4

The August 19 201 5 Judgment in thi s case states : "As between LP Broadband, Inc. and General Mills eac h party
shalI pa their own attorn ey fees and costs with respect to LP Broadband , In c.'s indemn ity count against General
Mill ."
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I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) provides:
(D) Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in or in an
amount in excess of that listed in subpart (C), may be allowed on a showing that
the co ts were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should
in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial comi, in
ruling on objections to discretionary costs, must make express findings as to why
the item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the absence of
any objection to an item of discretionary costs, the comi may disallow on its own
motion any items and must make express findings supporting such disallowance.
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the exceptional requirement of Rule
54(d)( l )(D) as follows:
This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost be "exceptional"
under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) to include those costs incurred because the nature of
the case was itself exceptional. In Great Plains Equip. , the Comi specifically
noted that discretionary costs, including those for expert witness fees, were
"exceptional given the magnitude and nature of the case." Great Plains Equip.,
136 Idaho at 475, 36 P.3d at 227. Fmihermore, Fish held that a district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying discretionary costs associated with expert
witness fees where the trial court had properly determined the case itself was not
"exceptional." Fish, 131 Idaho at 493 , 960 P.2d at 177. Certain cases, such as
personal injury cases generally involve copy travel and expe1i witness fees such
that these costs are considered ordinary rather than "exceptional" under I.R.C.P.
54(d)( l)(D). See e.g. Jnama, 132 Idaho at 384, 973 P.2d at 155.

Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161 168 (2005) (emphasis
added).
Although LP Broadband argues that the costs were necessary and reasonably incurred it
makes no argument to indicate that the costs or the nature of the case were in any way
exceptional as required by Rule 54(d)(l)(D). Neither the copy tape fees nor this case are
exceptional.
LP Broadband's request for discretionary costs should be denied.
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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

LP Broadband is awarded $136.00 in costs as a matter of right against Lincoln Land. LP
Broadband's motion for attorney fees and costs is otherwise denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this ;;),C\ day of

~--t..f~

2016.

District Judge

• • • I",
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

,2

0~

I hereby certify that on this
day of
2016, I did send a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox;
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Mark R. Fuller
F ULLER & BECK LAW OFFICES, PLLC
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
Lan-en K. Covert
SWA FFORD LAW, P.C.
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho FalJs, ID 83401
Alexander P. McLaughlin
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

•

.~--

Cler~ ~
Bonneville County, Idaho
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JU DICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STAT E OF IDAH O IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Plaintiff

Case No . CV-2015-3927

JUDGMENT

vs.
LP BROADBA D, I re. ,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAN D INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

GENERAL MILLS , INC. and GENERAL
MILLS OPERA TIO NS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff Lincoln Land Company, LLC s Complaint, and all claims asse1ied by
Lincoln Land Company, LLC in the above-captioned matter, be and are hereby
dismissed with prejudice and Lincoln Land Company, LLC shall take nothing in
this action.
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2.

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff LP Broadband, Inc.'s Third-Party Complaint
against General Mills, Inc. and General Mills Operations, LLC ( collectively
' General Mills"), and all claims asse1ied by LP Broadband Inc. in the abovecaptioned matter, be and are hereby dismissed with prejudice and LP Broadband,
Inc. shall take nothing in this action, except to the extent Lincoln Land Company,
LLC appeals this Judgment and the decision on appeal results in the revival of
Lincoln Land Company, LLC ' s unjust eniichment claim against LP Broadband
Inc. In that event, the claim from LP Broadband, Inc. against General Mill s shall
revive, as well as any and all claims, rights, and defen es of General Mills,
without limitation.

3.

As between LP Broadband, Inc. and General Mills, each party shall pay their own
attumey fees and costs with respect to LP Broadband, Inc. 's indemnity count

against General Mills.
DATED this

\°\.. day of July, 2016.
/s/ Dane H. Watkins, Jr.
The Honorable Dane H . Watkins, Jr.
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

R__

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of July, 2016, I caused a true and co1Tect
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
FULLER & BECK LAW OFFICE, PLLC
410 Mem01i a] Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

~ . S . Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (208. 524.7 167)

Ronald L. Swafford
Trevor L. Castleton
Lanen K. Cove1i
SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
655 S. Woodrnff
Idaho Falls, ID 83401

-~ . S . Mail , Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (208 .524.4131)

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jeffrey W. Bower
GIVE s PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720

- ~.S. Mail , Po stage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight M ail
( ) Facsirni1e(208.388.1300)

9803 489 _ l [1314 1-2]
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No . 2698)
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No . 7237)
PAULL. FULLER (ISB No . 8435)
FULLER & BECK
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE , SU ITE 20 1
P . o . Box 5 0 9 3 5
IDAHO FALLS , ID 8 3 4 0 5-0 935
TELEPHONE : (208) 52 4-54 00
FACSIMILE : (208) 524-7167
EMAIL : FULLERANDBECK@GMAIL . COM
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT - LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY , LLC , an
Idaho
limited
l iabil i ty
company ,

Case No. CV-15-3927

Petitioner -Appel l ant

NOTICE OF APPEAL

V.

FEE CATEGORY : L (4)
FEE - $129 . 00

LP BROADBAND , INC ., a Co lorado
corporation ,
successor
by
merger t o MicroServ, Inc . , an
Idaho corporation ,
Respondent.
LP BROADBAND , I NC .,
Th ird-Pa r ty Pla i nt iff ,
v.

GENERAL
MILLS,
I NC.
and
GENERAL MILLS OPERAT I ONS , LLC ,
Third- Party Defendants.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT,
RESPONDENT'S

ATTORNEYS ,

RONALD

LP BROADBAND,

SWAFFORD

AND

I NC ., AND THE

LARREN

COVERT ,

OF
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SWAFFORD LAW OFFICES ,
83401

(Ema il:

CHTD .,

655 S . WOODRU FF,

IDAHO FALLS ,

IDAHO

rons@swaffordl aw . com ; Telephone : 208-524 - 4002) , AND

THE THIRD-PARTY DEFEN DANTS , GENERAL MILLS , INC . , AND GENERAL MILLS
OPERATIONS ,

LLC ,

AND

TH E

TH I RD

PARTY

ALEXANDER MC LAUGHLIN AND JEFFREY BOWER ,
BOX

P . O.

2720,

BOISE ,

alexmclaugh l in@g i venspur sley . com ;

DEFENDANTS '

ATTORNEYS ,

OF GIVENS PURSLEY ,
ID

Te lephone :

83702

LLP ,

(Email :

208-388-1200) ,

AND

Lincoln Land Company ,

LLC,

THE CL ERK OF TH E ABOVE ENTIT LED COURT .
NO TI CE IS HEREBY GI VEN THAT :
1.

The above named Appellant ,

appeals against the above named Respondent to the

I daho Supreme

Court from the Judgment entered in the above ent i t le d action on
the 19 t h day of August , 2016 , a copy of wh i ch i s attached pursuant
to IAR 17(e) (1) , and t h e Memorandum Dec i sio n and Or der Re : Motions
for Summary Judgment,

entered in t he above entitled action on the

18th day of May , 2016 , Honorable Judge Dane Watkins , presi ding .
2.

That

Appe ll an t

has

a

righ t

to

appeal

to

the

Idaho

Supreme Court , and the Judgment and Order descr i bed in paragraph 1
above are appealab l e

under a n d pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule

1 1 (a) (1 ) .
3.
Appellant

Appellant prel iminari l y sets forth the following issues
intends

to assert

on appeal ,

but

such list of i ssues

s ha ll not prevent Appellant f rom asserting other issue s on appeal :
a.

Did

the

Judgment

to

Di strict
LP

Court

Broadband

err
by

in

granting

determining

Summary
that

no

benef i t was conferred to LP Broadband by Li ncoln Land
Company?
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b.

Did the Di stric t

Court err in determining that the

standard to establish a
requires

that

the

unjus t ly

enriched must

c la im for

benefit
be

unjust enrichment

conferred upon

the

party

d irectly provided by

the

Brewer

RSA

party seeking to recover?
c.

Should
No.

t he

8 Ltd.

Billing

&

in

Partnership,

and Med .

(2008)

re h ' g

hold ings

denied

1 4 5 Ida ho

Recovery Servs.

Collections ,
(Sept .

v.

I nc .

15 ,

1

735 ,

184

LLC v .

1

Idaho

157

2014)

Washington

be

P.3d 860

Bonneville
395

(2014),

d i stinguished

or

overruled?
4.

No ord er has been ente r ed sealing all or any portion of
the record .

5.

Appe l lant

requests no reporter ' s transcript.

6.

Appe ll a n t

requ ests

the

f ol l owing documents be

inc l uded

i n the clerk's record in add i tion t o those automatically
included under Rule 28 , I . A.R .:
a.

Affidavit

of

Doyle H.

Beck ,

entered November

12,

2015 .

b.

Affidavit of Mark R .

Fuller,

entered November 1 2 ,

2015.

c.

Af f i davit

of

Adam

Gil l ings,

of

Ma r k R.

entered

December

2,

entered December

3,

2015 .

d.

Af f i davit

Fu l l e r,

2015 .

e.

Second

Affidavit

of

Adam

Gillings ,

entered

De cember 9 , 2 01 5 .
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(
f.

Declarat i on

of

Alexander

P.

McLaughlin ,

entered

March 30 , 20 1 6 .
Defendant 's

g.

Affidavit

of

Counse l ,

entered

March

16, 2016 .
h.

Affidavit

of

Doy l e

H.

Beck ,

entered

March

30 ,

2 01 6 .
i .

Affidavi t of Jim Rooney, entered March 30 , 2016 .

j ;

Affidavit

of

Paul

L.

Fu ller,

entered

March

30,

Motions

for

20 1 6.
k.

Memorandum

Decision

and

Order

Re:

Summary Judgment , e n tered May 18 , 2016.
7.

I certify :
That t he estima te d fee of $100 . 00 for preparation

a.

of the Clerk 's record has been pa i d pursuant

t o IAR

2 7 (c)

amount

and Appe l lant wil l

pay any add i t ional

after t he ac t ual fee has been computed ;
b.

That the appella te filing fee of $129 . 00 has been
paid pursuant to IAR 23(a) (1 ) ; and

c.

Tha t

serv i ce

has

been

made

upon

all

parties

required t o be served pursuant t o Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this

day of September , 2016 .

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Appellant Lincoln Land Compa n y , LLC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY t hat I served a true and correct copy of the
fo ll owing described Not i ce of Appeal on the attorneys l i sted below
on t h is

day of September , 20 1 6

Document Served :

NOTI CE OF AP PEAL

Attorneys Served :
Ron Swafford
Larren Covert
655 S . Woodruff
I daho Falls , ID 83 40 1
Fax : 208 - 52 4- 4131
Al exa n der P. McLaug h li n
Je ff rey W. Bower
GIVENS PURS LEY , LLP
P . O. Box 2720
Boise , ID 83702
Fax : 208 - 388 - 1300
Court Cl er k
Bonnevil le County Courthouse
605 N. Capita l
Ida h o Fa l ls , ID 83402

~

U. S. Ma i l
Hand Del ive ry
Facs i mi le

t""

U. S . Mail
Hand De l ive r y
Facsimile

U. S . Ma i l
Fa csimil e
Hand De l ive r y

FULLE R & BECK LAW OFFICE S , PLLC
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
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Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Plaintiff,

LP BROADBAND'S DESIGNATION OF
RECORD ON APPEAL

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC. ,
Defendant.

LP BROADBAND, INC. ,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIONS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendant, LP Broadband, Inc., by and through its attorney of record,
Lanen K. Covert, Esq. , and hereby requests the following items be included in the appeal in this

LP BROADBAND 'S DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL - l

ORIGINAL
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matter in addition to those included by I.A.R. 28 and the items requested to be supplemented by
Appellant:
DOCUMENTS:
a. November 12, 2015 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Plaintiffs)
b. November 12, 2015 Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
c. Decemqer 2,2015 Defendant's Objection to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
d. December 9, 2015 Plaintiff's Reply Brief Fi led in Suppo11 of Motion for Pat1ia1
Summai-y Judgment
e. Januai·y 19, 20 l 6 General Mills Answers and Defenses

f.

March 4, 2016 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

g. March 4, 2016 Brief in Support of Motion for Paiiial Sunm1ai·y Judgment
h. March 16, 2016 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
1.

March 16, 2016 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

J·

Mai·ch 30, 2016 Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

k. March 30, 2016 General Mills Memorandum in Opposition to LP Broadband Inc ' s
Motion for Summary Judgment
l.

March 30, 2016 Declaration of Colleen Benson

m. March 30, 2016 Brief in Opposition to Defendant' s Motion for Summary Ju.dgment
n. March 30, 2016 Defendants Objection to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
o. April 6, 2016 Plaintiffs Brief in Reply to LP Broadband' and Gen ral Mill '
Opposition to Motion for Partial ummary Judgment

LP BROADBAND 'S DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL - 2
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p. April 6, 2016 Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Suppo1i of Motion for Summary
Judgment
q. April 18, 2016 Notice of Filing of Additional Citations
r.

August 12, 2016 Stipulation for Dismissal of LP Broadband Inc's Claims

s. August 19, 2016 Order of Dismissal

t.

September 2, 2016 Defendant' s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs

u. September 2, 2016 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
v. September 2, 20 16 Affidavit of Larren K. Covert
w. September 2, 2016 Affidavit of Ronald L. Swafford
x. September 16, 2016 Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant ' s Motion for
Attorney Fees and Costs
y. September 19, 2016 Supplemental Affidavit of Ronald L. Swafford
z. October 5, 2016 Memorandum Decision and Order
TRANSCRIPTS:
a. April 13 , 2016 hearing
b. September 21 , 2016 hearing
LP Broadband has provided with this designation the estimated fee for the preparation of
the transcripts and $100.00 for the supplementation of the record as requested.

i

7fl

DATED this _LL day of October, 20 16.

~
Attorneys for Defendant

LP BROADBAND ' S DESIGNATION OF RECORD ON APPEAL - 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

/4?tLday of October, 20 16, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 20 1
PO. Box 50935
ldaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D
D
D

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
60 l W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 8370 1

D
D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-de) ivered
~ Fax: 208-524-7167

)Kl

U.S. Mail , postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax: 208-388- 1300

~c~-------_
LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorneys for Defendant
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SWAFFORD LAW, P.C.
Ronald L. Swafford, Esq., Bar No. 1657
Trevor L. Castleton, Esq., Bar No. 5809
Larren K. Covert, Esq., Bar No. 7217
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Telephone (208) 524-4002
Facsimile (208) 524-4131
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Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, rN AND FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY

LrNCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC,

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Petitioner-Appellant,

LP BROADBANO'S NOTICE OF
APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL

vs.
LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Respondent - Cross Appellant.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GENERAL MILLS, INC. and
GENERAL MILLS OPERATIO NS, LLC,
Third-Party Defendants.

TO: The above named Plaintiff, Lincoln Land, LLC, and its attorney of record, Mark Fuller, Esq,
The Third-Party Defendant, General Mills, Inc. and its attorney ofrecord Alexander McLaughlin,
and THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

ORIGINAL
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendant, LP Boradband, Inc. appeals against the District

Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County, State ofldaho, to the Idaho Supreme
Court, from the Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs
entered on the 5th day of October, 2016 by the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order

described in Paragraph One above, is an appealable Order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(2) of
the Idaho Appellate Rules.
3.

Initial issues on appeal are the Court's ruling and findings regarding the

determination of attorney fees and costs.
4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Defendant has previously designated the record for this appeal in the Plaintiffs

Notice of Appeal.
6.

Defendant further requests a transcript of the September 21, 2016 hearing be

prepared.
7.

Defendant requests all documents of the Clerk's records to be included in the

agency's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate
Rules plus those previously designated in this matter.
8.

I certify that:

a.

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter from whom a

transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Amy Bland, 605 N. Capital Avenue, Idaho Falls, Idaho
b.

The Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for preparation of

LP BROADBAND'S NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL
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the reporter' s transcript and preparation of the court' s record upon notificatioi:i of the same, if any
above that already provided.
c.

The amount of $100.00 has been provided as the initial fee for the preparation of

the transcript requested.
d.

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

e.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to

Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
DATED this --1.!/!Jay ofNovember, 2016.

LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant

LP BROADBAND'S NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

; t'/ ftaay of November, 2016, I served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document on the following by the method of delivery indicated:
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D
D
D
[xl

D
D
D

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax: 208-524-7167

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701

0

Amy Bland
605 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
~ Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered

Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax: 208-388-1300

D
D
D

Fax:

~c__st-LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

LP BROADBAND'S NOTICE OF APPEAL/CROSS-APPEAL
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Amy L. Bland, CSR, RPR
Official Court Reporter
Seventh Judicial District
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N. Capital Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(208) 529-1350 Ext 1329
E- mail : abland@co.bonneville.id.us

**************************************************************
NOTICE OF LODGING

**************************************************************
DATE:

December 14 , 2016

TO :

St eph en W. Kenyon , Clerk of the Court
Supreme Cou r t / Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, I D 83 7 20 - 0101

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO: 44612
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO:
CAPTION OF CASE:
Inc.

CV - 2015 - 3927

Lincoln Land Company vs. LP Broadban d,

You are her e b y notified that a r epo rt er ' s appe ll ate
transcrip t i n the above-entit led and numbered case has bee n
l odg ed with the Di strict Court Cler k of the County of
Bonneville i n the Seven th J u dicia l District.
Said t r anscript
co nsis ts of th e f o ll o win g proceedin g s, t o t ali ng 142 pages:
1.

Cross - Motions fo r Summary Judgment
(April 1 3 , 2016)

2.

Motion f or Attorney's Fees (September 21 , 2 016)
Respectfully ,
AMYL. BLAND
Idaho CSR #SRL-10 53

cc :

Dist ri ct Co u rt Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC, an [daho
Lim ited Liability company,
Plaintiff/ Appel Iant/Cross-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Docket No.

44612

)

LP BROADBAN D, INC., a Colorado
corporation, successor by merger to MicroServ.
lnc., an Idaho corporation,
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appel !ant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION
OF EXHIBITS

- - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - - )
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

)
)
)

I, Penny Manning, C lerk of the D istrict Court of the Seventh Judicial Di strict of the State
of Idaho , in and for the County of Bonneville. do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were
marked for identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the
Court in its determination:

No exhibits were admitted
I, certify that the following documents wi ll be submitted as CON FIDENTIAL
EXHIBITS to the Record:
1) Affidavit of Paul L. Fuller in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgm ent dated March 30,
2017 (this document itself was not sealed but the Exhibit A attached to this document
is sealed pursuant to the Protective Order dated February 3, 20 17)

CLERK'S CElfflFICATION OF EXH IBITS- I
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And I further ce11ify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this
record on Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the
District Court this

:3/

day of January, 2017.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION O F EX HIBITS - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability company,
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Docket No.

44612

)

)
LP BROADBAND, INC., a Colorado
corporation, successor by merger to MicroServ,
Inc., an Idaho corporation,
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

_________________
STA TE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true,
correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will
be duly lodged with the C lerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript
(if requested) and the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 3 1 of the ldah.o Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District
Court thi~ / day of January, 2017.

CLERK'S CERTIFI CATE- I

591

IN

HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
Limited Liability company,
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Respondent,
V.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2015-3927
Docket No.

44612

)

LP BROADBAND, INC., a Colorado
corporation, successor by merger to MicroServ,
Inc., an Idaho corporation,
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE

- - - -- - -- - - - -- - - - - )
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .3.l__ day of January, 2017, I served a copy of the

Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in
the above entitled cause upon the following attorneys:
Ronald L Swafford
655 S Woodruff
Idaho Falls ID 83401

Mark R. Fuller
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls ID 83405

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid in an envelope
addressed to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys
known to me.
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